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FRANCISCAN STUDIES

Volume 19

1959

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Published by
THE FRANCISCAN INSTITUTE
ST. BONAVENTURE UNIVERSITY
ST. BONAVENTURE, N.Y.

Sponsored by
THE FRANCISCAN EDUCATIONAL CONFERENCE

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FRANCISCAN STUDIES is published quarterly (March, June, September and December). Annual subscription, $ 5.00 for four issues
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WHAT SAINT BONAVENTURE HAS GIVEN TO PHILOSOPHERS TODAY

Of all the works of the Seraphic Doctor, I suspect that philosophers have the greatest familiarity with the *De reductione artium ad theologiam,* at least by title. The reason for its familiarity, however, does not seem to come from any kind of universal acclaim. On the contrary, it seems to have become familiar because of a kind of notariety attached to the title. Unless I am mistaken, this *opusculum* of Saint Bonaventure has, at least in certain quarters, become a symbol of "a grevious sin against philosophy" — and a sign of impure thoughts against a metaphysics of being. Professor E. Gilson, for example, who unquestionably has a great admiration for the Seraphic Doctor, nevertheless, feels compelled to say the following in commenting on the *De reductione:* "Anyone with the slightest feeling for the value of the mystical life will immediately realize that Saint Bonaventure was fundamentally right. That, however, is not the question. If you want a theology in order to bring all the other sciences back to God, your first requisite is, of course, a theology; and if you want to refer your philosophy to God, what you need first is a philosophy — a philosophy, I repeat, that is wholly and exclusively, a philosophy, and which, because it is a philosophy, can be related to theology without being reduced to it. Despite his marvellous gifts as a theologian and as a philosopher, it must be said that Saint Bonaventure's remarkable achievements in both sciences would have been still greater had he not failed to perceive that difficulty."

Now according to Gilson the difficulty which Bonaventure failed to perceive was the neccessity for keeping philosophy wholly and exclusively a philosophy — a philosophy which cannot be reduced to theology. But did Saint Bonaventure really fail to see the difficulty, or was this his answer to a difficulty which later philosophers have failed to see?

The crucial term in this controversy, is, of course *reductio*. Gilson is well aware that Bonaventure means by that term a taking back of things to God. Nevertheless, Gilson seems to insist that the taking back, the *recursus,* consists in some kind of untoward comprehension of the philosophic proprieties. And this certainly is debatable. If one sees Saint

Bonaventure's program as a moment in an Augustinian history, then the proposed *recursus* or *reductio* in no way results in a compression, decimation or truncation of philosophy proper. On the contrary, as I understand Saint Bonaventure's program the purpose of the *reductio* is rather an exfoliation of philosophy.

Perhaps the best way to explain my metaphor is to suggest a theological analogy. Since the days of the early church Fathers, there has been general agreement that the reading of Scripture can take two directions, that of a literal reading and a subsequent spiritual or figurative interpretation. And there is further agreement that to read Scripture according to the *sensus spiritualis*, in no way destroys or compresses the historical or literal meaning. Instead when applicable, a reading according to the *sensus spiritualis* perfects or completes what was first read historically. Now what I want to suggest is that when Saint Bonaventure proposes a *reductio* of arts to theology, what he has in mind can be paralleled by the twofold reading of Scripture. The arts, including philosophy, have a naturally historical and literal antinomy, in fact they have a temporal priority in the life of the wayfarer. The *reductio* therefore, in no way is a challenge or a threat to the antinomy of the arts. Instead, what the *reductio* proposes is precisely the opposite — the *reductio* proposes that the antinomy of the arts can be realized more fully when seen in relation to the "Father of lights", just as the significance, of an historical event made the Odd Dispensation, takes on an added significance when read allegorically. In short, I am suggesting that Bonaventure's proposal in the *De reductione* is to treat the activities and products of mind as capable of a double signification just as some historical events as recorded in Scripture are capable of a double signification. I could argue that the opening sentences of the treatise in which Bonaventure speaks of the source of all illumination and notes further that a distinction should be made between the Fount of Light and the generous flame of rays which issue from the fount, obviously support this suggestion. But even if this were so, it would not meet the more serious problem of whether the products of mind, especially philosophy can and ought to be treated in this manner.

The issue, thus, is whether Gilson is justified in saying: "It cannot be denied, that as a philosopher, Saint Bonaventure sometimes allowed himself to be carried away by his religious feelings". In the way of evidence Gilson points to Bonaventure's position on efficient causality and takes exception to Bonaventure's doctrine of seminal causation, which Gilson regards as pious enough but wrong. And, as far as I can tell, the only reason that Gilson gives for calling Bonaventure mistaken is the fact that he holds to a doctrine of efficient causality which has a radically different emphasis. For Bonaventure, the concern with physical causality turns on the ground of its efficacy, and he looks to creation for that ground. But Gilson seems less concerned with the principle of efficacy than he is with maintaining the causally efficacious actions of creature. Now as far as I know, Bonaventure never denied that creatures could be causally efficacious in any way soever, but neither did he intend to emphasize that aspect of causality. Furthermore, let it be granted that a doctrine of seminal causes differs widely from the thomistic doctrine of efficient causality. But the fact that the doctrine of seminal causality differs in orientation and formulation from that of the thomistic notion of efficient causality in no way proves, of itself, that Bonaventure was carried away by his religious feelings.

While I do not intend to belabor Gilson's view of Bonaventure, I would like to point out that what is at issue here is much more than a difference regarding the interpretation of efficient causality. For Gilson makes parallel objections to Bonaventure's epistemology, especially to the theory of illumination.

The real issue here concerns the distinctions beween a philosopher, a philosophic problem, and a philosophy which deals with such problems. Gilson, for example, is prepared to distinguish between the philosopher and his philosophy. In fact his charge against Bonaventure begins with the assertion that Bonaventure's piety got in the way of his philosophy. I concede that a philosopher's biography may and often does influence his philosophy, but whether the charge holds in the case of Bonaventure or any other philosopher depends in part on whether or not a second distinction is made, a distinction beween a philosophy and a philosophic problem. My reason for insisting so strongly on this latter distinction is twofold.

In the first place, a philosopher ought to be able to learn from his predecessors. And secondly because philosophy is in the last analysis a completely personal activity, the genuine philosopher must be prepared both to evaluate the work of his predecessors and to try to advance beyond his heritage.

Learn from one's predecessor sounds simple enough, but is it? There is of course no problem, if all that is meant by learning is a conditioned memorizing or perhaps even a paraphrasing of an historical work. But if learning from the past is for the sake of present evaluation and future development, then the problem quickens. For philosophy, unlike science, is not cumulative in its result. A sign of this can be taken from the common objection that philosophers never seem to learn. They are still discussing the same problems which Plato and Aristotle discussed. And it must be granted that there is some truth in the charge.

The history of philosophy, moreover, gives eloquent testimony to the fact that philosophy is not a cumulative discipline. Even the most cursory reading of the history of philosophy reveals an almost cyclical recurrence of philosophic concerns and attitudes. Among the Greeks there was a progressive shift in emphasis from concern with nature, to moral and political questions, and then the emphasis turned to logical problems. I do not think that it would be too hard to show that this same cycle was repeated in the middle ages, particularly from the tenth through the fourteenth centuries and again from the Enlightenment to the present time. Be that as it may, my point now is simply the fact that the history of philosophy reveals a continuous shift in philosophic attitudes and emphases, and that individual philosophers, each from the vantage point of his own concern, finds it necessary to re-examine some of the same problems which his predecessors have done out of other concerns. There is no doubt that in this sense the philosophic enterprise is repetitive rather than cumulative. But does it follow that there is no progress in philosophy even though the problems discussed seem to be perennial?

An example here may help. During the middle ages, one question was constantly asked, namely, What is truth? But during the Enlightenment the basic issue was, How do we know? And today, especially among linguistic analysts, the problem has been reflavored to read, What do we mean when we say, *I know*? Now I think that it is clear that these various formulations seem to point to a single problem. Yet it would be a serious mistake to think that these three questions are equivalent. For example, a modern linguistic analyst of the Oxford variety would without hesitation read out of the philosophic realm the question, What is truth? because the analyst's concern, as he sees it, is with the logic of correct usage and not with any kind of determining ontological or epistemological commitments.

The point of the example is to reinforce the need for my distinction between a philosophy and a philosophic problem. For despite the protests of the analyst there does seem, if only on common sense grounds, to be a similarity and a common concern between the questions, How do we know? and What do we mean when we say, *I know*? Yet from the point of view of the preferred mode of formulating these questions, there is little in common. Carefully compare, if you will, Locke's *Essay* with current articles in *Mind*, if further documentation is required. Here, then, is the issue. If one regards philosophy as a set of attitudes and procedures for formulating and solving certain kinds of problems, philosophy is simply not continuous. And if philosophy has no continuity, there seems little point in a study of the history of philosophy, simply because progress depends on continuity. Consequently, if there is progress in philosophizing, it must rest on a continuity, but the continuity cannot consist in the way that problems are formulated and solved. What then? Is it the case that the philosophic enterprise is absolutely atomistic without any kind of continuing bond?

That the philosophic enterprise is not absolutely atomistic can minimally be found in the empirical fact that philosophers are continually awakening each other from dogmatic slumbers. Kant said that Hume awakened him, but I am sure that the history of philosophy is full of such unconfessed instances. In fact, if all such awakenings were deleted from the history of philosophy, it is hard to imagine that philosophy could have a history. But if this is the unity among philosophers, it is a unity that goes well beyond individual philosophers. Indeed, it must go well beyond individual philosophies, for it is a philosophy to which a philosopher objects, and every philosophic revolution buries a philosophy. However, it is a curious thing, as Gilson aptly remarked, that in turn "philosophy always buries its undertakers". Gilson's own aphorism should have given him pause. For despite the fact that he pronounced early Franciscan epistemology "dead as a doornail" (cause of death, theologism), here we are engaged not in exhuming or embalming a corpse, but indeed pursuing an epistemological inquiry with Saint Bonaventure — an activity which, I for one, do not regard as a *dance macabre*.

Perhaps, this is the point where I should restate my argument. Initially I asked, What can Bonaventure teach us? And the answer I insisted had to be put off until some other decisions were made regarding the history of philosophy, especially the sense of philosophical continuity or unity. For if the philosophy of Saint Bonaventure is relevant today, there must be some kind of unity to the philosophic enterprise. Finding that continuity, however, is not as easy as might at first be thought, because the unity goes beyond the philosophers and their philosophies. In other words, two facts here demand our attention.

In the first place, it is a fact that philosophers do, over long historical periods, concern themselves with identical problems. But it is equally a fact that philosophers in their statements of those recurring problems seem to find it necessary to repudiate the formulations, or solutions of their predecessors. Consequently, our first conclusion is a negative one, namely, that, to borrow a phrase, the unity of philosophic experience cannot consist in a persistent philosophy where philosophy means a preferred mode of formulating and solving problems. Whatever is meant by the *philosophia perennis*, it ought not to imply that there is, or ought to be, an externally adequate set of philosophic attitudes and convictions. To use the language of Scotus Erigena, the history of philosophy consists in variegated epiphanies of philosphic problems, and there certainly is no reason to think that these recurring shifts in approach result in dried echoes of synonymity. On the contrary, whatever progress there is in philosophy must be sought precisely in the successive variety of philosophies, because the philosophic problem itself has no history.

But now a serious difficulty arises, namely, how to distinguish or separate the philosophic problem from the philosophies which deal with it. Regardless of the difficulty, however, I think this task is an unqualified condition for continued philosophizing. For example, I suggested earlier that Saint Bonaventure's *De reductione* might well be a unique and worthwhile philosophic answer to a problem instead of, as Gilson says, some piously compressed confusions. But my explication of Bonaventure would depend first on clearly stating the problem, but stating it as independently as possible of a given philosophy.

Now I fully realize the difficulty here. What I seem to be asking for is a kind of neutral formulation of the problem, something which may be thought to be an invitation to scepticism. My concern, however, is not so much with the question of philosophic neutrality in statement as it is with the necessity for comprehensiveness in understanding. And it seems to me clear that the best way we can go beyond our philosophic heritage is by first understanding just how adequate our predecessors have been in the face of the persistent problems. Yet how are we to grasp comprehensively the problem if not by looking to the history of the preferred solutions. As I see it then, the purpose of reading the history of philosophy is primarily to lay bare the philosophic problem denuded of a particular philosopher and philosophy. Only when this has been accomplished can we begin to appreciate both the legacy of the past and then to look to our own task ahead.

Modern philosophers, however, are by no means agreed that the task of philosophers is to be prefaced in the way I have suggested. In fact, there is a common distinction made between the problematic and the historical approach, and the so-called historical approach is not at all the preferred method in most of the 'name' universities today. Philosophers with leanings toward pragmatist, positivist and analytic views feel deeply that their task is to focus directly on the problem. A philosopher on their view must be tough-minded, and they suspect that philosophers who look to history are being soft-headed or worse. The sense of their suspicion has at least one honorific aspect, namely, that men who rely on historical solutions for their own positions are not fulfilling the creative function of the philosopher. I certainly admit that it is possible for a philosopher to be creative without an historical knowledge, but I seriously doubt that the most probable road to philosophic competency and even greatness lies independently of the past. True enough, philosophic successes are not cumulative, and it is also granted that philosophic problems have in the strict sense no evolution. But if the problem is not seen from any perspective save the present, I do not see how it is probable that the solution can have any but limited interest. And if that be the case, it is even more difficult to understand what possible contribution we may leave for the future.

Continued looking to the past does, in fact, have an attendant danger. The pitcher may go to the well too often. But the danger is not nearly as great as our contemporaries suspect. In fact, there is no danger whatever in looking to historical formulations and solutions for insight if certain assumptions and commitments are carefully spelled out. In what follows, I should like to specify such a set of assumptions in order to do two things: 1. I want to attempt a justification for my assertion that the best preface to individual philosophizing consists in a study of the history of philosophy. To put the matter another way, I want now to argue for the distinction between a philosophy and a philosophic problem, and then show that the most probable way of grasping a philosophic problem is by seeing it formulated in diverse ways. 2. I then intend to return briefly to the original point on Saint Bonaventure, namely, the question of the philosophic contribution of the *De reductione* and try to defend in outline my suggested interpretation of that work.

So far, we have noted two characteristics of the philosophic enterprise. There is on the one hand a continuing recurrence of diverse approaches to problems, a continuing succession of philosophies. Secondly, we have inferred from this historical fact that there must be some kind of persistent substratum, some principle of unity which allows for such philosophical diversity, and we have insisted that this unity lies in the philosophic problem as opposed to the philosophy which deals with it. Here, then, we have an instance of a one-many problem and what needs to be done is at least to offer evidence which makes the distinction intelligible. To avoid circularity and to be consistent, the evidence cannot consist in arguments taken from a given philosophy which are held as true. Rather, the arguments cited must be understood as indices to assumptions which in turn specify the problem.

I do not think that any philosopher wants to deny that his philosophy is about the world. No matter what distinctions and disputes there may be about the criteria for necessary and contingent propositions, yet since the first Eleatics there was a consensus that philosophizing in some way ought to apply to the world of experience. There is furthermore, a second area of agreement, namely, that philosophy is a product of mind. To be sure there have been and continue to be almost violent differences as to how to best philosophize, but that it belongs to the creativity of the human spirit was never an issue. Here are the two elements out of which philosophic discourse is born, the world and the human mind. And if we look carefully to these elements in relation, it may be possible to find some explanation for the one-many question of the philosophic problem and philosophies.

The most obvious and the most puzzling thing about the world is change. When Zeno formulated his paradoxes, he certainly was not denying that there was change. On the contrary, what he in effect said was that the human mind could devise no adequate explanation for the obviousness of change and that when it tried, only paradox resulted. Centuries later Bergson puzzled over the same problem. True enough Bergson did not stop where Zeno had. But Bergson did reaffirm Zeno's position in saying that science mathematicizes reality; that it freezes process; that when we think in concepts, we cut up and distort reality. Bergson then added what Zeno did not, that there is a way out of the dilemma, namely, the method of intuition. Aristotle, too, struggled with the problem of change. Out of his reflections came the conclusion that the universe was finite but unbounded — a conclusion which several centuries later was to be repeated and elaborated by Einstein, although for quite different reasons.

Kant too must be mentioned, for his first antinomy again casts in doubt the possibility of mind to come to any final conclusions about the extent and duration of the world. The significance of Kant's first antinomy is worth a moment of reflection. For Kant's argument in effect says that no matter how carefully we construct our philosophy, it will never capture the meaning of the whole. The world, says Kant, is too big to be fitted by a single philosophic garment. No matter how universal our system, part of the world will always escape.

When we look back over the history of philosophy we can appreciate Kant's insight even if we dispute his argument. The paradigm case is, in my view, Aristotle's criticism of Plato and Democritus. According to Aristotle, Plato's excessive belief in form forced him to slight the intelligibility of the physical world. Plato indeed was long on causes but short on facts which were to be causally explained. And for the opposite reason, Aristotle found fault with Democritus. For Democritus put excessive trust in matter with the result, that unlike Plato, Democritus' inventory of fact was complete, but he could find no causes to explain the facts. Democritus in despair turned to chance, the unintelligible, for his principle of explanation. Yet when the Stagirite finished his monumental work, he, too, was in difficulty. His development of the theory of science began with the assumption that all process soever, regardless of the agent or patient, was capable of causal analysis. And so is was, but at a price. The meaning and significance of the singular physical object was lost in *scientia*. To be sure, the universal was to explain the singular, and it explained much. But it did not and cannot explain the singularity of the singular. For Aristotle, the physical singular just is, it has no meaning apart from the universal, an intolerable consequence for both Plato and Democritus.

I think the more we reflect on that Kantian antinomy, the more we should be willing to agree with Whitehead that the world is big with meaning, so big that it defies systematic encirclement. The world in its endless cycles of recurring birth and death, invites and challenges the human spirit to explain it. Yet even a momentary reflection on intellectual history is enough to show that the significance of the whole cannot be captured and kept. Newton's physics, Dante's poetry, Aristotle's metaphysics and Plotinus' mysticism are, and must be, partial accounts of the immensity of meaning.

If this is true of the world, what, then, of mind? For philosophy is born of mind reflecting on the world. When Anaxagoras first said that all is mind, he perhaps overstated the case. But you can see what he was after. If all was mind, then there was hope for our minds, for then there would be no separation between the mind and its object. However, when mind and its object are distinct, the difficulties of separation caused by the profundity of the object cause no little anguish. Simonides, looking to the possibility of men knowing ultimate causes, observed that if the gods be at all jealous, of this they must be jealous. For they alone, can have such knowledge, or have it perfectly. Plato proposed to solve the difficulty of the distance between mind and its object by having an embodied mind recollect. Democritus invented fiery and passable atoms which he called mind. Aristotle qualified Anaxagoras by saying that in a sense mind is capable of becoming all things. Descartes made mind more substantive than body. Leibniz made mind mirror the world. Kant made mind legislate to the world, and only then could he ask whether metaphysics as a science is possible.

But why should mind be called upon to mirror, legislate, recollect and invent if it is indeed capable of becoming all things? I think that nearly all philosophers have strongly believed that mind, like the world, is finite but unbounded. I think that most philosophers are agreed that despite the richness of the world, there is intrinsically nothing which the mind cannot know, and that in this sense mind is unbounded. To say, however, that mind can know everything, is not to say that it does. When mind begins to reflect upon its own possibilities, its own unboundedness, it is brought up short, because there is something ineffable about the unbounded. At this point mind can only desire or love wisdom, it cannot have wisdom. Here finally is the basic unity of philosophic experience — a unity of desire, a bound of continuing search, an eternally restless query. It is a shared question which makes the philosophic enterprise continuous.

Questions, however, call for answers. Yet by the very nature of the case, no complete answer can be given to the question which entertains the ineffable as subject. Mind, however, demands an answer to its own question, no matter how tentative or partial, and I suppose this is the reason why we call man a metaphysical animal. When mind attempts an answer to its own question, a discipline, a science, a philosophy is born.

It should come as no surprise that men are dissatisfied with the philosophies of other men. How could it be otherwise if the philosophy, the answer, must be partial and limited. Nor should it alarm us to discover that philosophers are ofttimes the first to see the limitations of their own philosophy. I know of no more poignant passage in all of the philosophic literature than Hume's anguished cry that he cannot accept his own answer, but sees no alternative to going back and trying again. Only indolence or perversion of the human spirit, says Hume, can keep a man from re-opening the eternal riddle of mind.

Here, then, is the distinction which I wanted to defend, the distinction between a philosophic problem and a philosophy. The question of mind's limits and of the world's richness is the fundamental question, and the answer is a philosophy. And between the two there is always a tension. I like to think that Augustine first saw this tension very clearly — a tension he described in terms of the clarity of belief and the certitude of proof. Augustine called his proof for the existence of God tenuous. I cannot interpret this evaluation as simply a modest disclaimer. Augustine, I hold, saw that no philosophy could be adequate to the facts, just as he saw that he, nevertheless, was obliged to philosophize. Augustine left a considerable heritage. Duns Scotus, for example, seems to have transformed Augustine's distinction into his own basic criteria of *certa et sincera*. In a way the concern of the Enlightenment with clear and distinct ideas seems little else but a continuation of the Augustinian problem. The evidence for saying this is admittedly slight. Yet, how can we make the most out of Spinoza's insistence that basic ideas must not only be clear and distinct, but also adequate! And Spinoza, you remember, decided the idea of God was the only adequate idea.

All this leads me to two conclusions. The first conclusion follows from seeing in the appropriate sense that mind and the world are finite but unbounded. A philosophy, a science, an art is always condemned to approximate the intelligibility inherent in the world. Secondly, because philosophy is an approximation, it is necessarily partial and plural. This means that the succession of philosophies can best be understood as a history. But a history of the human mind itself. This is the sense in which the history of philosophy is philosophy itself, because it sets the problem and not the solution for subsequent philosophers.

To say that a philosophy as a condemned approximation has a consequence which must be noted. For if a philosophy is approximated and approximates, it needs the direction of that which it approximates. Aristotle had only the world against which to measure his philosophy. But he was keen enough to see the limits of his philosophy. He declared that even a lover of myths is a philosopher. As I understand Aristotle, he is saying that it may well turn out that even myth may be required to help explain the whole, the all — something which Plato well knew.

Saint Bonaventure had no need to call upon myth to give direction to the approximations which the arts and philosophy provide. Bonaventure turned to theology, to the Incarnate Word as the touchstone against which to measure the human enterprise. Such *reductio* can by no means be a confusion; rather, it seems to be the result of a profound insight in the very nature of philosophy itself — an understanding of the necessary approximateness and plurality of all philosophies.

Philosophy is, as I said, necessarily an individual task. And for that reason we may be dissatisfied with much that Saint Bonaventure has done. Yet to grasp as profoundly as he did the need to measure the arts against the Font of Light is surely "a measure of wheat" that he has given to us philosophers in our day.

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THE THEORY OF ASSERTORIC CONSEQUENCES IN ALBERT OF SAXONY*

CHAPTER III

QUANTIFICATION

In the preceding chapter we examined Albert's theory of consequences among unanalyzed propositions, and we shall be concerned in the three following chapters with Albert's exposition of consequences among assertoric analyzed propositions. The present chapter will deal with the analysis of propositions in regard to their quality, quantity, opposition, and ampliation. The fourth chapter will study consequences from one analyzed assertoric proposition to another. These analyzed assertoric propositions are called 'quantified propositions'. The fifth chapter will study consequences from two quantified propositions to a third. These three chapters might be called the theory of the categorical assertoric syllogism; the first two chapters being the theory of quantity of propositions, and the third may be regarded properly as the analyzation of the syllogistic.

In our times some modern logicians have remarked that there are several errors in the so-called traditional theory of the syllogism; for instance, the contention of the traditional position that a particular proposition follows from a universal. The following examples are given to prove that such a contention leads to errors, and hence, the theory is inconsistent in some aspects. 'All my dimes are shiny, therefore some of my dimes are shiny', 'All centaurs are Greek, therefore some centaurs are Greek'; If there are no centaurs, and I have no dime, then, the universal propositions are true, but the particulars are false; and, so, the inferences are invalid. If round squares are impossible, then, the following universal is true: 'All round squares are round,' but the following particular is false: 'Some round squares are round;' consequently, to infer the last proposition from the first is invalid. Sometimes the universal proposition will be true whether there are, or there are not objects such as the propositions indicates; but if there are not, then the particular will be false; and, therefore, the inference from the former to the latter is invalid, as the following examples show: 'All golden mountains are mountains, therefore some golden mountains are mountains,' 'All Pegasi are winged horses, therefore some Pegasus is a winged horse,' 'All brakeless trains are dangerous, therefore some brakeless train is dangerous,' 'All dragons breathe flame, therefore some dragon breathes flame.' The preceding and similar instances prove that if 'x' is the subject of a universal proposition, and 'x' is an empty term or null class; then, the universal having 'x' as subject is true, but the particular with 'x' as subject is false. Hence, the inference from universal to particular is invalid. Furthermore, all the laws of the logical square, except those of contradiction, are invalid; the same holds for the laws of conversion *per accidens*, and for all syllogisms with two universal premises and a particular conclusion.[1]

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* See *Francican Studies* 18 (1958) pp. 290—354.

Lukasiewicz has proven in an historical and systematic analysis that Aristotle's theory of the categorical syllogism, is free from the errors that have been imputed to it regarding the existential import of propositions. The Aristotelian theory is exceedingly exact, although it has a narrow frame. The categorical syllogism is a deductive system of true propositions or theses concerning the constants: A (every), E (none), I (some), O (some-not). Almost all theses of the Aristotelian doctrine are implications, or 'if . . . then' propositions. The variables of the system are term-variables, the values of which are exclusively positive, universal, non-empty terms. Thus, singular, negative, and empty terms are not introduced into the theory; which is the case also with the quantifiers. Another great and fundamental shortcoming of Aristotle's system is the supposition that all problems can be expressed by the four types of syllogistic premises: viz., universal affirmative, particular affirmative, universal negative, and particular negative; and that the syllogism is the only instrument of proof. The logic of propositions is absent from the system, although some of its laws are used intuitively. The important invention of the propositional calculus was due to the Stoics.[2]

After an historical and textual analysis of Aristotle's doctrine, Lukasiewicz builds up a system of the Aristotelian non-modal categorical syllogism according to the requirements of modern logic, but in close connection with the ideas expressed by Aristole himself. The author finds two specific primitive constants in the system: A and I, the fundamental properties of which are expressed in four axioms; two of these axioms are concerned with the non-emptiness of the Aristotelian syllogistic propositions; viz., Aaa (Every a is an a), and Iaa (Some a is an a; or there is an a which is an a). The other two axioms that characterize the constants A and I, are the syllogistic moods *Barbara* and *Datisi*. Other axioms are some laws of the propositional calculus. There are four rules: The rule of definition, the rule of substitution, the rule of detachment, and the rule of rejection. The system is rigorously developed, and it contains the laws of the logical square, the laws of simple and *per accidens* conversions, and twenty-two syllogistic moods, besides the *Barbara* and *Datisi* which are introduced into the system as axioms.[3]

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[1] Cfr. Lewis and Langford, *Symbolic Logic*, pp. 62—69; J. C. Cooley, *A Primer of Formal Logic* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1949), pp. 329—332; Quine, *Methods of Logic*, pp. 70—72, Copi, *Symbolic Logic*, *pp*. 70—74.

[2] Cfr. Lukasiewicz, *Aristotle's Syllogistic*, pp. 4—6, 44, 72, 204.

Bocheńschi, closely following Lukasiewicz, constructed a similar system of the assertoric categorical syllogism, which was further developed and extended by I. Thomas, who introduced into it the infinitizing negation of Scholastic logic. In the system of I. Thomas, only one syllogistic operator is primitive; viz., A; I is defined along with E and O; one of the specific axioms, viz., *Barbara*, is dropped, and becomes a proven thesis; but *Ferio* is kept as an axiom, as in Bocheńschi's system; and the axioms of existence are also preserved. New laws of the system are, for instance, the laws of obversion and contraposition.[4]

M. Black developed a presentation of the theory of the syllogism along the lines of the theory of classes, taking inspiration from Huntington, but differing from him by the introduction of the notions of the complement of a class as a primitive term. The basic assumption, responsible for the deviations of the syllogistic theory from the general theory of classes, is the assumption that all syllogistic classes are supposed to have at least one member; in other words, no syllogistic class may be null or universal.[5]

H. Reichenbach presented a revision of the syllogistic along the same lines of the theory of classes. There are several points of agreement in this presentation with those of M. Black and I. Thomas; as for instance, the introduction of the notion of complement class (infinitizing negation of I. Thomas), and the postulate of existence. Reichenbach studies the logical relations between two classes, and inferential relations among three classes. The logical relations between two classes are represented in a cube of opposition embracing relations of contradiction, contrariety, subcontrariety, and subalternation. The traditional square of opposition is the front face of the cube. The relations of the cube hold on two conditions, first, none of the four classes represented is empty, viz., S, P, $\overline{S}$, P, which are the two basic classes and their complements; and second, no two of the four classes are identical. The second condition validates the relations of opposites, subopposites, and slant-subalterns. It is worthy of notice that the latter relations are not valid in the system of I. Thomas; or as he states it, no dependence can be proved to hold between complementary, subcomplementary. or contra-complementary propositions. The reason of I. Thomas' stand is that he does not introduce into his system the postulate excluding the use of two identical classes; without this postulate, all the other relations hold, except those not accepted by I. Thomas; but some relations are acceptable on weaker conditions, as Reichenbach remarks. Nevertheless, this logician still holds that the moods in which an existential premise is derived from two all-statements, are semi-valid and need a third premise stating that a certain class is not empty. It would seem to us that if it is axiomatically specified that no empty class is to be used in syllogistic propositions, then, as a result, the third premise is unnecessary.[6]

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[3] Cfr. Lukasiewicz, *Aristotle's Syllogistic*, pp. 77—129.

[4] Cfr. Bocheńschi, *Nove lezioni di logica simbolica*, pp. 139—145; "On the Categorical Syllogism," *Dominican Studies*, vol. 1 (January, 1948), 35—37; *Précis de logique mathématique*, pp. 37—41; I. Thomas, "CS(n): An Extension of CS," *Dominican Studies*, vol. 2 (April, 1949), 145—160.

[5] Cfr. M. Black, "A New Method of Presentation of the Theory of the Syllogism," *The Journal of Philosophy*, ,vol. 12 (August, 1945), 449—455.

QUALITY OF PROPOSITIONS

In the following paragraphs we turn to the analysis of Albert's position regarding the doctrine of quantification, opposition, and ampliation; at the same time, we shall find his stand in regard to the Aristotelian doctrine of syllogistic propositions, as presented by Lukasiewicz; and his position as compared to the modern exposition and objections to the so-called traditional logical square. Categorical assertoric propositions, when analyzed, are found by Albert, as by other Scholastics, to be singular, indefinite, particular, or universal; and any proposition of these types is either of the present, past, or future time. Moreover, any proposition belonging to any of the preceding groups is either affirmative or negative. All these properties of propositions are indicated by some syncategorematic term. The quality of propositions is their affirmation or denial, and this property is indicated by the affirmed or denied copula 'is.' Albert explains the logical import of the quality of propositions in several rules regarding the truth and falsity of propositions by their being affirmative or negative.

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[6] Cfr. H. Reichenbach, "The Syllogism Revised," *Philosophy of Science*, vol. 19 (January, 1952), 1—16.

The copula 'is,' Albert maintains, may be used in two ways: as *secundo adiacens*, and as *tertio adiacens*. The copula used as *secundo adiacens* and when it is affirmed, signifies the existence of the thing for which the subject stands; as for instance: 'a man exists' *(homo est)*. When the copula is used as *tertio adiacens* and in the affirmative way, it denotes a certain composition of the subject and predicate; viz., that they stand for the same. Hence, any affirmative proposition signifies that subject and predicate stand for the same; as for instance: 'A man is an animal,' signifies that the terms 'man' and 'animal' stand for the same. Any affirmative proposition is true if the subject and predicate stand for the same, as it is denoted by the copula; and if the proposition does not falsify itself. The last addition, Albert warns, is necessary because of such propositions as: 'What I am saying is false;' assuming that I do not say anything else, then the subject and predicate stand for the same, and nevertheless the proposition is false, because it falsifies itself, since it signifies that it is true and false. An affirmative proposition is false, if subject and predicate do not stand for the same, or if the subject or predicate do not stand for anything. For instance, these propositions are false: 'A chimera is a chimera,' 'A chimera is intelligible;' they are false because subject and predicate do not stand for the same, since they do not stand for anything. The proposition: 'A man is a donkey,' is false; because, although, subject and predicate do supposit, nevertheless, they do not stand for the same.[7]

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[7] "Hoc verbum 'est' secundo adiacens sicut hic: 'Homo est', significat de sua principali significatione existentiam illius pro quo supponit subiectum. Sed quando hoc verbum 'est' ponitur tertio adiacens significat quamdam compositionem praedicati ad subiectum; id est, subiectum et praedicatum supponere pro eodem, et tempus in quo est significatum subiecti esse illud tempus in quo est significatum praedicati; et quando ita est, propositio est vera, si non sit propositio falsificans se; et quando non est ita, propositio est falsa. Exemplum primi ut: 'Homo est animal,' exemplum secundi ut: 'Homo est asinus.' . . . Ex his dico primo quod omnis propositio affirmativa significat subiectum et praedicatum supponere pro eodem; et omnis propositio negativa significat quod subiectum et praedicatum non supponunt pro eodem. Secundo dico quod quando in propositione affirmativa non falsificante se pro eodem supponunt subiectum et praedicatum, propositio est vera; et quando non supponunt pro eodem, propositio est falsa. Et notanter dico "in propositione non falsificante se", quia in ista propositione: 'Ego dico falsum,' posito quod nihil aliud dicam, subiectum et praedicatum supponunt pro eodem, et tamen praedicta propositio est falsa et non vera; propter hoc quod falsificat se, seu significat se esse falsam. . . . Quarto dico quod quando subiectum et praedicatum alicuius propositionis affirmativae non supponunt pro aliquo, talis propositio semper est falsa; verbi gratia dicendo: 'Chimaera est chimaera,' 'Chimaera est opinabilis,' 'Chimaera est intelligibilis.' Patet, quia ex quo

Albert examines two objections against this doctrine about the falsity of an affirmative proposition. The first is based on the authority of Boëthius, who maintained that there is no truer predication than that in which some term is predicated of itself. And, it is argued, this is the case with the proposition: 'A chimera is a chimera.' Albert answers that to predicate a term of itself in an affirmative proposition is the truest predication, if the term supposits for something; but if the term does not stand for anything, then, the proposition is false, which is the case with the given example. The second objection regards an example given by Aristotle as a true proposition: 'Not being is not being' *(Non ens est non ens)*, which is an affirmative proposition whose subject does not stand for anything. Albert answers that the proposition is equivocal, since it can be taken in two senses. In a first sense, the first denial is attached to the term immediately following it; hence, the copula is affirmative, and the sense is: 'Non-being is non-being'; and, thus, the proposition is false. Another and second sense of the proposition is given when the first denial affects the whole proposition, thus: 'It is not the case that being is non-being;' in this sense, the proposition is true.[8]

Since Albert requires for the truth of an affirmative proposition that subject and predicate stand for the same; and for its falsity, that subject and predicate do not stand for the same, or that they do not stand for anything at all; then, we would be inclined to conclude that

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est affirmativa non falsificans se, et cum ad veritatem talis propositionis affirmativae requiratur subiectum et praedicatum supponere pro eodem, sequitur dictam propositionem affirmativam in qua subiectum non supponit pro aliquo fore falsam; in ista enim subiectum et praedicatum non supponunt pro eodem, ex quo non supponunt pro aliquo, quod tamen requiritur ad hoc quod propositio affirmativa non falsificans se sit vera." *Log.*, t. 1, c. 6, f. 4r. Cfr. *Quaestiones super libros posteriorum*, q. 11, f. 10r.

[8] "Sed contra probatur quod haec est vera: 'Chimaera est chimaera;' quia hic est praedicatio eiusdem de seipso, modo per Boëthium in Praedicamentis, nulla est verior praedicatio illa in qua idem praedicatur de seipso; quod autem ibi sit praedicatio eiusdem de eodem, patet de se. Secundo, nam Aristoteles VII Metaphysicorum concedit istam: 'Non ens est non ens;' et tamen est affirmativa cuius subiectum pro nullo supponit. Respondetur ad primum, quando dicitur "Boëthius dicit in Praedicamentis quod nulla est verior praedicatio illa in qua praedicatur idem de seipso;" conceditur, si in ea termini supponant pro aliquo; si autem termini non supponant pro aliquo, propositio potest esse falsa, et sic est de ista: 'Chimaera est chimaera.' Ad secundum dico quod in ista propositione: 'Non ens est non ens,' prima negatio potest cadere super terminum cui adiungitur, ita quod copula maneat affirmativa, et tunc praedicta propositio est affirmativa et falsa; nec sic Aristoteles eam concessit. Alio modo, potest intelligi sic: quod prima negatio cadat supra totam propositionem ita quod sit sensus: 'Non-ens est non-ens;' id est: 'Non est verum quod ens est non-ens,' et sic ipsa est vera et est negativa et non affirmativa. Eodem modo potest distingui de ista: 'Nihil est nihil'." *Log.*, t. 1, c. 6, f. 4r. Cfr. *Quaestiones super libros posteriorum*, q. 11, f. 10r.

any affirmative proposition has existential import; it is thus, if we understand it in Albert's sense. He explains that the verb 'to stand for' or 'to supposit,' amplifies the sentence in which it is used. Thus, when it is said: 'This term stands for something,' the term 'something' is amplified for that which exists, has existed, will exist, or can exist. Hence, the following consequence is not valid: 'This term stands for something, therefore it stands for something which exists.' Consequently, the existential import to be found in an affirmative proposition has to be understood in the sense that the terms of the proposition stand for that which is, was, will be, or can be. No logically empty terms, or contradictory terms, can be used in any affirmative proposition; the proposition: 'A chimera is a chimera,' is always a false affirmative proposition because the term 'chimera' is logically empty. Affirmative propositions in which some ampliative term is used, may have actually or factually empty terms, but not contradictory or logically empty terms. Ampliative terms, as we shall see, are those which make the terms of a proposition stand for things which are, were, will be, or can be. The term 'was' amplifies the following proposition: 'Something white was black,' which does not mean that there is now something white or something black, but it means that there is or there was something white which was black. We shall treat this point subsequently in this chapter. But if no ampliative terms are used in a proposition, then, its subject is not amplified, but it is denoted to stand for something which actually exists; as for instance in: 'Man is an animal,' the terms 'man' and 'animal' are denoted to have supposition for that which actually exists.[9]

Hence, for the truth of an affirmative proposition of the present time, in which no ampliative term is used, it is required that the subject and predicate supposit for that which actually exists, and that they stand for the same; as the proposition denotes. The proposition: 'Thunder is a sound produced in the clouds,' is a false proposition, assuming that there is no actually existing thing for which the subject stands. The proposition is false because it is a proposition of the present time, and it does not have any ampliative term; consequently, it denotes that its subject stands for that which actually exists; and if there is no thunder at the present time, then, the proposition is false. The same is to be said of the proposition: 'The rose is the most beautiful of the flowers;' it is false, when there is no actual rose.[10]

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[9] "Talem vim etiam habet hoc verbum 'supponit;' unde quando dicimus: 'Talis terminus supponit pro aliquo,' ly 'aliquo' ampliatur pro eo quod est, vel fuit, vel erit, vel potest esse, vel potest intelligi; et ideo non valet ista consequentia: 'Talis terminus supponit pro aliquo, ergo supponit pro aliquo quod est'." *Log.*, t. 2, c. 10, f. 15v; Cfr. *Ibid.*, f. 15r—16r.

If the copula is used as *tertio adiacens* and is denied, then, the copula signifies a certain division of the subject and predicate; viz., that they do not stand for the same; as for instance, the proposition: 'A man is not a donkey,' signifies that the terms 'man' and 'donkey' do not stand for the same. Thus, any negative proposition signifies that the subject and predicate do not stand for the same. A negative proposition is true, if subject and predicate do not stand for the same, or if the subject does not stand for anything at all. The proposition: 'A man is not a donkey,' is a true negative proposition, because, although, subject and predicate have *supposita*, nevertheless, they do not supposit for the same. The proposition: 'A chimera is not a chimera', is a true negative proposition, because subject and predicate do not stand for anything. Consequently, it is not required for the truth of a negative proposition, that subject and predicate stand for different things; but it is enough that they do not stand for anything, in which case they do not stand for the same thing. A negative proposition is false, if subject and predicate stand for the same thing; as for instance: 'man is not an animal,' in which proposition, subject and predicate have *supposita* and supposit for the same.[11]

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[10] "Finaliter ergo dico quod terminus in propositione non denotatur supponere pro eo quod fuit, vel erit, vel potest esse, vel intelligi, vel imaginari, nisi in tali propositione ponatur aliquis terminus ampliativus. Cum hoc tamen stat quod terminus potest supponere in propositione pro eo quod fuit, vel erit, vel potest esse, vel intelligi, vel imaginari, absque hoc quod in tali propositione ponatur terminus ampliativus. Et sic dico quod subiectum istius propositionis: 'Tonitruum est sonus factus in nubibus,' supponit personaliter pro eo quod fuit, vel erit, vel potest esse, vel imaginari; sed quia per propositionem denotatur supponere pro eo quod est, cum sit de praesenti sine termino ampliativo, praedicta propositio est falsa, supposito quod nullum tonitruum sit. Similiter diceretur de ista: 'Rosa est pulcherrima florum,' posito quod nulla rosa sit." *Log.*, t. 2, c. 5, f. 12v.

[11] "Et quando apponitur sibi [copulae tertio adiacenti] negatio, significatur quod subiectum et praedicatum non supponunt pro eodem; et si ita est, propositio est vera, ut dicendo: 'Homo non est asinus;' et si aliter, propositio est falsa, ut dicendo: 'Homo non est animal.' Et notanter dico quod quando sibi apponitur negatio, significatur quod non supponunt pro eodem subiectum et praedicatum; et non dico significatur quod subiectum et praedicatum supponunt pro diversis, quia in ista propositione 'Chimaera non est chimaera,' quae est vera, subiectum et praedicatum non supponunt pro diversis, quia pro nullo supponunt; sed tamen verum est quod non supponunt pro eodem, quia enim pro nullo supponunt, non supponunt pro eodem. . . . Tertio dico quod in omni propositione negativa quando subiectum et praedicatum non supponunt pro eodem, propositio est vera; et quando supponunt pro eodem, propositio est falsa. . . . Quinto dico propositionem negativam cuius subiectum pro nullo supponit esse

This doctrine of the copula 'is' *tertio adiacens* as signifying that the subject and the predicate stand for the same in an affirmative proposition, and do not stand for the same in a negative, is known as the "identity theory of the copula." We symbolize this identy by supposition by the sign: '= sup' for affirmation, which may be read as 'identical by supposition,' or 'stands for the same as;' and we employ the symbol '≠ sup' for denial of identity by supposition, which may be read as 'not identical by supposition,' or 'does not stand for the same as.' Thus, 'x = sup y,' may be read as 'x is identical by supposition to y,' or 'x stands for the same as y.' This theory, Albert remarks, applies only to terms, not to things signified by the terms. The terms are identical or non-identical by supposition, not because one term is or is not the other; but because both terms are not symbols of the same thing in a proposition. This type of identity by supposition, denoted by the copula, is distinguished by Albert from the identity of relation *(relativum identitatis)*, which we symbolize as '='; and from the identity of definition, which we represent by '= def.'[12]

Albert's doctrine on the truth and falsity of affirmative and negative propositions is common to other Scholastics, as, for instance, Ockham and Buridan. Buridan acknowledges the indemonstrable character of these rules of truth and falsity for affirmative and negative propositions; but he remarks that they are highly reasonable, and tries to show it with some examples.[13]

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veram; ex quo sequitur istam esse veram: 'Chimaera non est chimaera,' et similiter istam: 'vacuum non est vacuum,' et similiter istam: 'Chimaera, non est intelligibilis'." *Log.*, t. 1, c. 6, f. 4r. Cfr. *Quaestiones super libros posteriorum*, q. 11, f. 104.

[12] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 1, c. 6, f. 3v—4r; *Ibid.*, c. 12, f. 5v—6r; *Ibid.*, t. 4, c. 8, f. 29v.

[13] Cfr. Ockham, *Summa logicae*, II, c. 2, p. 224; *Ibid.*, c. 3, pp. 229—231; *Ibid.*, c. 4, p. 234; *Ibid.*, c. 7, p. 242; *Ibid.*, c. 10, p. 249; *Ibid.*, c. 14, p. 259. Buridan, *Sophismata*, c. 2, f. B2r—B2v: "Decima conclusio est quod ad veritatem categoricae affirmativae requiritur quod termini, scilicet subiectum et praedicatum, supponant pro eodem vel eisdem; ideo etiam ad eius falsitatem sufficit quod non supponant pro eodem vel eisdem. Et forte quia haec non est conclusio sed principium indemonstrabile, vel si est conclusio ipsa est propinqua principio indemonstrabili, tamen in libro Posteriorum apparet quod aliquando principia indemonstrabilia indigent bene aliqua declaratione, vel exemplari, vel inductiva, aut huiusmodi; ideo dictam conclusionem ego sic declaro. . . . Undecima conclusio, quod ad veritatem negativae categoricae sufficit quod subiectum et praedicatum non supponant pro eodem nec pro eisdem; licet tamen aliquando sit vera in qua subiectum et praedicatum supponunt pro eodem vel eisdem ut: 'Animal non est homo.' Et sic etiam ad falsitatem negativae requiritur quod subiectum et praedicatum supponant pro eodem; licet non sequitur: Subiectum et praedicatum supponunt pro eodem, ergo negativa est falsa. Haec ergo conclusio patet ex praecedente." *Ibid.*

QUANTITY OF PROPOSITIONS

The quantity of propositions is indicated by some syncategorematic term. There are many quantifying particles in current languages, and Latin is no exception; but the principal and fundamental ones are: ‘every’ *(omnis)*, ‘some’ *(aliquis)*, ‘none’ *(nullus)*. The syncategorematic terms ‘every’ and ‘none’ are signs of universality, which form the universal propositions; ‘some’ is a sign of particularity, which forms particular propositions. The logical function of these signs of quantity is to determine the mode of supposition of the terms which immediately or mediately follow them.[14]

We have already given some notions of supposition and its divisions; we are now going to analyze more in detail the logical meaning of these notions, and their influence in Albert’s theory of quantity of propositions. We shall study the modes and some of the rules for personal supposition; but these rules, Albert remarks, apply proportionally to material or simple supposition; since the quantifying signs are applied to terms in material or simple supposition, as well as to terms taken in personal supposition. For instance: “‘Man’ is a monosyllable,” is an example of a proposition in which the term ‘man’ has material determinate supposition; the quantity of the proposition is that of an indefinite proposition, which in turn is equivalent to a particular proposition; the example under consideration is thus made universal: “Every term ‘man’ is a monosyllable.”[15]

Personal supposition is the use of a vocal or written term for that which it was instituted to signify, or it is the use of a mental term for that which it signifies naturally and properly; an example of the first is: 'man is an animal;' an instance of the second: 'man is an animal,' assuming that the latter is a mental proposition. Personal supposition is divided into discrete and common. Discrete personal supposition is the use of a singular term, or a common term determined by a demonstrative adjective, to stand in a proposition for one and only one singular value or *suppositum.*[16]

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[14] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 3, c. 2, f. 17v; *Ibid.*, t. 2, c. 9, f. 15r.

[15] “Diceres tu, quomodo in ista propositione: “‘Homo’ est bisyllabum,” ly ‘homo’ supponit. . . . Respondetur quod in praedicta propositione ly ‘homo’ supponit materialiter, sicut potest patere ex prius dictis. Et quando dicebatur “ly ‘homo’ supponit communiter;” concedatur; et quando dicebatur “suppositio communis etc.;” dico quod aliqua est suppositio communis quae non est personalis sed materialis, et propter hoc notanter dixi “suppositio personalis communis;” et non dixi “suppositio communis.” Sed diceres ultra, quanta est ista: “‘Homo’ est bisyllabum.” Dico quod est indefinita. Diceres ultra, quomodo debet universalizari. Dico quod sic dicendo: “Omne ‘homo’ est bisyllabum,” unde in ista propositione: “‘Homo’ est bisyllabum,” ly ‘homo’ nomen est indeclinabile et neutri generis per illam regulam: omnis dictio quaecumque fuerit materialis est neutri generis et indeclinabile nomen.” *Log.*, t. , c. 4, f. 11v. “Tenendo sicut prius tenebatur, quod quaedam est suppositio materialis discreta et quaedam determinata recte sicut de personali, concedendum est quod illae regulae [de suppositionibus terminorum] sunt generales, tam pro terminis supponentibus materialiter quam pro terminis supponentibus personaliter.” *Ibid.*, c. 6, f. 12v; Cfr. *Ibid.*, t. 3, c. 4, f. 18v; *Ibid.*, t. 4, c. 6, f. 28rv.

Common personal supposition is the use of a common term for any of its values. It is to be noticed that in this definition it is required that the term stands for any of its values, and not that it stands for several of its values; because in these propositions: 'Every sun is shining,' 'Every phoenix exists,' the terms 'sun' and 'phoenix' have personal common supposition, and, nevertheless, they do not stand for several things, but for one. Common personal supposition is subdivided into determinate supposition and confused supposition. Determinate personal supposition is the use of a common term for any of its singular values; in such a manner that, by virtue of this supposition, it is valid to descend to its singular values by means of a disjunctive proposition. For instance, in the proposition: 'A man is running,' the term 'man' has determinate personal supposition; hence, we may descend to this disjunction: 'This man is running, or that man is running, or . . . and so on for each individual man.' Hence the truth of the proposition: 'A man is running,' is that of a disjunction.[17]

Confused personal supposition is further subdivided into merely confused supposition and confused distributed supposition. Merely confused supposition is the use of a term for any of its singular values; in such a manner as to allow a descent to its singulars by a proposition with a disjunct predicate, but not by a disjunctive proposition. The predicate of the proposition: 'Every man is an animal,' has purely confused supposition; hence, it follows: 'Every man is an animal, therefore every man is this animal, or that animal, or . . . so on for each individual animal.'[18]

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[16] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 2, c. 4, f. 11 v.

[17] "Suppositio vero determinata est acceptio termini communis pro quolibet quod significat ex impositione, vel naturaliter proprie significat, sub quo virtute talis acceptionis licet fieri descensus ad sua singularia per propositionem disiunctivam. Eodem modo supponit hic terminus 'homo' in ista propositione: 'Homo currit,' quia hic terminus 'homo' in praedicta propositione supponit pro quolibet disiunctive quod significat ex impositione; nam ad veritatem istius propositionis: 'Homo currit,' sufficit veritas istius disiunctivae: 'Iste homo currit, vel ille homo currit, et sic de singulis'." *Log.*, t. 2, c. 4, f. 11 v.

[18] "Suppositio personalis confusa tantum est acceptio termini pro quolibet quod significat ex impositione vel naturaliter proprie, sub quo virtute illius suppositionis potest fieri descensus ad sua singularia per

Confused distributed personal supposition is the use of a common term for any of its values; in such a manner as to allow a descent to its singular values in a copulative proposition in virtue of this supposition. The term 'man' has distributed supposition in the proposition: 'Every man is an animal;' hence, this is a valid consequence: 'Every man is an animal, therefore this man is an animal, and that man is an animal, and . . . so on for each individual man.' Albert remarks again, that it is not required for a term having distributed supposition, that it has several singular values; for it is sufficient that it has one singular value. Distributed supposition is subdivided into movable and immovable supposition. The movable supposition allows a uniform descent to the singulars. A uniform descent is one in which all the singular propositions are of the same quality. An example of this type of supposition is already given and explained above: 'Every man is an animal.' We shall refer, as Albert does, to this type of supposition, as distributed supposition without the additional qualification of movable.[19]

Immovable distributed supposition is the distributed supposition that allows a "double-form descent" *(difformiter descendere)* to the singular values. A "double-form descent" is one in which not all the singular propositions are of the same quality. The term 'man' has immovable supposition in the proposition: 'Every man, except Socrates, is running;' hence, we may conclude: 'Plato is running, and Cicero is running, and . . . any other individual man different from Socrates is running, and Socrates is not running.' As we see, not all the singular propositions have the same quality; since the last is negative, and the remaining ones are positive.[20]

A particular proposition is one in which a common term is the subject, which is determined by the sign of particularity 'some.' A particular proposition may be affirmative or negative; it is affirmative when

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propositionem de disiuncto extremo, et non per propositionem disiunctivam nec copulativam. . . . Unde hac suppositione supponit hic terminus 'animal' in ista propositione: 'Omnis homo est animal;' nam bene sequitur: 'Omnis homo est animal, igitur illud vel illud animal,' ita quod totum hoc disiunctivam 'illud vel illud animal' sit verificabile de isto termino 'homo' significative acceptus." *Log.*, t. 2, c. 4, f. 11 v.

[19] "Suppositio confusa distributiva est acceptio termini vocalis vel scripti copulative pro quolibet . . . cui impositus est ad significandum, vel acceptio termini mentalis pro quolibet . . . quod naturaliter proprie significat; sic quod sub eo contigit descendere copulative ad ea pro quibus supponit virtute praedictae suppositionis. Et notanter dico pro quolibet, et non pro pluribus; nam in istis propositionibus: 'Omnis sol lucet,', 'Omnis phoenix est,' subiecta non supponunt pro pluribus, et tamen supponunt confuse et distributive virtute illius signi distributivi 'omnis'." *Log.*, t. 2, c. 5, f. 11 v.

[20] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 2, c. 5, f. 12 r.

the copula is affirmed; and negative, when the copula is denied. The subject and predicate of a particular affirmative proposition have determinate supposition; and this is the logical import of the particular quantifier, unless other syncategorema prevents it, as in the case of the particular negative. For instance, from the particular affirmative proposition: 'Some man is running,' it is allowed to descend or to infer the disjunctive proposition: 'Plato is running, or Socrates is running, or . . . so on for any singular value of the subject.' And, since both subject and predicate have determinate supposition, the following consequence is valid, when the individual values of both terms are used: 'Some man is running, therefore Socrates is this running, or Socrates is that running, or . . . so on for any individual running thing; or Plato is this running, or Plato is that running, or . . . so on for any individual running thing; or . . . so on for any individual man and running thing.' If we, following Moody's method, use as predicate or property variables the capital letters 'F' and 'G'; the small letters 'x,' 'y,' and 'z' with numerical subcripts, as individual constants; and the sign of supposition already mentioned '= sup;' then, we might symbolize the descent or reduction of a particular affirmative proposition to its singular values, as the following disjunction of disjunctions:

$$[(Fx_1 = \text{sup } Gx_1) \vee (Fx_1 = \text{sup } Gx_2) \vee (Fx_1 = \text{sup } Gx_3) \vee \ldots] \vee \ldots$$
$$[(Fx_2 = \text{sup } Gx_1) \vee (Fx_2 = \text{sup } Gx_2) \vee (Fx_2 = \text{sup } Gx_3) \vee \ldots] \vee \ldots$$

Consequently, a particular affirmative proposition of the present time is true if subject and predicate stand for at least one and the same singular value. This proposition corresponds to the particular affirmative of modern logic:[21]

$$(Ex)\ (Fx \cdot Gx)$$

Closely connected with the particular, is the indefinite proposition; such as: 'A man is running' *(Homo currit)*. In fact, these two types of propositions are equivalent; thus, what was said about the particular affirmative, holds for the indefinite affirmative; and what will be said for the particular negative, holds also for the indefinite negative. Albert remarks that in an indefinite proposition the subject can stand materially or personally, but not so in a particular; because the sign of particularity causes the term that it affects, to have personal supposition. Let us take, for instance, these indefinite propositions: "'Man' is a species," 'Man is an animal.' In the first proposition the term 'man' has material supposition, while in the second it has personal supposition; but it is false to say: 'Some man is a species.' This would seem to deny that terms taken in material or simple supposition are subject to quantification as Albert admits; but we think that here Albert was carried away answering an objection, since the example given does not disprove the possibility of quantifying an indefinite proposition in which the subject has material supposition. The example given, and mentioned above, is: "*'Homo' est species*' ("'Man' is a species"); but the quantification is accomplished with the adjective '*aliquis*,' masculine gender, when it should be the same adjective in the neuter gender; because, as Albert states, any noun taken in material supposition is neuter.[22]

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[21] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 3, c. 2, f. 17v; "Signum particulare est per quod denotatur terminus communis stare pro quolibet suo supposito per modum disiunctionis, . . . quod patet quia dicendo: 'Quidam homo currit,' sequitur: 'Ergo Sortes currit, vel Plato currit, et sic de singulis,' . . . Et ergo ad veritatem istius: 'Quidam homo currit,' requiritur et sufficit quod de aliquo homine sit verum dicere quod ipse currit; seu quod una istarums ingularium sit vera quae est pars istius disiunctivae: 'Sortes currit, vel Plato currit, et sic de singulis'." *Ibid.* "Cuiuslibet propositionis particularis subiectum supponit determinate." *Ibid.*, t. 2, c. 6, f. 12v; Cfr. *Ibid.*, t. 3, c. 3, f. 18r. Cfr. Moody, *Truth and Consequence*, p. 48.

The subject of a particular nagative proposition has determinate supposition; hence, the following consequence is valid: 'Some man is not running, therefore Socrates is not running, or Plato is not running or . . . so on for any individual man.' The predicate of the particular negative has confused distributed supposition; because a denial preceding a common term, either mediately or immediately, causes it to have distributive supposition. Thus, the following consequence is valid: 'Some man is not a donkey, therefore some man is not this donkey, and not that donkey, and . . . so on for any individual donkey.' If we reduce both subject and predicate to its singulars, then, we have the following disjunction of conjunctions as consequent of a particular negative: 'Some man is not a donkey, therefore this man is not this donkey, and he is not that donkey, and . . . so on for this man in respect to each donkey; or that man is not this donkey and he is not that donkey, and . . . so on for that man in regard to each donkey; or . . . so on for any individual man in relation to each individual donkey.' The consequent of this consequence may be symbolized as follows:

$$[(Fx_1 \mp \sup Gx_1) \cdot (Fx_1 \mp \sup Gx_2) \cdot (Fx_1 \mp \sup Gx_3). \dots].$$
$$[(Fx_2 \mp \sup Gx_1) \cdot (Fx_2 \mp \sup Gx_2) \cdot (Fx_2 \mp \sup Gx_3). \dots] \dots.$$

From the preceding and the rules of truth for negative propositions, we may conclude that a particular negative proposition is true, if subject and predicate do not stand for at least one and the same significate;

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[22] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 3, c. 1, f. 17v; *Ibid.*, t. 2, c. 4, f. 11v.

or if the subject does not stand for anything at all. A particular negative proposition is false, if subject and predicate have actual values, and there is no one and the same value for which the subject and predicate do not stand. Hence, the particular negative of Albert's doctrine differs from the particular negative of modern logic; for in the latter it always has existential value, and consequently is symbolized thus:

$$(Ex)\ (Fx.\ -Gx)$$

while in Albert's system the particular negative may or may not have existential import, and might be symbolized thus:[23]

$$(Ex)\ (Fx.\ -Gx)\ v\ -(Ex)\ (Fx \cdot Gx)$$

Ockham has the same doctrine as Albert in regard to the truth of particular propositions, and he expresses the doctrine even clearer than Albert. For the truth of a particular affirmative proposition, Ockham states, it is sufficient that subject and predicate stand for at least one and the same thing; while for the truth of the particular negative, it is required that the subject does not stand for anything, or that it stands for something for which the predicate does not stand.[24]

A universal proposition is one in which the subject is a common term determined by a universal sign; as for instance: 'Every man is an animal,' 'No man is a donkey.' The universal sign determines the mode of supposition of subject and predicate. The subject of any universal affirmative has confused distributive supposition; thus, this consequence is valid: 'Every man is an animal, therefore this man is an animal, and that man is an animal, and . . . so on for any individual man.' The predicate of the same universal has confused supposition, if it is a common term; for instance, this consequence is valid in which the consequent reduces to is singulars the predicate of the universal affirmative, which is the antecedent: 'Every man is an animal, therefore, every man is this animal, or that animal, or . . . so on for any individual animal.' Purely confused supposition, Moody explains, can be reduced essentially to determinate supposition; if we reduce both subject and predicate to their singular values. Ockham, whom Moody quotes, remarks that a common term has purely confused supposition, when it is not valid to descend to its singulars without any variation of the other extreme. But if we effect the variation, thus reducing to their singular values both subject and predicate; then, we have a conjunction of disjunctions in which the predicate of the universal affirmative has determinate supposition, as this consequence shows: 'Every man is an animal, therefore, this man is this animal, or this man is that animal, or . . . so on for this man in regard to each individual animal; and that man is this animal, or that man is that animal, or . . . so on for that man in respect to each individual animal; and . . . so on for any individual man in relation to each individual animal.' The consequent of this consequence may be symbolized as follows:

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[23] Cfr. footnote 21 of this chapter. "Negatio praecedens terminum communem sive mediate sive immediate confundit ipsum confuse distributive; ergo cuiuslibet propositionis negativae cuiuscumque fuerit quantitatis, sive singularis, sive particularis, praedicatum supponit confuse distributive, nisi tunc praedicatum sit terminus singularis, vel aliud syncategorema impediat. . . . Verbi gratia: 'Quidam homo non est asinus,' in ista propositione sub isto termino 'asinus' potest fieri descensus ad omnia supposita copulative." *Log.*, t. 2, c. 6, f. 12v.

[24] Cfr. Ockham, *Summa logicae*, II, c. 3, p. 299.

$$[(Fx_1 = \text{sup } Gx_1) \text{ v } (Fx_1 = \text{sup } Gx_2) \text{ v } (Fx_1 = \text{sup } Gx_3) \text{ v } \ldots].$$
$$[(Fx_2 = \text{sup } Gx_1) \text{ v } (Fx_2 = \text{sup } Gx_2) \text{ v } (Fx_2 = \text{sup } Gx_3) \text{ v } \ldots]. \ \ldots$$

From the preceding and from the rule of truth for affirmative propositions of the present time, we may conclude that for the truth of a universal proposition, it is required that subject and predicate stand for something, and that the predicate supposits for whatever the subject stands. Thus, we may assert that Albert's universal affirmative proposition differs from the universal affirmative of modern logic; for in the latter such a proposition has no existential import, while it does have in Albert's doctrine. The first symbolization corresponds to the modern interpretation of the universal affirmative; the second to Albert's explanation.[25]

$$(x)\ (Fx \supset Gx)$$
$$(x)\ (Fx \supset Gx) \cdot (Ex)\ (Fx \cdot Gx)$$

We have used the symbol of material implication or "as of now" consequence, because we are considering assertoric, non-modal propositions. The proposition: 'Every man is an animal,' is a proposition of the present time; it is not necessary, but contingent; and has existential import. If we symbolize 'man' by 'M_1,' and 'animal by 'A_1,' then we have:

$$(x)\ (M_1x \supset A_1x) \cdot (Ex)\ (M_1x \cdot A_1x)$$

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[25] "Signum universale est per quod denotatur terminus communis cui adiungitur stare pro quolibet suo supposito per modum copulationis; . . . nam dicendo: 'omnis homo currit,' sequitur formaliter: 'Ergo iste homo currit, et ille homo currit, et sic de singulis'." *Log.*, t. 3, c. 2, f. 17v; "Omnis terminus communis sequens signum universale affirmativum immediate sine praepositione negationis supponit confuse distributive." *Ibid.*, t. 2, c. 6, f. 12v; "Cuiuslibet propositionis universalis affirmativae cuius praedicatum est terminus communis, praedicatum supponit confuse tantum." *Ibid.*, t. 2, c. 7, f. 13r. Cfr. Moody, *Truth and Consequence*, pp. 47—48; Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, I, c. 70, p. 191.

But a sentence of the type: 'It is necessary that every man is an animal,' has no existential import as the preceding proposition, and the conditional connective required is the one for necessary implication or consequence '$\overline{\supset}$;' because, as Albert remarks, this type of propositions has a conditional necessity. The meaning of the aforesaid proposition is: 'It is necessary that if there is a man, then he is an animal.' This and similar propositions are called by Albert modal propositions *in sensu composito;* and if we take into account that contradictory terms cannot be used in affirmative propositions, then this necessary proposition may be symbolized as follows:

$$(x)\ [(M_1x \text{ v } PM_1x)\ \overline{\supset}\ A_1x] \cdot (Ex)\ (M_1x \text{ v } PM_1x)$$

Albert clearly distinguishes this modal proposition from the modal proposition *in sensu diviso:* 'Every man is necessarily an animal;' this proposition is false, because any man can cease to exist, or it is possible for any man not to exist, and it is possible that there is no man. This false proposition may be interpreted as follows:[26]

$$(x)\ [(M_1x \text{ v } PM_1x)\ \overline{\supset}\ LA_1x] \cdot (Ex)\ (M_1x \text{ v } PM_1x)$$

Ockham maintains the same doctrine as Albert in regard to assertoric universal affirmative propositions. The *Venerabilis Inceptor* states that for the truth of a universal affirmative proposition, it is required that the predicate stands for all the things for which the subject stands. He holds seemingly against Shyreswood, that the quantifying syncategorema 'every' does not require three significates for the term that it determines; but it is sufficient that the term has one significate, as in the propositions: 'Every God exists,' 'Every phoenix exists.'[27]

The subject and predicate of a universal negative proposition have confused and distributive supposition, provided that the predicate is a common term; for instance, in the proposition: 'No man is a donkey,' the term 'man,' as well as the term 'donkey,' has confused distributive supposition. Hence, applying the definition of distributive supposition, we may reduce the preceding proposition to its singular values in the following fashion: 'No man is a donkey, therefore this man is not this donkey, and this man is not that donkey, and . . . so on for this man in regard to each individual donkey; and that man is not this donkey, and that man is not that donkey, and . . . so on for that man in respect to each individual donkey; and . . . so on for each individual man in relation to each individual donkey.' We may express the consequent of this consequence in our symbolization in the following manner:

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[26] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 2, c. 10, f. 15v—16r; *Ibid.*, t. 4, c. 6, f. 28v; *Quaestiones super libros posteriorum*, q. 16, f. 13v; *Ibid.*, q. 20, f. 16v. Cfr. Buridan, *Consequentiae*, 1. 2, f. C2rv; *Ibid.*, 1. 4, f. D4rv.

[27] Cfr. Ockham, *Summa logicae*, II, c. 4, p. 234.

$$[(Fx_1 \mp \text{sup } Gx_1) \cdot (Fx_1 \mp \text{sup } Gx_2) \cdot (Fx_1 \mp \text{sup } Gx_3). \, . \, . \, .].$$
$$[(Fx_2 \mp \text{sup } Gx_1) \cdot (Fx_2 \mp \text{sup } Gx_2) \cdot (Fx_2 \mp \text{sup } Gx_3). \, . \, . \, .]. \, . \, . \, .$$

From the application of the rule of truth for negative propositions and the foregoing analysis, we may conclude that a universal negative is true, if the predicate does not stand for anything for which the subject stands, or if the subject does not stand for anything. Hence, it is obvious that the universal negative is employed in similar manner to that of the modern symbolic interpretation.[28]

$$(x)\ (Fx \supset —Gx)$$

OPPOSITION

The relationship of the four quantified propositions, when they include the same two terms and in the same order, is expressed by Albert as by the rest of the Scholastics, in the doctrine of opposition, known in traditional logic as the square of opposition. We wish to introduce by definition four expressions composed of several of the following elements; four logical constants, 'A,' 'E,' 'I,' 'O;' two small letters representing term-variables, 'a,' 'b;' the already-mentioned symbol of definition '= def,' whatever is to the left of this sign is the *definiendum*, and whatever is to the right is the *definiens;* the capital letter 'N' to express the denial of a quantified expression; and, finally, the asterisk '*' to indicate rejection of a quantified proposition from the laws of the system.

$$Aba = \text{def } (x)\ (Fx \supset Gx) \cdot (Ex)\ (Fx \cdot Gx)$$
$$Iba = \text{def } (Ex)\ Fx \cdot Gx)$$
$$Eba = \text{def } (x)\ (Fx \supset —Gx)$$
$$Oba = \text{def } (Ex)\ (Fx.\ —Gx) \text{ v } —(Ex)\ Fx \cdot Gx)$$

The relationship of these four quantified propositions, or quantified propositional expressions, is as follows: the universal affirmative and the particular negative are contradictories; the universal negative and the particular affirmative are contradictories; the universal affirmative and the particular affirmative are subalternates; the universal negative and the particular negative are subalternates; the universal affirmative and the universal negative are contraries; the particular affirmative and the particular negative are subcontraries. The logical significance of these relationships is determined in the following rules. Concerning the contradictories, if one is true, the other is false, and vice versa; consequently they cannot be true simultaneously, nor false together. This rule describes the following theses:[29]

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[28] Cfr. footnote 23 of this chapter. "Verbi gratia dicendo: 'Nullus homo est asinus,' tam ly 'homo' quam ly 'asinus' supponit confuse distributive." *Log.*, t. 2, c. 6, f. 12v.

Aba $\equiv$ NOba
Oba $\equiv$ NAba
Eba $\equiv$ NIba
Iba $\equiv$ NEba
N (Aba $\cdot$ Oba)
N (NAba $\cdot$ NOba)
N (Eba $\cdot$ Iba)
N (NEba $\cdot$ NIba)

If a universal proposition is true, then its subalternate particular is true also; but not vice versa. Thus, if the universal affirmative is true, the particular affirmative is true also, but not vice versa; and if the universal negative is true, then, the particular negative is likewise true, but not vice versa.[30]

Aba $\overline{\supset}$ Iba
*Iba $\overline{\supset}$ Aba
Eba $\overline{\supset}$ Oba
*Oba $\overline{\supset}$ Eba

If one proposition of a pair of contraries is true, then the other is false, but not vice versa; consequently, they cannot be both true together, but they can be false simultaneously. Hence, if the universal affirmative is true, the universal negative is false, but not vice versa; and if the universal negative is true, the universal affirmative is false, but not vice versa; and the universal affirmative and the universal negative cannot be true together, but they can be false in conjunction.

Aba $\supset$ NEba
*NEba $\overline{\supset}$ Aba
Eba $\overline{\supset}$ NAba
*NAba $\supset$ Eba
N (Aba $\cdot$ Eba)
P (NAba $\cdot$ NEba)

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[29] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 3, c. 10, f. 23v; "De contradictoriis est regula quod si una est vera, reliqua est falsa, et e converso; unde non possunt simul esse verae neque falsae in aliqua materia; et hoc est unum commune principium in omni scientia." *Ibid.*

[30] "Regula subalternarum: si universalis est vera, sua particularis est vera, sed non e converso." *Log.*, t. 3, c. 10, f. 23v.

Albert adds here that the rule for contraries does not apply solely to universals; but to propositions of other quantity. These two propositions are contrary; and, nevertheless, one is universal and the other is singular: 'Every man is running,' and 'This man is not running.' They are contrary; since they cannot be true together, but can be false simultaneously. That they can be false together, is proven thus; let us assume that Socrates is running, and every other man is at rest; then, this proposition is false, when it refers to Socrates: 'This man is not running;' likewise, this proposition is false: 'Every man is running.'[31]

If one of the subcontraries is false, then the other is true, but not vice versa; consequently, they can be both true; and they are true in conjunction, when both contraries are false. Thus, if the particular affirmative is false, then, the particular negative is true, but not vice versa; and if the particular negative is false, then the particular affirmative is true, but not vice versa. The particular affirmative and the particular negative can both be true together; and when the universal affirmative and the universal negative are both false, then, the subcontraries are true.[32]

$$\mathrm{NIba}\ \overline{\supset}\ \mathrm{Oba}$$
$$*\mathrm{Oba}\ \overline{\supset}\ \mathrm{NIba}$$
$$\mathrm{NOba}\ \overline{\supset}\ \mathrm{Iba}$$
$$*\mathrm{Iba}\ \overline{\supset}\ \mathrm{NOba}$$
$$(\mathrm{NAba} \cdot \mathrm{NEba})\ \overline{\supset}\ (\mathrm{Iba} \cdot \mathrm{Oba})$$

The doctrine of opposition of assertoric propositions of the present time in Albert, as well as in Ockham, Buridan, and other Scholastics, is consistent. It is in accordance with Aristotle's doctrine on the existential import of the universal affirmative and the particular affirmative; but while for Aristotle the universal negative, as well as the particular negative, has existential import, it is not so for the mentioned Scholastics. The modern doctrine about the four quantified propositions is in accordance with these Scholatics in the interpretation of the particular affirmative and the universal negative; but it differs in respect to the remaining two propositions, as we have already pointed out.

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[31] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 3, c. 10, f. 23v; "Secunda regula est de contrariis quod si una est vera, reliqua est falsa, et non e converso; unde non possunt simul esse verae, sed bene possunt esse falsae in materia contingenti." *Ibid.*

[32] "Tertia regula de subcontrariis: si una est falsa, reliqua est vera, et non e converso; possunt enim simul esse verae in contingenti materia, . . . unde quando contrariae sunt simul falsae, tunc subcontrariae sunt simul verae." *Log.*, t. 3, c. 10, f. 23v.

Albert states two rules for relative particles that are equivalent to some of the modern laws of the quantifiers' shift. The first concerns the existential quantifier; if the antecedent of a relative term is a common term, it is not valid to substitute instead of the relative a term similar to the antecedent. For instance, it is not the same to say: 'Some man is running, and some man is disputing;' as to say: 'Some man is running, and he is disputing;' because when the first proposition is true, the second can be false, as in the following situation. Let us assume that one man is running, and another one is disputing; then, it is true to say: 'Some man is running, and some man is disputing;' but it is false to say: 'Some man is running, and he is disputing.' This rule of Albert does not seem entirely correct. The example given clearly points at a rejected equivalence, which is correct:

$$*[(Ex)\ Fx \cdot (Ex)\ Gx] \equiv (Ex)\ (Fx \cdot Gx)$$

This equivalence is rejected because the following consequence does not hold:

$$*[(Ex)\ Fx \cdot (Ex)\ Gx] \supset (Ex)\ (Fx \cdot Gx)$$

But the wording of the rule itself suggests that a correct formal consequence does not hold. Thus, if we have: 'Some man is running, and he is disputing;' then, it follows formally: 'Some man is running, and some man is disputing;' although it does not follow vice versa. Hence, we have the correct theses:

$$(Ex)\ Fx \cdot Gx) \overline{\supset} [(Ex)\ Fx \cdot (Ex)\ Gx]$$

The second rule regards the universal quantifying sign and is entirely correct. If a distributed antecedent is found in one proposition, and its relative in another; then, it is valid to write the antecedent instead of the relative. For instance: 'Every man is running, and he is eating something,' is equivalent to: 'Every man is running, and every man is eating something.[33]

$$(x)\ (Fx \cdot Gx) \equiv (x)\ Fx \cdot (x)\ Gx$$

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[33] "Si antecedens est terminus communis, non est licitum ponere loco relativi terminum consimilem suo antecedenti; unde non est idem dicere: 'Homo currit, et homo disputat,' sicut dicere: 'Homo currit, et ipse disputat;' nam prima existente vera, secunda potest esse falsa; si enim unus homo curreret, et unus alius disputaret, verum esset dicere: 'Homo currit, et homo disputat,' tamen falsum esset dicere: 'Homo currit, et ipse disputat,' ex eo quod alius currit, et alius disputat." *Log.*, t. 2, c. 8, f. 14v. "Si antecedens distributum ponitur in una propositione et relativum suum in alia, ita quod distributio unius cadit super distributionem alterius, tunc non esset inconveniens loco relativi ponere suum antecedens distributum; verbi gratia: 'Omnis homo currit, et ipse comedit,' haec enim valet istam: 'Omnis homo currit, et omnis homo comedit'." *Ibid.*, t. 2, c. 9, f. 14v.

OTHER QUANTIFIED PROPOSITIONS

There are other types of propositions which we are going to analyze following Albert, to find how quantification applies to them. These propositions include singular propositions, propositions with infinite terms, propositions with oblique terms, and propositions with ampliative terms.

A singular proposition is one in which the subject is a singular term. A singular term is one that has only one significate; hence, it can stand for only one thing in a proposition. A singular term may be a proper name, as 'Socrates;' or a common term with a demonstrative adjective, as 'this man.' The subject and the predicate of a singular proposition have discrete supposition. A term has discrete supposition, as we saw, when it stands for one and only one singular value. Hence, a singular proposition is true, if subject and predicate stand for one and only one thing. Singular propositions are treated in some cases as universal propositions, as we shall see in chapter four. For instance: 'Socrates is a man,' can be interpreted as a universal proposition stating that: 'Every thing. which is identical with Socrates is a man.' Consequently, the same rules of truth for the universal propositions are applicable to the singular propositions.[34]

Infinite propositions are those in which an infinite or infinitized term is used. An infinite term is a noun preceded by a denial 'not,' called the infinite or infinitizing negation *(negatio infinitans)*, as we have already mentioned in chapter two. The infinite denial causes a positive or finite term to signify the opposite of its significates. This negation disjoins supposition from signification; since it prevents a positive term from standing in a proposition for those things that it signifies, and makes it to stand for things that it does not signify. The term 'man,' for instance, when infinitized, signifies every thing that is not a man; and when used in a proposition, it stands for everything that it does not signify. The four quantifying constants can be applied to propositions with infinite terms; for instance: 'a non-man is running,' is equivalent to: 'something which is not a man is running;' and this is an universal proposition: 'Every non-man is running,' which is equivalent to: 'Everything which is not a man is running.'[35]

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[34] Cf. *Log.*, t. 1, c. 10, f. 5r; *Ibid.*, t. 3, c. 1, f. 17r; *Ibid.*, t. 2, c. 4, f. 11v; *Ibid.*, c. 6, f. 12v; *Ibid.*, c. 9, f. 15r; *Ibid.*, t. 4, c. 7, f. 29r.

[35] "Sed quia negatio non solum potest cadere super verbum, seu super determinationem appositam determinabili seu terminum adiectivum, sed etiam super determinabile seu terminum substantivum, ut dicendo: 'Non-homo currit,' vel 'Homo est non-currens;' dubitatur quid talis

To further clarify the meaning of an infinite term, Albert contrasts it with privative terms. A privative term is one which is preceded by the privative negation *(negatio privans)*, as the particle 'in,' or 'un;' as we mentioned in chapter two. The difference between an infinite and a private term is that while the former signifies the opposite of a finite term; the latter signifies not only the opposite of a positive term, but it connotes an aptitude to the property signified by the positive term. Thus, we have the positive term 'just;' the infinite term 'non-just' signifies everything that is not just; and the privative term 'unjust' signifies everything that is not just, but which is fitted to be just. This is the reason why this proposition is rightly conceded: 'A stone is non-just'; but this other is denied: 'A stone is unjust,' since a stone is not fitted to be just. Another special property of the infinite terms is that the less general a finite term is, the more general is the infinite term; and the more general a finite term is, the less general is the infinite. The reason for this is that the more general a term is, the more significates it has; and the term that has the opposite meaning has less significates in direct proportion to the scope of the first; which is the case with the infinite term, which signifies the opposite of the finite term. For instance, the term 'man' signifies more things than the term 'Socrates;' hence, the term 'non-man' signifies less things than the term 'non-Socrates;' since Plato is non-Socrates, but Plato is not a non-man; thus, everything that is a non-man, is non-Socrates; but not vice versa.[36]

Propositions with oblique terms are those in which terms are used in oblique cases; that is, in cases other than the nominative or vocative. These oblique terms indicate what in modern logic is called the logic of

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negatio operetur. Respondetur quod ipsa facit terminum substantivum seu determinabile supponere pro eo de quo ipse terminus potest negative verificari. Unde ista propositio: 'Non-homo currit,' valet istam: 'Aliquid quod non est homo currit;' et ista: 'Omnis non-homo currit,' valet istam: 'Omne quod non est homo currit.' Talis igitur negatio dividit suppositionem a significatione; prohibet enim terminum supponere pro illis rebus quas significat, faciens ipsum supponere pro illis quas non significat." *Log.*, t. I, c. 6, f. 3v—4r.

[36] Cfr. *Log.*, t. I, c. 5, f. 3v; "De nomine infinito notandum est quod differentia talis est inter nomen privativum et infinitum, sicut inter ly 'non-musicus' et inter ly 'inmusicus;' quia nomen infinitum significat oppositum termini finiti sive eius significati sine connotatione alicuius aptitudinis, sicut ly 'non-musicus' significat omne quod non est musicus, et 'non-iustus' significat omne quod non est iustum; sed nomen privativum sicut ly 'iniustus' significat oppositum illius quod significatur per suum positivum connotans aptitudinem ad significativum nominis positivi, sicut ly 'iniustus' significat omne quod non est iustum, quod aptum natum est esse iustum. Et per hoc bene conceditur ista: 'Lapis est non-iustus;' sed negatur ista: 'Lapis est iniustus,' propter hoc quod lapis non est aptus natus esse iustus." *Ibid.*

relations. This part of logic, although very important, is scarcely developed in Albert as well as in the other Scholastic logicians. The four quantifying constants are applied to propositions with oblique terms. We shall come back to this point in the next chapters.[37]

Amplified propositions or propositions with ampliative terms are those in which an ampliative term is used. Ampliative terms include the copula of the past or future time, some predicates and verbs, and the modal terms. We shall here examine the logical significance of these syncategorematic terms, except the modalities which do not belong to our study.

The subject of any proposition of the past is amplified to stand for that which was; for instance, in the proposition: 'Something white was black,' the term 'white' stands not only for that which actually is white, but also for that which was white; hence, the proposition means: 'What is white or what was white, was black.' The predicate of any proposition of the past has appellation as to its form; that is, for the truth of such a proposition, it is required that its predicate was at some past time verified in a proposition of the present of a demonstrative pronoun referring to that for which the subject term stands in the proposition of the past. For instance, for the truth of the proposition: 'Something white was black,' it is required that this proposition was true at some past time: 'This is black,' in which the pronoun 'this' refers to that for which the subject of this proposition stands: 'Something white was black.' This is not the case with the subject; because for the truth of the proposition under examination, and assuming that this thing which is now white, was black at some past time; then, it is not required that the term 'white' be the subject in a proposition of the present in which the predicate is the term 'black.' It is sufficient for the truth of the proposition, that a demonstrative pronoun takes the place of the subject; hence, it is sufficient that this was true at some time in the past; 'This is black,' in which the pronoun 'this' refers to the thing for which the subject stands in this proposition: 'Something white was black.' Thus, we realize that the subject is amplified in a disjunctive manner; it stands in disjunction for that which is or that which was; while the predicate has appellation as to its form; that is, it stands for that which was.[38]

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[37] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 1, c. 5, f. 3v; *Ibid.*, t. 4, c. 4, f. 27r.

[38] "Omnis terminus supponens respectu verbi de praeterito ampliatur ad supponendum pro eo quod fuit; verbi gratia, dicendo: 'Album fuit nigrum,' in ista propositione ly 'album' non solum accipitur pro eo quod est album, verum etiam pro eo quod fuit album; unde ista: 'Album fuit nigrum,' significat quod: 'Illud quod est album vel quod fuit album, fuit

We further gather that if subject and predicate stand for the same thing in the past, it is not required that they stood for the same thing at the same time of the past; but it is enough that they stood for the same thing at different moments of the past. Consequently, we may paraphrase the proposition: 'Something black was white,' in this manner: 'Something which is white at the present or which was white at some moment of the past, was black at some moment of the past.' To interpret amplified sentences in symbolic notation, we need some new symbols besides those already employed. We symbolize the present moment by a constant 'h;' time prior to the present moment, by '$>$;' and time posterior to the present moment, by '$<$.' Furthermore, we agree that when any quantified expression has no ampliative signs, it is to be understood as of the present time; thus the constant 'h' will always be used implicitly. Let us now symbolize the four types of quantified propositions of the past.

The universal affirmative: 'Every B was an A':

(1) $(x)\,[(Fx \vee > Fx) \supset\, > Gx] \cdot (Ex)\, Fx \vee > Fx)$

(2) $> Aba = \mathrm{def}\ (1)$

The particular affirmative: 'Some B was an A':

(3) $(Ex)\,[(Fx \vee > Fx) \cdot > Gx]$

(4) $> Iba = \mathrm{def}\ (3)$

The universal negative: 'Every B was not an A':

(5) $(x)\,[(Fx \vee > 6x) \supset - > Gx]$

(6) $> Eba = \mathrm{def}\ (5)$

The particular negative: 'Some B was not an A':

(7) $(Ex)\,[(Fx \vee > Fx) \cdot - > Gx] \vee -(Ex)\,[(Fx \vee > Fx) \cdot > Gx]$

(8) $> Oba = \mathrm{def}\ (7)$

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nigrum'." *Log.*, t. 2, c. 10, f. 15r; "In propositione de praeterito praedicatum sequens verbum appellat suam formam; id est, ad veritatem illius propositionis requiritur quod eius praedicatum fuerit aliquando verificabile in propria forma in propositione de praesenti de pronomine demonstrante illud pro quo supponit subiectum illius propositionis de praeterito; verbi gratia, dicendo: 'Album fuit nigrum,' ad veritatem istius requiritur quod haec aliquando fuerit vera, si fuisset formata: 'Hoc est nigrum,' demonstrando per ly 'hoc' illud pro quo supponit subiectum istius propositionis: 'Album fuit nigrum.' Et sciendum est quod subiectum non sic appellat suam formam; nam ad veritatem istius: 'Album fuit nigrum,' posito quod ista res sit alba quae prius erat nigra, non requiritur quod iste terminus 'album' subiiciatur in propria forma in propositione de praesenti respectu istius termini 'nigrum,' quia nunquam haec fuit vera: 'Album est nigrum;' sed sufficit quod pronomen demonstrativum ponatur loco illius, unde sufficit quod aliquando haec fuerit vera: 'Hoc est nigrum,' demonstrando per ly 'hoc' illud pro quo supponit subiectum istius propositionis: 'Album fuit nigrum'." *Ibid.*, c. 11, f. 16v.

Albert further inquires about the general interpretation of propositions in which the subjects are amplified. He poses the question whether such propositions have to be expanded into disjunctions, or into categoricals with disjunct subjects. For instance: 'Some man is dead,' if expanded into a disjunction, results as: 'Something which actually is a man is dead, or something which was a man is dead.' The same proposition is expanded into a categorical with disjunct subject thus: 'Something which is now or which was a man, is dead.' Albert rejects the opinion of those who expand these propositions into disjunctions; because, then, two contradictories would be true together, as in this case: 'No creator can be God, and some creator can be God.' The first proposition is true; because it is expanded into a disjunction, one of which parts is true: 'Nothing which is now a creator can be God, or nothing which can be a creator can be God;' assuming that God does not create, the first part of the disjunction is true, since it is a negative proposition whose subject does not stand for any actual value; consequently, the whole disjunction is true. Likewise, this proposition is true: 'Some creator can be God;' because it is expanded into a disjunction, which has a true component under the same assumption as the preceding proposition; the true part is the second part of this disjunction: 'Something which is actually a creator can be God, or something which can be a creator can be God.' Albert rejects another opinion which would expand a proposition with amplified subject into a copulation, in case it is a universal; and into a disjunction if it has other quantity. But this opinion does not satisfy Albert; because in the case of the universals, this proposition, which Albert concedes as true, would be false: 'Every creator necessarily is God;' this proposition would be false in case that God does not create; because it would be expanded into this copulation: 'Every actual creator is necessarily God, and every possible creator is necessarily God,' but the first part of this copulative proposition is false, hence, the whole copulative is false.

All propositions with amplified subjects, Albert decides, no matter what quality or quantity they have, are to be explanded into categoricals with disjunct subjects. Hence, Albert concedes some propositions, which at first glance, have the appearance of contradiction; but which when expanded in the manner explained, are found to be true and harmless; as: 'A child was an old man,' which means: 'What is now a child or what was a child, was an old man;' and this is true, since you who now are a century old were an old man, and you yourself were a child.[39]

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[39] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 2, c. 10, f. 16r.

An important thing to notice is that the ampliation of the suject is nullified, or restricted, by adding immediately before the subject the expression 'which is,' or 'which is at the present time,' or 'which is now,' or similar ones. The ampliation of the term 'white' in: 'something white was black,' is limited thus: 'something which is now white was black,' the term 'white' in the last proposition does not stand for that which actually is or was, but only for that which is at the present time.[40]

If we symbolized 'white' by 'W_1' and 'black' by 'B_1;' then, the amplified proposition is:

$$(Ex)\ [(W_1x \mathrm{\ v} > B_1x) \cdot > B_1x$$

and the restricted proposition:

$$(Ex)\ (W_1x \cdot > B_1x)$$

The subject of a proposition of the future rime is amplified to stand for that which is or that which will be; for instance, the proposition: 'Something white will be black,' means: 'Something which is now white or which will be white, will be black.' The predicate of this type of propositions has appellation as to its form; that is, the predicate will be verified in some future time in proposition of the present in which the subject is a demonstrative pronoun, which stands for the same thing for which the subject stands in the proposition of the future. Thus, for the truth of the proposition: 'Something white will be black,' it is required that in some future time this proposition will be true: 'This is black,' in which the pronoun 'this' stands for the same thing for which the subject of this proposition stands: 'something white will be black.' Accordingly, these propositions are to be conceded in the sense just explained: 'An old man will be a child,' 'The future will be past.'[41]

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[40] "Item, notandum quod ampliatio terminorum in propositione tollitur aliquando per additionem illam 'quod est;' unde quamvis in ista propositione: 'Album fuit nigrum,' subiectum supponat ampliative pro eo quod est vel fuit; tamen si dicatur: 'Quod est album fuit nigrum,' ista ampliatio tollitur." *Log.*, t. 2, c. 10, f. 16r.

[41] "Terminus supponens respectu verbi de futuro ampliatur ad supponendum quo eo quod erit; sicut hic: 'Homo generabitur,' 'Album erit nigrum,' et consimiles; unde in qualibet istarum subiectum supponit pro eo quod est vel erit. . . . Similiter sensus secundae est: 'Quod est album vel quod erit album, erit nigrum'." *Log.*, t. 2, c. 10, f. 15v; "In omni propositione de futuro praedicatum sequens verbum appellat suam formam; id est, quod aliquando in eadem forma erit verificabile in propositione de praesenti de pronomine demonstrante illud pro quo supponit subiectum istius propositionis de futuro; verbi gratia, dicendo: 'Album erit nigrum,' ad hoc enim quod haec sit vera requiritur quod haec aliquando sit vera de praesenti: 'Hoc est nigrum,' si formabitur, demonstrando per ly 'hoc' illud pro quo supponit subiectum istius propositionis: 'Album erit nigrum'." *Ibid.*, c. 11, f. 16v.

Let us now symbolize the four quantified propositions of the future. The universal affirmative: 'Every B will be an A':

(1) $(x)\ [(Fx\ v < Fx) \supset\ < Gx] \cdot (Ex)\ (Fx\ v < Fx)$
(2) $< Aba = \mathrm{def}\ (1)$

The particular affirmative: 'Some B will be an A':

(3) $(Ex)\ [(Fx\ v < Fx) \cdot < Gx]$
(4) $< Iba = \mathrm{def}\ (3)$

The universal negative: 'No B will be an A':

(5) $(x)\ [(Fx\ v < Fx) \supset - < Gx]$
(6) $< Eba = \mathrm{def}\ (5)$

The particular negative: 'Some B will not be an A':

(7) $(Ex)\ [(Fx\ v < Fx) \cdot - < Gx]\ v - (Ex)\ [(Fx\ v < Fx) \cdot < Gx]$
(8) $< Oba = \mathrm{def}\ (7)$

There are other terms which have ampliative power, and Albert states the following rules about them. The subject of a proposition in which the predicate is a participle of the past, is amplified to stand for that which is or was; even if the copula is of the present time. For instance, the term 'man' is amplified to stand for that which is or was, in this proposition: 'some man is dead.' The subject of a proposition in which the predicate is a term expressing future time, is amplified to stand for that which is or will be, although the copula is of the present time. For instance, the proposition: 'Some man is to be generated' *(Homo est generandus)*, denotes that: 'Something which is now a man or which will be a man, is to be generated.'[42]

All verbs, even if they are in the present time, which are transitive to present things, as well as future, past, or possible amplify the terms which are in the accusative case as the objects of these transitive verbs, so as to stand for objects of the present, past, or future time, or simply for possible objects. Such verbs are: 'to understand,' 'to know,' 'to wish,' 'to signify,' 'to supposit,' and similar ones. And as these verbs in the active voice amplify their accusatives, so they amplify their nominatives when they are in the passive voice. For instance, the term 'rose' in the proposition: 'I am thinking of a rose,' is amplified for that which is, was, will be, or is possible; and the same term has this type of ampliation in the proposition: 'A rose is thought of by me.'[43]

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[42] Cfr., *Log.*, t. 2, c. 10, f. 15v.
[43] Cfr., *Log.*, t. 2, c. 10, f. 15v.

Consequently, it follows that it is not always a valid consequence to infer a proposition with the copula *secundo adiacens* from a proposition with the copula *tertio adiacens;* and this holds in the case of propositions with ampliative terms. For instance, it does not follow that: 'A man is dead, therefore a man is or exists;' and it does not follow either: 'A rose is understood, therefore a rose is or exists.' Nevertheless, all verbs whose action has to determine a present thing do not amplify their accusative objects; as for instance: 'to eat,' 'to drink,' and similar ones. Hence, these are valid consequences: 'I am eating bread, therefore bread exists,' 'I am drinking wine, therefore wine exists.'[44]

This concludes our chapter on the analysis of propositions as to their quality, quantity, opposition, and ampliation; and our comparison of Albert's doctrine with those of Aristotle, some of Albert's predecessors or contemporaries, and to the modern theories. In the next chapter we shall study formal consequences from one quantified proposition to another.

CHAPTER IV

QUANTIFIED CONSEQUENCES

This chapter deals with formal quantified assertoric consequences; that is, it is concerned with formal assertoric consequences from one quantified proposition to another. Some of the rules regard consequences which are equivalences; others refer to consequences in which one proposition implies another but not vice versa.

EQUIVALENCES

First rule. If 'p' and 'q' are two propositions, and every cause of truth for one of the propositions is a cause of truth for the other, and vice versa; then, both propositions imply each other. And, if every cause of truth for 'p' is a cause of truth for 'q', but there is a cause of truth for 'q' which is not a cause of truth for 'p;' then, 'p' implies 'q,' but 'q' does not imply 'p.' A cause of truth for a proposition is that which is sufficient to verify the proposition; for instance, for the truth of the proposition: 'A man is running,' it is sufficient that Socrates is running; likewise, it is sufficient that Plato is running; and, in the same manner, it is sufficient that any single man is running; consequently, any of these singular propositions stating that an individual man is running, is a cause of truth for the proposition: 'A is running.' But no singular proposition is sufficient to verify this universal affirmative: 'Every man is running;' hence, no singular proposition alone is a cause of truth for the universal affirmative. This rule is sometimes stated thus: Whenever two propositions have the same and equal number of causes of truth, these two propositions mutually imply each other. And, when there are two propositions in such a relationship that all causes of truth for one are causes of truth for the other, and not vice versa; then, the one that has more causes of truth is consequent to the other that has less causes of truth, and not vice versa.[1]

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[44] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 2, c. 10, f. 15v.

This rule has three parts. The first is proven thus. If every cause of truth for 'p' is a cause of truth for 'q,' and vice versa; then, if it is so as 'p' signifies, it is also so as 'q' signifies; consequently, 'p' implies 'q.' The same reasoning holds in the opposite direction, because every cause of truth for 'q,' is a cause of truth for 'p.' The second part is valid also, because if every cause of truth for 'p' is a cause of truth for 'q,' but not vice versa; then, if it is thus as 'p' signifies, then it is so as 'q' signifies; hence, 'q' is consequent to 'p,' by the definition of antecedent and consequent. The third part of the rule is proven in this manner. If there is some cause of truth for 'q' which is not also a cause of truth for 'p;' then, it can be so as 'q' signifies, while it is not so as 'p' signifies; consequently, 'q' is not antecedent to 'p,' by the definition of antecedent and consequent.[2]

This rule establishes three important facts: the relationship of equivalence between two propositions, which is mutual implication or consequence; the one-sided relationship of consequence, in which a proposition is antecedent to another, but not vice versa; and the principle of rejection for consequence.

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[1] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 4, c. 2, f. 25r; "Si A et B sunt duae propositiones, et omnis causa veritatis unius est causa veritatis alterius, tunc A et B mutuo se consequuntur; et si nulla causa veritatis sit ipsius A, quin sit causa veritatis ipsius B, quamvis sit aliqua causa veritatis ipsius B quae tamen non est causa veritatis ipsius A; tunc ad A sequitur B, et A ad B non sequitur A." *Ibid.* Cfr. *Ibid.*, t. 3, c. 3, f. 18r. "Per causam veritatis intelligo illud quod sufficit ad veritatem illius propositionis; verbi gratia, ad veritatem istius propositionis: 'Homo currit,' sufficit quod Sortes currat, similiter sufficit quod Plato currat, et sic de aliis; ergo Sortem currere est causa veritatis istius propositionis: 'Homo currit,' similiter Platonem currere est causa veritatis eiusdem, et sic de aliis." *Ibid.*

[2] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 4, c. 2, f. 25r.

To clarify further the notion of propositions that have more or less causes of truth, we are going to analyze a passage in which Albert treats this point. He tries to establish whether a proposition with a distributed term has more or less causes of truth than a proposition with the same term but undistributed. Albert answer that a proposition with an undistributed term has by its form more causes of truth, than a proposition with the same term when it is distributed; and all other terms are the same in both propositions. The reason is that the proposition with the undistributed term has by its form from the part of this term, as many causes of truth as there are singular values for which the term stands. But the proposition with the same term when it is distributed, cannot have by its form, but one cause of its truth; viz., that it is so as the proposition signifies for any of the singular values of the common term, and not for only one, or two, or whatever number, except for any and all. For instance, the proposition: 'A man is running,' is true, if only Socrates is running, or if Plato alone is running, or if any individual man is running; and it would not be less true if all men were running simultaneously. But it is otherwise for the truth of the proposition: 'Every man is running,' which by its form has only one cause of truth; viz., that each man is running. Sometimes a proposition with an undistributed term, by reason of its matter or material elements, has no more causes of truth than its parallel with a distributed term; and this is the case when both propositions cannot be true by reason of their matter; for instance, the proposition: 'A man is a donkey,' has no more causes of truth than the proposition: 'Every man is a donkey;' since the first proposition has no cause of truth at all, it has no more causes of truth than the second; but that by its matter, not by its form.[3]

Any proposition with a common term having purely confused supposition has more causes of truth, than a proposition with the same term having determinate supposition in respect to a distributed term; and that by the form of the propositions. Let us analyze these two propositions: (1) 'Some G is every F,' and (2) 'Every F is a G.' Proposition (1) has from the part of 'G' as many causes of truth as there are singular values of 'G;' since the proposition would be true if this G is every F, and if that G is every F, and so on for any individual value of 'G.' Proposition (2) would be true if every F is this G, or if every F is that G, and so on for any G; but (2) has another cause of truth that (1) does not have; viz., that this F is this G, or this F is that G, or . . . so on for this F in regard to each G; and that F is this G, or that F is that G, or . . . so on for that F in respect to each G; and . . . so on for each F in relation to each G. Consequently, this proposition is false: 'Some animal is every man,' while this is true: 'every man is an animal.' If the subject and predicate of any proposition both have determinate supposition, then, such a proposition has more causes of truth, than a second proposition with the same terms but with one having distributed supposition and the other merely confused supposition. For instance, the proposition: 'Every F is a G,' has less causes of truth than the proposition: 'an F is a G.'[4]

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[3] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 3, c. 3, f. 18r.

Second rule. If 'p' and 'q' are two propositions, and they have the same quality, the same terms with the same type of supposition, and the same copula; then, 'p' and 'q' mutually imply each other. This rule is based on the immediately preceding; because propositions which have the same and equal number of causes of truth imply each other; but if 'p' and 'q' are propositions with the aforesaid properties; then, they have the same causes of truth; therefore, they imply each other. These propositions have the same causes of truth; because the causes of truth for a proposition cannot be different from the causes of truth of another, but due to these reasons; the propositions have different terms; or if they have the same terms, these terms have different supposition; or they have a different copula; or the denial affects the copula in different ways; but none of these elements is different in the propositions under consideration; therefore, 'p' and 'q' have the same causes of truth.[5]

Third rule. From the second rule Albert draws some conclusions concerning equipollences for assertoric propositions in the sense defined by Peter of Spain; that is, equipollences are thought of as a certain convertibility of propositions resulting from different combinations of the signs of quantification and the denial 'not.' Albert refers to three of the rules of equipollence as a well-known fact. These rules are found in

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[4] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 3, c. 3, f. 18r.

[5] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 4, c. 2, f. 25r; "Si A et B sunt duae propositiones eiusdem qualitatis, et de eisdem terminis eodem modo supponentibus, et de eadem copula, mutuo se consequuntur consequentia formali; et capitur 'idem' hic pro omnino consimili." *Ibid.*

Peter's *Summulae logicales* and in Buridan's *Compendium logicae*. The first rule of equipollence is that a universal or particular sign preceded by the denial 'not' is equivalent to its contradictory. Dorp, commenting on this text of Buridan, remarks that this rule is not correctly phrased; because nothing is equivalent to its contradictory. Consequently, he interprets the rule as expressing that given two contradictory propositions, if the negative denial is placed before one of the propositions, so as to affect the proposition as a whole; then, the resulting expression composed of the denial and the denied proposition is equivalent to the other proposition. Albert refers to this rule when he states that, according to one of the rules of equipollences, this consequence is valid: 'It is not the case that every man is running, therefore some man is not running;' the consequence is valid because both propositions have the same copula, the same quality, the same having identical supposition. The whole rule describes the following theses:[6]

$$\begin{gathered} \mathrm{Aba} \equiv \mathrm{NOba} \\ \mathrm{Oba} \equiv \mathrm{NAba} \\ \mathrm{Eba} \equiv \mathrm{NIba} \\ \mathrm{Iba} \equiv \mathrm{NEba} \end{gathered}$$

The second rule of equipollences, to which Albert refers, is that a universal sign followed by the denial 'not' is equipollent to its contrary; for instance: 'Every man is not running,' is equipollent to: 'No man is running.' The theses described by the rule are the following:

$$\begin{gathered} \mathrm{ANba} \equiv \mathrm{Eba} \\ \mathrm{ENba} \equiv \mathrm{Aba} \end{gathered}$$

The third rule of equipollence is that if a denial is placed before and after a sign of quantity, it is equipollent to its subalternate; for instance, this consequence is valid: 'It is not the case that every man is not running, therefore some man is running.' The following laws are described by this rule:

$$\begin{gathered} \mathrm{NANba} \equiv \mathrm{Iba} \\ \mathrm{NINba} \equiv \mathrm{AbA} \\ \mathrm{NENba} \equiv \mathrm{ObA} \\ \mathrm{NONba} \equiv \mathrm{Eba} \end{gathered}$$

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[6] Cfr. Peter of Spain, *Summulae logicales*, t. 1, p. 8—9; Buridan, *Compendium logicae*, t. 1, f. B7v—B8v; J. Dorp, *Expositio super logicam Buridani* (Venice, 1499), f. B7v; Albert of Saxony, *Log.*, t. 4, c. 2, f. 25r.

This is the manner, Albert concludes, that equipollences among assertoric propositions hold by virtue of the second rule of this chapter. Consequently, the square or opposition can be enlarged by the following equipollences:[7]



CONSEQUENCES WITH SIMPLY QUANTIFIED PROPOSITIONS AND WITH AMPLIFIED PROPOSITIONS

Fourth rule. A proposition with a distributed term formally implies another with the same term undistributed; but the consequence does not hold vice versa. This rule is based on the first rule of this chapter; and it itself is the foundation for all the consequences by subalternation, and for the conversions *per accidens*. We symbolized in chapter three the accepted and rejected theses of subalternation; we shall symbolize subsequently in this chapter consequences by conversion *per accidens*.[8]

Fifth rule. No proposition with a term having merely confused supposition, by reason of a preceding distributed term, implies a proposition with the same term having determinate supposition, if the distribution of the other term is not removed; but the proposition under consideration implies the other if the distribution is removed. For instance, it does not follow: (1) 'Every man is an animal, therefore an animal is every man;' but it does follow: (2) 'Every man is an animal, therefore an animal is a man.' The difference between (1) and (2) is clearly seen, if we symbolize the structure of both propositions. Symbolizing 'man' by 'M_1,' and 'animal' by 'A_1,' we have:[9]

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[7] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 4, c. 2, f. 25r.

[8] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 4, c. 2, f. 25r; "Ad omnem propositionem de termino distributo sequitur alia de eodem termino non distributo, aliis similiter manentibus, et hoc in consequentia formali; et non e converso . . . Et per illam regulam tenent omnes consequentiae per subalternationem, et omnes conversiones propositionum universalium in particulares." *Ibid.*

$$(1)\ {*}\ [(x)\ (M_1x \supset A_1x) \cdot (Ex)\ (M_1x \cdot A_1x)]\ \overline{\supset}\ (Ex)\ [A_1x \cdot (y)\ (M_1y \supset y = x)]$$

$$(2)\ \ (x)\ [(M_1x \supset A_1x) \cdot (Ex)\ (M_1x \cdot A_1x)]\ \overline{\supset}\ (Ex)\ A_1x \cdot M_1x)$$

Sixth rule. The following consequence is not valid whenever the propositions involved are not universals: (1) 'Some B was an A, therefore something which is now a B was an A;' but the consequence in the opposite direction does hold: (2) 'Something which is now a B was an A, therefore some B was an A.' Consequence (1) is invalid because in the antecedent the subject is amplified to the past, while in the consequent it is restricted to the present; consequently, the antecedent has more causes of truth than the consequent, and it is not valid to infer a proposition that has less causes of truth from one that has more. Consequence (2) is valid because the subject of the antecedent is restricted to the present, while it is amplified to the past in the consequent; hence, the antecedent has less causes of truth than the consequent, and a proposition that has less causes of truth implies another that has more, by the first rule of this chapter. By the same reason this is a valid consequence: 'Something which was a B was an A, therefore some B was an A;' but this consequence is invalid: 'Something which is a B was an A, therefore something which was a B was an A.' Using constants instead of variables, the following consequence is not valid: 'Some animal was in the Ark of Noah, therefore something which is now an animal was in the Ark of Noah.' This rule and the ones that follow regarding consequences with amplified propositions may easily be symbolized following the interpretation of the amplified propositions given in chapter three, but we shall omit the symbolization.[10]

Seventh rule. This consequence is not formal: 'Some B will be an A, therefore something which is now a B will be an A;' but vice versa the consequence is valid: 'Something which is now a B will be an A, therefore some B will be an A.' This rule is proven in similar manner as the immediately preceding.[11]

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[9] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 4, c. 2, f. 25r; "Ad nullam propositionem de aliquo termino supponente confuse tantum, propter distributionem termini praecedentis, sequitur propositio de illo termino supponente determinate non remota distributione; sed bene sequitur remota distributione." *Ibid.*

[10] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 4, c. 2, f. 25rv; "Nullae tales consequentiae sunt formales: 'B fuit A, ergo quod est B fuit A;' sed bene sequitur e converso, et hoc quando propositio non est una universalis." *Iid.*, f. 25r.

Eighth rule. This consequence is not valid: 'Some B is an A, therefore something which is now a B is an A;' this consequence is not valid when 'A' is an ampliative term, and, consequently, 'A' amplifies the subject and causes the antecedent to have more causes of truth than the consequent; but it is a valid consequence to argue in the opposite direction: 'Something which is now a B is an A, therefore some B is an A.'[12]

Ninth rule. Consequences of the following form are not valid, when the propositions involved are universal affirmatives: (1) 'Every A is a B, therefore everything which is now an A is a B,' (2) 'Everything which is now an A is a B, therefore every A is a B.' None of these consequences is valid because the antecedent has a cause of truth which is not a cause of truth for the consequent; hence, by the first rule of this chapter, the consequences are not valid. The ampliation of the subject of the antecedent is not prevented in the first consequence, but the subject of the consequent is restricted to the present; hence, the first has a cause of truth that the second does not have; for instance, it does not follow: 'Every man is dead, therefore everything which is now a man is dead.' Likewise, the antecedent of the second consequence can be true without the consequent; because it has a cause ot truth that the consequent does not have; for instance, it does not follow: 'Everything which is now a man is baptized, therefore every man is baptized;' the consequence is invalid, because assuming that all actual men are baptized, and before them there were many who were not baptized and are now dead; then, the antecedent of the consequence is true, and the consequence false. The antecedent is true by the assumption; and the consequent is false, since by reason of the term 'baptized' (a participle of the past in Latin: *baptizatus*), the subject of the consequent is amplified to stand for that which is or was a man; hence, the consequent means: 'Everything that is now a man or was a man, is baptized,' and this is false; since Adam is or was a man, and nevertheless he is not baptized.[13]

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[11] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 4, c. 2, f. 25v; "Nullae tales consequentiae sunt formales: 'B erit A, ergo quod est B erit A;' sed bene e converso, scilicet: 'Quod est B erit A ergo B erit A'." *Ibid.*

[12] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 4, c. 2, f. 25v; "Et universaliter, quandocumque subiectum ampliatur et non est propositio universalis, nullae tales consequentiae sunt bonae nec tales valent respectu huius verbi 'est' et praedicati ampliativi, scilicet: 'B est A, igitur quod est B est A;' . . . sed bene e converso." *Ibid.*

[13] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 4, c. 2, f. 25v; "Omnes tales consequentiae non valent quando propositiones sunt universales affirmativae, ut: 'Omne A est B, ergo omne quod est A est B;' nec e converso, scilicet: 'Omne quod est A est B, ergo omne A est B'."

Tenth rule. Consequences with universal negative propositions and which have similar form to the following are not valid: 'Nothing which is now a B is an A, therefore no B is an A;' but vice versa the consequences are valid. For instance, this consequence is not valid: 'Nothing which is an actual man is dead, therefore no man is dead;' it is not a valid consequence because the antecedent has a cause of truth that the consequent does not have, since for the truth of the first it is sufficient that there be no actual man that is dead. This is not sufficient for the truth of the consequent; because it is required for its truth that no man who exists now or who existed in the past, is dead. But every cause of truth for the consequent is a cause of truth for the antecedent; hence, to infer the antecedent from the consequent is valid, by the first rule of this chapter.[14]

Eleventh rule. The following consequences are valid among quantified propositions, affirmative or negative, with incomplex subjects and in which no ampliative terms are used: 'Every B is an A, therefore everything which is a B is an A,' and vice versa; 'Something which is now a B is an A, therefore some B is an A,' and vice versa. The last consequence fails *in terminis divinis;* that is, when the divine terms of the Blessed Trinity are used to replace the variables; for instance, it does not follow: 'What is now the Father is the Son, therefore the Father is the Son;' the consequence does not hold because in the divine Trinity one and the same thing is simultaneously triune and simple and an indivisible unity. We shall come back to the problem of the divine terms in the next chapter. In all other propositions with incomplex subjects and no ampliative terms, the aforesaid consequences are valid. Albert remarks that these consequences are valid only when there is question of propositions with incomplex subjects, and not otherwise; because this consequence is not valid: 'Every animal or tree is an animal, therefore everything which is an animal or a tree, is an animal;' the antecedent is true and in it only the term 'animal' is distributed, but the consequent is false because the term 'animal' as well as the term 'tree' is distributed. It is not clear how Albert would explain the verification of the antecedent; perhaps the antecedent might be interpreted as a disjunction of a universal and a particular, and the consequent as a universal with complex subject; in which case the antecedent is true, but the consequent is false. Let 'A_1' be 'animal, and 'T_1' be 'tree;' then, the antecedent is the first of the following symbolic expressions, and the consequent is the second.[15]

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[14] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 4, c. 2, f. 25v; "Nullae tales consequentiae sunt formales: 'Nullum quod est B est A, ergo nullum B est A,' scilicet quod propositiones sint universales negativae; sed bene est e converso." *Ibid.*

$$[(x)\ (A_1x \supset A_1x) \cdot (Ex)\ A_1x]\ v\ (Ex)\ (T_1x \cdot A_1x)$$
$$(x)\ [(A_1x\ v\ T_1x] \supset A_1x] \cdot (Ex)\ A_1x\ v\ T_1x)$$

CONVERSIONS OF SIMPLY QUANTIFIED PROPOSITIONS AND OF PROPOSITIONS WITH INFINITE TERMS

Twelfth rule. This rule concerns conversions by contraposition in which infinitized terms are employed. The Scholastics distinguish three types of conversion; simple, *per accidens*, and by contraposition. Conversion by contraposition was usually applied by some of the Scholastics to the universal affirmative and the particular negative. For instance, Peter of Spain in his *Summulae logicales*, and Buridan in his *Compendium logicae*, admit the validity of conversion by contraposition; but such is not the case with Albert of Saxony and Dorp. Albert states that no conversion by contraposition is a formal consequence. Conversion by contraposition is given when the subject of an original proposition is made the predicate of a second, and the predicate of the first becomes the subject of the second; besides, the quality and quantity of the original proposition is retained in the second, but the positive terms of the first are changed into negative or infinitized terms in the second. Albert proves that no conversion by contraposition is a formal consequence, because there are cases in which the antecedent is true and the consequent false. Dorp specifies that the consequence does not hold when the antecedent is an universal affirmative in which the predicate is a transcendent term (the universal class of modern logic); and the consequence is not valid either when the antecedent is a particular negative in which the subject is an empty term. Albert gives the following example to disprove the validity of a consequence by contrapositive conversion of a universal affirmative: 'Every man is a being, therefore every non-being is a non-man;' the antecedent is true, and the consequent is false; hence, by the definition of consequence, the first proposition is not antecedent to the second. The consequent is false, since it is an affirmative proposition without ampliative terms in which the subject stands for nothing. Consequently, the following thesis is rejected:

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[15] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 4, c. 2, f. 25v; "In quibuscumque propositionibus in subiectis simplicibus in quibus non ponitur aliquis terminus ampliativus, tales consequentiae sunt bonae, ut: 'Omne B est A, ergo omne quod est B est A,' similiter e converso; 'Quod est B est A, ergo B est A,' et e converso, praeterquam in terminis divinis non sequitur. . . . Et similiter sic est in negativis." *Ibid.*

$$*\mathrm{Aba} \ \overline{\supset}\ \mathrm{Ananb}$$

Albert disproves the validity of a consequence by contrapositive conversion of a particular negative by this instance: 'Some chimera is not a man, therefore some non-man is not a non-chimera;' this consequence is not valid because the antecedent is true, and the consequent is false. The antecedent is true, since it is a negative proposition in which the subject does not stand for anything; but the consequent is false, because its contradictory is true: 'Every non-man is a non-chimera.' Hence, this thesis is rejected:

$$*\mathrm{Oba} \ \overline{\supset}\ \mathrm{Onanb}$$

Albert finally remarks that conversion by contraposition is a formal consequence, if it is assumed that each of the terms entering the contrapositive consequence is not empty. This position of Albert of Saxony and Dorp on contrapositive conversion is similar to Reichenbach's and Black's stand on the same point, which we briefly studied in the beginning of chapter three.[16]

Thirteenth rule. A negative proposition with a positive predicate does not imply formally a proposition composed of the same terms of the first but with the predicate infinitized. For instance, this is not a formal consequence: 'Some chimera is not a man, therefore some chimera is a non-man;' because the antecedent is true and the consequent is false; hence, by the definition of consequence the first proposition does not imply the second. The rule refers to negative propositions; therefore, no matter whether they be universal or particular; and, since it is only required that the predicate of the antecedent be a positive term, consequently, the subject may or may not be a positive term. Thus, the following theses are rejected.

$$\begin{array}{l}
*\mathrm{Oba} \ \overline{\supset}\ \mathrm{Ibna} \\
*\mathrm{Eba} \ \supset\ \mathrm{Abna} \\
*\mathrm{Onba} \ \overline{\supset}\ \mathrm{Inbna} \\
*\mathrm{Enba} \ \overline{\supset}\ \mathrm{Anbna}
\end{array}$$

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[16] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 4, c. 3, f. 25v—26r; "Nulla conversio per contrapositionem est consequentia formalis, . . . quia non sequitur: 'Omnis homo est ens, ergo omne non-ens est non-homo;' similiter non sequitur: 'Quaedam chimaera non est homo, ergo quidam non-homo non est non-chimaera.' . . . Verum est tamen quod conversio per contrapositionem est bene consequentia formalis ex hypothesi seu ex suppositione quod quilibet terminorum pro aliquo supponat." *Ibid.* Cfr. Peter of Spain, *Summulae logicales*, t. 1, p. 7; Buridan, *Compendium logicae*, t. 1, f. C3rv; Dorp, *Expositio super logicam Buridani*, f. C3v.

These consequences would be formally valid if it would be assumed that the four terms involved in the consequences would stand for something; but of course, these are not the assumptions of Albert's system.[17]

Fourteenth rule. It is formal consequence to infer from an affirmative proposition with a finite predicate, a negative proposition with the same terms but with the predicate infinitized. For instance, this consequence: 'Every A is a B, therefore no A is a non-B,' is valid; since the contradictory of the consequent cannot be true together with the antecedent. 'Some A is a non-B (Ibna), is the contradictory of the consequent; and this implies: 'Some A is not a B' (Oba), which is repugnant to the antecedent: 'Every A is a B' (Aba). The theses described by this rule are the following:[18]

Aba $\overline{\supset}$ Ebna
Anba $\overline{\supset}$ Enbna
Iba $\overline{\supset}$ Obna
Inba $\overline{\supset}$ Onbna

Fifteenth rule. An universal affirmative proposition in which no ampliative term is used formally implies a particular affirmative with interchanged terms; that is, the universal affirmative can be converted *per accidens*. The interchange, transposition, or conversion of the terms consists in making the subject of a first proposition the predicate of a first proposition the predicate of a second; and the predicate of the first, the subject of the second. This rule is based on the fourth rule of this chapter, and it describes the following thesis:[19]

Aba $\overline{\supset}$ Iab

Sixteenth rule. Any particular affirmative or indefinite affirmative in which no ampliative term is used formally implies a particular affirmative or indefinite affirmative with interchanged terms; that is, any of these propositions can be converted by simple conversion. This rule is based on the first rule of this chapter, and it mentions the following thesis:[20]

Iba $\overline{\supset}$ Iab

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[17] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 4, c. 3, f. 26r; "A propositione negativa de praedicato finito ad propositionem affirmativam de praedicato infinito, manentibus eisdem terminis, non est consequentia formalis." *Ibid.*

[18] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 4, c. 3, f. 26r; "Ab affirmativa de praedicato finito ad negativam de praedicato infinito, terminis manentibus eisdem, est consequentia formalis." *Ibid.*

[19] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 4, c. 3, f. 26r; "Ab universali affirmativa in qua non ponitur aliquis terminus ampliativus ad particularem affirmativam in terminis transpositis est consequentia formalis; sub isto modo loquendi: 'Omne A est B, ergo quoddam B est A'." *Ibid.*

[20] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 4, c. 3, f. 26r. "Ab omni propositione particulari affirmativa vel indefinita in qua non ponitur terminus ampliativus, ad particularem vel indefinitam est consequentia formalis in terminis transpositis." *Ibid.*

Seventeenth rule. A singular affirmative proposition with a common term as predicate formally implies three affirmative propositions with interchanged terms; a singular, an indefinite, and a particular; for instance, all these consequences are valid: 'This A is a B, therefore this B is this A;' 'This A is a B, therefore a B is this A;' 'This A is a B, therefore some B is this A.'[21]

Eighteenth rule. An universal negative without ampliative terms, and which is negative in the usual manner of speech, formally implies an universal negative with interchanged terms; for instance: 'No man is a stone, therefore no stone is a man.' A proposition is negative in the usual manner of speaking, when the denial is placed before the predicate, as in these propositions: 'No man is an animal,' or 'Every man is not an animal.' A proposition is negative in the unusual manner of speech, when the denial is placed not before, but after the predicate; as for example: 'Every man an animal is not,' or 'Every man with some animal is not identical.' In the examples of negative propositions in the common manner, the term 'animal' is distributed, while it is not distributed in the instances of negative propositions in the unusual manner; thus the proposition: 'Every man is not an animal,' is false; but the proposition: 'Every man an animal is not,' is true. If we symbolize 'man' by 'M_1,' and 'animal' by 'A_1;' the first symbolic expression is the false universal negative; and the second, the true universal negative.

$$(x)\ (M_1x \supset -A_1x)$$
$$(x)\ [M_1x \supset (Ey)\ (A_1y \cdot y \neq x)]$$

The basis of this rule about the simple conversion of a universal negative proposition, is the second rule of this chapter; and the thesis mentioned by the rule is the following:[22]

$$Eba \equiv Eab$$

Nineteenth rule. The conversion of an universal negative into a particular negative is a formal consequence, if both propositions are negative in the ordinary way; for instance: 'No man is a stone, therefore some stone is not a man.' This rule is based on the first rule of this chapter and on the immediately preceding rule.[23]

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[21] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 4, c. 3, f. 26r.

[22] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 4, c. 3, f. 26r; "Ab universali negativa in qua non ponitur aliquis terminus ampliativus, quae est negativa de consueto modo loquendi, ad universalem negativam de terminis transpositis est bona consequentia. Per universalem negativam de consueto modo loquendi intelligas universalem negativam in qua negatio ponitur ante praedicatum, ut hic: 'Nullus homo est animal;' vel hic: 'Omnis homo non est animal.' Per negativam de inconsueto modo loquendi intelligo illam ubi negatio non ponitur ante praedicatum, sed ponitur post; ut hic: 'Omnis homo animal non est'." *Ibid.*

$$Eba \overline{\supset} Oab$$

Twentieth rule. An universal negative in the unusual way of speaking, does not imply formally an universal negative with interchanged terms, no matter whether the latter is negative in the common or uncommon manner of speech. Hence, these consequences are invalid: (1) 'Every man an animal is not, therefore no animal is a man,' (2) 'Every man an animal is not, therefore every animal a man is not.' These consequences, and all those which have a similar form, are not valid because a proposition with an undistributed term does not imply formally a proposition in which the same term is distributed; as is established by the third part of the first rule of this chapter. Thus, in consequence (1) the term 'animal' is not distributed in the antecedent, but it is distributed in the consequent; and the same holds for consequence (2). Symbolizing 'man' by 'M_1,' and 'animal' by 'A_1,' we may represent both invalid consequences as follows:[24]

$$(1)\ \ {}^*(x)\ [M_1x \supset (Ey)\ (A_1y \cdot y \neq x)]\ \overline{\supset}\ (x)\ (A_1x \supset -\ M_1x)$$
$$(2)\ \ {}^*(x)\ [M_1x \supset (Ey)\ (A_1y \cdot y \neq x]\ \overline{\supset}$$
$$(y)\ [A_1y \supset (Ex)\ (M_1x \cdot x \neq y)]$$

Twenty-first rule. There is a valid consequence from an universal negative in the uncommon manner of speaking, to a particular negative of the uncommon manner of speech with interchanged terms; for instance: 'Every man an animal is not, therefore some animal a man is not.' The thesis mentioned by this rule is the following:[25]

$$(x)\ [M_1x \supset (Ey)\ A_1y \cdot y \neq x)]\ \overline{\supset}\ \{(Ey)\ [A_1y \cdot$$
$$(Ex)\ (M_1x \cdot x \neq y)]\ v - (Ex)\ [M_1x \cdot (y)\ (A_1y \supset x = y)]\ \}$$

Twenty-second rule. It is not a valid consequence to argue from a particular or indefinite negative to a particular or indefinite negative, when there is transposition of the terms, and the propositions involved are negative in the accepted manner of speech. For instance, this is not a valid consequence: 'Some animal is not a man, therefore some man is not an animal.' This rule is based on the fourth rule of this chapter; it mentions and rejects the conversion of a particular negative.[26]

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[23] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 4, c. 3, f. 26r; "Ab universali negativa ad particularem negativam de modo consueto loquendi est bona consequentia de terminis transpositis." *Ibid.*

[24] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 4, c. 3, f. 26r; "Ab universali negativa per modum loquendi inconsuetum ad universalem negativam in terminis transpositis non est bona consequentia." *Ibid.*

[25] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 4, c. 3, f. 26r; "Ab universali negativa de inconsueto modo loquendi ad particularem negativam de inconsueto modo loquendi, terminis transpositis, est bona consequentia." *Ibid.*

$$^*Oba \mathrel{\overline{\supset}} Oab$$

Twenty-third rule. A particular negative in the unusual way of speaking formally implies a particular negative of the same type with transposed terms. The same holds for the indefinite negative of the same type. This rule is based on the second rule of this chapter. For instance, this is a valid consequence: 'Some animal a man is not, therefore some man an animal is not,' and vice versa.[27]

Twenty-fourth rule. It is a valid consequence to argue from a negative singular proposition to another singular negative, or particular negative, or indefinite negative, or universal negative; for instance, these consequences are valid: 'Socrates is not Plato, therefore Plato is not Socrates;' 'Socrates is not a donkey, therefore a donkey is not Socrates;' 'Socrates is not a donkey, therefore some donkey is not Socrates;' 'Socrates is not a donkey, therefore no donkey is Socrates.'[28]

CONVERSION OF PROPOSITIONS WITH AMPLIATIVE TERMS

Twenty-fifth rule. Any affirmative proposition whose subject is an ampliative term, but it itself is not amplified, implies by conversion another affirmative proposition with the same terms. The conversion is made according to the rules for affirmative propositions in which there is no ampliative term. Hence, an universal is converted into a particular; an indefinite or particular into another indefinite or particular; a singular, into another singular or particular; as we have already established. This and the next rules have to be understood in relation to the conversions already mentioned for affirmative and negative propositions. Examples of this twenty-fifth rule are the following. This is a valid consequence: 'Something dead is a man, therefore some man is dead;' likewise: 'Something to be generated is a man, therefore some man is to be generated.' These consequences are valid because every cause of truth for the antecedent is a cause of truth for the consequent;

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[26] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 4, c. 3, f. 26r; "A particulari vel indefinita negativa de consueto modo loquendi ad particularem negativam vel indefinitam, terminis transpositis, non est consequentia bona." *Ibid.*

[27] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 4, c. 3, f. 26r; "Ad particularem negativam de inconsueto modo loquendi sequitur particularis negativa de modo loquendi inconsueto, terminis transpositis, consequentia formali." *Ibid.*

[28] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 4, c. 3, f. 26r; "A singulari negativa ad singularem negativam, vel particularem, vel indefinitam vel universalem, terminis transpositis, est bona consequentia." *Ibid.*

and the antecedent has less causes of truth than the consequent, since in the antecedent the predicate stands for present values only, but in the consequent the same term that was the predicate of the antecedent becomes the subject of the consequent, and it is amplified to stand for present as well as past values in disjunction.[29]

Twenty-sixth rule. A negative proposition in which the subject is not amplified, but is an ampliative term, does not imply formally by conversion another negative proposition. The conversion is to be made according to the rules of conversion for negative propositions. The reason for this rule is that there is a cause of truth for the antecedent which is not a cause of truth for the consequent. This consequence, for instance, is not valid: 'Nothing dead is a man, therefore no man is dead;' since the term 'man' is not amplified in the antecedent, but it is amplified in the consequent to stand for present or past values.[30]

Twenty-seventh rule. An affirmative proposition in which the subject is amplified by the predicate does not imply formally another affirmative proposition with transposed terms; because there is a cause of truth for the antecedent which is not a cause of truth for the consequent. For instance, this is not a valid consequence: 'Some man is dead, therefore something dead is a man.'[31]

Twenty-eighth rule. To infer by conversion an affirmative proposition from another affirmative in which the subject is amplified by the predicate, is a valid consequence; provided that the predicate of the consequent is amplified in the same manner as the subject of the antecedent, and the ampliation is made by disjunction; as in the following instance: 'Some man is dead, therefore something dead is or was a man.' The reason of this rule is that any cause of truth for the antecedent is a cause of truth for the consequent.[32]

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[29] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 4, c. 4, f. 26r; "A propositione affirmativa cuius subiectum non est ampliatum quamvis sit terminus ampliativus, ad propositionem affirmativam in terminis transpositis est bona consequentia; iuxta conversionem propositionum affirmativarum. Et sic eodem modo debent intelligi regulae sequentes." *Ibid.*

[30] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 4, c. 4, f. 26r; "A propositione negativa in qua subiectum non est ampliatum sed terminus ampliativus, ad negativam de terminis transpositis non est bona consequentia; eodem modo quo esset si subiectum non esset terminus ampliativus." *Ibid.*

[31] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 4, c. 4, f. 26r; "A propositione affirmativa in qua subiectum ampliatur per praedicatum ad affirmativam de terminis transpositis non est bona consequentia." *Ibid.*

[32] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 4, c. 4, f. 26rv; "A propositione affirmativa cuius subiectum est ampliatum per praedicatum ad affirmativam, terminis transpositis, est bona consequentia; eodem modo quo esset si subiectum non esset ampliatum per praedicatum: ubi tamen praedicatum secundae ampliatur sicut erat ampliatum subiectum primae, quae ampliatio debet fieri per disiunctionem." *Ibid.*

Twenty-ninth rule. It is a valid consequence to infer by conversion a negative proposition from another negative in which the subject is an ampliative term; provided that the subject of the consequent, which is the predicate of the antecedent, is restricted to stand for the same values for which it stands as predicate of the antecedent. The reason for this rule is that every cause of truth for the antecedent is a cause of truth for the consequent; since they are propositions of the same quality, with the same terms having identical supposition, and with the same copula. For instance, this is a valid consequence: 'Nothing dead is a man, therefore something which is now a man is not dead;' the term 'man' in the consequent is restricted to stand for present values only, as it is in the antecedent.[33]

Thirtieth rule. A negative proposition in which the subject is amplified by the predicate, and the subject is not an ampliative term, formally implies another negative proposition with interchanged terms, just as if the subject of the antecedent were not amplified. For instance: 'No man is dead, therefore nothing dead is a man.'[34]

Thirty-first rule. It is a valid consequence to infer by conversion an affirmative proposition of the past from another affirmative proposition of the past, in the same way as if they were of the present; provided that it is added to the subject of the consequent the term 'what,' or 'which,' together with the verb of the proposition which is to be converted; and as the copula of the consequent is to be used the verb 'is' in disjunction with the verb of the antecedent. The same holds proportionally for affirmative propositions of the future, and for negative propositions of the past or future. The reason for this rule is that any cause of truth for one proposition, is a cause of truth for the other; likewise, this rule is proven by the second rule of this chapter. These are valid consequences with affirmative propositions of the past: 'A white thing was black, therefore what was black is or was white;' with affirmative propositions of the future: 'A white thing will be black, therefore what will be black is or will be white;' with negative propositions of the past: 'Nothing white was black, therefore nothing that was black is or was white;' with negative propositions of the future: 'No old man will be a child, therefore nobody who will be a child is or will be an old man.'[35]

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[33] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 4, c. 4, f. 26v; "A propositione negativa in qua subiectum est terminus ampliativus ad propositionem negativam, terminis transpositis, est bona consequentia; dum tamen praedicatum primae propositionis quod non erat ampliatum, sic restringatur in subiecto alterius, quod pro eodem et non pro pluribus supponat quam pro quo supponit in prima." *Ibid.*

[34] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 4, c. 4, f. 26v; "A propositione negativa cuius subiectum est ampliatum per praedicatum et non est ampliativum ad negativam, terminis transpositis, est bona consequentia; eodem modo quo esset si subiectum non esset ampliatum." *Ibid.*

Thirty-second rule. There are two types of valid consequences by conversion with propositions in which the copula and predicate are included in the verb. The first variety of these consequences is the type in which the verb can be expanded into the copula and the predicate; in which case the expansion is first made, and, then, the conversion is accomplished following the rules already explained. For instance: 'A man runs,' is expanded into: 'A man is running;' then, the conversion is made thus: 'A man is running, therefore some running thing is a man.' The second type of these consequences, viz., by conversion of propositions in which the copula and predicate are included in the verb, is given when the verb of the proposition to be converted cannot be expanded into a predicate and the copula, retaining the same sense of the proposition; either because of lack of grammatical expressions, or by the very meaning of the verb involved. In either case the proposition to be converted, which is the antecedent of the consequence, has to be converted by adding to the subject of the consequent the term 'what,' or its grammatical equivalents, together with the verb which admits no expansion; and as the copula of the consequent is to be used the verb 'is;' and if the predicate is an ampliative term, it has to be added to the predicate of the consequent, besides the already mentioned additions, a disjunction which is to be made according to the exigencies of the ampliative term. For instance, the verbs 'is-being-made' *(fit)*, and 'is-being-loved' *(amatur)*, cannot be expanded into a copula and a predicate; because such verbs have no present participle. The propositions: 'A man is-being-loved' *(Homo amatur)*, and 'A man is-being-made' *(Homo fit)*, cannot be expanded, retaining the same sense of the propositions, into: 'A man is loved,' and 'A man is made;' because it is doubtful that they are equivalent. As Aristotle remarks, in the first instant of love, it can be said: 'A man is-being-loved;' but it cannot be said: 'A man is loved;' and what is-being-made does not yet exist as an individual; consequently, what is-being-made is not yet made. Hence, the consequence by conversion of the proposition: 'A man is-being-made;' is as follows: 'A man is-being-made, therefore what is-being-made is a man.' The verbs 'is-being-made,' 'is-being-generated,' and similar ones, mean that a thing is not now but will be after a while. The verb 'is-beginning,' and similar ones, means that something is now which was not before; the verb 'is-being-destroyed' and similar ones, means that something which is now will cease to exist after a while; the verb 'ceasing-to-be, and similar ones, means that what is not now was before. Hence, the following consequences by conversion: 'B is-being-made, therefore what is-being-made is or will be B,' 'B is beginning-to-be, therefore what is-beginning-to-be is or will be B,' 'B is-being-destroyed, therefore what is-being-destroyed is or was B,' 'B is-ceasing-to-be, therefore what is-ceasing-to-be is or was B.' When a predicate is placed after the verb 'is-being-made,' as for instance in: 'Something white is-being-made black;' then, the proposition is to be converted in this way: 'What is-being-made black is or was white;' the same is true proportionally of the other above-mentioned verbs.[36]

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[35] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 4, c. 4, f. 26v; "A propositionibus affirmativis de praeterito et futuro ad affirmativas, terminis transpositis, est bona consequentia; eodem modo ac si essent de praesenti; dum tamen subiecto consequentis addatur illa dictio 'quod' cum verbo istius propositionis, et ponatur pro copula consequentis verbum praedictae propositionis cum disiunctione illius ab hoc verbo 'est.' . . . Similiter sic valet consequentia a negativis ad negativas de praeterito vel de futuro." *Ibid.*

Thirty-third rule. If a proposition with the copula 'is' *secundo adiacens* is to be converted; then, it is to be expanded first into a proposition with the copula 'is' *tertio adiacens*, and the disjunctive predicate 'being or beings;' once this is done, the conversion of the proposition is accomplished according to the rules already explained. To convert the proposition: 'Socrates exists' *(Sortes est)*, it is to be expanded first into: 'Socrates is a being or beings;' then, it is converted into: 'A being or beings is or are Socrates.' The predicate of the expanded proposition has to be 'being or beings;' otherwise, the consequence by conversion of a proposition with the copula *secundo adiacens* would not be formal; since it would lead to erroneous conclusions, as the following: 'An army exists, therefore an army is an individual and real being' *(exercitus est, ergo exercitus est ens)*; this consequence is invalid, because the consequent is false, since there is no real and individual being which is an army; but the antecedent is true. Nevertheless, if it appears that the subject stands for only one thing; then, the following consequences are materially valid, the first by expansion, the second by conversion: 'Socrates exists, therefore Socrates is a real and individual being;' Socrates exists, therefore a real and individual being is Socrates.' Albert here seemingly interprets the form of a singular affirmative proposition as one of a particular with a common term as subject, and the copula *secundo adiacens;* but the form of a singular affirmative proposition is definitely different from the form of a particular affirmative: the first states the existence of exactly one individual:

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[36] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 4, c. 4, f. 26v.

$$(ex)\ [Fx \cdot (y)\ Fy \supset y = x)]$$

while the particular affirmative states the existence of at least one individual:[37]

$$(Ex)\ Fx$$

If it appears that the subject of a proposition with the copula *secundo adiacens*, does not stand for only one individual, but for several individuals collectively; then, the following consequence by conversion is materially valid: 'A people exist, therefore real beings are people;' and this consequence holds materially by expansion: 'People exist, therefore people are real beings.' From this thirty-third rule, Albert continues, it follows that these are formal consequences: 'A exists, therefore A is a real and individual being or beings;' 'A and B exist, therefore A and B are a real and individual being or beings.' But these other consequences are rejected as formally invalid: 'A exists, therefore A is a real and individual being;' 'A and B exist, therefore A and B are different and real beings.'[38]

Thirty-fourth rule. If the subject of a proposition to be converted has material or simple supposition; then, the predicate of the converted proposition has to be restricted in the same manner as the subject of the proposition to be converted. Take, for instance, the proposition: "'Man' is a term;" it is not to be converted into: 'A term is a man;' but into: "A term is a 'man.'"[39]

CONVERSIONS OF PROPOSITIONS WITH OBLIQUE TERMS

Thirty-fifth rule. This rule concerns the conversion of propositions with oblique terms, such as: "Socrates' donkey is running;" in which the term "Socrates'" is used in an oblique case. Albert examines two opinions regarding the subject of such propositions. He himself maintains the second opinion, but remarks that for the present it is immaterial which opinion is correct; since for the present the important point is the validity or invalidity of the consequences, and according to both opinions the consequences to be mentioned are valid. According to the first opinion, if the term in the oblique case is placed before the verb; then, it is the subject of the proposition. If the term in the nominative case is placed with the term in an oblique case before the verb; then, either the term in the nominative case precedes the term in the oblique case, or vice versa. If the term in the oblique case precedes the term in the nominative case; then the term in the oblique case alone is the subject; as the term "man's" in the proposition: "A man's donkey is running." If the term in the nominative case precedes the term in the oblique case; then, the whole aggregate of the terms in the nominative and oblique cases is the subject; as for instance in: 'A donkey of a man is running,' the aggregate 'a donkey of a man' is the subject of the proposition. The second opinion maintains that the term in the oblique case alone never can be the subject of a proposition; but always the explicit or implicit term in the nominative case is the subject, or the aggregate of the terms in the nominative and oblique cases is the subject.[40]

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[37] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 4, c. 4, f. 26v.
[38] *Ibid.*
[39] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 4, c. 4, f. 27r.

According to the first opinion, to convert a proposition with a term in an oblique case, it has first to be resolved into a proposition with a subject in the nominative case, and this has to be the term that is in an oblique case in the original proposition; and to such a subject it must be added a relative particle as 'whose,' 'to which,' 'whom,' 'by whom,' or similar ones. After this is done, the conversion is accomplished according to the rules already stated. For instance: (1) the proposition 'On the wall there is a picture,' is expanded into: (2) 'A wall exists on which there is a picture,' and this proposition is converted into: (3) 'Something on which there is a picture is a wall.' If we symbolize 'wall' by 'W_1,' 'picture' by 'P_1,' and 'to be placed on' by 'L_2;' we have the following three expressions which are equivalent, or are antecedent to each other.[41]

$$(1)\ (Ex)\ (Ey)\ (L_2yx \cdot W_1x \cdot P_1y)$$
$$(2)\ (Ex)\ (Ey)\ W_1x \cdot L_2yx \cdot P_1y)$$
$$(3)\ (Ex)\ (Ey)\ (L_2yx \cdot P_1y \cdot W_1x)$$

The second opinion concedes that the consequence from (1) to (3) is valid, but it is not by conversion; because the subject is not converted into the predicate, and vice versa. But consequences that according to this opinion are conversions, are not such for the first opinion; because both opinions differ as to what is the subject in a proposition with oblique terms. Both opinions agree that the consequences presented by one of the two are valid, and that they have some interchange of terms; but both opinions maintain that this is not enough for a consequence by conversion in which the interchange has to be of subject and predicate. For this second opinion, when there is a question of the conversion of propositions with oblique terms, several cases have to be distinguished. The first case is when the oblique term alone precedes the verb, and the verb is just the copula 'is.' If a proposition of this type is to be converted; then, either a nominative case is supplied and placed before the copula, and the oblique case is placed after the copula; as for instance the proposition: 'Of a man there is a donkey' *(Hominis est asinus)*, is supplemented thus: "There is something which is a man's donkey" *(Aliquid est hominis asinus)*; or the term in the oblique case is placed immediately after the added term in the nominative case; as for instance: 'Something which belongs to a man is a donkey' *(Aliquid hominis est asinus; vel possessio hominis est asinus)*. After one of these steps is accomplished, the conversion of the proposition is made according to the rules already explained. But, if the term in an oblique case alone precedes the verb, and the verb contains the copula and the term with which the oblique case is constructed; then, an expansion is to be made first, and after it, the conversion is accomplished.[42]

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[40] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 4, c. 4, f. 27r.
[41] *Log.*, t. 4, c. 4, f. 27r.

The second case of conversion of propositions with oblique terms is given, according to the second opinion, when the nominative term together with the oblique term precedes the verb in either one of the two following different ways. First, the oblique term is constructed as a determination of the term in the nominative case; in which case the whole aggregate of the terms in the nominative and oblique case is the subject of the proposition; and the conversion is made as in the following instance: "Socrates' donkey is running, therefore something running is Socrates' donkey." If a denial precedes the whole aggregate; then, the whole aggregate has to be distributed in the converted proposition; for instance: "No man's donkey is running, therefore no running thing is a man's donkey." If the proposition is affirmative and the universal sign distributes the subject and causes the predicate to have purely confused supposition; then, in the converted proposition the universal quantifier is to be suppressed; for instance: "There is a man whose every donkey is running, therefore something running is a man's donkey." *(Hominis quilibet asinus currit, ergo currens est hominis aliquis asinus)*. The second way in which a term in an oblique case together with the term in the nominative case precedes the verb, is given when the term in the oblique case is not constructed as a determination of the term in the nominative case, but it is related to the predicate. For instance: the expression 'at a horse' is not a determination of the subject, but of the predicate, in the proposition: 'At a horse a man is looking;' hence, the proposition means the same as: 'A man is looking at a horse;' thus this is a valid consequence by conversion: 'At a horse a man is looking, therefore something looking at a horse is a man' *(Equum homo est videns, ergo videns equum est homo)*. If a denial precedes and distributes all the terms, then, the same type of supposition is to be kept in the converted proposition. If the distributive sign is affirmative, then, it has to be removed from the converted proposition.[43]

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[42] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 4, c. 4, f. 27r.

Thirty-sixth rule. If propositions equivalent to hypotheticals (as exclusive, exceptive, reduplicative and similar propositions), have to be converted; the following procedure is to be applied. The propositions are expanded first into their exponents; then, they are converted according to the logical exigences of their exponents. For instance, this exclusive proposition: 'Only an animal is a man,' has as its exponent: 'An animal is a man, and nothing different from an animal is a man;' hence, the first proposition is converted into: 'Man is an animal, and no man is different from an animal.' Likewise, this exclusive is equivalent to the universal affirmative: 'Every man is an animal;' hence, this is a valid consequence by conversion: 'Only animals are men, therefore every man is an animal' *(Tantum animal est homo, ergo omnis homo est animal)*. This fact is covered by the rule: It is a valid consequence to infer from an exclusive proposition an universal affirmative with interchanged terms. The exceptive proposition: 'Every man, except Socrates, is running,' is expanded into: 'Socrates is not running, and any man different from Socrates is running;' and it is converted into: 'Something running is not Socrates, and something running is a man different from Socrates.'[44]

With this rule on conversions of propositions equivalent to compound statements, we close our study of Albert's theory of consequences from one quantified proposition to another and proceed to examine syllogistic consequences, which are consequences from two quantified propositions to a third quantified sentence.

CHAPTER V

SYLLOGISTIC CONSEQUENCES

Having studied Albert's theory of propositional and quantified consequences, we shall now devote our attention to the consideration of Albert's doctrine on syllogistic consequences. We shall examine syllogistic consequences with common positive non-ampliative terms in the nominative case, negative or infinite terms are treated as positive, provided that one and the same term is not used as finite in one premise and as infinite in the other. Likewise, we shall deal with syllogistic consequences in which the divine and singular terms are used; with syllogisms in which ampliative terms or terms in an oblique case are employed; and with syllogisms in which the middle term is finite in one premise and infinite in the other. We shall close this chapter with some notes on the doctrine of consequences as the main and unifying theme in some medieval logicians.

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[43] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 4, c. 4, f. 27r.

[44] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 4, c. 4, f. 27r.

THE NOTION OF SYLLOGISM

A syllogistic consequence, or simply a syllogism, is a formal consequence whose antecedent is a conjunction of two quantified propositions, and whose consequent is a third quantified proposition following from the antecedent. This propositions of which the antecedent consists are called the premises, and the premises are composed of three terms, two of these terms, known as the extremes, are combined affirmatively or negatively with a third called the middle term. These terms are combined in such a manner that one of the premises is made up of the middle term and one of the extremes, while the other is compounded of the combination of the other extreme and the middle term. The proposition that is placed first in the antecedent is the major premise, and the one that follows it, or comes in the second place in the antecedent, is the minor premise. The term which is combined with the middle in the major premise is the major term or extreme, and the second term which is combined with the middle in the minor premise is the minor term or extreme. The consequent of a syllogism, or the proposition that follows from a syllogistic combination of terms and propositions, is called the conclusion; in which one of the extremes is affirmatively or negatively predicated of the other, and in which the middle term is not to be used. When the major term is predicated of the minor in a syllogistic conclusion, then it is a direct conclusion; but, if the minor is predicated of the major, then, the conclusion is indirect. A syllogism with a direct conclusion is a direct syllogism, and one with an indirect conclusion is an indirect syllogism.[1]

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[1] "Ad cuiuslibet consequentiae syllogisticae vel syllogismi constitutionem requiruntur tres termini; quorum unus vocatur maior extremitas, alius minor extremitas, tertius vocatur medium in quo extremitates combinantur, propter quam combinationem sequitur combinatio extremitatum inter se affirmative vel negative. Et ex isto sequitur quod ad syllogismum requiruntur duae propositiones, quae vocantur premissae, in quarum una medium

These notions of Albert do not correspond exactly with those of Aristotle, but they express certain differences which should be noticed. If Lukasiewicz's interpretation is correct, Aristotle always formulated his syllogisms as conditionals, and of course as formally valid; on this point Albert is in accord with Aristotle as far as the former defines a syllogism as a formal consequence. But Aristotle defined the major and minor extremes, not according to their formal position in the premises as Albert does, but in respect to their extension in signification. This is an error which is patent in Aristotle's definition of the major, minor, and middle terms for the first figure; the major term is the one in which the middle term is contained, the minor term is the one which is contained in the middle; thus, the middle term is the one which is contained in the major and contains the minor. These definitions are incorrect, since they can be applied only to syllogisms of the mood *Barbara* with concrete terms and true premises. Nevertheless, Aristotle gives a correct definition of the middle term for all figures, as the term which is common to both premises; but this definition is against the one given of the same term for the first figure. Aristotle does not give a definition of major and minor terms for all figures; although, in practice he treats the predicate of the conclusion as the major, and the subject of the conclusion as the minor; indicating that the predicate of the conclusion is the largest in extension, and the subject, the smallest. This again could be a mistake, since we have no guarantee that the major term will be the largest in extension and the minor the smallest, whenever one of the premises is negative or particular. The obvious Aristotelian error on the one hand, and his misleading terminology on the other, were a source of difficulties. John Philoponus correctly solved the problem by defining the major and minor extremes according to their formal position in the conclusion; the major term is the predicate, and the minor is the subject of the conclusion; and this rule has a purely conventional character. This

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coniungitur cum una extremitate, et in alia medium coniungitur cum alia extremitate; quarum praemissarum prima vocatur maior, secunda vero minor, et extremitas sive terminus sumptus cum medio in prima praemissa vocatur maior extremitas, et terminus sumptus cum medio in secunda praemissa vocatur minor extremitas. Sunt ergo tres termini, videlicet: maior extremitas, et minor extremitas, et medium; et duae praemissae. Propositio autem quae sequitur ex tali combinatione ad invicem vocatur conclusio, et in ea una extremitas debet de altera affirmative vel negative praedicari, nec in eadem poni iste terminus qui est medius combinationis extremitatum. Et quando in tali conclusione maior extremitas praedicatur de minori, tunc conclusio est directa; si autem est e converso, tunc conclusio est indirecta." *Log.*, t. 4, c. 7, f. 28v—29r. "In syllogismo neutra praemissarum est antecedens, sed copulativa composita ex eis dicitur totale antecedens." *Ibid.*, f. 29v. Cfr. *Ibid.*, c. 2, f. 24v; c. 12, f. 30v.

solution is correct, but different from Albert's stand; since for the latter the major and minor extremes are defined according to their formal position, not in the conclusion, but in the premises.[2]

It is to be noted here that in practice Albert formulates his syllogistic consequences, rather as arguments than as conditionals, because the premises are seldom joined by the copulative conjunction; but, since he expressly states that syllogisms are consequences whose antecedents are copulative propositions composed of the premises, and sometimes the premises are joined by the conjunction 'and,' we think that Albert implicitly admits the following definition:

$$[p, q \,/\, r] = \text{def}\ [(p \cdot q) \overline{\supset}\ r]$$

Albert's position on this point is similar to that of the Stoics and some modern logicians, who, as we saw in chapter two, distinguish between an argument and a conditional, but acknowledge that there is a correspondence and equivalence between a conditional and an argument, between a valid argument and a tautological conditional.

SYLLOGISTIC FIGURES

A syllogistic figure is a certain arrangement of the terms in the premises, resulting from the position of the middle term as subject or predicate in the premises. There are four syllogistic figures, since there are four possible positions of the middle term in the premises as subject or predicate; because, either the middle term is the subject of the major premise and the predicate of the minor, the arrangement which constitutes the first figure; or the middle term is the predicate in both premises, the disposition which forms the second figure; or the middle term is the subject in both premises, the grouping which determines the third figure; or the middle term is the predicate of the major premise and the subject of the minor, the ordering which yields the fourth figure. But Albert remarks that the fourth figure is different from the first only in the transposition of the premises, which consists in exchanging the position of the premises in such a manner that the first premise of a syllogistic mood in the first figure, becomes the second premise in the parallel syllogistic mood in the second figure, and vice versa; and the second premise under the same circumstances as above, becomes the first premise, and vice versa. This transposition does not affect the validity or invalidity of any syllogistic mood found in the first figure, and does not yield any new conclusion; but causes only that a direct conclusion in the first figure becomes indirect in the fourth figure, and vice versa; hence, Albert decides that it is enough to study the syllogistic moods of the first figure; but it is obvious and clear that he indicates the method to obtain the moods of the fourth figure, viz., by the transposition of the premises. Two examples may illustrate the relationship of the first and fourth figure: *Baralipton,* the first indirect mood of the first figure, and *Bamalip,* the first direct mood of the fourth figure; we may notice the transposition of the premises, the indirect and direct conclusion, and the identity of the conclusions. We shall add and use in this chapter the term-variable 'm' to those already used in preceding chapters. *Baralipton:* 'Amb, Aam / Iba;' *Bamalip:* 'Aam, Amb / Iba.'[3]

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[2] Cfr. Lukasiewicz, *Aristotle's Syllogistic*, pp. 28—32.

Aristotle recognized only three figures, and most of the Scholastic logicians before the fifteenth century follow the Philosopher; among them, Peter of Spain, Ockham, and Buridan in his *Compendium logicae.* Aristotle explicitly determines that the position of the middle term in the premises is the principle that determines a syllogistic figure; but he admits only three figures, and overlooks the fourth, although he mentions and accepts the moods of the fourth figure which later were named *Bamalip, Camenes, Dimaris, Fesapo, Fresison.* Theophrastus, a pupil of Aristotle, found for these moods, placeless in Aristotle's system, a position among the first figure. The first figure is for Aristotle the one in which the middle term is the subject of the major premise and the predicate of the minor, Theophrastus modifies this definition by saying that in the first syllogistic figure the middle term is the subject of one premise and the predicate of the other.[4]

The definition of the first figure given by Theophrastus reappears in some Medieval logicians of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The first syllogistic figure according to Dorp can be understood in a large or a strict sense. When it is taken in the broad sense, the first figure is the one in which the middle term is the subject of one of the premises and the predicate of the other, regardless of whether it is subject or predicate of the major or the minor. Thus understood, the first figure can be divided into two types; in the first type the middle term is the subject of the major premise and the predicate of the minor; in the second type the middle is the predicate of the major and the subject of the minor premise. The first syllogistic figure taken in the strict sense is defined as the one in which the middle term is the subject of the major and the predicate of the minor premise. Hence, Dorp concludes, if the first figure is understood in the broad sense, then, there is no need to admit a fourth figure different from the first. But, if the first figure is taken in the strict sense, then, there has to be admitted the fourth figure as different from the first. This shows, Dorp continues, that Galen, prince of physicians, who for the first time advocated the fourth figure, is justified in his contention; while some logicians who have attacked him for this fact, in vain have they done it. Dorp here holds the opinion, which is nowadays rejected, that Galen, a physician of the second century of our era, is the father of the fourth figure. The real author is still unknown, but lived probably not before the sixth century of our era.[5]

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[3] "Combinatio extremitatum per medium potest fieri quattuor modis: primo quod medium subiiciatur in prima praemissa et praedicetur in secunda, secundo modo quod medium praedicetur in utraque praemissarum, tertio modo quod subiiciatur in utraque praemissarum, quarto modo quod medium praedicetur in prima praemissarum et subiiciatur in secunda. Et secundum hoc sunt quattuor figurae, figura enim syllogistica non est nisi ordinatio medii ad extremitates in praemissis secundum subiiectionem et praedicationem. Sed notandum est quod quarta figura non differt a prima nisi transpositione praemissarum, quae nihil facit ad aliquam conclusionem inferendam vel non inferendam; sed solum facit quod conclusio illata si esset directa in prima figura, quod esset indirecta in quarta figura, et e converso. Et ergo pro syllogismis de prima et quarta figura sufficiet determinare solum de syllogismis de prima figura." *Log.*, t. 4, c. 7, f. 29r.

[4] For Aristotle and Theophrastus, cfr. Lukasiewicz, *Aristotle's Syllogistic,* pp. 23—28.

It is argued, Dorp continues, that the fourth figure is different from the first only in the transposition of the premises, and hence, it cannot be a different figure; otherwise the syllogistic moods *Cesare* and *Camestres* would not belong to the same second figure, but would be moods of different figures, since they differ in the transposition of the premises alone. Dorp answers that even in the case that the fourth figure would be different from the first in the transposition of the premises alone, it would be a distinct figure, because the relationship of the middle term with the extremes in the premises determines the distinction of the syllogistic figures; regarding the first figure, the transposition of the premises in any of its moods changes such a relationship, thus producing a new figure. The case of the moods *Cesare* and *Camestres* is different, because the transposition of the premises does not change the relationship of the middle to the extremes. Hence, the transposition of the premises produces a new syllogistic figure, if and only if the relationship of the middle to the extremes as subject or predicate is changed by the transposition. The reason why Aristotle in the *Prior Analytics* and Buridan in his *Compendium logicae* did not mention the fourth figure, Dorp maintains, is that the fourth figure is so easily obtained and reduced to the first by the transposition of the premises.[6]

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[5] Cfr. Dorp, *Expositio super logicam Buridani*, f. K 9. "Prima figura potest capi dupliciter. Uno modo large prout est cuius medium subiicitur in una praemissarum et praedicatur in alia, sive hoc sit in maiore sive in minore. . . . Alio modo capitur prima figura stricte prout est cuius medium subiicitur in maiore et praedicatur in minore. . . . Capiendo primam figuram large, non est ponenda quarta figura distincta contra primam. . . . Capiendo primam figuram stricte, ponenda est quarta figura distincta contra primam." *Ibid.* For the author of the fourth figure, cfr. Lukasiewicz, *Aristotle's Syllogistic*, pp. 28—42; Bocheński, *Ancient Formal Logic*, p. 105.

THE SYLLOGISTIC MOODS

The syllogistic moods or modes are all the possible combinations of the quality and quantity of the two premises in any syllogistic figure. There are sixteen possible combinations in each figure; because, either the two premises are universal, or both are particular, or the major is universal and the minor particular, or the major is particular and the minor universal. Each one of these four combinations of quantity has a fourfold qualitative combination; since either both premises are affirmative, or both are negative, or the major is affirmative and the minor negative, or the major is negative and the minor affirmative. These notions are well illustrated in the following table devised by the modern logician M. Black.[7]

	A	E	I	O
A				
E				
I				
O				

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[6] Cfr. Dorp, *Expositio super logicam Buridani*, f. K6v. "Licet per solam transpositionem praemissarum de quarta figura fieret prima, tamen alia est habitudo medii cum extremitatibus in prima figura et in quarta; nam in quarta figura medium praedicatur de maiore extremitate et subiicitur respectu minoris extremitatis, et e contra est in prima figura. Modo talis diversa habitudo medii cum extremitatibus variat figuram; ergo si per transpositionem praemissarum [variatur] (intelligatur *ed.*) habitudo medii cum extremitatibus, tunc illa transpositio variat [figuram]; sed si per illam transpositionem non variaretur habitudo medii cum extremitatibus, tunc non variaretur figura. Modo sic est quod talis habitudo variatur respectu primae et quartae, et non variatur respectu Cesare et Camestres." *Ibid.*

[7] "In qualibet figura syllogistica sunt sexdecim combinationes combinando universalem et particularem per affirmativam vel negativam in duabus praemissis; nam vel ambae sunt universales, vel ambae sunt parti-

We find that there are sixty-four possible moods in all, when we apply the definition of syllogistic mood given by Albert, but this definition does not cover all the syllogistic moods accepted by the same author. For instance, these moods of the first figure are not different from each other: *Barbara* and *Baralipton*, *Darii* and *Dabitis*, *Celarent* and *Celantes;* since each pair has premises that are identical in regard to their quality and quantity. Dorp excellently clarifies this point, when he distinguishes two ways of defining a syllogistic mood. In a first sense, a mood is determined by the quality and quantity of the premises alone; and thus, *Barbara* and *Baralipton* are not different moods. In a second sense, a syllogistic mood is determined by the premises and the conclusion together; that is, a syllogistic mood results from the combination of quality and quantity of both premises and conclusion, and the position or order of their terms; taking mood in this second sense, *Celarent* and *Cesare* are different moods, not by the quality or quantity of their premises or conclusion; but by the order and position of their terms; the last reason holds also for the case of *Darii* and *Dabitis.*[8]

This second definition that Dorp gives of a syllogistic mood, justifies all the moods accepted by Albert and his distinction of a direct and indirect conclusion. Taking mood in this sense, we obtain one hundred and twenty-eight possible syllogistic moods; half of them concluding directly and the other sixty-four concluding indirectly. There are one hundred and twenty-eight possible moods, since there are eight possible combinations of the quantity of the premises and conclusion; because either both premises and the conclusion are universal; or the premises

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culares, vel maior universalis et minor particularis vel e converso. Tunc quilibet istorum quattuor modorum dividitur in quattuor; quia vel ambae sunt affirmativae, vel ambae sunt negativae, vel maior est affirmativa et minor negativa vel e converso." *Log.*, t. 4, c. 8, f. 29v. Cfr. Black, *Critical Thinking*, p. 413.

[8] "Modus . . . potest capi dupliciter. Uno modo pro praemisis tantum, et secundum hoc . . . modus est ordinatio duarum praemissarum; id est, modus syllogisticus est duae praemissae ordinatae in debita qualitate et quantitate, sic quod ex eis sequatur conclusio in consequentia bona et formali; vel modus est propositio copulativa composita ex illis praemissis. Et isto modo capiendo modum, Barbara et Baralipton non sunt modi distincti. Alio modo capitur modus pro aggregato ex praemissis et conclusione, et tunc . . . modus syllogisticus est ordinatio duarum praemissarum et conclusionis in debita qualitate et quantitate, et in debito situ et ordine suorum terminorum; sic quod ex illis praemissis sequatur illa conclusio in consequentia bona et formali. [Dicitur] (dubitatur *ed.*) notanter "in debito situ et ordine suorum terminorum," quia alias Celarent et Cesare non essent modi distincti; ex quo in utroque illorum modorum praemissae et conclusiones sunt eiusdem qualitatis et quantitatis, sed alius est ordo et situs terminorum in Celarent et Cesare, ergo sunt modi distincti." Dorp, *Expositio super logicam Buridani*, f. L1r.

and conclusion are all particular; or the premises are universal and the conclusion particular; or the premises are particular and the conclusion universal; or the major premise is universal, the minor is particular, and the conclusion is particular; or the major is particular, the minor is universal and the conclusion is universal; or the major is particular, the minor is universal, and the conclusion is particular. Each one of these eight combinations of the quantity of premises and conclusion is combined in eight different ways in regard to the quality; because either the premises and conclusion are affirmative; or the premises and conclusion are negative; or both premises are affirmative, and the conclusion is negative; or both premises are negative, and the conclusion is affirmative, and the major premise is affirmative, the minor is negative, and the conclusion is affirmative; or the major is affirmative, the minor is negative, and the conclusion is negative; or the major is negative, the minor is affirmative, and the conclusion is affirmative; or the major is negative, the minor is affirmative, and the conclusion is negative. Hence, it is so that the eight quantity combinations multiplied by the eight combinations of quality total sixty-four combinations, and each one of these is subdivided into two different varieties; because either the major term is predicated of the minor in the conclusion, in which case the conclusion is direct; or the minor term is predicated of the major in the conclusion, in which case the conclusion is indirect; hence, we have a hundred and twenty-eight syllogistic moods; and since there are four syllogistic figures in which any of these moods can occur, it follows that there is a grand total of five hundred and twelve syllogistic moods. To determine which of these moods are formal consequences, Albert provides two methods; the method of the rules for syllogistic quality and quantity, and the method of axiomatization or syllogistic reduction.

THE VALID SYLLOGISTIC MOODS

A) The Method of the Rules of Syllogistic Quality and Quantity

The two principles of the syllogistic quality and quantity are the principle of all *(dictum de omni)*, and the principle of none *(dictum de nullo)*. The affirmative syllogisms, those which have an affirmative conclusion, hold by the principle of all: if any two terms are related to a third in two propositions in such a manner that one of them is verified affirmatively of the third or middle term determined by the expression 'everything which is,' and the second term is combined with the third taken or not with the expression 'everything which is;' then, these two terms are verified of each other affirmatively. For instance, if the term 'substance' is predicated affirmatively of the term 'animal' determined by the expression 'everything which is,' thus: 'Everything which is an animal is a substance;' and the term 'man' is combined with the same term 'animal,' even when the latter is not taken with the expression 'everything which is,' as for instance in the following proposition: 'Man is an animal;' then, it follows that these terms 'man' and 'substance' are verified affirmatively of each other, thus: 'Man is a substance.' The middle term has to be taken in the premises at least once with the expression 'everything which is,' otherwise it does not follow necessarily that the two terms, which are combined with the middle, are verified of each other. The principle of the affirmative syllogisms is sometimes formulated thus; whatever two things are identical with a third, they are identical with each other. The things here referred to are terms; and the identity, is identity of supposition.[9]

The negative syllogisms hold by the principle of one; that is, if any two terms are combined in two different propositions with a third or middle term in such a way that one of the terms is verified of the third determined by the expression 'nothing which is,' and the second term is combined with the third affirmatively; then, the first two terms are verified negatively of each other. For instance, if the term 'substance' is negatively verified of the term 'quality,' when the latter is determined by the expression 'nothing which is,' thus: 'Nothing which is a quality is a substance;' and the term 'whiteness' is affirmatively verified of the same term 'quality,' thus: 'Whiteness is a quality;' then, it is necessary that these two terms 'whiteness' and 'substance' be verified negatively of each other, thus: 'Whiteness is not a substance.' The principle of the negative syllogisms is sometimes formulated as expressing that, if one of any two things is identical with a third, and the second is not identical with the third; then, the first two things are not identical with each other. The things here referred to, as in the case of the principle of the affirmative syllogisms, are terms; and the identity, is the identity of supposition.[10]

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[9] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 4, c. 7, f. 29r. "Syllogismi affirmativi tenent per illud principium: quicumque termini divisim alicui tertio sic combinantur et coniiunguntur quod unus eorum affirmative de isto tertio termino sumpto cum ista oratione 'omne quod est' verificatur, et aliud etiam isto termino affirmative combinatur, quamvis non ipso sumpto cum illa oratione 'omne quod est,' isti termini de se invicem affirmative verificantur." *Ibid.* Cfr. *Ibid.*, c. 13, f. 31r; c. 18, f. 32v.

[10] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 4, c. 7, f. 29r. "Syllogismi negativi tenent per illud principium: quicumque duo termini divisim alicui tertio sic combinantur quod unus illorum negative verificatur de illo sumpto cum illa oratione

It is required in the two principles of the syllogism that one of the terms which enter into the premises be verified of the middle term taken at least once with the expressions 'everything which is' or 'nothing which is;' but this verification is required, Albert remarks, only if the conclusion is to be true; otherwise, it is sufficient for the validity of the syllogisms that the term is denoted to be verified of the middle. It is also to be noticed that the principles of all and of none apply more intuitively to the four first moods of the first figure; viz., *Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferio,* which were called the perfect moods; but the middle term is not taken with any of the expressions 'everything which is' or 'nothing which is,' for instance, in all the valid moods of the second figure; hence, these and all the other valid moods were reduced to one of the aforesaid four.[11]

The rules of syllogistic quality are the following: (1) The principle of the affirmative syllogisms requires that in order to infer a positive conclusion, it is necessary that both premises be affirmative, since the affirmative proposition alone indicates identity of supposition. (2) To infer a negative conclusion, it is necessary that one of the premises be affirmative and the other negative, by the principle of the negative syllogisms.(3) Two negative premises yield no valid syllogism, since no such syllogism can be regulated by one of the two principles of the valid syllogisms. These syllogisms cannot be regulated by the principle of the affirmative syllogisms, because this principle requires that both premises be affirmative; and they cannot be regulated by the principle of the negative syllogisms, because this principle requires that one of the premises be affirmative and the other negative. But, if one of the terms used in the premises is infinitized, then, from two negative premises a valid syllogism can be constructed; as in the case of this valid syllogism: 'Ema, Ebnm / Eba.'[12]

'nihil quod est,' et alter combinatur eidem affirmative, isti duo termini de se invicem negative verificantur." *Ibid.*

[11] "Et sciendum est quod quando dicebatur de principiis syllogismorum quod oportet unam extremitatum verificari de medio sumpto cum ista oratione 'omne quod est' vel 'nihil quod est,' intelligatur de syllogismis concludentibus conclusionem veram; sed in syllogismis concludentibus conclusionem falsam, sufficit quod una extremitatum denotetur verificari de medio sumpto cum ista oratione 'omne quod est' vel 'nihil quod est'." *Log.*, t. 4, c. 8, f. 29v.

[12] "Ad concludendam propositionem affirmativam oportet ambas praemissas esse affirmativas; propositio enim affirmativa significat identitatem, negativa autem non-identitatem." *Log.*, t. 4, c. 7, f. 29r. "Ad concludendam negativam propositionem oportet unam praemissarum esse affirmativam." *Ibid.* "Ex puris negativis non fit bonus syllogismus in quo nullus terminorum variatur penes finitum et infinitum." *Ibid.*

The rules of syllogistic quantity are the following: (1) No syllogism is a formal consequence without the use of one of the expressions 'everything which is' or 'nothing which is.' The addition 'which is' is required to prevent ampliation and erroneous conclusions when substituting the syllogistic variables for the divine terms. We shall return to these two problems in another discussion which is to follow in this chapter. (2) No valid syllogism is constructed from two particular or indefinite premises; because an affirmative syllogism has to be regulated by the principle of all, which requires that one of the extremes be verified of the middle term determined by the expression 'everything which is,' and this is not accomplished when both premises are particular or indefinite; and a negative syllogism is to be regulated by the principle of none, which requires that one of the extremes is verified of the middle term taken with the expression 'nothing which is,' and this is not done when both premises are particular or indefinite. (3) It is necessary that in any valid syllogism the middle term be distributed at least in one of the premises. The reason for this rule is explained very clearly by Buridan in his *Consequentiae*. When the middle term, Buridan remarks, is a common term, then, it is necessary that the extremes be united in the middle so as to stand for the same for which the middle term stands; but if the middle is not distributed, then, it is possible that its union with the major term is true for some of its singular values, but its union with the minor is true for some other of its singular values; hence, no mutual union of the extremes can be inferred. This union, of which Buridan speaks here, is the subject-predicate relationship, which may be affirmative or negative. The reasoning of Buridan is obviously equivalent to that given in modern terminology by M. Black. Any syllogism in which the middle term is undistributed in both premises is invalid; because, Black points out, "we are told that (part or all of) 'p' and 's' are related (by inclusion of exclusion) to some 'm,' but we have no assurance that the same members of 'm' are involved each time."[13]

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[13] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 4, c. 8, f. 29rv. "Nulli syllogismi sunt formales sine illa additione 'omne quod est' vel cum ly 'nihil quod est'." *Ibid.*, f. 29r. "Ex puris particularibus et indefinitis non fit bonus syllogismus." *Ibid.* "Ad hoc quod aliquis syllogismus sit bonus oportet quod ad minus medium in aliqua praemissarum distribuatur." *Ibid.*, f. 29v. "Nullus syllogismus valet in quo medium in neutra praemissa est distributum, nisi in minori propositione sumatur medium cum relativo identitatis. Quia regulae per quas tenent syllogismi requirunt, si medium sit commune, quod extremitates coniungantur ei ratione eiusdem rei pro qua iste terminus communis supponat, ut ante dicebatur; et cum medium in neutra sit distributum possibile est quod coniunctio eius cum maiori extremitate sit vera pro uno, et coniunctio eius cum [minori] (maiori *ed.*) sit vera pro alio, ut per haec nulla potest inferri coniunctio extremitatum inter se; nisi per relativum identitatis medium

(4) An important rule of syllogistic quantity given by Buridan in his *Consequentiae*, but omitted by Albert, expresses that, if the minor extreme is distributed in the premises, then, a direct universal conclusion can be inferred; but if the minor term is not distributed, then, a direct universal conclusion cannot be inferred. And if the major extreme is distributed in the premises, then, an indirect universal conclusion can be drawn; but if the major term is undistributed, then, an indirect universal conclusion cannot be inferred. Thus, a term can by no means be distributed in the conclusion, if it is undistributed in the premises; but it can be distributed in the conclusion, if it is distributed in the premises; because it can be inferred that an extreme is related to the other in the conclusion, so as to stand for the same thing for which the first extreme stands in relation to the middle and because there is a valid consequence from a term having distributed supposition to the same term undistributed, but not vice versa. With these rules of syllogistic quality and quantity, it is possible to determine the number of valid syllogistic moods.[14]

In each syllogistic figure, Albert continues, there are at least five invalid combinations of syllogistic quality and quantity in the premises; four, when both premises are negative, since two negative premises infer no conclusion, by the third rule of syllogistic quality; and a fifth invalid combination results when both premises are particular affirmative, since from two particular premises nothing can be inferred, by the second rule of syllogistic quantity. The cross in the following table indicates these five invalid syllogistic moods.

We might expect that Albert would catalogue as invalid the combinations in which both premises are particular, whether affirmative or negative, since the rule of quantity, to which he refers, is not limited to particular affirmative propositions, but it covers both affirmative and negative particulars. Albert, seemingly copying Buridan in his *Consequentiae*, overlooks that the combinations IO, OI, are valid only for conclusions which are negative in the uncommon manner of speech;

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cogatur teneri pro eodem in minori propositione pro quo erat eius verificatio in maiori." Buridan, *Consequentiae*, I. 3, c. 4, f. C5v. Cfr. Black, *Critical Thinking*, p. 140.

[14] "Si [minor] (maior *ed.*) extremitas fuerit distributa in praemissis, conclusio directa potest inferri universalis; et si non, non. Et si maior extremitas fuerit distributa in praemissis, conclusio indirecta potest inferri universalis; et si non, non. . . . Quia nullo modo terminus debet distribui in conclusione qui non fuerit distributus in praemissis; sed potest distribui si fuerit distributus, quia extremitas pro quibus coniungitur medio pro illis inferri potest coniungi ad alteram extremitatem, et non pro aliis." *Consequentiae*, I. 3, c. 4, f. C5v.

	A	E	I	O
A				
E		✕		✕
I			✕	
O		✕		✕

furthermore, Albert does not refer to these combinations anywhere in his treatment of the assertoric syllogistic consequences. We shall mention Buridan's position, when treating each one of the syllogistic figures.[15]

Besides the invalid combinations found in every figure, no syllogism is valid in the first figure, if the major is particular, affirmative or negative, and the minor is universal affirmative; because the middle term is not distributed in such combinations. No syllogistic mood in the first figure is valid, if the major is particular negative, and the minor is particular affirmative; because the middle term is not distributed. The next table shows the eight invalid and the eight valid combinations of quality and quantity for the premises in the first figure, the invalid are indicated by the cross.[16]

The valid moods of the first figure are: *Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferio, Baralipton, Celantes, Dabitis, Fapesmo, Frisesomorum.* The first four moods conclude directly; the remaining five, indirectly. The names of these moods, and the other names to be given the other syllogistic moods, have a mnemonic significance; the first three vowels indicate the quality and quantity of the major and minor prmises and of the conclusion, in that order. 'A' indicates the universal affirmative propo-

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[15] "In qualibet figura syllogistica ad minus quattuor istarum combinationum seu coniugationum sunt inutiles, scilicet: quae fiunt ex ambabus negativis; . . . similiter in qualibet figura est iste modus inutilis qui est ex ambabus particularibus affirmativis." *Log.*, t. 4, c. 8, f. 29v. Cfr. Buridan, *Consequentiae*, I. 3, c. 4, f. C6rv.

[16] "Si maior fuerit particularis in prima figura, sive affirmativa sive negativa, et minor universalis affirmativa, non valet syllogismus; et ratio est quia medium non distribuitur. . . . Similiter si maior sit particularis negativa et minor particularis affirmativa, in prima figura non valet syllogismus; iterum patet, quia medium non distribuitur." *Log.*, t. 4, c. 8, f. 29v.

	A	E	I	O
A			✕	✕
E		✕		✕
I			✕	
O		✕		✕

sition; 'E,' the universal negative; 'I,' the particular affirmative; 'O,' the particular negative. Some of the consonants indicate the direct or indirect reduction of the other moods to the four perfect moods or first four moods of the first figure, as we shall explain when treating of syllogistic reduction. We notice that nine of the valid moods described by Albert has the conbinations AO or IO in the premises, which should appear according to the immediately preceding table; Buridan remarks in his *Consequentiae* that such combinations are useful to infer a negative conclusion in the uncommon manner of speech. Hence, these valid theses: 'Every B is a C, some D is not a B, therefore some D with a C is not identical;' 'Some B is a C, some D is not a B, therefore some D with a C is not identical.'[17]

Any one of the valid moods infers not only the indicated conclusion, but any proposition that follows from it. For instance, a mood concluding an universal conclusion is valid to infer the subaltern particular; hence, the mood *Barbara*, which concludes an universal affirmative, infers also the subaltern particular as a direct conclusion, a mood which may be called *Barbari;* and by the same token we can infer the moods *Celaront* concluding directly and *Celantos* concluding indirectly from *Celarent* and *Celantes* respectively. By this rule we may obtain the so-called subaltern or weakened moods. The rule is obviously based in the propositional rule that whatever follows from the consequent follows from the antecedent; as Ockham expressly states. From this rule and the preceding lists of valid syllogistic moods in the first figure, we gather that there are twelve valid moods in the first figure, six concluding directly and six concluding indirectly.[18]

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[17] "In prima figura novem sunt coniugationes et combinationes utiles, et designantur per hos versus vel dictiones: Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferio, Baralipton, [Celantes, Dabitis, Fapesmo, Frisesomorum]. Et quattuor de istis concludunt directe; aliae vero indirecte, quae sunt quinque aliae, et possunt reduci ad alias quattuor directe concludentes per conversionem vel transpositionem praemissarum." *Log.*, t. 4, c. 8, f. 29v. Cfr. Buridan, *Consequentiae*, 1. 3, c. 4, f. C6r.

We may obtain from these twelve moods of the first figure, following Albert's indications already given when we studied the notion of syllogistic figure, the valid moods of the fourth figure by the sole transposition of the premises. Hence, the valid moods of the fourth figure are twelve; six that conclude directly and are the transposed moods which in the first figure conclude indirectly, and which are commonly called: *Bamalip, Camenes, Camenop, Dimaris, Fesapo, Fresison;* and six that conclude indirectly and are the transposed moods which in the first figure conclude directly, and which may be called: *Barbaram, Barbarim, Clamerent, Clameront, Dirami, Frimenon.*

Any syllogistic mood whose premises are both affirmative is invalid in the second figure, because the middle term is not distributed. Adding to these invalid moods the ones that are invalid in any figure, we find that there are eight valid combinations and eight invalid regarding the quality and quantity of the premises in the second figure, as the following table shows.

	A	E	I	O
A	☒		☒	
E		☒		☒
I	☒		☒	
O		☒		☒

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[18] "Et notandum est quod quicumque istorum modorum utilium concludit aliquam conclusionem, concludit etiam illam quae ad eam sequitur; unde concludens universalem, etiam concludit particularem eius. Et ergo sicut Barbara concludit universalem affirmativam, ita etiam concludit particularem affirmativam; et sicut Celarent concludit universalem negativam, ita etiam concludit particularem negativam; et ergo possumus habere duo nomina, scilicet Barbari et Celaront, sicut habemus ista duo Barbara et Celarent." *Log.*, t. 4, c. 8, f. 19v. Cfr. Ockham, *Summa logicae*, III, I, c. 6, p. 348.

The valid moods of the second figure are: *Cesare, Camestres, Festino, Baroco,* which conclude directly; *Stifeno* and *Robaco,* which conclude indirectly. Albert does not mention any mood having the combinations IO, or OI in the premises, which combinations are supposed to be valid; but Buridan clarifies the point in his *Consequentiae,* when he states that these combinations are valid to conclude propositions which are negative in the common manner of speech; hence, the following valid syllogisms: 'Some B is a C, some D is not a C, therefore some D with a B is not identical;' 'Some B is not a C, some D is a C, therefore some D with a B is not identical.' From the valid moods of the second figure listed by Albert, the distinction of direct and indirect conclusion, and the rules for the subaltern moods, we gather that there are twelve valid moods in the second figure; six concluding directly: *Cesare, Cesaro, Camestres, Camestrop, Festino, Baroco;* and six concluding indirectly: *Cesares Cesarop, Camestre, Camestrop, Friresmo (Stifeno), Boramco (Robaco).*[19]

Albert does not indicate which are the invalid combinations of quality and quantity in the premises peculiar to the third figure, besides the combinations which are invalid in any figure; but Buridan describes them in his *Consequentiae*. Nothing follows in the third figure from two particular premises, because the middle term is not distributed. Hence, the following table.

	A	E	I	O
A				
E		☒		☒
I			☒	☒
O		☒	☒	☒

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[19] "In secunda figura solum sunt quattuor combinationes utiles concludentes directe formando conclusionem secundum modum loquendi consuetum, et istae possunt designari per istas dictiones: Cesare, Camestres, Festino, Baroco; et duo utiles concludentes indirecte, quae possunt designari per illas duas dictiones: Stifeno et Robaco, et probantur per reductionem ad Festino et Baroco per solam transpositionem praemissarum. Si aliquae aliae fiunt combinationes in secunda figura, puta ex puris affirmativis vel ex puris negativis, non sunt utiles in secunda figura ad inferendam conclusionem formatam secundum modum loquendi consuetum." *Log.*, t. 4, c. 8, f. 29v. Cfr. Buridan, *Consequentiae,* 1. 3, c. 4, f. C6v.

The valid moods of the third figure are six that conclude directly: *Darapti, Felapton, Disamis, Datisi, Bocardo, Ferison;* and three concluding indirectly: *Lapfeton, Carbodo, Rifeson.* From this list of valid moods, the notion of direct and indirect conclusion, and the rule of the subaltern moods, we may gather that there are twelve valid moods in the third figure; six concluding directly: *Darapti, Felapton, Disamis, Datisi, Bocardo, Ferison;* and six that conclude indirectly: *Daraptis, Disami, Datisis, Fapelmon (Lapfeton), Bacordo (Carbodo), Frisemon (Rifeson).*[20]

Among the five hundred and twelve possible syllogistic moods there are forty-eight valid ones; twenty-four concluding directly, and twenty-four concluding indirectly; twelve moods are valid in each figure, six concluding directly, and six indirectly. An anonymous author whose work was published at the beginning of the sixteenth century maintains the same position. He distinguishes with Dorp the notion of the first figure in a broad and in a strict sense; and the notion of syllogistic mood in two different ways; first, as determined by the quality and quantity of the premises alone; and second, as determined by the premises and conclusion together. If the first figure is understood in the broad sense, as the one in which the middle term is subject in one of the premises and predicate in the other, then, the fourth figure is not distinct from the first, but is included in it. If we understand the first figure in this broad sense and the syllogistic mood as determined by the premises alone, then, there are twelve moods in the first figure: *Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferio, Fapesmo, Frisesomorum,* and six others obtained by the mere transposition of the premises of the first six. *Baralipton, Dabitis,* and *Celantes* are not syllogistic moods; at least they are not different from *Barbara, Darii,* and *Celarent* respectively, since they have the same premises. If we take the first figure in the broad sense, and the syllogistic mood as determined by premises and conclusion, then, there are twenty-four syllogistic moods in the first figure; the following nine listed by Peter of Spain: *Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferio, Baralipton, Celantes, Dabitis, Fapesmo, Frisesomorum,* plus three subaltern moods: *Barbari, Celaront, Celantos;* the other twelve moods are obtained from the preceding twelve by transposition of the premises.

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[20] "In tertia figura sunt sex combinationes utiles concludentes directe, et designantur per istas dictiones: Darapti, Felapton, Disamis, Datisi, Bocardo, Ferison; et tres indirecte concludentes, et designantur per illas dictiones; Lapfeton, Carbodo, et Rifeson, et reducuntur ad Felapton, Bocardo, et Ferison per solam transpositionem praemissarum." *Log.*, t. 4, c. 8, f. 29v. Cfr. Buridan, *Consequentiae*, 1. 3, c. 4, f. C6v.

If we take the first figure in the strict sense, as the one in which the middle term is the subject of the major premise and predicate of the minor; then, the fourth figure is different from the first. If we understand the first figure in this strict sense and syllogistic mood as determined by the premises alone, then, there are only six moods in the first figure: *Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferio, Fapesmo, Frisesomorum.* If we take the first figure in the strict sense and mood as determined by premises and conclusion together, then, there are twelve valid moods; the nine that Peter of Spain indicates and the three subaltern moods, as quoted above. The moods of the fourth figure obviously may be obtained from the moods of the first by transposition of the premises in each mood; but this last point is not indicated in the text quoted by Prantl, and we did not have access to the source.

Regarding the second figure, the anonymous author continues, if we take syllogistic mood as determined by the premises alone, then, there are only four moods in the second figure as indicated by Peter of Spain: *Cesare, Camestres, Festino, Baroco.* But, if we understand a syllogistic mood as determined by the premises and conclusion together, then, there are twelve moods; six concluding directly, viz., the four indicated by Peter of Spain plus *Cesaron* and *Camestron*, and six concluding indirectly. There are only six moods in the third figure, if we take mood as determined by the premises only, viz., the ones indicated by Peter of Spain: *Darapti, Felapton, Disamis, Datisi, Bocardo, Ferison.* But, if we understand a syllogistic mood as determined by the premises and conclusion together, then, there are twelve moods; six concluding directly, and six that conclude indirectly.[21]

If we write the valid syllogistic moods in the Russellian notation, we notice an important feature of the negative syllogisms; they are valid to infer a negative conclusion with existential import, except *Baroco* and *Boramco.* The following examples show such an existential import in the conclusion marked as b). Neither Ockham, Buridan, nor Albert of Saxony say anything about this peculiarity, since it cannot be noticed in the ordinary language, nor in the more formalized Scholastic expressions, not even if we use our alternative notation, as the following examples show.

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[21] Cfr. *Commentarium secundum modernam doctrinam in tractatus logices Petri Hispani primum et quartum* . . . (Hagenau, 1503); as quoted by Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik*, vol. 4, p. 245.

Celarent

(1) 'No B is a C, every D is a B, therefore no D is a C'
(2) 'Ema, Abm / Eba'
(3) $(x)\ (Mx \supset -Ax)$
$\underline{(x)\ (Bx \supset Mx) \cdot (Ex)\ (Bx \cdot Mx)}$
a) $(x)\ (Bx \supset -Ax)$
b) $(x)\ (Bx \supset -Ax) \cdot (Ex)\ Bx$

Ferio

(1) 'No B is a C, some D is a B, therefore some D is not a C'
(2) 'Ema, Ibm / Oba'
(3) $(x)\ (Mx \supset -Ax)$
$\underline{(Ex)\ (Bx \cdot Mx)}$
a) $(Ex)\ (Bx \cdot -Ax)\ v - (Ex)\ Bx \cdot Ax)$
b) $(Ex)\ (Bx \cdot -Ax)$

B) Syllogistic Reduction

Aristotle divides all categorical syllogisms into perfect and imperfect. The perfect syllogisms are the axioms of his system, true and evident implications, which do not have and do not need demonstration; they are the moods of the first figure subsequently called *Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferio;* sometimes Aristotle drops the last two moods and retains only the first two. The imperfect syllogisms are reduced to or proven from the axioms by direct reduction, indirect reduction, or ecthesis; although the reduction by ecthesis or exposition has no importance for Aristotle's system. In the proofs by direct reduction, Aristotle uses the laws of conversion, and he employs some of the laws of opposition in the proofs by indirect reduction. A fundamental defect of his method of proof is his assumption that the syllogism is the only instrument of proof; but he forgets that, for instance, the laws of conversion cannot be proven by syllogistic process. Above all, Aristotle did not know the existence of the fundamental theory of logic, viz., the logic of propositions, which was discovered by the Stoics half a century after him, although the Philosopher uses intuitively some of the propositional laws in the syllogistic reduction; furthermore the very formulation of his syllogisms by means of the conjunctions 'if . . . then' and 'and' presupposes a logical theory more fundamental than the syllogistic.[22]

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[22] Cfr. Lukasiewicz, *Aristotle's Syllogistic*, pp. 43—67.

Scholastic logicians such as Peter of Spain, Ockham, Buridan, Albert of Saxony and many others, took over Aristotle's doctrine of syllogistic reduction, developed and complemented it by the rules and laws of the propositional logic. Albert refers occasionally to the perfect moods that hold evidently by the principle of all or the principle of none, he also indicates that the five moods *Baralipton, Celantes, Dabitis, Fapesmo, Frisesomorum*, can be reduced to the perfect moods by conversion or transposition of the premises.[23]

Albert does not give any further explanation about the direct syllogistic reduction, perhaps because he takes it for granted as common doctrine; at any rate, he omits some important information given by Buridan in his *Consequentiae*. We shall give a brief account of the method of direct reduction following Buridan's doctrine principally. The last author states in his *Consequentiae* that the first four moods of the first figure are the perfect moods, they are evidently and explicitly valid by the principle of all or by the principle of none. The rest of the moods, except *Baroco* and *Bocardo*, are proven by direct reduction to the four perfect moods with the help of the rules of conversions which are formal consequences. Furthermore, Buridan enunciates the propositional law which is the basis for direct reduction, and which in modern times is used in the axiomatic exposition of the theory of Aristotle's categorical syllogism by Lukasiewicz and Bocheński. Buridan states the rule that any conclusion which follows from the premises of any given syllogism, the same conclusion follows from one of the premises together with the antecedent of the other premise. The thesis mentioned by this rule may be symbolized as follows:[24]

$$(1)\ \{[(p \cdot q) \overline{\supset} r] \cdot (s \overline{\supset} p)\} \overline{\supset} [(s \cdot q) \overline{\supset} r]$$

$$(2)\ \{[(p \cdot q) \overline{\supset} r] \cdot (s \overline{\supset} q)\} \overline{\supset} [(p \cdot s) \overline{\supset} r]$$

Some of the consonants of the mnemonic names designating the valid syllogistic moods indicate the conversions to be made in order to prove the validity of the imperfect moods, and some other consonants indicate other logical operations, as the next exposition shows. The four perfect moods begin with one of the letters 'B,' 'C,' 'D,' 'F,' and all the rest of the mnemonic names also begin with one of these consonants, indicating that the imperfect moods designated by them are to be reduced to the perfect mood beginning with the same letter. The consonants 's' and 'p' show how the premise indicated by the immediately preceding vowel is to be converted; viz., by simple conversion, if 's' follows; or by conversion *per accidens*, if 'p' is the following letter. The consonant 'm' indicates transposition of the premises, and 'c' reduction *per impossibile.* The meaningful part of the mnemonic names is only the first three syllables; if any other syllable is found, it has no meaning; nor any other letter, except the aforesaid and the vowels 'a,' 'e,' 'i,' 'o' already explained, has any significance.[25]

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[23] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 4, c. 8, f. 29v; c. 13, f. 31r; c. 15, f. 31v; c. 18, f. 32v.

[24] "Quattuor primi modi quos ponit Aristoteles sunt perfecti, tenentes evidenter aut explicite per dici de omni aut de nullo; et alii modi concludentes secundum modum consuetum quos ponit Aristoteles reducuntur ad illos quattuor modos, sicut bene docet Aristoteles eos reducere, quia tali modo loquendi sunt conversiones quas ipse ponit formales. . . . Modo per conversiones reducuntur ad quattuor modos primae figurae perfectos omnes alii, [praeter] (propter *ed.*) Baroco et Bocardo." *Consequentiae*, I. 3, c. 4, f. C6v—C7r. "Omnes syllogismi dati; quaecumque conclusio sequitur ad eius praemissas, illa sequitur ad unam illarum cum antecedente alterius." *Ibid.*, f. C5r.

Let us illustrate the direct syllogistic reduction with an example. The mood *Cesare* is reduced to *Celarent* with the help of the propositional law of direct reduction, and the law of simple conversion of a universal negative proposition. Thus, if we have *Celarent,* and the simple conversion of the universal negative as formal consequences; then, we have also *Cesare.*

$$\{[(\mathrm{Ema} \cdot \mathrm{Abm}) \overline{\supset} \mathrm{Eba}] \cdot (\mathrm{Eam} \overline{\supset} \mathrm{Ema})\} \overline{\supset} [(\mathrm{Eam} \cdot \mathrm{Abm}) \overline{\supset} \mathrm{Eba}]$$

An alternative method for the direct reduction is by accomplishing the following steps:

(1) $(\mathrm{Eam} \cdot \mathrm{Abm}) \overline{\supset} \mathrm{Eba}$ *Cesare*
(2) $(\mathrm{Ema} \cdot \mathrm{Abm}) \overline{\supset} \mathrm{Eba}$ *Celarent*
(3) $(\mathrm{Eam} \cdot \mathrm{Abm}) \overline{\supset} \mathrm{Eba}$ (1) from (2) by simple conversion of the major premise of (2).

The indirect syllogistic reduction or reduction *per impossible* is based on the propositional rule compound transposition for consequence or implication; viz., if a copulative proposition implies a third proposition, then, any one of the constituents of the copulative in conjunction with the contradictory of the consequent or third proposition implies the denial of the other constituent of the original copulative; or as Albert expresses it, any one of the premises of a syllogistic consequence together with the contradictory of the conclusion implies the contradictory of the other premise. Thus we have:

(1) $[(p \cdot q) \overline{\supset} r] \overline{\supset} [(\overline{r} \cdot q) \overline{\supset} \overline{p}]$
(2) $[(p \cdot q) \overline{\supset} r] \overline{\supset} [(p \cdot \overline{r}) \overline{\supset} \overline{q}]$

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[25] Cfr. Peter of Spain, *Summulae logicales,* t. 4, pp. 42—43; Buridan, *Compendium logicae,* t. 5, f. L2rv.

Albert establishes this rule by the following reasoning; the total antecedent of any syllogistic consequence is none of the premises alone, but the copulative proposition composed of both premises; hence, the contradictory of the consequent or conclusion implies the contradictory of the copulative which is the antecedent, by the rule already stated that the contradictory of the consequent implies the contradictory of the antecedent. Hence, we have:

$$[(p \cdot q)\ \overline{\supset}\ r]\ \overline{\supset}\ [\overline{r}\ \overline{\supset}\ \text{—}\ (p \cdot q)]$$

The denial of the copulation of the premises is equivalent to a disjunction composed of the contradictories of each premise, by the propositional rule already stated that the denial of a copulative proposition is equivalent to a disjunction in which the components of the copulation are denied. Thus, we have:

$$[(p \cdot q)\ \overline{\supset}\ r]\ \overline{\supset}\ [\overline{r}\ \overline{\supset}\ (\overline{p} \vee \overline{q})]$$

Therefore, the conjunction of one of the premises with the contradictory of the conclusion necessarily implies the contradictory of the other premise by law of the disjunctive syllogism; since the premise taken in conjunction with the contradictory of the conclusion is the denial of one part of the disjunction resulting from the denial of the syllogistic antecedent, then, it follows necessarily that the other premise is true.[26]

From the preceding exposition of the rule of compound transposition for consequence, we may conclude that, besides the mentioned propositional rule, the rules of contradictory opposition are necessary for the indirect syllogistic reduction. For instance, to reduce *Baroco* to *Barbara* we take the thesis of compound transposition for consequence, substitute the propositional variable 'p' for 'Ama,' 'q' for 'Abm,' 'r' for 'Aba;' then, we obtain *Barbara* as antecedent and *Baroco* as consequent.[27]

$$[(\text{Ama} \cdot \text{Abm})\ \overline{\supset}\ \text{Aba}]\ \overline{\supset}\ [(\text{Ama} \cdot \text{Oba})\ \overline{\supset}\ \text{Obm}]$$

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[26] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 4, c. 8, f. 29v. "Omnes syllogismi boni; ex utraque praemissa cum contradictorio conclusionis sequitur contradictorium alterius praemissae. Pro quo notandum quod in syllogismo neutra praemissarum est antecedens, sed copulativa composita ex eis dicitur totale antecedens. Isto supposito, si aliquis syllogismus est bonus, tunc ex contradictorio conclusionis quae dicitur consequens sequitur, per quartam regulam secundi capituli huius, contradictorium istius copulativae quae dicitur antecedens, cuius contradictorium est una disiunctiva ex contradictoriis praemissarum composita; et praemissa quae cum contradictorio conclusionis accipitur interimit unam partem illius disiunctivae, ex eo quod praemissa accepta cum contradictorio conclusionis contradicit uni parti disiunctivae; ergo oportet alteram sequi, ex eo quod disiunctiva non dicitur vera nisi una eius pars sit vera." *Ibid.*

[27] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 4, c. 8, f. 29v. Buridan in his *Consequentiae* remarks that: "Baroco et omnes alii modi secundae figurae reduci possunt et probari per impossibile, scilicet quia ex maiore et contradictorio conclusionis infertur

In an alternative formulation of this method we may reduce *Baroco* to *Barbara* by these steps:

(1) (Ama · Oba) $\overline{\supset}$ Obm *Baroco*
(2) (Ama · Abm) $\overline{\supset}$ Aba *Barbara*
(3) (Ama · NAba) $\overline{\supset}$ NAbm From (2) by compound transposition for implication.
(4) (Ama · Oba) $\overline{\supset}$ Obm *Baroco* from (3) by contradictory opposition.

To derive the subaltern moods together with *Baralipton* and *Bamalip*, the propositional law called the hypothetical syllogism is needed, plus the laws of subalternation and conversion *per accidens* of the universal affirmative proposition. Albert clearly insinuates the need of the propositional law, and Ockham expressly states it, as we have already remarked in this chapter. The proof by transposition of the premises is based on the propositional rule of the commutability of the copulative proposition, although Albert does not express it in such a fashion. By this method of transposition of the premises, are derived, for instance, the moods of the fourth figure from the moods of the first figure, *Stifeno (Frimesnon)* from *Festino*, *Robaco (Boramco)* from *Baroco*, and so on.[28]

THE VALIDITY OF THE SYLLOGISTIC MOODS AND THE DIVINE TERMS

Medieval logicians were faced with the grave problem of the universal validity of logic and the Blessed Trinity; that is, the problem of the terms concerning the Divine Trinity, which apparently lead to the falsification of logical theories, tending towards the Tertullian "*Credo quia absurdum.*" Albert examines the syllogisms with common-term-variables, the *syllogismus expositorius*, and syllogisms in which the sign of identity is used, in regard to the divine terms. He asserts that no syllogism is formal without the addition of the expression 'everything which is' or 'nothing which is' to the subject of one of the premises, because without one of these expressions any syllogism fails or leads to erroneous conclusions *in terminis divinis*. For instance, the moods *Barbara* and *Celarent* lead to false and and heretical conclusions from true premises in the following examples which we prefer to leave in Latin:

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contradictorium minoris per primam figuram, ideo per tertiam conclusionem sequitur quod boni erant syllogismi. Ita etiam Bocardo et omnes alii modi tertiae figurae probantur quia ex contradictorio conclusionis et minore infertur contradictorium maioris, ideo omnes erant boni, etc." *Consequentiae*, 1. 3, c. 4, f. C7r.

[28] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 4, c. 8, f. 29v. Ockham, *Summa logicae*, III, I, c. 6, p. 348.

(1) Omnis Deus est Pater, omnis Filius est Deus, ergo omnis Filius est Pater.

(2) Nullus Pater est Filius, omnis Deus est Pater, ergo nullus Deus est Filius.

But the following syllogisms, in *Barbara* and *Celarent* as the preceding and with the same terms, are valid; because even if the conclusion is false, so is the major premise of each syllogism:

(3) Omne quod est Deus est Pater, omnis Filius est Deus, ergo omnis Filius est Pater.

(4) Nihil quod est Pater est Filius, omnis Deus est Pater, ergo nullus Deus est Filius.[29]

If anyone, Albert concedes, wishes to accept as formal the syllogistic consequences which are invalid exclusively *in terminis divinis*, then, it can be granted that they are formal without the aforesaid additions. It seems that Albert refers here to Buridan, who in his *Consequentiae* maintains that no syllogism is formal according to the convential manner of speech, that is, without the addition of 'which' or 'everything which is,' or similar devices; no syllogism is formal, because all are invalid *in terminis divinis*. Whether the syllogistic consequences are valid in any terms with the addition of the mentioned expressions or some other device, it is a question that master Buridan does not want to solve, but he leaves the problem and its solution to the competence of the theologians. However, since *nomina sunt ad placitum*, Buridan decides to call "formal" those syllogisms which are invalid only when the terms employed express the relations of distinction of the Substance and Persons of the Divine Trinity.[30]

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[29] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 4, c. 8, f. 29r.

[30] "Si quis tamen istos syllogismos sive consequentias vellet vocare formales contra quos vel quas non reperitur instantia, nisi in terminis divinis, posset concedere esse syllogismos formales sine praedicta additione ['omne quod est' vel 'nihil quod est']." *Log.*, t. 4, c. 8, f. 29r. "Nulli sunt syllogismi formales secundum communem et consuetum modum loquendi. Voco modum communem et consuetum, modum loquendi sine hac additione 'quod est' vel huiusmodi; ut si dico: "Sortes est homo,' 'Homo est animal;' non dicendo: 'Qui est Sortes est homo,' vel 'Omne quod est homo est animal,' aut huiusmodi. Causa huius conclusionis est quia inveniuntur termini in quibus talis forma non valet, propter hoc quod sic non valebant regulae prius dictae. Verbi gratia, non valet sic: 'Iste Deus est Pater, et iste idem Deus est Filius, ergo Filius est Pater;' similiter non valet: 'Iste Pater non est Filius, et iste idem Pater est Deus, ergo Deus non est Filius;' similiter non valet: 'Omnis Deus est Pater divinus, omnis Filius divinus est Deus, ergo omnis Filius divinus est Pater divinus;' similiter non valet: 'Nullus Filius est Pater divinus, omnis Deus est Filius, ergo nullus Deus est Pater divinus;' et sic potest instare contra alios modos. Utrum autem secundum alium modum locutionis syllogismi de forma valent in his divinis, et quae sit illa forma, relinquo theologis. Et est notandum et semper in memoria habendum quia

It is required for the validity of the *syllogismus expositorius*, Albert continues, that one of the extremes be predicated of the middle term taken with the expression 'everything which is' or 'nothing which is.' A *syllogismus expositorius* is the one in which the middle term is a singular term. The following syllogism (1) is invalid, because it has true premises and a false and heretic conclusion; but syllogism (2) is valid, although it has a false conclusion, because it has a false major premise, since none of these terms '*Pater*' and '*Filius*' can truly be predicated of the term '*iste Deus*' taken with the expression '*omne quod est*' or '*nihil quod est*:'

(1) Iste Deus est Pater, iste Deus est Filius, ergo Filius est Pater.

(2) Omne quod est iste Deus est Pater, iste Deus est Filius, ergo Filius est Pater.

Consequently this *syllogismus expositorius* is not valid, because it fails *in terminis divinis:* 'Socrates is a man, Socrates is white, therefore something white is a man.' But when a *syllogismus expositorius*, similar in form to the preceding, is formed with terms other than the divine, then the expression 'everything which is' or 'nothing which is' is not added, because one and the same thing is not numerically many when creatures are involved. Hence, it is valid to infer from a singular proposition a universal with the expression 'everything which is' or 'nothing which is;' for instance, it is valid to infer: 'Everything which is identical with Socrates is a man,' from: 'Socrates is a man.' But this does not hold for the divine terms, because it is true that: '*Iste Deus est Pater*,' and nevertheless, it is false that: '*Omne quod est iste Deus est Pater*;' because the same thing is most simple and singular, and at the same time it is many, when the Divine Trinity is involved.[31]

The same problem is met with the identity theory. Albert briefly points out that the following consequence, which later on was called *syllogismus expositorius virtualiter* to distinguish it from the *syllogismus expositorius formaliter* or simply the *syllogismus expositorius*, is not formally valid because it fails *in terminis divinis:* 'Some B is an A, and some C is identical with the same preceding B, therefore some C is an A.' This consequence is the following valid thesis based on identity:

$$(\mathrm{Ex})\ [(\mathrm{Fx} \cdot \mathrm{Gx}) \cdot (\mathrm{Ey})\ \mathrm{My} \cdot \mathrm{y} = \mathrm{x})]\ \overline{\supset}\ (\mathrm{Ex})\ (\mathrm{Mx} \cdot \mathrm{Gx})$$

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non pertinet ad istam de praedictis ultra praedicta determinare; et quia etiam nomina sunt significativa ad placitum, ergo de cetero vocabo syllogismos formales contra quorum formam non erit alia instantia quam in terminis divinis, et non intelligam per haec quod sint simpliciter formales, sed ex hypothesi solum quod non fiant in terminis pertinentibus ad discretionem personarum divinarum." Buridan, *Consequentiae*, 1. 3, c. 4, f. C4v.

[31] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 3, c. 1, f. 17r; t. 4, c. 7, f. 29r.

But this consequence, Albert remarks, fails *in terminis divinis*, because the conclusion of the following consequence is false, while the antecedent is true:

Deus est Pater, et Filius est idem Deus, ergo Filius est Pater.

If, however, someone wishes to accept as formal those consequences which are invalid only *in terminis divinis*, then the preceding syllogistic consequences are formal, and the rule that from two particular or indefinite premises nothing follows, should be restated in this way: Two particular or indefinite premises do not yield any conclusion, unless the middle term is taken with the sign of identity in the minor premise.[32]

In regard to the *syllogismus expositorius* and the syllogism in which the identity sign is used, Buridan holds that they are valid in any figure according to the rules of syllogistic quality and quantity, but in the third figure the *syllogismus expositorius* is most evident. The *syllogismus expositorius* and the syllogisms with common terms are universally valid for Ockham; but the divine terms are not always suitable to be used in these formally valid syllogisms, because of the peculiar nature of these terms which is determined by the fact that the Divine Essence is something unique and simple, numerically one and most singular, and nevertheless, It is several things; since the Divine Essence is one substance and at the same time several Persons who are really distinct from each other. Hence, Ockham maintains that beween the Divine Essence and each of the three Persons there is a formal distinction or formal non-identity, although each Person is in reality identical with the Divine Essence. But Ockham, as Boehner remarks, "is well-aware that he does not give a solution of the difficulty, if solution means the elimination of the problem by reducing it to better-known statements. For the *distinctio formalis* is a mystery of the same degree as the mystery of the Blessed Trinity itself." Indeed, we have to confess with St. Augustine that, when it comes to the highest mystery of the Christian Faith, the most Holy Trinity, "*magna prorsus inopia humanum laborat eloquium;*" and if we dare to say anything at all about it, it is "*non ut illud diceretur, sed ne taceretur.*"[33]

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[32] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 4, c. 8, f. 29v. "Syllogismus expositorius virtualiter est syllogismus cuius medium est terminus communis restrictus in una praemissarum per relativum identitatis, . . expositorius formaliter est cuius medium est terminus singularis singulariter tentus." Michael of Breslau, *Introductorium dialecticae* . . . (Strasburg, 1515); as quoted by Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik*, vol. 4, p. 264.

[33] Cfr. *Buridan, Consequentiae*, I. 3, f. C5rv. "In omni figura valet syllogismus expositorius ex ambabus affirmativis ad conclusionem affirmativam; et ex una affirmativa et alia negativa ad conclusionem negativam, quaecumque praemissa fuerit affirmativa; utrique enim tenent per regulas

Albert, as we have seen in chapter three, employs the expression 'which is' to prevent ampliation of the subject, and in this present chapter we shall again meet this function of this expression. But in this present chapter Albert used the same expression together with the universal quantifiers, as 'everything which is' or 'nothing which is,' to construct formal syllogistic consequences in which the divine terms are used, and which otherwise would not be formal, but would lead to false conclusions from true premises. Albert does not explain how these expressions accomplish the task they are supposed to do. For an explanation we turn to a contemporary of Albert, the logician Dorp, who taught at Paris at the end of the fourteenth and beginning of the fifteenth century. He asks the question whether the four perfect moods are formal consequences. He answers in two different ways and the second seems to be the one accepted by him. The first answer establishes that if the first four syllogisms of the first figure are formulated according to the conventional manner, then, they are not formal consequences, because they lead to erroneous conclusions when the divine terms or ampliative terms are used. For instance, *Barbara* is not formal consequence, if formulated in the conventional manner as in (1); because when the divine terms are used as in (2), the conclusion is false and the premises are true:

(1) Every A is a B, every C is an A, therefore every C is a B.

(2) Omnis Essentia Divina est Pater in divinis, et omnis Filius in divinis est Essentia Divina, ergo omnis Filius in divinis est Pater in divinis.[34]

But if the four perfect moods are formulated adding to the subjects of the premises and conclusion the expression 'which is,' then, they are formal consequences, since they do not fail in any terms. They are not invalid when ampliative terms are used, because the expression

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in suppositionibus assignatas. Et in tertia figura illi syllogismi sunt maxime evidentes." *Ibid.*, f. C5r. "Nullus syllogismus valet in quo medium in neutra praemissarum est distributum, nisi in minore propositione sumatur medium cum relativo identitatis, . . . [et sic] cogatur teneri pro eodem in minori propositione pro quo erat eius verificatio in maiore. Sed tunc valet syllogismus et tenet manifeste per regulas supradictas, et est tamquam syllogismus expositorius; verbi gratia: 'B est A, et C est idem B, ergo C est A.' Tenent ergo tales syllogismi in omnibus modis quibus tenent syllogismi expositorii. Et iste est unus modus secundum quem contigit arguere ex duabus particularibus." *Ibid.*, f. C5v. Cfr. Ockham, *Summa logicae*, III, I, c. 16, pp. 367—370; c. 4—5, pp. 337—346; Boehner, "The Medieval Crisis of Logic and the Author of the *Centiloquium Attributed to Ockham*," *Franciscan Studies*, vol. 4 (June, 1944), 151—170; St. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, 1. 5, c. 9, *PL*, vol. 42, col. 918; 1. 7, c. 4, col. 939—942.

[34] Cfr. *Expositio super logicam Buridani*, f. L3r.

'which is' prevents ampliation; and they are not invalid either, if the divine terms are used. Hence, *Barbara* is to be formulated as in (3); and thus, (4) has a false and heretical conclusion, but the major premise falls into the same category:

(3) Everything which is an A is a B, and everything which is a C is an A, therefore everything which is a C is a B.

(4) Omne quod est Essentia Divina est Pater in divinis et omne quod est Filius in divinis est Essentia Divina, ergo omne, quod est Filius in divinis est Pater in divinis.[35]

It is argued against the preceding solution, Dorp continues, that these propositions: 1) 'Every A is a B,' and 2) 'Everything which is an A is a B,' have absolutely the same form; since they have the same quality, quantity, the same place and order of the terms, and the same copula, and there seems to be no other elements that would belong to the form of a proposition. Consequently, if the four perfect moods are formal consequences with the addition of 'which is,' the same moods are formal without it. The first opinion answers to this objection that the propositions 1) and 2) do not have the same form, since they differ in the syncategorematic terms, which belong to the form of the propositions. In proposition 2) the expression 'which is' affects the universal quantifier, but this syncategorematic term 'which is' is lacking in proposition 1).[36]

It is further objected that the subjects of both propositions 1) and 2) have the same distribution, and hence, they have the same meaning and the same truth-value. The answer to this objection is that the subject of both propositions is not distributed in the same manner, and consequently, both propositions have different meaning; because the quantifier 'every' distributes the subject *infra terminum*, while the quantifier 'everything which is' distributes the subject *infra terminum et extra terminum*. To grasp the value of these distinctions we have to explain the meaning of these technical Latin terms. Dorp distinguishes three types of distribution. The first type is distribution *in termino* or *infra terminum;* and if a term has this type of distribution in a proposition, then, the statement is explained by singular propositions in the following manner: 'Every A is a B,' means: 'This A is a B, and that A is a B, and there is not a single A unless it is a B.' The second distribution or distribution *in termino et extra terminum* is explained by singular propositions in which the term previously distributed is singularized by demonstrative adjectives, and besides a third term is added. We may note that the third term is the transcendental term 'thing,' which can be applied to anything whatsoever. If the subject has this type of distribution in the proposition: 'Every A is a B,' then, it is explained as meaning: 'This A is a B, and that A is a B, and there is not a single A unless it is a B, and there is not a single thing which is an A unless it is a B.' The third type of distribution is *in termino, extra terminum, et extra numerum.* A proposition in which the subject has this type of distribution is explained by singular propositions, in which the distributed term is singularized by demonstrative adjectives, and a third term in the plural grammatical number is added. If the subject has this type of distribution in the proposition: 'Every A is a B,' then, it is explained as meaning: 'This A is a B, and that A is a B, and there is not a single A unless it is a B, and there are no things which are A unless they are things which are B.'[37]

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[35] Cfr. *Expositio super logicam Buridani*, f. L3r.

[36] *Ibid.*

Coming back to our problem, the subject of the proposition: 'Every A is a B,' is distributed *in termino;* hence it is explained as meaning: 'Some A is a B, and there is no A unless it is a B.' The subject of the proposition: 'Everything which is an A is a B,' is distributed *in termino et extra terminum;* hence, the proposition is explained as meaning: 'Some A is a B, and there is not some A unless it is a B, and there is not a thing which is an A unless it is a B.' Consequently, we may see why the proposition: '*Omne quod est Deus est Pater,*' is false; since it would mean: '*Aliquis*

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[37] "Negatur quod in dictis propositionibus ly 'A' eodem modo distribuitur. Et etiam negatur quod illarum propositionum sit idem sensus, quia sensus huius: 'Omne A est B', sic explicatur: ['Aliquod A est B, et non est aliquod A quin sit B;' sed sensus huius: 'omne quod est A est B,' explicatur sic:] 'Aliquod A est B, et non est aliquod A quin sit B, nec est aliqua res quae sit A quin sit B.' Et diversitas istorum sensuum provenit ex diversitate distributionum, quia illud signum 'omne' praecise habet virtutem distribuendi terminum distributione cadente infra terminum; et ly 'omne quod est' habet virtutem distribuendi terminum distributione cadente infra terminum et extra terminum." *Expositio super logicam Buridani,* f. L3r. "Triplex est universalitas seu distributio alicuius termini. Quaedam est quae explicatur per propositiones singulares in quibus terminus prius distributus singularizatur per pronomina demonstrativa non assumendo aliquem terminum alterius rationis, ut si ista: 'Omne A est B', universalitas seu distributio sic explicatur: 'Hoc A est B, et hoc A est B, et non est aliquod A quin sit B,' tunc ibi est debita distributio et vocatur distributio in termino. Alia est distributio quae explicatur per propositiones singulares in quibus terminus prius distributus singularizatur per pronomina demonstrativa, cum hoc assumendo terminum alterius rationis; ergo si sensus huius propositionis: 'Omne A est B,' sic explicetur: 'Hoc A est B, et hoc A est B, et non est aliquod A quin sit B, nec est aliqua res quae sit A quin sit B,' tunc ibi est debita distributio, et vocatur distributio in termino et extra terminum. Tertia est universalitas termini quae explicatur per propositiones singulares in quibus terminus prius distributus singularizatur per pronomina demonstrativa, cum hoc assumendo terminus alterius rationis et alterius numeri; ergo si sensus huius: 'Omne A est B,' sic explicetur: 'Hoc A est B, et hoc A est B, et non est aliquod A quin sit B, nec sunt aliquae res quae sunt A quin tales sint res quae [sint] (sit *ed.*) B;' tunc ibi est debita distributio, et vocatur distributio in termino, extra terminum, et extra numerum." *Ibid.*, f. K7r.

Deus est Pater, et non est aliquis Deus quin sit Pater, nec est aliqua res quae sit Deus quin sit Pater,' but there is some thing *(res)* which is God, viz., the Son, and nevertheless, the Son is not the Father.[38]

Thus, we see what was a contemporary explanation of the expression 'which is,' phrase which Albert leaves unexplained. We might notice also that this explanation of the universal proposition further strengthens and confirms our interpretation of the universal affirmative proposition as a conjunction:

$$(x)\ (Fx \supset Gx) \cdot (Ex)\ (Fx \cdot Gx)$$

expression which may be interpreted in ordinary language as: 'If there is anything which is an F, it is a G; and there is some F which is a G;' and this last sentence is equivalent to Dorp's phrasing: 'Some F is G; and there is not a thing which is an F, unless it is a G.'

The second manner of considering the formal validity of the perfect moods, which seems to be Dorp's tenet, is in some respects different from the opinion already explained. This second view maintains that the addition of the expression 'which is' to the subjects of both premises, and to the subject of the conclusion, is not required in order that the four perfect moods be formal consequences, under the condition that the universal quantifiers be taken as signifying the distribution *in termino, extra terminum et extra numerum*. If the addition of the expression 'which is' would be required, it would be by reason of the ampliative terms ot the divine terms. Although the perfect moods do fail when ampliative terms are used, nevertheless, they do not fail in the same form; because ampliation is a part of the form, since it originates in the copula, or in another term including the copula or affecting the copula, and the copula is part of the form. For instance these two propositions have different form 'A man is an animal' *(Homo est animal)*, and 'A man will be generated' *(Homo est generandus)*. The divine terms do not require either the addition of the expression 'which is,' because the expression would affect either the subject, or the predicate, or the sign of quantity. If it affects either the subject or the predicate, then, the expression belongs not to the form but to the matter of the proposition. But, if it affects the quantifier, then, it produces incongruities such as: '*Omne quod est homo est album*,' in which the term '*omne quod est*' would be an adjective of neuter gender, but its noun would be of different gender. We have left the preceding proposition in Latin, because Dorp's objections are purely grammatical and do not prove the point, as it can be seen if we translate the proposition into English which does not have any gender for the adjectives; then, we have the grammatically congruent proposition: 'Everything which is a man is white.' But Dorp provides a stronger argument to prove his stand, when he states that if the universal quantifiers have the power to distribute *in termino, extra terminum, et extra numerum,* then, there is no need of the aforesaid addition; which, otherwise, would serve this purpose. Hence, the following syllogism (1) is valid, even if the conclusion is false and heretic; since the major premise belongs to the same category, for it is explained in the sense of proposition (2) which is given after syllogism (1):

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[38] Cfr. *supra*, footnote 37.

(1) Omnis Essentia Divina est Pater in divinis, et omnis Filius in divinis est Essentia Divina, ergo omnis Filius in divinis est Pater in divinis.

(2) Aliqua Essentia Divina est Pater in divinis, et non est aliqua Essentia Divina quin sit Pater in divinis, nec est aliqua res quae est Essentia Divina quin sit Pater in divinis, et non sunt aliquae res quae sunt Essentia Divina quin sint Pater in divinis.[39]

Thus, we close our discussion of syllogisms in which the divine terms are used, and commence the study of syllogisms in which other types of terms are employed.

SYLLOGISM WITH AMPLIATIVE TERMS AND SYLLOGISM WITH OBLIQUE TERMS

The treatment of the syllogisms with ampliative terms is more complete in Buridan's *Consequentiae* than in the *Perutilis logica.* Albert only asserts that the ampliative terms prevent a direct universal conclusion in the syllogistic moods already established as valid; but if the subject of each premise and the subject of the conclusion are taken with the expression 'which is' to prevent ampliation of the subject, then, the ampliative terms do not prevent the universal conclusion. For instance, this syllogism in *Barbara* and with ampliative terms of the future is not valid: 'Everyone of my horses will go to Rome, every horse is mine, therefore every horse will go to Rome', the premises may be true and the conclusion false at the same time as in the folloving situation. The major means 'Every horse which is mine or will be mine, will go to Rome', and granted that this is true; and conceded that the minor premise is true also, viz., that 'Every horse which exists now is mine;' nevertheless, the conclusion is false, assuming that tomorrow there will be many horses which will not be mine and will not go to Rome. But if ampliation of the subject is prevented, then, the syllogism is valid; as for instance: 'Everything which is a horse and is mine will go to Rome, everything which is a horse is mine, therefore everything which is a horse will go to Rome.' The following syllogism in *Celarent* and with ampliative terms of the past is not valid: 'No living thing is dead, every horse is a living thing, therefore no horse is dead;' the syllogism is invalid because the premises are true and the conclusion is false. But this syllogism is made valid by the addition of the expression 'which is' in the following manner: 'Nothing which is living is dead, everything which is now a horse is living, therefore nothing which is a horse is dead.'[40]

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[39] Cfr. *Expositio super logicam Buridani,* F. L3rv.

Regarding the syllogism with oblique terms, Albert holds that a valid syllogism with oblique terms can be formed from two propositions; a proposition with a distributed term, which may be the term that is in the nominative case, or the one that is in the oblique case; and a second proposition in which there is used another term falls under the range of the distributed term. Albert considers three different cases of this type of syllogisms. The first case is given when the whole aggregate of the term in the nominative case, together with the term in the oblique case, is distributed; in which case to form a valid syllogism, it is required that the term that falls under the range of the distributed term should fall under the distribution of the whole aggregate formed by the term in the nominative case and the term in an oblique case. For instance, in the proposition: 'Every man's donkey is running,' the distributed term is not only the term 'donkey' or the term 'man,' but the whole aggregate "man's donkey". If we use the following symbols: 'M_1' for 'man,' 'D_1' for 'donkey,' 'R_1' for 'running,' and 'B_2' for 'belongs to;' then, we have the following formulation of the preceding proposition:

$$(x)\,(y)\,[(D_1x \cdot M_1y \cdot B_2xy) \supset R_1x] \cdot (Ex)\,(Ey)\,D_1x \cdot M_1y \cdot B_2xy)$$

Hence, Albert continues, it does not follow: 'Every man's donkey is running, Brunellus is a donkey, therefore Brunellus is running;' because the premises are true and the conclusion is false, assuming that Brunellus does not belong to any man and the same Brunellus is sleeping. Likewise it does not follow: 'Every man's donkey is running, Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates' donkey is running;'

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[40] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 4, c. 8, f. 29v. Cfr. Buridan, *Consequentiae*, I. 3, c. 4, f. C6v—C8r.

because the premises are true and the conclusion false, if Socrates does not have any donkey. But this is a valid syllogism: 'Every man's donkey is running, Brunellus is a man's donkey, therefore Brunellus is running.'[41]

The second case of syllogisms with oblique terms is given when the distributive sign is in the same case as the noun in the oblique case, thus distributing only the term in the oblique case. To form a valid syllogism in this case, it is required that the term which is taken under the range of the distributed term should fall under the distribution of the term in the oblique case alone. For instance, in the proposition: 'Every man has a donkey that is running' *(Cuiuslibet hominis asinus currit)*, only the term 'man' is distributed, and not the term 'donkey' or the aggregate of 'man' and 'donkey'. In symbols we may express this proposition as folows:

$$(x)\ [M_1x \supset (Ey)\ (D_1y \cdot B_2yx \cdot R_1x)] \cdot (Ex)\ (Ey)\ M_1x \cdot D_1y \cdot B_2yx)$$

Consequently, Albert continues, this is an invalid syllogism: 'Every man has a donkey that is running, Brunellus is a donkey, therefore Brunellus is running;' and this syllogism is invalid also: 'Every man has a donkey that is running, Brunellus is a man's donkey, therefore Brunellus is running;' but this syllogism is perfectly valid: 'Every man has a donkey that is running, Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates has a donkey that is running;' and this is a valid syllogism also: 'A man is watching every donkey, Brunellus is a donkey, therefore a man is watching Brunellus.'[42]

The third case of constructing syllogism with terms in an oblique case occurs when the term in the nominative case alone is distributed. For instance, in the proposition: 'There is a man whose every donkey is running' *(Hominis quilibet asinus currit)*, only the term 'donkey' is distributed, and not the term 'man' or the aggregate of 'man' and 'donkey.' In symbolic logic we may interpret this proposition as:

$$(Ex)\ (Ey)\ \{(M_1x \cdot D_1y \cdot B_2yx) \cdot (y)\ [(D_1y \cdot B_2yx) \supset R_1y])\}$$

Albert does not indicate how to construct valid syllogism in this third case, and does not give any examples; but we find both in Buridan's *Consequentiae*. The following syllogisms, Buridan remarks, are invalid: 'There is a man whose every donkey is running, Brunellus is a donkey, therefore Brunellus is running;' this syllogism is invalid because even if the term 'donkey' is distributed, it is distributed as determined by the term 'man' which has determinate supposition; and the next syllogism is invalid because the aggregate of 'man' and 'donkey' is not distributed: 'There is a man whose every donkey is running, a donkey which belongs to the bishop is a man's donkey, therefore a donkey which belongs to the bishop is running;' the premises would be true and the conclusion false, if some or any donkey that belongs to the bishop is lying in the stable, and Socrates is the man whose every donkey is running. Hence, to form a valid syllogism in this third case, it is required that in the minor premise the term that falls under the distribution of the term which is distributed in the major premise be taken with the identity sign, in order that the middle term should stand for the same singular values in both premises. Thus, this is a valid syllogism: 'There is a man whose every donkey is running, a donkey that belongs to the bishop is a donkey of that same man whose every donkey is running, therefore a donkey that belongs to the bishop is running.' If we symbolize 'bishop' by 'E_1,' and the rest as in the two preceding cases, then, we have the following formal consequence:[43]

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[41] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 4, c. 9, f. 29v—30r.
[42] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 4, c. 9, f. 30r.

$$\begin{gathered}(Ex)\ (Ey)\ \Big(\big\{(M_1x \cdot D_1y \cdot B_2yx) \cdot (y)\ [(D_1y \cdot B_2yx) \supset R_1y]\big\} \cdot \\ (Ez)\ (Ew)\ (E_1z \cdot D_1w \cdot B_2wz \cdot z=x)\Big) \overline{\supset} \\ (Ez)\ (Ew)\ (E_1z\ .\ D_1w\ .\ B_2wz\ .\ R_1w)\end{gathered}$$

This type of syllogism with terms in an oblique case, Albert remarks, has special characteristics, that do not conform to syllogisms with common terms in the nominative case; because for the former it is not required that the major extreme or the minor be the subject or predicate of one of the premises, nor is it required that the middle term be the subject or predicate in the major premise. Hence, sometimes a syllogism with oblique terms is valid, and the middle is neither the subject nor the predicate of the major premise, and neither the major term nor the minor is subject or predicate in the conclusion; as for instance, in the following syllogism: 'Some man is watching every donkey, Brunellus is a donkey, therefore some man is watching Brunellus.' In this syllogism the term 'donkey' is the middle term, 'Brunellus' is the minor term, and the major term is the aggregate of the terms 'man' and 'watching;' in the same syllogism the middle term is not the total subject or predicate of the major premise, and neither the major term, nor the minor, is the total subject or predicate of the conclusion. Hence, in this type of syllogism that term is the middle which is distributed in the major premise and under whose distribution is taken another term in the minor premise, and it does not matter whether the distributed term is the total subject or total predicate, or a part of the subject or of the predicate. Furthermore, these syllogisms cannot be classified under any of the syllogistic figures as previously defined.[44]

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[43] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 4, c. 9, f. 30r; *Buridan, Consequentiae,* t. 3, c. 4, f. C8rv.

SYLLOGISMS IN WHICH THE MIDDLE TERM IS FINITE IN ONE PREMISE AND INFINITE IN THE OTHER

Albert enunciates two rules that concern syllogisms in which the middle term is finite in one premise and infinite in the other, and in which there are no ampliative terms. The first rule establishes that when the middle term is distributed at least in one of the premises, and it is finite in one premise and infinite in the other; then, a syllogism in which both premises are affirmative is valid to infer in any figure a negative conclusion, which may be universal or particular, direct or indirect, according to the conventional or unconventional manner of speech. Buridan specifies in his *Consequentiae*, and Albert omits this specification, of negative conclusion, which may be inferred validly, is determined that the type by the rules of syllogistic quantity.[45]

The following is a valid syllogism in the first figure: 'every animal is a substance, every stone is non-animal, therefore every stone with some substance is not identical.' If we symbolize 'animal' by 'A_1, substance by 'S_1,' and 'stone' by 'P_1,' then we obtain the following valid argument in which the conclusion marked as a) has no existential import, while b) has it:

$$\begin{array}{ll}
 & (x)\ (A_1x \supset S_1x) \cdot (Ex)\ (A_1x \cdot S_1x) \\
 & (x)\ (P_1x \supset -A_1x) \cdot (Ex)\ (P_1x \cdot -A_1x) \\
\hline
a) & (x)\ [P_1x \supset (Ey)\ (S_1y \cdot y \neq x)] \\
b) & (x)\ [P_1x \supset (Ey)\ (S_1y \cdot y \neq x)] \cdot (Ex)\ (Ey)\ (P_1x \cdot S_1y \cdot y \neq x)
\end{array}$$

The validity of the preceding syllogism, Albert continues, is proven from the fact that the contradictory of the conclusion in conjunction with the major premise implies the contradictory of the minor premise. The contradictory of the conclusion is: 'Some stone is every substance,' which implies by conversion: 'Every substance is a stone,' and the latter proposition in conjunction with the major premise of the original syllogism implies the contradictory of the minor premise, thus: 'Every substance is a stone, every animal is a substance, therefore every animal is a stone.' The conclusion of the latter syllogism implies by conversion *per accidens* the proposition: 'Some stone is an animal,' which is the contradictory of the minor premise of the original syllogism, viz., 'Every stone is a non-animal.' The premises of the original syllogism imply also this conclusion: 'Some substance is not a stone,' because the contradictory of this proposition and the major premise imply the contradictory of the minor premise.[46]

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[44] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 4, c. 9, f. 30r.

[45] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 4, c. 11, f. 30v; Buridan, *Consequentiae*, t. 3, c. 4, f. D3r.

The second rule regarding syllogistic consequences in which the middle term is finite in one premise and infinite in the other states that, if the middle term is distributed at least in one of the premises, then, in any figure two negative premises imply a negative conclusion, which may be universal or particular, direct or indirect, according to the conventional or unconventional manner of speach. Which of these types of conclusion is implied by the premises depends on the rules of syllogistic quantity, as Buridan remarks. For instance, this is a valid syllogism in the second figure: 'No stone is an animal, no man is non-animal, therefore no man is a stone.' Using term-variables instead of constants we obtain the following thesis: 'Eam, Ebnm / Eba.' This syllogism is valid in the third figure: 'no animal is a stone, no non-animal is a man, therefore no man is a stone.'[47]

THE THEORY OF CONSEQUENCES AS THE UNIFYING THEME OF LOGIC

We wish to conclude this chapter with some notes that will show, at least partially, that Albert's conception of the theory of consequences as the main and unifying theme of logic was typical of some of the main representatives of medieval logic in the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, and that this doctrine survived up to the sixteenth century. Our notes regard only assertoric consequences, although the same would apply to modal consequences.

The *Venerabilis Inceptor* shows a slight tendency to incorporate the syllogistic into the theory of consequences. He remarks in the *Tractatus medius* that syllogisms, conversions, inductions and many other arguments are simple consequences, if they should be called consequences *(si vocantur consequentiae)*. Furthermore, he acknowledges practically, although not systematically, the priority of the propositional logic over the syllogistic, when he explains supposition and quantification with the help of conjunction, disjunction, and consequence; and when he uses some of the propositional or consequential rules to prove the validity of syllogisms. Although for Ockham the syllogism still holds the time-honored position of being the central theme of logic and the most important form of argument to which every other type of argument is to be reduced.[48]

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[46] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 4, c. 11, f. 30v. Buridan, *Consequentiae*, 1. 3, c. 4, f. D3rv.

[47] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 4, c. 11, f. 30v. Buridan, *Consequentiae*, 1. 3, c. 4, f. D3rv.

Burleigh is the first medieval logician, as far as we know, who constructs his system of logic on the basis of the theory of consequences. A syllogism is a consequence which is valid when the contradictory of the consequent, together with either one of the premises, implies the contradictory of the other premise. But the syllogistic consequence has a peculiar antecedent in Burleigh's doctrine, it is neither a simple proposition, nor a compound one, but several propositions which are not bound by any propositional connective; hence, the rule that the contradictory of the consequent implies the contradictory of the antecedent, does not apply to the syllogistic consequence. This is not the opinion of other logicians, such as Buridan in his *Consequentiae*, Albert of Saxony, and John Dorp, for whom the antecedent of a syllogistic consequence is a copulative proposition composed of the two premises.[49]

Buridan in his *Compendium logicae* follows Ockham's opinion in regard to the syllogism as the main form of argument, to which every other type has to be reduced; although Buridan, as Ockham uses some rules of consequences to prove some syllogisms, and explains supposition and quantification on the basis of conjunction, disjunction, and some rules of consequences. But in his *Consequentiae* Buridan develops a system of deductive logic based on the theory of consequences, in which the propositional logic precedes systematically the logic of terms. We shall not discuss any further Buridan's position, nor Albert's, because we have studied them throughout this work.[50]

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[48] "Sic syllogismi, conversiones, inductiones, et plura alia argumenta, sunt consequentiae simplices, si vocantur consequentiae." *Tractatus medius* f. 157r; as quoted by Boehner, "Does Ockham Know of Material Implication?", p. 216. Cfr. Boehner, *Medieval Logic*, pp. 80—83; Salamucha, "Die Aussagenlogik bei Wilhelm Ockham," pp. 120—123.

[49] "Haec regula, videlicet ex opposito consequentis debet inferri oppositum antecedentis, est intelligenda in consequentia enthymematica, et universaliter in consequentia non-syllogistica, quia in consquentia syllogistica, videlicet in syllogismo, antecedens non habet oppositum, quia antecedens syllogisticum est propositio plures inconiunctae, et tale antecedens non habet oppositum, cum nec sit propositio simpliciter una nec propositio coniunctione una. Sed in consequentia syllogistica ex opposito conclusionis, scilicet ex contradictorio conclusionis cum utraque praemissarum sequitur oppositum alterius praemissae. Et si ex opposito conclusionis cum ultralibet praemissarum vel cum altera sequatur oppositum alterius praemissae, tunc est syllogismus bonus." W. Burleigh, *De puritate artis logicae, Tractatus longior*, with a revised edition of the *Tractatus brevior*, (St. Bonaventure, N. Y., 1955), *Tractatus longior*, t. 2, pl. 1, c. 1, p. 65; *Ibid.*, c. 3, p. 86; *Ibid.*, *Tractatus brevior*, t. 1, p. 1, pp. 207—208. Cfr. Boehner, *Medieval Logic*, pp. 87—89.

Dorp in his commentary to Buridan's *Compendium logicae* outlines a system in which the syllogistic is incorporated into the theory of consequences, although the very nature of the commentary prevents him from developing fully his own doctrines. Every consequence, according to Dorp, is either non-syllogistic or syllogistic. Some non-syllogistic consequences are irreducible to the syllogism; as for instance, the consequence in which a part of a copulative is deduced from the whole copulative proposition; or the one in which a disjunction is deduced from one of its parts, or conversions and equivalences. The first two types of these consequences are irreducible to syllogisms, because some proposition different from the antecedent is deduced as a conclusion from the propositions which constitute the antecedent, and which are not syllogistically combined, that is, they are not composed of three terms combined in two propositions. Conversions and equivalences are consequences irreducible to syllogisms, because one categoric proposition, which constitutes the antecedent, implies another proposition as its conclusion composed of the same terms of the antecedent, there are not two propositions in the antecedent and three terms as in any syllogism.[51]

A syllogistic consequence, according to Dorp, is one in which the antecedent is a copulative proposition composed of two premises and three terms, and the conclusion which is composed of two terms that appear in the premises and are different from the middle term, which is the one twice repeated in the premises. Dorp explicitly joins the premises of his syllogisms with the copulative conjunction, and even finds fault with the authors who do not follow the same pattern. An enthymematic consequence or enthymeme in the strictest sense is a consequence in which one categoric proposition, which constitutes the antecedent, implies another proposition or consequent. There are three terms in an enthymeme, just as in the syllogism; there is a term that appears in the antecedent and not in the consequent, and there are the two terms that are the subject and predicate of the conclusion, one of them is a part of the conclusion only and not of the antecedent, and the other term is a part of both the antecedent and the consequent. An enthymeme in the strictest sense is reducible to a syllogistic consequence by the addition of a second premise. This second premise is formed from the term which appears in the antecedent of the enthymeme and not in the consequent, and becomes the middle term; and from the term which appears in the conclusion and not in the antecedent of the enthymeme. For instance, this enthymeme: 'A man is running, therefore an animal is running,' is reduced to a syllogistic consequence by the addition of this premise: 'Every man is an animal;' thus we obtain the following syllogism:' Some man is running, and every man is an animal, therefore an animal is running.'[52]

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[50] Cfr. *Compendium logicae*, t. 6, f. N3r, f. N4v—N5r.

[51] Cfr. *Expositio in logicam Buridani*, F. N4r. "Alio modo potest formari enthymema, inferendo ex pluribus propositionibus non syllogistice combinatis in antecedente aliquam aliam conclusionem; et hoc etiam potest fieri inferendo ex una in antecedente expressa per medium non diversum ab extremitatibus conclusionis. Exemplum primi, ut est consequentia qua arguitur a tota copulativa ad alteram eius partem, vel consequentia qua arguitur a parte disiunctivae ad totam disiunctivam; exemplum secundi, ut sunt conversiones et aequipollentiae, ut sic arguendo: 'Homo currit, ergo currens est homo,' ubi ex sola propositione categorica infertur alia et non per medium diversum ab extremitatibus conclusionis. . . . Si formetur enthymema inferens conclusionem ex pluribus propositionibus in antecedente explicatis, vel ex una et non per medium diversum ab extremitatibus conclusionis; ipsum non est reducibile ad syllogismum." *Ibid.*, f. N4v—N5r.

The doctrine of the incorporation of the syllogistic into the more embracing theory of consequences was not lost completely in the centuries that follow the above-mentioned authors. In the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, we find three authors who upheld this position: John Dolz, Le Fèvre d'Etaples, and Clichtove. The Aragonian John Dolz divides his work *Syllogismi* into three parts: the first part treats the notion, division, and general rules of consequences; the second examines the general rules of syllogistic consequences; and the third part studies the syllogistic figures and moods.[53]

There is an early sixteenth century work, the *Introductiones artificiales in logicam* by Le Fèvre d'Etables and his pupil Clichtove, which is an outstanding compendium of a very considerable part of the Scholastic tradition in logic, together with some definite improvements. The *Introductiones* deserve a thorough analysis which we cannot provide here, but we shall content ourselves with some observations. In regard to our point Le Fèvre maintains that a consequence is a necessary conditional; an argument and a valid consequence are the same. A consequence is formal or material. Le Fèvre constructs a well-developed logic of propositions, in which the main propositional connectives considered are: 'and,' 'or,' 'if . . . then,' 'is equivalent to.' Equivalence is defined with remarkable accuracy; two propositions are equivalent, if they have the same truth-value, that is, if both are true or both are false, and they mutually imply each other. The principle of compound transposition for implication is stated as a propositional rule, and then it is applied to the syllogistic. Conversions and equivalences are formal consequences. A syllogism is a formal consequence composed of two premises and a conclusion. The validity of syllogistic moods is proven by two methods; by the method of propositional rules together with the laws of opposition, and by the method of the rules of syllogistic quality and quantity.[54]

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[52] "Omnis syllogismus categoricus constitutus ex extremis simplicibus constat ex tribus terminis, vel ex duobus supplentibus vicem trium, et ex duabus praemissis et una conclusione." *Expositio super logicam Buridani*, f. K8r. "Sed negatur quod totum antecedens sit praecise maior et minor, sed est aggregatum ex maiore et minore et coniunctione copulativa. Ex quo patet quod aliqui qui in syllogizando non ponunt inter maiorem et minorem coniunctionem copulativam deficiunt, quia ibi nullum est antecedens." *Ibid.*, f. L4v. Cfr. *Ibid.*, f. N4r—N5r.

[53] "Hoc syllogismorum opus in tres secabo partes; in prima, de formalitate consequentiae quid requiratur et sufficiat; . . . in secunda tangemus regulas generales ad omnem consequentiam syllogisticam; . . . in tertia de unoquoque modo et unaquaque figura specialis fiet mentio." *Syllogismi magistri Iohannis Dolz aragonensis del Castellar*, (Paris, 1511); as quoted by Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik*, vol. 4, p. 260.

Logic or dialectics is, for Clichtove, one of the three liberal arts or sciences whose subject-matter is language, the other two being grammar and rhetoric. But while grammar is interested in language for its congruency or correctness according to the rules of a given idiom, as for instance, the Latin; and rhetoric, for the sake of its elegance; logic is interested in language for its truth and falsity. Logic teaches how to discriminate truth from falsity, valid arguments from the invalid or sophistic ones; it studies the reasons for and the forms of arguments. All the rest that is treated in logic is ordered to the knowledge of arguments, as for instance, the different properties of terms and propositions.[55]

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[54] Cfr. *Introductiones in logicam*, intr. 7, f. 117v—135r; f. 125v—135r. "Aequivalentia sunt quae eiusdem veritatis sunt aut falsitatis, et quae se convertibiliter consequuntur." *Ibid.*, intr. 14, f. 254r. "Si ad aliquam copulativam sequitur aliquod consequens, ad oppositum consequentis cum alterutra partium copulativae sequitur oppositum alterius partis." *Ibid.*, intr. 7, f. 132v. "Ex cuiuslibet syllogismi contradictorio conclusionis cum alterutra praemissarum de necessitate sequitur oppositum alterius praemissae." *Ibid.*, intr. 8, f. 159r. Cfr. *Ibid.*, intr. 7, f. 114r—115v, f. 120v—124v; intr. 14, f. 254r; intr. 8, f. 152r—175r.

[55] Cfr. *Introductiones in logicam*, intr. 1, f. 8v—9r. "Est autem disciplina rationalis quae principaliter de sermone tamquam subiecto attributionis determinat, et ergo alio nomine disciplina sermocinalis dicitur. Et est triplex . . . scilicet: grammatica, logica, et rhetorica. Grammatica quidem determinat de sermone congruo, logica de vero, et rhetorica de ornato; . . . sub quibus comprehenduntur eorum opposita, scilicet: Incongruum, falsum, et inornatum." *Ibid.*, f. 9v. Cfr. *Ibid.*, intr. 2, f. 21v—23r. "Grammatica congruum ab incongruo discernit, et latinae orationis contextum

When Clichtove determines the subject matter of the liberal arts, he defines logic as the science of arguments; and since an argument is for Clichtove the same as a consequence, hence, logic is the science of consequences, as he explicitly states. Furthermore, logic is an axiomatic science or doctrinal art. A doctrinal art consists of principles or axioms and conclusions or theorems. The principles are some propositions evidently true, accepted as such without proof, since they are known to be true by themselves and not by any other proposition. Logical principles are, for instance, the principle of excluded middle: It is necessary that any proposition is either true or false; and the principle of contradiction: It is impossible that any proposition is true and false simultaneously. Definitions are also principles of a science. The conclusions or theorems are some propositions unevident by themselves, which need to be demonstrated as true by the principles through one or several demonstrations. A demonstration is an argument or consequence showing that a conclusion follows from the principles, or from other conclusions already demonstrated.[56]

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docet; litterarum enim, syllabarum, dictionumque determinationem in hunc finem refert, ut orationem congruam latinamque componat. Logica verum a falso internoscit, et omnem argumentationis rationem modumque declarat; caetera omnia, ut terminorum proprietates, propositionumque diversas passiones, ad argumentationis cognitionem ordinans." *Ibid.*, f. 23r. Cfr. *Ibid.*, intr. 2, f. 33rv; intr. 8, f. 152v.

[56] Cfr. *Introductiones in logicam*, intr. 2, f. 29r—30v. "Est autem subiectum attributionis scientiae circa quod principaliter scientia versatur; ut grammatica praecipue considerat sermonem latinum, et logica argumentationem, quare sermo latinus grammaticae, et argumentationis logicae subiectum est. Et alio nomine vocatur genus, subiectum, sive materia circa quam." *Ibid.*, intr. 2, f. 30v. Cfr. *Ibid.*, intr. 1, f. 10v—12r; "Argumentatio est unius propositionis ex alia per consequentiae notam illatio. Argumentatio, consequentia: idem." *Ibid.*, f. 10v. "Argumentatio communiter accepta et consequentia, idem; et complectitur tam veras argumentationes et bonas consequentias, quam apparentes argumentationes et malas consequentias, quae ita a logica reiiciuntur, sicut soloecismus et barbarismus, quae non latina est locutio sed esse videtur, a grammatica. Proprie vero accepta, argumentatio et bona consequentia idem sunt; et haec potissimum logicae est considerationis, ut recta locutio latina, grammaticae." *Ibid.*, intr. 8, f. 152v. Cfr. *Ibid.*, intr. 2, f. 26r—27v, f. 34; "Porro omnis ars doctrinalis intellectum et scientiam ut praecipuas partes suas continet. Intellectus est habitus principiorum. . . . Principia sunt propositiones manifeste verae, per quas in disciplinis aliae probantur. Sic intellectus grammaticus est principiorum grammaticorum habitus, et logicus, logicorum; et ita de caeteris sub arte doctrinali contentis speciebus. Scientia est habitus conclusionis per demonstrationem acquisitus. Conclusio est quae per alias demonstrari nata est, ex principiis illata propositio. Demonstratio est ex principiis conclusionem manifestans argumentatio. Ita scientia grammatica est conclusionum grammaticarum habitus per demonstrationem grammaticam acquisitus; et logica, logicarum. Et hoc pacto deinceps per caeteras artis doctrinalis species procedendo. . . . Deinde definitur intellectus esse habitus, hoc est firma et non facile ab animo delebilis cognitio principiorum." *Ibid.*, f. 26rv; Cfr. *Ibid.*, intr. 10, h. 200r.

We have already studied in chapter two Clichtove's notion of consequence, hence, we omit it here. He divides consequences into formal and material; a formal consequence is defined in the sense explained by Ockham, Buridan, and Albert of Saxony; and a material consequence is understood in the sense of material simple consequence, since material as of now consequence is rejected as valueless; hence, Clichtove's logic is a system of strict implication. Clichtove explains Le Fèvre's logic of propositions, but his explanations are not altogether completely accurate, for he does not use propositional variables as Le Fèvre's formulae require, instead Clichtove employs quantified propositions and term-variables. But Clichtove's exposition of the syllogistic is very successful. Conversions and equivalences are for him formal consequences. A syllogism is a formal consequence whose antecedent is a copulative proposition composed of two propositions linked by the copulative conjunction, which copulation formally implies the consequent or conclusion. The first proposition of the antecedent, viz., the one that precedes the copulative conjunction, is the major premise; the second proposition of the antecedent, that is, the one that follows the copulative conjunction, is the minor premise. Clichtove admits only three syllogistic figures and rejects the fourth; but he defines the first figure as Theophrastus did, and in the sense called by Dorp the broad sense of the first figure, as we already have seen early in this chapter concerning Theophrastus and Dorp. In this sense, the first figure is the one in which the middle term is the subject in either one of the premises and the predicate in the other.[57]

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[57] Cfr. *Introductiones in logicam*, intr. 1, f. 10v—14v; intr. 7, f. 118r—137v; intr. 8, f. 152v—153v, f. 155rv. "Syllogismus est oratio, est enim propositio hypothetica rationalis et argumentatio, in qua, cum duae ad minus propositiones sive praemissae in antecedente positae fuerint et coniunctione copulativa connexae, conclusio alia ab utraque praemissarum formaliter sequitur, non propter maiorem tantum, neque minorem tantum, sed maiorem et minorem simul. . . . Ex hac autem definitione manifestum est omnem syllogismum ex duabus constitui propositionibus, maiore et minore, et insuper ex conclusione. Propositio in proposito est ad conclusionem inferendam in syllogismo assumpta enuntiatio. Propositio, praemissa: idem; quod conclusioni inferendae praemittatur sic dicta. Maior syllogismi est prima syllogismi propositio, et quae coniunctionem copulativam praecedit. Maior, maior propositio, maior praemissa, maior assumptio: idem. Minor syllogismi est secunda syllogismi propositio, et quae coniunctionem copulativam sequitur. Minor, minor propositio, minor praemissa, minor assumptio: idem. Totum antecedens syllogismi est propositio copulativa ex maiore et minore composita. Et haec prima est partium principalium, syllogismi notam illationis praecedens. Conclusio syllogismi est ex praemissis syllogismi conclusa enuntiatio, vel est quae ex praemissis in syllogismo infertur enuntiatio; et est consequens syllogismi, et secunda eius pars principalis sequens notam illationis." *Ibid.*, intr. 8, f. 152v—153v. "Nota (non *ed.*) consequentiae, nota illationis: idem." *Ibid.*, intr. 1, f. 10v.

To demonstrate the valid syllogistic moods, Clichtove uses two methods: the method of syllogistic reduction consisting of some axioms, some rules of the propositional logic, and the rules of conversion; and the method of rules of syllogistic quality and quantity. Clichtove's axiomatization of the syllogistic by the first method is a remarkable piece of logical work, and the best provided by any of the medieval logicians we have studied. The axioms of the system are the principle of all and the principle of none. The rules of the propositional logic are the following four. The first rule is the rule of commutation for the premises: two premises imply themselves in an interchanged order, that is, the premise that appears first in the antecedent is the second in the consequent, and the one that is placed second in the antecedent is the first in the consequent. Clichtove expressly proves this rule by the definition of the copulative proposition. Hence, we have the following thesis of the propositional logic:

$$(p \cdot q) \overline{\supset} (q \cdot p)$$

The second rule is based on the first and states that when two premises imply a conclusion, then, the same conclusion is implied by the transposed premises. The thesis described by this rule is:

$$[(p \cdot q) \overline{\supset} r] \overline{\supset} [(q \cdot p) \overline{\supset} r]$$

The third rule expresses that the contradictory of the conclusion of a syllogism together with one of the premises necessarily implies the contradictory of the other premise. Clichtove explicitly remarks that this rule is based on the propositional law that, if a copulative proposition implies a consequent, then, the contradictory of the consequent together with one of the parts of the copulative necessarily implies the contradictory of the other premise. This rule describes the following theses:

$$[(p \cdot q) \overline{\supset} r] \overline{\supset} [(p \cdot \overline{r}) \overline{\supset} \overline{q}]$$
$$[(p \cdot q) \overline{\supset} r] \overline{\supset} [(\overline{r} \cdot q) \overline{\supset} \overline{p}]$$

The fourth rule is that if two premises imply a conclusion, then, the same premises imply any proposition that is implied by the conclusion by conversion, subalternation, or equivalence. Clichtove bases this rule on the propositional law that whatever follows from the consequent, the same follows from the antecedent. The thesis referred to by this rule is the following:

$$[(p \overline{\supset} q) \cdot (q \overline{\supset} r)] \overline{\supset} (p \overline{\supset} r)$$

Finally, the rules of the logic of terms concerning simple conversions and conversions *per accidens* are taken for granted.[58]

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[58] Cfr. *Introductiones in logicam*, intr. 8, f. 157v—164v; f. 169v—174v.

With these axioms and rules Clichtove demonstrates twenty-three syllogistic moods, and except for the proofs of the four perfect moods which are not quite convincing, the rest is notable for its accuracy and formality. The demonstrated moods are the customary nineteen plus four others; for the first figure: *Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferio,* which conclude directly; and *Baralipton, Celantes, Dabitis, Fapesmo, Frisesomorum,* which conclude indirectly; for the second figure: *Cesare, Camestress, Festino,* and *Baroco;* for the third figure: *Darapti, Felapton, Disamis, Datisi, Bocardo, Ferison.* Two more moods have to be added to the second and third figure: *Fapesmo* and *Frisesomorum* in each one; that is, the combinations of quality and quantity for premises and conclusion 'AEO' and 'IEO' are valid in these figures to conclude indirectly, but the order of the middle term is different in each figure.[59]

As examples of Clichtove's demonstrations of syllogistic moods, we give the demonstrations of *Baralipton, Camestres,* and *Bocardo.* The method followed by Clichtove in proving the first two of these moods is very close to the method called in modern logic the method of conditional proof. *Baralipton:* The fifth syllogistic conclusion or theorem is a valid mood of the first figure, which is composed of a universal affirmative major premise, and a universal affirmative minor premise, which together infer a particular affirmative indirect conclusion; as for instance: 'Every animal is a substance, and every man is an animal, therefore some substance is a man.' Proof: this is a valid argument by the first conclusion *Barbara:* 'Every animal is a substance, and every man is an animal, therefore every man is a substance.' Thus, we have the proposition: 'Every man is a substance,' then: 'Every man is a substance, therefore some substance is a man,' by conversion *per accidens* of the universal affirmative. Hence, by the rule of the hypothetical syllogism *(de primo ad ultimum)*, it is valid to argue: 'Every animal is a substance, and every man is an animal, therefore some substance is a man,' and this last syllogism is *Baralipton.* All the steps of the proof are clearly indicated and can perfectly be symbolized by the method of conditional proof.[60]

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[59] Cfr. *Introductiones in logicam,* intr. 8, f. 155r—157v; f. 164v—169v.

[60] "Quinta conclusio. Maiore universali affirmativa et minore universali affirmativa fit primae figurae syllogismus particularem affirmativam concludens, ut: 'Omne animal est substantia, et omnis homo est animal, ergo quaedam substantia est homo.' Patet, nam bene sequitur: 'Omne animal est substantia, et omnis homo est animal, ergo omnis homo est substantia,' per primam conclusionem [Barbara]. Et ultra sequitur: 'Omnis

1)	$(Ama \cdot Abm) \supset Iab$	*Baralipton*
2)	$\rightarrow Ama \cdot Abm$	Assumption
3)	Aba	From 2) by *Barbara*
4)	Iab	From 3) by conversion *per accidens*
5)	$(Ama \cdot Abm) \supset Iab$	*Baralipton* from 2)—4) by conditional proof.

Camestres: The eleventh syllogistic thesis, which is a valid mood of the second figure, consists of a universal affirmative major premise, and a universal negative minor premise, which major and minor imply a universal negative direct conclusion; for instance: 'Every man is an animal, and no stone is an animal, therefore no stone is a man.' Proof: 'Every man is an animal, and no stone is an animal; therefore no stone is an animal, and every man is an animal,' by the rule of transposition for the premises. Furthermore, it follows: 'No stone is an animal, and every man is an animal; therefore no animal is a stone, and every man is an animal,' by simple conversion of the first proposition of the antecedent. Moreover, it is valid to argue: 'No animal is a stone, and every man is an animal, therefore no man is a stone,' by the second conclusion *Celarent*. Besides, it does follow: 'No man is a stone, therefore no stone is a man,' by simple conversion of a universal negative. Hence, by the rule of the hypothetical syllogism or rule *de primo ad ultimum* the last consequent follows from the first antecedent, thus: 'Every man is an animal, and no stone is an animal, therefore no stone is a man.'[61]

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homo est substantia, ergo quaedam substantia est homo,' per conversionem universalis affirmativae per accidens. Igitur de primo ad ultimum recte sequitur: 'Omne animal est substantia, et omnis homo est animal, ergo quaedam substantia est homo;' nam quidquid est consequens consequentis, consequens est antecedentis, ut superius monstratum est." *Introductiones in logicam*, intr. 8, f. 165v—166r.

[61] "Undecima conclusio. Maiore universali affirmativa et minore universali negativa fit secundae figurae syllogismus universalem negativam directe concludens, ut: 'Omnis homo est animal, et nullus lapis est animal, ergo nullus lapis est homo.' Patet, nam bene sequitur: 'Omnis homo est animal, et nullus lapis est animal; ergo nullus lapis est animal, et omnis homo est animal,' per primam regulam. Et ultra sequitur: 'Nullus lapis est animal, et omnis homo est animal; ergo nullum animal est lapis, et omnis homo est animal,' per secundam regulam. Et ultra sequitur: 'Nullum animal est lapis, et omnis homo est animal, ergo nullus homo est lapis,' per secundam conclusionem [Celarent]. Deinceps sequitur: 'Nullus homo est lapis, ergo nullus lapis est homo,' per conversionem simplicem universalis negativae in seipsam. Igitur ultimum consequens sequitur ad primum antecedens, quare recte sequitur: 'Omnis homo est animal, et nullus lapis est animal, ergo nullus lapis est homo,' quod est propositum." *Introductiones in logicam*, intr. 8, f. 167r.

1)	(Aam . Ebm) $\overline{\supset}$ Eba	*Camestres*
2)	→ Aam . Ebm	Assumption
3)	Ebm . Aam	From 2) by transposition of a conjunction
4)	Emb . Aam	From 3) by simple conversion of the universal negative
5)	Eab	From 4) by *Celarent*
6)	Eba	From 5) by simple conversion
7)	(Aam . Ebm) $\overline{\supset}$ Eba	*Camestres* from 2)—4) by conditional proof.

Bocardo: The eighteenth syllogistic theorem is a valid mood of the third figure, which consists of a particular negative major premise, a universal affirmative minor premise, and a particular negative direct conclusion implied by the premises; as for instance: 'Some man is not a stone, and every man is an animal, therefore some animal is not a stone.' Proof: It is valid to argue by the first conclusion *Barbara:* 'Every animal is a stone and every man is an animal, therefore every man is a stone.' By the rule of indirect syllogistic reduction or rule of the compound transposition for implication, it does follow from the preceding syllogism: 'Some man is not a stone, and every man is an animal, therefore some animal is not a stone,' and this last syllogism is precisely Bocardo.[62]

1) (Oma · Amb) $\overline{\supset}$ Oba *Bocardo*
2) (Aba · Amb) $\overline{\supset}$ Ama *Barbara*
3) (Oma · Amb) $\supset$ Oba *Bocardo* from 2) by indirect proof.

Twenty-three other syllogistic moods are deduced and demonstrated from the preceding twenty-three by simple transposition of the premises. The resulting moods have the same conclusions as the originals, but if in the original mood the conclusion is direct, then, it is indirect in the derived mood, and vice versa. Nineteen of these moods are given a special name; for the first figure: *Barbara, Calerent, Dirai, Fireo,* concluding indirectly; and *Brabalipton, Calentes, Dibatis,*

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[62] Decimaoctava conclusio. Maiore particulari negativa et minore universali affirmativa fit tertiae figurae syllogismus particularem negativam directe concludens, ut: 'Quidam homo non est lapis, et omnis homo est animal, ergo quoddam animal non est lapis.' Patet, nam per primam conclusionem [Barbara] recte sequitur: 'Omne animal est lapis, et omnis homo est animal, ergo omnis homo est lapis;' ergo per tertiam regulam ex contradictorio conclusionis, quod est: 'Quidam homo est animal,' sumpto pro maiore, cum minore: 'Omnis homo est animal,' servante ut prius locum minoris, sequitur alterius praemissae, utputa maioris, contradictorium, quod est: 'Quoddam animal non est lapis;' hoc modo: 'Quidam homo non est lapis, et omnis homo est animal, igitur quoddam animal non est lapis'." *Introductiones in logicam,* intr. 8, f. 169r.

Fesmapo, *Fresisomorum*, concluding directly; these moods were the reason why some logicians attempted to construct a fourth figure against the opinion of Aristotle. The moods of the second figure are: *Casere*, *Cesmatres*, *Fitesno*, *Boraco;* and for the third figure: *Daprati*, *Fapleton*, *Damisis*, *Disati*, *Bacordo*, *Fiseron*. The other four moods are derived by transposition of the premises of *Fapesmo* and *Frisesomorum* in the second as well as in the third figure, but Clichtove does not give any special names for these moods. To the already mentioned forty-six moods there have to be added the ones resulting from rule four, as for instance the subaltern moods. All the syllogisms which the fourth rule adds are one hundred and thirty-two, following Clichtove's instructions; which, together with the forty-six already mentioned total one hundred and seventy-eight valid syllogistic moods, conclusions or theorems.[63]

Clichtove's system comes very close to Aristotle's syllogistic, although the medieval logician complements the Philosopher's system with the logic of propositions, and further develops it in his treatment of the figures, moods and syllogistic proofs. At the same time Clichtove fails to understand some of the fine achievements of medieval logic found for instance in Ockham, Buridan, Albert of Saxony, Dorp, and others; as can be seen by the following considerations. The Aristotelian form of propositions is for Clichtove the one in which the extremes appear in their proper place; the subject before the copula, and the predicate after the copula. If at times the predicate precedes the denial and the copula in a negative proposition, it is for the sake of elegance in the Latin language; but such a predicate has to be understood as if it would follow the copula. Furthermore, the extremes of the Aristotelian proposition have to be common terms, and not singular ones; the predicate must not be affected by any universal sign, and thus, the predicate of any affirmative proposition has to be taken particularly as having determinate supposition, while the predicate of any negative statement is to be taken universally as having distributed supposition. The copula of the Aristotelian proposition is intemporal, that is, the copula has no temporal import. All the other forms of propositions different from the Aristotelian, as for instance, those propositions in which the copula has a temporal import, or those in which any of the characteristics of the Aristotelian proposition is violated, are rejected from the sciences.[64]

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[63] Cfr. *Introductiones in logicam*, intr. 8, f. 199v; f. 161r—163v.

[64] Cfr. *Introductiones in logicam*, intr. 3, f. 42r; intr. 7, f. 125r.

Consequently, only the syllogistic moods in the form that Aristotle states them are scientific, and all other forms are rejected and useless in the construction of the sciences. Some forms of rejected syllogism are, for instance, syllogisms in which the expression 'which is,' 'which will be,'or equivalent phrases are added to the subject or predicate of the premises; syllogisms in which a universal sign is added to the predicate; syllogisms in which the predicate is placed before the denial and the copula, so as to have determinate supposition; and syllogisms in which the conclusion is negative and in which the predicate is taken particularly as having determinate supposition, because it precedes the denial, or is taken with a universal affirmative quantifier, or it is taken with the identity term 'identical with', or with any other particle similar to 'which is,' 'which was,' or 'which will be.' All these types of syllogisms and similar ones, in which inept forms of unaristotelian propositions are used, are no more than monstrous forms of syllogisms *(syllogismorum deformia monstra)*.[65]

Although singular terms are rejected from the syllogistic, nevertheless, Clichtove concedes that they can be used in the *syllogismus expositorius*, but only in the third figure and as a help to understand certain points. The method of singularization or descent is rejected from the sciences, especially when it is question of descending from a universal proposition to the singulars or individuals. This method is only helpful to explain the types of supposition, but it is rejected from the sciences because the singular terms are not considered in the sciences. But there is another descent or singularization, viz., from a common and more embracing term to a less common term; and this descent is more aptly fitted as applying to logic than the first. Thus, the singulars that are used in the process of induction or inductive syllogism are not singular terms, but common terms that are less common than others, as the species in regard to its genus. All these are Aristotelian tenets, but it seems that Clichtove embraces an unaristotelian position when he allows empty common terms to be used in the syllogistic propositions; for instance, he accepts as true the proposition: 'Some chimera is not a man,' because the subject does not stand for anything. Furthermore, he admits that the proposition: 'Thunder is a sound,' is true even if there is no thunder, because the copula has no temporal import; and the proposition 'Thunder is not a sound,' is false even if there is no thunder. This position, together with the laws of subalternation, leads to the admission that even the particular propositions have no existential import, which is most unaristotelian. But for all the shortcomings, Clichtove's system is highly formal and close to the Aristotelian syllogistic, although complemented and developed, as we have seen.[66]

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[65] Cfr. *Introductiones in logicam*, intr. 3, f. 52v—53v; intr. 7, f. 124v—125v; intr. 8, f. 170v, f. 175v.

Thus, we conclude this chapter in which we have analyzed Albert's syllogistic and have tried to place it in its fourteenth century environment; and in which we have made some remarks on the theory of consequences as the unifying link of the logic of some great medieval logicians.

CONCLUSION

Logic has known in its history three climactic stages: The Aristotelian and the Stoic-Megaric logic of the Antiquity, the consequential logic of the late Middle Ages, and the symbolic logic of modern times. Although the history of the origin and development of the medieval logic is not fully known, nevertheless, it is a fact that the characteristic doctrines of the two logical currents of the Antiquity are blended in medieval logic; but while the Aristotelian influence and heritage is evident, the influence of the Stoic-Megaric tradition is not completely established, although it seems probable that it was received by the medieval logicians through the *De syllogismo hypothetico* of Boëthius. It is likely that Abelard and other logicians of the middle thirteenth century were influenced by the cited work of Boëthius, and the accomplishments of this century paved the way for the powerful synthesis of the *Venerabilis Inceptor* and the mature consequential logic of the fourteenth century.

One of the main representatives of the consequential logic is Albert of Saxony in whose works, and especially in his *Perutilis logica* we meet with an harmonious combination of the logical theories of Ockham and Buridan. Throughout our study, we have tried to analyze a part of the logic of Albert, viz., his theory of assertoric consequences, and to place it in its historical environment, although we were unable to pass a final judgment as to the originality of Albert, since we could not establish the authenticity of Buridan's *Consequentiae*. We studied Albert's doctrines on the theory of signs which introduces us to the theory of consequences, and establishes the material and formal elements of language. The material elements of propositions are the categorematic terms, which function as the operands of the formal elements or logical constants, which are the syncategorematic terms. We studied Albert's doctrine of propositional consequences and analyzed the syncategorematic terms 'not,' 'and,' 'or,' 'if . . . then,' 'is equivalent to,' and the rules and theorems involving these logical constants. In comparing Albert's doctrines with parallel modern views, we found that both are in agreement in regard to the definition of the logical constants 'not,' 'and,' 'or;' but concerning the factors 'if . . . then,' and 'is equivalent to,' we found that Albert was confronted by similar problems to those faced by the Stoic and modern logicians. It is our contention that Albert constructed his system of logic as a system of strict implication, since every formal consequence is necessary; but Albert did not go so far as to reject the 'as of now' consequence, as Clichtove did, but he accepts into his system the 'as of now' consequence which is the counterpart of material implication.

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[66] Cfr. *Introductiones in logicam*, intr. 1, f. 12v—13r; intr. e, f. 38v—39r; intr. 7, f. 125v; intr. 9, f. 190r.

The logic of terms is mainly an Aristotelian heritage of medieval logic; but Albert of Saxony, as well as Ockham, Buridan, and other medieval logicians, complements, develops, and even deeply alters Aristotle's theory of the categorical syllogism. The assertoric syllogistic is complemented by the propositional logic and incorporated into the theory of consequences; it is further developed with the introduction of quantifiers, singular terms, oblique terms, negative terms, ampliative terms, the identity sign, and negative propositions in the unconventional manner of speech. The content of the fundamental four quantified propositions is different in Albert's theory, as well as in Ockham and Buridan, and in Aristotle's system; for the latter, the four propositions have existential import, while for Albert only the universal affirmative and the particular affirmative have existential import, but both the universal and the particular negatives do not have existential import, since empty terms can be used in these propositions. Albert's doctrine also from the position of modern logicians for whom the universal proposition, affirmative or negative, has no existential import; but the particular statement, affirmative or negative, does have existential import. Albert expressed the doctrines of opposition, conversion, and equivalences as formal consequences; but with Buridan and Dorp he rejects contrapositive conversion as formal consequence.

Albert's syllogistic is explained and based on the logic of propositions. A syllogism is a formal consequence whose antecedent is a conjunction composed of the two premises. Albert recognizes the existence of four syllogistic figures, but treats only the first three, although he indicates how the moods of the fourth figure may be obtained. To determine which of the combinations of syllogistic quality and quantity are formal consequences or valid syllogistic moods, Albert uses two methods: the method of the rules of syllogistic quality and quantity, and the method of rules of propositional logic together with the rules of opposition. The syllogistic figures and moods apply strictly to propositions with positive, non-ampliative terms in the nominative case; Albert also treats syllogistic consequences with ampliative terms, infinite terms, and terms in an oblique case, but he remarks that such syllogisms do not conform exactly to the ordinary syllogisms, that is, to syllogisms with positive, non-ampliative terms in the nominative case. We also studied Albert's theory of syllogistic consequences in which the divine terms and singular terms are used. We closed our study with some notes that show, although very fragmentarily, the importance of the theory of consequences in medieval logic; we established that for some medieval logicians this theory was the unifying doctrine of their systems of logic; and we remarked that the best exposition of the assertoric syllogistic that we have met in the authors that we have studied was that of Clichtove in the *Introductiones artificiales in logicam*.

Our study covered but a small part, although one of the most important, of medieval logic, which has an astonishing wealth of topics. We hope that we have proved, at least partially, that medieval logic at its best was a highly formal science and a definite improvement and step forward in regard to the Aristotelian and Stoic-Megaric traditions. Medieval logic has many points of contact with modern logic, and this is especially true in the theories which we have treated; but of course, modern logic far surpasses its medieval forerunner in the power of its method, symbolic techniques, and axiomatic construction. Nevertheless, we are convinced that medieval logic has much to offer even to the twentieth century, not only as history but as a system, and great profit would result from the understanding of medieval and modern logic.

(The End)

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SOME REFLECTIONS
ON GERMAN VALUE THEORY

A German philosopher in considering the field of contemporary Ethics points out how in the words of Schopenhauer 'it is easy to preach morals but difficult to ground them.' It is certainly true that today more than ever before we need the soundest foundation for a truely demonstrable Ethics. It can be shown that there is not a single affirmation in morals which is not contradicted by its opposite. Eduard Von Hartmann at the beginning of the twentieth century could still maintain that the differences of opinion in Ethics are concerned with questions of general principle rather than with the concrete applications of these principles. On the other hand, Edward Westermarck holds that the concrete moral customs differ radically amongst different nations, especially among the primitive peoples, and the agreement of opinion is found only as regards general principles.[1] Twelve years before the publication of Westermarcks work, G. E. Moore wrote practically the same thing.[2]

In an effort to give moral philosophy a more fundamental basis we are compelled to consider the concrete material ethics of values in German thought. Hartmann was one of the leaders of this group of philosophers and he declared that only this kind of Ethics can solve the most difficult problems we meet in Kant and Nietzsche as well as the profoundest ethical questions of ancient and modern times.[3] Within the scope of this paper we would like to examine the claims made by this philosopher as well as to attempt an analysis of one particular theory of value—the interest theory.

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[1] *E. Westermarck: 'The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas,'* 1924, vol. II, P. 742: 'The moral ideas of mankind . . . present radical differences. A mode of conduct which among one people is condemned as wrong is among other people viewed with indifference or regarded . . . as a duty . . . But at the same time . . . the general uniformity of human nature accounts for . . . similarities.'

[2] *G.E. Moore: Ethics,* 1912, P. 94: 'If we look at the extraordinary differences that there have been and are between different races of mankind and in different stages of society in respect to the classes of actions and particular actions which have been regarded as right and wrong it is . . . scarcely possible to doubt that in some societies actions have been regarded with actual feelings of positive moral approval towards which many of us would feel the strongest disapproval.'

[3] *N. Hartmann: Ethics* (translated by Stanton Coit), 1932, vol.I, p. 17.

Max Scheler promulgated this new ethical doctrine of value in German thought in 1913 and 1916 in the 'Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung,' in a treatise of some length entitled 'Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik.' Scheler has himself stated that his doctrine in its widest aspects is in strict opposition to Kant's Critique of Practical Reason which is evident from the sub-title of the first and most important part of his essay — 'With special reference to Kant's Ethics.'

Historically, it is easy to see why in the nineteenth century in both England and Germany there was a return to Kant. In both countries there was a reaction against positivistic and hedonistic Ethics in the direction of Kantian morality because in the latter could be discovered a defense for an absolutely universal ethical law that would be valid without any reference to empirical changing sentiments. In this historical association, then, there is a meetingground between Scheler and Kant in that both agree that the ethically valuable can only be given for us a priori, not a posteriori, by empirical altering circumstances and events. Scheler likewise agrees with Kant and with Neo-Kantianism that knowledge a priori is not an inborn, innate knowledge, to be found in us earlier than all other experiences but that it is a priori in logical significance and not in time. A value a priori is not therefore a value we know already at our birth before we know other things; but a value a priori is a value which can never be depreciated, which can never become valueless by any new experience. Therefore, both Scheler and Kant seek after absolutely firm ethical principles of this kind, for ethical principles a priori, which show a self-evident value, comprehensible in themselves. And such an ethical law Kant found only in one quite abstract formal principle, namely in his categorical imperative in contrast to all hypothetical laws. It was precisely and specifically here that Scheler considers Kant in error. We are not forced to accept such a purely formal and abstract law as the only fixed rule in morals because we are also able to find concrete material values a priori. Kant was only justified in rejecting concrete ends or concrete goods in a priori Ethics. However, in contrast to these concrete empirical goods or ends, there are still concrete values a priori which Kant failed to recognize as such. We can conceive of cases in which neither concrete goods nor concrete ends can be referred to strictly universal ethical principles. Scheler believed that an entirely different conception is called for, namely the conception of concrete values. The goods we had to give to our neighbor may vary; and even the whole end, the whole purpose to give anything may be wrong from the moral point of view. Only one conception has ever been present, and only this conception has rightly guided us in these elementary reflections, namely the idea of the well-being of our friend, the value of the life of our fellow-man. This vital value remained the same. The different goods may some day lose their moral meaning and may even become evil; and also all the different ends and concrete aims; there remains unchanged and unchanging a distinct number of concrete values.

These values retain an absolutely eternal moral significance and they fall into four groups: (1) the values of the agreeable and the useful; (2) the values of vitality; (3) intellectual values, by which are meant the values of truth, honesty, beauty and justice; (4) the religious values, the values of the holy. Scheler explains that no one can deny that the useful, for example, is necessarily of moral value for all people and at all times. The goods which are useful are often very different for different men and in different ages. This is true also of the ways and means and goals by which we want to bring the useful into existence. But the value of the agreeable itself remains throughout the same; it can never be changed to a non-value.

Scheler advances some explanation why the importance of these values has been overlooked by the illustration of a man who does not help another simply because he wants to realize some vital value in the life of his friend. Scheler argues that if a man only has good works in mind and does them, not because he wants to help, but because he wants to be moral, then his work in truth is not purely moral. It would in reality be pharisaism if we never helped others for the sake of helping but only because we wanted to realize moral values. Thus in the specifically ethical acts we do not have directly moral values in view; and these values do not appear in the ends at which the acts aim. The moral values appear, as Scheler says, 'on the back of our acts.' Therefore we can understand why the philosophers have rarely analyzed these concealed values, which are in general never the expressed ends of our acts. But these values are never to be identified with any ordinary end or any real good or any real thing of value.

Hartmann designates these values as pure essences which have a purely ideal existence. This is not to deny that their ideal existenc is as important to us as the existence of real events or things. Pascal speaks of an 'ordre du coeur' or 'logique du coeur'[4] by which we have an immediate insight a priori into what is the meaning of such ideal essences as vital or intellectual value. Hartmann says that in this emotional order, this 'logic of the heart,' we have an immediate 'sensing of value,' a quite evident inner vision, a clear 'beholding 'of what these pure ideas mean.[5] These values or rather these ideas of values are not given to us in the form of rational conceptions but still we have a concrete perception of them. In addition Scheler believes that we are able to recognize a priori a definitely strict gradation in the scale of these values. The lowest value for Scheler is the value of the agreeable and in ascending order he places the values of vitality, the intellectual values and at the summit, the religious values, the values of the holy. Everything that is associated with these religious values stands in Scheler's Ethics in the paramount place: the religious 'reaction of response' as belief or adoration always stands higher than esteem or respect in the intellectual field or than the feeling of courage in the vital sphere. The religious state of blessedness always weighs ethically more than the intellectual delight or vital gladness or agreeableness in the sphere of the useful. Scheler continually stresses the fact that people very often take extremely holy things for holy and very unintellectual thoughts for intellectual. Nevertheless, the value of the holy in itself remains absolutely constant as does also the superior rank of the holy in comparison with the intellectual, the vital and the useful objects.

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[4] *N. Hartmann: Ethics,* 1932, vol. I, p. 177.

With this foundation to his Ethics Scheler hoped that he could solve some of the greatest difficulties in the science. These ideas of Scheler exercised great influence in Germany not only in Ethics, but also in Sociology, Pedagogy, and even in Psychology.

In brief summary we would like to advert to the two developments of Scheler's theses in the hands of Edward Spranger and Nicolai Hartmann (revealed in the latter's Ethics). The former distinguishes six different types of carriers of values: the economic man, the theoretical man, the aesthetic man, the social man, the man of power, and the religious man. However for both Spranger and Scheler the highest value is the religious and the lowest in general the useful, here called the economic value. Spranger attempts to eliminate the difficulty which he sees in so simple and strict a gradation of all values, namely that one of the six values has to be always the highest. Therefore he believes that in the question of the rank of values we are compelled to consider not only the distinctions of higher and lower but also the distinctions of stronger and weaker values. Values are not only at a different height but also often of different intensity, different force. The interesting example he gives of the understanding of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason lies in the fact that it can be for us a much higher value than the giving of money, but none the less we have often to prefer — even as ethical persons — a lower value, if this value can claim in the circumstances a much stronger intensity. Therefore we have to think in every moral decision not only of the height but also of the present strength of values.

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[5] See these terms especially in *N. Hartmann: Ethics*, 1932, for instance vol. I, p. 185.

Nicolai Hartmann's Ethics presents a critically extensive study of Scheler's teaching. An ardent follower of Neo-Kantianism it was only later that he approached Phenomenology. Hartmann began by constructing his whole theory on the phenomenological foundations of Scheler and therefore he rejects just as Scheler does all Ethics of goods and ends. He asserts that there are different ethical values as pure essences and that they possess ideal existence, even an absolute 'self existence,' a definitely ontological independence.[6] In the important and more difficult problem of Ethics, namely in the question of the number and of the gradation of values, there are in Hartmann as in Spranger some departures from Scheler. Hartmann believes that it is necessary to distinguish and to give broad descriptions of many more values even than those which Spranger describes. There is a group of fundamental values such as life, consciousness, activity, but also suffering, which can become a value, strength, foresight and happiness. There is a second realm of fundamental moral values, which in contrast to the first are in a special relation to freedom. They are the good in general, the noble in contrast to the common, the richness of experience, and in some contrast to this richness, purity. Hartmann then distinguishes three further classes of special higher concrete values. The first group comprises the 4 Platonic virtues, justice, wisdom, courage, self-control, supplemented by Aristotelian virtues of the golden mean such as magnificence, magnanimity, the sense of shame. The second group of special values presents the more Christian virtues of brotherly love, trust and faith, modesty, humility, aloofness, and truthfulness with the problem arising under certain circumstances of a justifiable usage of the broad mental reservation. Finally the third realm of special values brings much more modern values as the love of the most remote in contrast to brotherly love, and as highest special value, personal love. In his attitude toward the problem of the gradation of values he does not assume that there is only one dimension of values from higher to lower but he speaks of a multiple dimensionality,[7] of the whole valuational space,[8] and even of three dimensions.[9] With this arrangement we find as in Spranger that Hartmann orders the values not only according to their grade but also according to their intensity or according to their strength. Despite all this Hartmann frequently emphasizes the fact that in all ages man has been able to see only a small part of this 'firmament of values.' Even in this small section of the whole 'heaven of values' which we are aware if we are not able to recognize in every case which value is to be preferred in certain complicated moral conflicts. We have to be satisfied that for the present we can decide quite clearly that brotherly love is a priori higher than justice, bravery higher than self-control, faith and fidelity higher than bravery and 'radiant virtue' or personality again higher than fidelity.[10]

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[6] *N. Hartmann: Ethics,* 1932, vol. I, p. 225 et seq.

These three German Phenomenologists confronted the state of Ethical theory and practice. Certainly such a situation when looked upon by us at the present is disturbing. So many intelligent men argue that objectivism in ethics is unconvincing and subjectivism, whether hedonistic or what is called emotive, is intellectually untenable and socially intolerable. We shall be able to evaluate these philosophers better if we consider one aspect of the value concept held by those thinkers who equate it with interest.

The interest theory of value if it is to lay any claims to conviction on our part must certainly explain the element of objectivity in the concept of value. There is no doubt but that when we value something we take an interest in it and it is also true that often there is a direct proportion between the value an object has for us and the interest we take in it. Some philosophers have concluded that the value of any object is simply the interest we take in it and nothing more. Value is interest. The principial difficulty here is what has already been set down as the acid test of this theory — namely that interest is a distinctly subjective category while value or importance is something ontological and objective. Two persons can discuss whether an object has more or less value and each on the score of his interest and experience can defend a different position. There is a content in the notion of value which is stubbornly objective in character. We all are aware that when we value an object we value it because it has value and not merely that it has value because we value it. We are convinced that if this value is so obstinately present in something then others ought to appreciate the value of it too. On questions of taste it is the sign of the prudent man to say 'non disputandum' but to say the same on matters of value is the mark of the fool. Professor Perry[11] in his book 'General Theory of Value' examines the interest theory of value according to the criterion mentioned above, namely whether as a theory it is able to account for the genuine element of objectivity that we find in the concept of value or importance. In this analysis of Professor Perry we are given four notions which may be legitimately employed for the critical comparison of values. These are correctness, intensity, preference and inclusiveness. However the attempt to treat value as an objective character of things which is simply given to them by the interest attitude adopted toward them by individuals breaks down as soon as we analyze the ambiguities on which its plausibility depends. Professor Garnett shows us how this is true by the following example — If X is positively interested in A, i. e. if X values A, then we may say that A has value in the eyes of X. And if A is similarly valued by a million people, then it has value for a million. Further, since on this form of the theory of value, the value of an object is its character of being the object of interest, A then has much of this character, much value. In this sense a broadcast concert should be said to have much value because it can be so widely enjoyed. But here 'has much value' merely means 'is much valued.' Yet the phrase may easily be interpreted to mean 'is greatly to be valued' or 'is very valuable;' and the same reason for this further meaning might be given, i. e. 'because it can be so widely enjoyed.' But in this second meaning we have passed from the mere factual notion that the concert is widely valued (is the object of favorable interest by many) to the axiological or ethical notion that that which is widely enjoyed ought to be valued i. e. sustained and promoted. The term 'valuable' (and its comparative 'more valuable' and the synonym 'better') never mean as a matter of fact that a thing is valued. They mean rather that it is worthy to be valued whether it is valued or not. Most of us would agree that probably a world in which there is more valuing, and thus more value experience, is a world more to be valued, a better or more valuable world, a world rather to be maintained and developed than a world in which there is less. But it would certainly be a mistake to assert that it must necessarily be so. Professor Perry offers an elaborate and brilliant thesis but it does not yield an objective standard of value. It has been pointed out by Professor Garnett[12] that the failure of Professor Perry and other supporters of the interest theory of value to give a satisfactory account of the objectivity in our value experience is due to two reasons: *First* — a too simple correlation of value and interest, and *Second* — a certain limitation inherent in the concept of interest and of the affective-volitional life as taken over from current psychology. Let us consider each one of these reasons according to the analysis of Garnett. According to him psychology has simply taken over its categories from biology and has endeavored to interpret behavior in psychochemical terms plus such non-chemical concepts as those of the 'organism' and the 'struggle for existence' which were already in use in the biological sciences. In particular the affective-volitional life has always been interpreted as tending merely toward the maintenance of the individual and the species. The organism is conceived as initially uninterested so long as nothing occurs to disturb the organic equilibrium and its interests are all conceived as originally directed towards those adjustments which tend to ensure the survival of individual and species.

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[7] *N. Hartmann: Ethics,* 1932, vol. II, pp. 50—51.
[8] Ibid, p. 78.
[9] Ibid, p. 408.
[10] Ibid, p. 387.

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[11] *R. B. Perry: General Theory of Value*, p. 612.

In another work of Professor Campbell Garnett entitled 'The Mind in Action: A Study of Motives and Values,' he shows that this account of motivation (of interest or the affective-volitional life) is inadequate and that in addition to its reaction or responses to stimuli — ultimately directed as they are to biological ends — 'every living organism, so long as it is conscious, constantly seeks to express itself in ever-changing activity,' that, indeed, 'the essential nature of the process of living (from the standpoint of finite consciousness) is to be a finite centre of experience ever enlarging its grasp or penetration of the infinite reality in the midst of which it dwells.' In the light of this observation Professor Garnett concludes that the objects of interest are seen not to be limited to the conditions which satisfy particular wants rooted in biological needs and feeling tone and in acquired tendencies based on these. Instead activity itself becomes an object of interest. The progressive activity of the self in expanding its cognitive grasp of its world and extending its cognitive impact upon it is for him the most fundamental of all human interests. It is the indirect source of the lower human values which are concerned with our problems of self-maintenance and biological satisfactions; and it is the direct source of those higher human values — intellectual, aesthetic, moral and religious — for which, it is so difficult to account on other forms of the interest theory of values. Professor Garnett maintains that this wider and universal feature of human interest accounts for both the nature of our higher values and for the element of absoluteness or objectivity in all our value judgments. While value does depend upon interest, the relation for him is not one of identity nor one of simple correlation as for Perry. He contends that the relation between interest and value should be modified because too many have assumed a simple relation whereas the opposite is the true case. What does he finally establish himself as the relation between these two? He states that the value experience is a sense of harmony of the more proximate and more remote ends with which the act is concerned. Value, therefore, if this interpretation is correct, is something intellectually grasped. It is due to the relation between our ends — between the more proximate and more remote ends with which present activity is concerned. But activity is always directed upon an object, whether it be a physical thing, an abstract thought, a sensory image, or some other mental process. The sense of value, therefore, is always a feature of our experience of objects. In our unanalyzed experience it attaches itself naturally to the object which is the center of attention, the object upon which the act is directed, and it is not easily distinguished, even by deliberate introspection, from the other features which enter into our experience of the object. It is not a quality possessed by objects independently of our experience of them, but, as a feature of our experience of objects is a quality which objects have for us. Values are therefore perfectly real characters of their own peculiar effect upon subsequent events. They are known and remembered and overlooked and forgotten like other objects that human beings experience; and, like many other objects, if not known at the time of their occurrence, they may often nevertheless be discovered subsequently by reconstruction of the circumstances in memory and attention to the nature of the activity involved.

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[12] *A. Campbell Garnett: The Mind in Action:* A Study of Motives and Value.

We must say that we cannot understand how according to this interpretation of value, the ontological objective nature of value or importance is maintained. We cannot believe that the objectivity of value is saved by the assertion of Professor Garnett that it is not necessary to the value experience that there be explicit cognition of the ends concerned and of the harmony between them. The value experience is the experience of the harmonious operation of the ends concerned in present activity. The value of an object is the harmony of the nearer and remoter ends with which the activity directed upon it is concerned.

And the remotest or ultimate ends or interest reveal the progressive penetration or grasp of the world in which we live. This penetration or grasp is both cognitive and conative. Cognitively it involves the effort to observe, know, or think all the actualities and possibilities of our world. Conatively it involves the effort continuously to create, i. e. to take effective part in the changing, growing process of the malleable world. It is in the harmony and unitive aspects of this ultimate end that our higher or ultimate values are experienced. Professor Garnett contends that once we recognize this fact of the essentially active nature of our mental life, we see that it is quite unnecessary to look to the specific instincts for the explanation of the interests involved in higher values. This very thing Alexander does in his book 'Beauty and Other Forms of Value' but Garnett holds that his explanation permits these interests to arise from the essential nature of mental life. We discover that they are final because they are the experiences in which we see that finds life its fulfillment; and they are objective, or public, because the nature of mental life is essentially the same in all of us.

We must repeat our criticism of the interest theory of value by asserting once again that even in the compromise form of Professor Garnett the explanation does not adequately uphold the ontological content of the value concept. Any survey of the scattered definitions of value will sufficiently acquaint us with the maelstrom of current theories. To all of them the question must be placed — does it satisfactorily establish the objective element in value or importance? The science of value we are told by Sorley embraces while at some points extending the field of traditional Ethics.[13] For another 'value' is synonymous with 'good and evil,' and to be preferred because of its freedom from the theological and transcendental implications of these words in the older philosophy.[14] For still another values are ideals; and the absolute values are the absolute ideals of Truth, Beauty, and Goodness.[15] From 'ideal' the definitions advance along the path of generality to 'purpose,' and thence to that vague and vagrant word meaning.' With somewhat more definiteness we get a group of psychological definitions.

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[13] *Sorley: The Philosophical Attitude* (International Journal of Ethics, vol. XX, p. 159, 1910).

'General theory of value might, perhaps by stretching the meaning of an old term, be called Ethics; or a new term, Axiology, might be used for it.'

Bosanquet: Some suggestions in Ethics, p. 46. 'Value, worth, and goodness seem all to be names for the same character of objects.'

[14] *J. S. Mackenzie: Ultimate Values*, pp. 15, 93.

[15] *W. P. Montague: Ways of Knowing*, p. 25. 'Theory of value is concerned with the nature of ideals and with the way they may be made actual.'

J. C. Smuts: Holism and Evolution, p. 107.

Value is 'satisfaction,' 'enjoyment,' 'an attitude taken up toward an object which is valued.' We have already seen something on the theories that have been built up upon the definition of value as the property of 'being an object for feeling, or conation, or affective and conational disposition.' Distinct from such individualistic conceptions is the group of 'social' definitions, falling roughly into two sub-classes: either value is the object for socially approved ideals or purposes; or it is conduciveness to the prosperity of society. Intellectually, entirely unrelated to the forgoing are the metaphysical definitions such as Whitehead's which conceive value to be the concreteness of sensible as opposed to conceptual existence. And finally, the realists think value to be undefinable and unanalysable — a simple and intrinsic quality of things. Little wonder that one writer could say after considering the confusion worse confounded by the laxity of language that would be an intolerable scandal in any other branch of learning: 'With the bewildering virtuosity of a conjuring trick, 'value,' 'values,' 'spheres of value,' and the rest, undergo in each writer successive metamorphose of meaning, from adjective to substantive, from substantive to relation, and from relation through mental activity back to adjective.[16]

In the consideration of all these varied definitions of value and in the particular analysis of the interest theory of value, we cannot without being untrue to ourselves say that the theory of value as proposed according to the conceptions of relativism preserves the objective content of value. We are convinced that the interpretation of value of Professor Von Hildebrand is the most satisfying of all. The concepts of the importance in itself, of the objective good for the person, and of the merely subjectively satisfying, the irreducibility of the importance in itself, the coherent manner in which these concepts are a part of our moral experience — these truths have become more and more compelling as we searched through the different notions of value according to contemporary moral thought. We cannot but see Hildebrand's theory of value in some way adumbrated in Plato's theory of values just as some writers say of Plato himself that his theory of forms is founded directly upon Plato's faith in what we today call the objectivity of value. We believe that our judgments concerning the value of this or that object, practice, or institution are objective if we believe that we discover the importance or value of the object rather than by producing it through fostering an opinion in its favor — so to speak by giving it publicity. Our judgments must then be said to refer to a virtue or excellence that these judgments themselves do not produce or constitute. If we recognize this value as a Platonic form, we attribute to it an objectivity quite sufficient to justify our considering value judgments as acts of discovery rather than as arbitrary facts whereby value is produced. I would like to cite two examples from Plato's writings where he has made the nature of value clear by describing objects where value is conspicuous by its absence. The first is taken from the Phaedrus[17] —

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[16] *H. Osborne: Value* (Journal of Philosophy, vol. VI, p. 433, 1931).

> *Socrates:* At any rate, you will allow that every discourse ought to be a living creature, having a body of its own and a head and feet; there should be a middle, beginning, and end, adapted to one another and to the whole?
>
> *Phaedrus:* Certainly.
>
> *Socrates:* Can this be said of the discourse of Lysias? See whether you can find any more connection in his words than in the epitaph which is said by some to have been inscribed on the grave of Midas the Phrygian.
>
> *Phaedrus:* What is there remarkable in the epitaph?
>
> *Socrates:* It is as follows: —
>
> 'I am a maiden of bronze and lie on the tomb of Midas,
> So long as water flows and tall trees grow,
> So long here on this spot by this sad tomb abiding,
> I shall declare to passers-by that Midas sleeps below.'
>
> Now in this rhyme whether a line comes first or comes last, as you will perceive, makes no difference.

A student of Plato realizes that the balanced structure of classical poetry always contains form, and through its form, it achieves beauty. The lines on the tomb of Mides offer but a sorry minimum of structure and so are beneath the contempt of a Platonist.

The second reference is to the Republic in which Plato describes the life of a man as follows:[18]

> . . . he lives from day to day indulging the appetite of the hour; and sometimes he is lapped in drink and strains of the flute; then he becomes a water-drinker, and tries to get thin; then he takes a turn at gymnastics; sometimes idling and neglecting everything, then once more living the life of a philosopher; often he is busy with the science of government or politics, and starts to his feet and says and does whatever comes into his head; and, if he is emulous of any one who is a warrior, off he is in that direction, or of men of business, once more in that. His life is neither law nor order; and this distracted existence he terms joy and bliss and freedom, and so he goes on.
>
> . . . Yes, he replied, he is all liberty and equality.

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[17] *Plato: Phaedrus in Dialogues*, trans. by Benjamin Jowett, vol. I, pp. 472—473.

[18] *Plato: The Republic in Dialogues*, trans. by Benjamin Jowett, vol. III, p. 269.

> . . . Yes, I said; his life is motley and manifold and an epitome of the lives of many; — he answers to the State which we described as fair and spangled. And many a man and many a woman will take him for their pattern, and many a constitution and many an example of manners is contained in him.

We appreciate the logic in Plato's presentation that lack of structure, or of organization is fatal to both beauty and virtue. In the purely intellectual realm, that of reasoning, it breeds error. Thus the good, the beautiful, and the true seem to possess a common core, or one essential structure and to exhibit this structure is the prime purpose of Plato's writings that concern value.

These brief reflections on German Value Theory and on one species of Value Philosophy — the Interest Theory — lead us to make these two conclusions:

(1) we agree with Nicolai Hartman that any serious exploration into the phenomena of the moral life of men reveals the apriority of value and that the more profound the analysis the clearer does it become that true being or existential being is not "value-free" but intrinsically valuable.

(2) it is difficult to maintain the ontological nature of value from the conditions placed on value by most interest theories.

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MODERN SCIENCE AND THE PROOF FROM MOTION OF THE EXISTENCE OF A THEISTIC GOD

During the course of a five weeks' conference between scientists, philosophers, and theologians held during the summer of 1952 at the LYCEUM FOR NATURAL SCIENCE, River Forest, Illinois, a number of points were made, and a number of questions were raised of great importance not only to theoretical science but also to catholic philosophy and theology. We draw attention to a few of these as having a bearing on the subject-matter of this article. The references will be found in pages 39, 41, 42, 53, 54, 55, and 73 of *Science in Synthesis* which is the published report of the conferences. In the sixth conference, the Very Reverend Father Kane, O. P., director of the sessions, stated that Newton's "first law of inertia may be considered as a physical and not merely a mathematical principle," having defined a mathematical principle as a "relation between ideal quantities," and a physical principle or principle of physics as "an assertion about natural bodies and their motion." He questioned whether "the law of inertia of Galileo and Newton is a first principle of physics." Later in the same session, comparing pre-Galilean scientists with Galilean, he said that the former "started with the obvious fact about the physical universe, namely, its change." But "while the mathematico-physical method of Galileo and Newton appears to begin with the concept of change or motions, it really began not with change or motion itself but with measure of change." He then pointed out that "a measure of motion may be itself unchanging, for example, the space over which a body moves."

Another point to which we wish to draw particular attention in this same session is an objection raised to some remarks of the moderator by physicists present, "on the grounds that in Quantum Mechanics a particle is considered by some physicists to move discontinuously."

Again in the eleventh conference devoted to Einstein, Newton, and natural motion, the question was raised whether "Einstein's theory rests on principles that are strictly physical or whether it is in this respect fundamentally of the same character as that of Newton." Then one conferee asked: "Is it not an obvious physical fact, fundamental to a physical science that there is a real difference between motion and rest? If so, then the theories of Newton and Einstein, if they are really physical and not merely metrical theories ought to maintain the distinction as a certitude. Do they?" This member of the conference then went on to say that "in both Newton's theory and Einstein's the fundamental concept is motion, and if it should turn out they had not analyzed that concept, then the theories of both require either restriction or fundamental revision." When physicists explained the physical significance of the special theory of relativity by saying that "it generalizes the notion of rest to include uniform motion" or motion at a uniform velocity, "some participants thought that this last point amounted to admitting that rest and motion are not distinguishable in the terms of these theories."

The last point to which we draw attention is the report made about the session on the atomic theory in chemistry and physics, namely that there was not "universal agreement on the physical character of a molecule, electron, or other sub-atomic particle." If we interpret this and the immediately preceding passages of *Science in Synthesis* correctly, the meaning is this: All the conferees agreed that macroscopic bodies such as stars and tables and pieces of metal are composed of minute, individual bodies, corpuscles, or physical particles. Likewise, they were in unanimous agreement that the law of definite proportions was correct, and that atoms and molecules have been vitally necessary in discovering and explaining the relations between physical particles or corpuscles of different kinds of substance. However, they were not unanimously agreed that atoms and molecules were physical as distinct from mathematical particles. After all particles or little parts can be fractions and parts of larger units of measure.

So much for these very interesting conferences.

It is unquestionably true that, as a result of the discoveries in science during the last hundred years, a very great need has been felt by scientists to do something about the old dynamic laws of Newton. To illustrate this it will be sufficient to quote from three outstanding theoretical physicists. In reference to Newton's laws of motion and dealing with physical particles or corpuscles in nature which Millikan and Gale call atoms and electrons or "So called microscopic phenomena," these authors in *New Elementary Physics*, page 603, state as follows: "In this new field of so called microscopic phenomena it was at first assumed, and quite naturally, that the old laws would hold; but in some instances, at least, this has not been found to be true." This is a very cautious way of stating that individual corpuscles in nature do not obey Newton's laws of motion. Now in engineering and astronomy we are dealing with large bodies which as everybody knows are simply billions of little corpuscles acting on each other. There are no disembodied natural forces lying between individual bodies in nature and every material force is a force in a body such as for example a corpuscle. If each and every corpuscle does not obey Newton's law of motion it is impossible to see how large, or so called macroscopic bodies, can obey them. Nor does the scale of an effect have anything to do with fundamental principles involved. Moreover, as a matter of fact, the largest scale effects we know of have to do with nuclear energy and it is in this field especially that Newton's laws have been found wanting. Hence, the alibis offered by Millikan and Gale on this same page 603, for the Newtonian principles, are very far from satisfying anybody. In *From Euclid to Eddington, A Study of Conceptions of the External World* by Sir Edmund Whittaker, page 47, there is a much more forthright pronouncement which runs as follows: "From 1887 onwards, a number of experiments in optics and electro-magnetism were made, which could not at the time be brought within the compass of any consistent theory: conclusions which seemed to follow inevitably from certain experimental results were irreconcilable with other conclusions of equal certainty. These contradictions led in the years 1892—1905 to a careful re-examination of the whole subject of bodies in motion; and the assumptions on which the Newtonian scheme was founded were subjected to a searching criticism, which in effect destroyed them." We have a still more outspoken assertion by Eddington in *The Nature of the Physical World*, page 123. This book is the published lectures given by Eddington to the advanced students of physics at Cambridge University, England. Speaking of Newton's first law of inertia he said, "I must now ask you to let your mind revert to the time of your first introduction to mechanics before your natural glimmerings of the truth were sedulously uprooted by your teacher." This is indeed a strong statement about the effects of teaching Newton's law of inertia. We shall see whether it is not truer than even Eddington himself, suspected. However, it would be quite erroneous to assume that authors like Millikan, Eddington, and Whittaker abandoned the fundamental principle of Newtonian physics, namely Newtonian inertia. Rather they placed their hopes for a sound theoretical physics, conforming to modern practical science, on the repair job done by Einstein and others on the Newtonian laws which leaves the principle of Newtonian inertia intact.

Newton's first law of inertia is an assertion about nature and the external world. It says (a) every body continues in a state of rest unless compelled by an external force of other objects to change that state, and (b) every object in motion continues to be in motion unless compelled by the forces of other objects to change that state. For the present we are not concerned with (a). Indeed, in classical Newtonian physics no object is ever at rest. Rest is regarded as purely ideal or imaginary, a concept having no valid application to the external universe. An object may be at rest relative to the earth; but the earth is moving around the sun, and with it, the object. An object may be comparatively at rest because it has been decelerated and is now moving more slowly than before, or because it is moving more slowly or faster than other objects. But no object is ever at rest at any instant, in the proper, unqualified, or absolute sense of the word. It is always in motion and absolute rest has no meaning. Equilibrium is Newtonian dynamic equilibrium, that is, motion at a uniform velocity. As that faithful follower of Newton and the Newtonian tradition Lord Kelvin says in his *Elements of Natural Philosophy*, page 140, "Absolute rest has for us no meaning." It is superfluous to point out that if Catholic philosophers and theologians accept this viewpoint they have little hope of being able to prove the existence of an immovable God, always at absolute rest, from the motion of the universe. Moreover, in Newtonian physics, motion is regarded as a kind of power acting and not a change. If this be accepted then any object at absolute rest would be an object without power, motion being identified with power and activity, so that we can never arrive at an All-powerful immovable God of infinite activity. We must, therefore, give our attention to (b).

The measure of Newtonian inertia and Newtonian mass is the same. Today Newtonian mass and Newtonian inertia are regarded as identical. (See the article on mass in Van Nostrum's *Dictionary of Science*.) The concept Newtonian inertia or Newtonian mass, of Newtonian theoretical physics is the concept of a capacity of an object to keep on, or continue in motion at a uniform velocity under no external forces of any other object whatsoever and to resist being speeded up or slowed down. The mathematical development of this idea constitutes Newtonian theoretical physics. All the formulas and measures contain and depend on this idea. Should this concept not be valid in nature and, still worse, should it be intrinsically absurd and thus opposed to all sound mathematics and science and merely an illusion of the mind, it would not be too difficult to understand why no individual corpuscle in nature obeys

Newton's laws of motion. Nor would any reform of the Newtonian system of theoretical physics which does not abandon this concept provide a satisfactory system able to embrace the discoveries of modern science.

Let us now look at this question from the point of view of Catholic philosophy and theology. Non-Catholic theoretical physicists and philosophers recognize a direct contradiction between St. Thomas's fundamental principle of motion, *Quidquid Movetur ab Alio Movetur,* and Newton's concept of inertia. There can be little doubt that in this they are correct. For as Whittaker points out in *From Euclid to Eddington,* pages 55—56, under the heading "Concepts of Classical Physics," the origin of this idea, Newtonian inertia or Newtonian mass, was not really due to Newton. (We call it Newtonian because it was popularized by the influence of Newton and put into the teaching of all schools including Catholic schools.) It originated as a rejection of Aristotle's *Quidquid Movetur* by Philoponos in his commentary on Aristotle's physics written in 517 A. D. According to him an arrow in flight is not being moved by any force external to itself. In the thirteenth century, St. Thomas met this objection of Philoponos by maintaining that an arrow in flight is being moved by the air. As we should say today, the arrow is really millions of individual corpuscles each of which is being moved by the forces of the other corpuscles internal to, and external to the arrow, or in other words, by the force of the internal and external field of the arrow. Later however, the priest-philosopher, William of Ockham is said to have broken with the Aristotelian-Thomistic principle and thus he is recognized by them as the founder of Newtonian physics. Whether or not Whittaker be correct in ascribing these views to William of Ockham in particular, we cannot say. But certain it is, in any case that the Newtonian principle of motion was a philosophical principle held long before the time of Newton and was adopted by him. For St. Thomas and Aristotle the notion of any object being in motion, at any moment under any circumstances, without being made by external forces to be in motion at that moment, involved an inherent contradiction impossible for even an infinite power to realize. From this, St. Thomas was able to prove the existence of a Theistic God. Thus, when Whittaker and non-Catholics generally assert an absolute contradiction between St. Thomas's *Quidquid Movetur* and Newtonian inertia, they are undoubtedly correct. But when Whittaker further asserts that this principle of St. Thomas and Aristotle "is worthless from start to finish," it is to be feared he has made a serious mistake in theoretical science. All Catholic philosophers and theologians subscribe to a principle *Quidquid Movetur ab Alio Movetur*. But, for a great number, this is a new principle made especially to conform to Newton's first law of motion. It runs like this: every object is moved by another object but only in so far as it is not in motion at a uniform velocity. Quite clearly this principle is not the *Quidquid Movetur* of St. Thomas Aquinas. Catholics who do not recognize the contradiction between Newtonian inertia and St. Thomas's principle only deceive themselves. Moreover, this new principle is useless to prove the existence of a theistic God. Newtonian inertia combined with the transfer of motion or impulses from one object to another, and the conservation of this motion and momentum of the universe, guarantees the self-sufficiency of the universe or of nature for its motion. As St. Thomas pointed out, it is impossible to prove from reason that there was not always the universe in motion. Similarly, many pantheists and atheists do not deny intelligence and intelligent intent, but they do deny that this argues to the existence of an intelligence distinct from the universe altogether. Thus, the argument for the existence of the theistic God from finality is not so coercive without the argument from motion. Again these people deny that protons, neutrons, and electrons are caused, which makes it very difficult without the argument from motion to prove that everything in the universe is caused. They say that particles exist and always existed of necessity. They claim that they exist of themselves absolutely independently, and each is absolutely capable of moving around and forming new combinations. In a word, what we are suggesting is this. St. Thomas showed unerring instinct in picking out as the foundation of his *Summa Theologica* the argument from motion; and it is perhaps the most fundamental of all the arguments given by him. Thus, this question of Newtonian inertia is of great importance in Catholic philosophy and theology.

Kinetic energy, whatever it may be, is, even in the old classical physics, motion by external force. It is the motion produced as work done in the body or object on which the external force acts. (See *New Elementary Physics* page 149.) Now a gram of Newtonian inertia or mass, or of motion under no external forces whatsoever has been converted into 5.31×10^{17}, modern ergs of kinetic energy or of motion by external force, in modern practical science. One gram per 5.31×10^{17} modern electrostatic units or ergs, or 5.31×10^{17} e. s. u. per gram symbolized by $\frac{e}{m}$, see From Galileo to the Nuclear Age, page 306, or any textbook of physics for $\frac{e}{m}$. Measures and concepts that are found to have no meaning are conveniently gotten rid of in practical science by transforming them into measures and concepts that are valid and do have meaning. All this does not speak well for Newtonian mass or intertia, looking at it from the scientific point of view.

As we have mentioned above, authors, like those we have quoted, put their faith in a repair job by Einstein and others, on Newton's laws of motion. What have been the results? Measures of value instead of being standard, in order to compare the values of objects, are relativistic measures. The value of measures of natural mass such as the gram which is confused with natural mass itself and called mass, may be now less than a gram and again more than a gram. It is not absolute. So with the standard length, a centimeter, and the erg. Thus, we can get any results we please; and the results, as far as giving us knowledge of nature is concerned, are as useless as the relativistic measures by which we attain them. Time such as seconds expressing motion of the whole universe, is confused with the natural motion of particular body, such as, clock and stars. Time as a concept expressing the motion of the universe can go indifferently backwards or forwards. The physical universe is not getting any older. A particle whose energy is concentrated can be one whose energy is spread out over a large area. A hydrogen atom or molecule can be a concentrated particle or a spread out wave. The distinction between objects of thought or abstractions such as measures which are applied to objects has been almost completely lost sight of. Here is complete proof. Atoms and molecules in some way have to do with mass. Now the proportion between the value of an oxygen atom and that of the corresponding hydrogen atom in science is 8 × 2 or 16 to 1. The proportion cannot possibly in science be half of that or 8 to 1. However the proportion between the value of the natural mass of the oxygen corpuscle and that of the corresponding hydrogen corpuscle is exactly half that as Mosley and Aston proved in science beyond a shadow of doubt. Thus, it is impossible for an oxygen atom to be an oxygen corpuscle or physical particle and anything but a mathematical particle or little part or fraction of a larger unit of measure and thus itself a unit of measure however necessary in modern science. But what has happened? Every unit of measure is a mathematical concept or idea in our minds. We are composing the water corpuscles we drink out of oxygen atoms or ideas in our minds having in a manner totally contrary to sound mathematics and to sound theoretical science completely lost sight of the distinction between ideas, abstractions or mathematical concepts, and objects of thought in the external world. Instead of teaching the correct and scientific atomic theory in schools, a false and anti-scientific atomic theory is taught, opening the door to all kinds of illusions and to the bankruptcy of all knowledge in physics, chemistry, philosophy, and theology. As Eddington points out, we are now in Quantum theory also, composing stars and planets and such objects, as well as the water we drink, out of measures or composite ideas, subjective elements, mathematical and logical composites such as Bohr and Schrodinger atoms. Eddington is accused of being an idealist or subjectivist by many who go along with the repair job on the Newtonian laws. The charge is true. The only difference between him and them is that he understands where all these theories have led theoretical science, while they do not. He writes "I do not think it is possible to make the same hard and fast distinction between subjective and objective that we used to make. The theory of relativity has taught us that the subjective element in our experience of the physical universe is far stronger than we suspected. It is true that in relativity theory we continue our attempt to reach purely objective truth. But what results? A world so abstract that only a mathematical symbol could inhabit it. In the other great development of physics, the quantum theory, we have, if I am not mistaken, abandoned the aim and become content to analyze the physical into ultimate elements that are frankly subjective." (*Science and Religion — A Symposium*, page 129.) Thus the results of the repair job by Einstein and others has been anything but fortunate for sound theoretical science, the very essence of which is objective validity, impossible without making the most clear cut distinction between the subjective, or ideas, and the objective, or objects.

It may be said that, if the Newtonian law of inertia were wrong or at least not approximately correct, practical science would not have made, during the last two hundred or more years, the wonderful progress it undoubtedly has. But gravitational motion is motion by external force. Steam engines work because of the heating of water and heat motion is kinetic energy. Gasoline motors depend on the kinetic energy involved in the chemical change of the gasoline. The motion in electrical and electronic devices is electric current, and that is kinetic energy. Instead of saying that practical science has progressed because of Newtonian inertia or mass, there is far more reason to say it has advanced by ignoring it and in spite of it. Again there are those who imagine that theoretical science and methods of measurement would collapse if Newtonian inertia or mass were abandoned. How completely unfounded such a fear is, is plain from the fact the scientists themselves have long since transformed away grams of Newtonian mass or inertia into ergs of kinetic energy or motion by external force.

Let us see whether, if Newtonian inertia itself be subjected to a searching criticism, the fundamental principle of St. Thomas would be found to be so very useless in physics.

Location or position is not an object of thought but rather a thought or abstraction about objects, or an idea capable of being applied to objects. Location, position, or localization is the same idea as being localized and localizing. The spacious parts of bodies in nature are localized by and localize each other by their physical forces. But the location or localization of, or position true of, one object does not refer to the same as the localization or position true of another, even though the two objects are in immediate contact. Now localization, position or location is an idea which is relative and implies relativity or being relative; because the spacious parts of bodies exist relative to each other as localizing or being localized by each other. However, since it is impossible for anything to be relative in any way to itself, and it can be relative only to something distinct from itself, it follows that whatever is relative must be proper in itself and distinct from that relative to which it is. In other words, it must be absolute. Thus, it follows that relativity or being relative is an aspect true only of an object of which being absolute or proper in itself is also true and another true aspect. So, pure relativity or being relative only, without being absolute, is an intrinsically absurd idea contrary to all sound mathematics. Localization, then, referred to an object, refers to it as being both relative and absolute or proper in itself. Stance is a concept or idea which refers, in the expression stance of a golfer, to the legs of a golfer standing near the tee. Just as change of stance of a golfer refers to a physical change of that to which the stance referred, namely, the legs of the golfer, so change of location or position of a body scientifically refers to a physical change of that to which the localization or position referred, namely, the extensive parts of that body. Of this physical change of the object, its becoming more or less distant by so many centimeters from some other object is a true aspect. Local motion is the same idea as change of position. It is then evident that local motion referred to any object is a concept which refers to a physical change of that object.

If local motion be true of a body y let x be that which changes. To change is the same as, to become or to come to be different from being the same. It is impossible for any change or local motion to be true of x unless from being x it has come as far as to be different from x let us say x_1. Otherwise coming to be different or becoming different, is not true of x. To be changing or in motion is exactly the same idea as being in transit or in transition or being on the way from being the same to being different. X changing or in motion cannot be in transition or on the way from being the same x without having in some respect departed from being the same x. But x in motion cannot have departed from being x in motion with which it is identical in every respect even in respect to being in motion. There is no respect in which it can have departed from being the same x except it has departed from being x remaining the same for some duration however brief and from not changing or being in motion at all. Thus, it is clear that nothing can be in motion or changing except from remaining the same for some duration however brief. Neither can anything be changing or in motion except it be changing so far as to be different. But x having come to be different or x_1, if motion continues then it is x_1 and x not that must change. However x_1 also must change from remaining the same for some duration. So if x changes to x_1 and motion continues, x remaining the same, must change to x_1 remaining the same. To be remaining the same is, not to be in motion or not to be changing at all. Thus all continuous motion is and has to be from absolute rest to absolute rest or intermittent. To deny that all continuous motion or changing is, from remaining the same for some duration to remaining the same for some duration, or from absolute rest to absolute rest, or to deny that it is intermittent is altogether meaningless and incompatible with sound mathematics, science, and philosophy. It is impossible for x_1 in any move or series of moves finite or infinite to change back to x. Because unless some capacity of change is true of x it cannot change to x_1. We do not say that an absolute unconditional capacity of change independent of the aid of other objects must be true of x. But some capacity of change must be true of it otherwise it cannot change. But any capacity of changing or becoming different so as to become the same identical and no different is meaningless and absurd. Now if x_1 can ever become x then x being x at rest must be capable of changing and becoming different so as to become the same identical x at rest and no different. Thus it is absurd to suppose that x_1 can ever change back to x. If we define reversible or cyclic motion as change or motion in which the same identical, can become the same identical again, then it is evident that all cyclic and reversible motion is meaningless, absurd, and contrary to all sound mathematics and science. Therefore if x changes to x_1 and motion continues, then x_1 must change to x_2 to x_3 and x_3 to x_4 etc. Now if the measure of change or difference between x and x_1 and and x_2 and x_3 and x_4 be equal in fractions of a second then the velocity is said to be uniform. But obviously that does not mean that all continuous motion true of objects in nature is not from absolute rest to absolute rest or intermittent.

It is agreed by all scientists and philosophers, and so stated in Newton's first law, that all motion of an object from absolute rest would have to be by the external force of some other object or objects, and that the object in question would resist its own motion by them. But in Newtonians' physics it was assumed that such motion from absolute rest is purely ideal or imaginary having no valid application to objects in nature. However, as demonstrated, it is impossible for any object ever to be in motion at any moment except from remaining the same for some duration or from being at absolute rest. Thus it is demonstrated Newtonian inertia or mass is an illusion contrary to sound theoretical dynamics, mathematics, and science. The scientific gram of mass or inertia is a concept derived from weighing bodies without any assumption of capacity of bodies to keep on moving at a uniform velocity under no external forces. Consequently, the scientific gram is not the gram of Newtonian inertia or Newtonian mass. The modern erg is not the Newtonian erg or dyne-centimeter. It is the concept of an amount of kinetic energy equivalent to that involved in the production of $\frac{1118}{10^6} \times \frac{1}{3 \times 10^9}$ scientific grams of silver corpuscles, from a solution of silver nitrate in water. (The motion of bodies measured in modern ergs is their absolute change or motion.) From what has been said it is no wonder that in modern practical science the gram of Newtonian mass had to be transformed away into 5.31×10^{17} modern kinetic energy ergs. To say that all continuous motion is discontinuous, or not continuous, is a contradiction. But the continuity of motion is a continuity from intermission of absolute rest or intermittent continuity or continuation. It is a step by step affair. Newton was deceived by the apparent non-intermittent motion of group bodies such as pendulums and arrows.

The idea of an object of itself independently, or without being made to be changing by anything distinct from itself or simply and solely as being acting or existing as itself, as such, possibly becoming different from itself or being in motion, or not necessarily remaining the same, is a meaningless or absurd concept, incompatible with sound mathematics and sound theoretical science.

Biological bodies, as distinct from chemical and biochemical bodies, are capable of metabolism, and of motion of one part by another or by others. But one part is not the same object of thought as the others. So the Aristotelian-Thomistic law *Quidquid Movetur* is not only the most important law of motion in science but it is of universal validity and admits of no exceptions whatever.

Nothing can be in motion or changing except from one instant to another or between instants. Movements and moments are between instants, and not at them. Being instant, being or existing instantaneously, is the same as standing, staying, or remaining the same in existence or being at absolute rest. If there be an immovable object, being instant and existing instantly or instantaneously would be true of it also. But in Newtonian theoretical physics the instantaneous velocity of an object is the velocity of an object which is never at any instant of its existence at rest, and it is the measure of its motion at any instant of its existence, i. e., when it is at absolute rest and not in motion at all. Instantaneous motion is an absurdity, namely, remaining the same becoming different, or being in motion at rest. Newtonian theoretical physics by abolishing absolute rest made motion impossible just as surely as Zeno did.

Because localized objects do not exist so they are being displaced or so they are in motion, and as such placement is true of them, and no displacement of them is going on, it does not follow that they cannot ever be in motion and that they are never being displaced from having been localized. Zeno said that no placement or place is true of an object in motion. This is correct, for then they are not being displaced. From this he drew an absurd conclusion, therefore all motion and moveable objects are impossible. Nobody today would be so foolish as to agree with Zeno. There is no denying the reality of motion in the universe and the existence of moveable objects. The non-existence of a THEISTIC GOD is demonstrated in science to be completely impossible, from the existence of moveable objects at rest and in motion.

It is false to say that x_1 is in no way made to be and exist as itself by some other object or objects A making x to change to being and existing as x_1. Let us call whatever is made in any way, to be and as itself, exist an effect, and that by which it is so made to exist, its cause or the cause to which the effect corresponds.

We proceed a step further, remembering, that to say that any object ever exists at rest as something not identical with itself at rest, is meaningless and absurd. Suppose then there is an object at rest and not in motion which never came to be and exist as itself in any change or motion whatsoever, but which nevertheless exists as something capable of change or motion. If such an object were in no way made to exist as something itself capable of motion by any existing object distinct from itself, then, of itself independently and without being made to be in motion by anything distinct from itself, it must be capable of being in motion. But this is altogether impossible, as already demonstrated. It is thus demonstrated that every object in existence, itself in any way capable of change or motion, even though it was never made to come to exist as itself in any change or motion, whatever, and even though it be at rest and not in motion, must be an effect in the sense defined above, namely, something in some way made to be and exist as itself by some other object or objects distinct from itself.

An effect without its cause, that is something made in any way to exist by something distinct from itself, without there being anything existing by which it is made so to exist, is a contradiction, is meaningless and absurd and an absolute impossibility.

In the motion or change of x to x_1, x_1 comes to exist as itself x_1. It must have come to exist as x_1 by something existing distinct from x and x_1, changing x to x_1. This we call A. A cannot come to exist as A more than once, otherwise it would have to change and become different so as to become the same identical and no different which is ridiculous and absurd. Furthermore, since A makes x to change to x_1, it cannot ever come to exist and act as itself A, at any instant after x ceases to be x and could come to exist as A, only before x_1 comes to exist as itself x_1. So A can never at any instant whatever, come or have come to exist as A by x_1. If A has come to exist as A by x then for the same reasons x at any instant whatever cannot come or have come to exist as x by either A or x_1 but only by B, something existing not identical with A or x or x_1. Similarly, if B has come to exist as B in any motion whatever, it can only come to exist ad B, by C and C only by D and so on. Suppose this series is infinite, but no member of the series is incapable of change or not liable to change. Then all are effects and there must be effect without its cause; which is impossible and absurd. Unless, therefore, there is something immovable or unchangeable existing as uncaused cause, nothing whatever that is changeable can exist and nothing can be in motion or changing.

Of all the objects which exist and act relative to each other and which we call the universe or nature, there is not a single one that is immovable or not subject to, or liable to change. Admitting that some objects are incapable of change so as to go out of existence, still they can become different and thus change. There is no human mind or human substance nor matter, nor energy, nor body, that is incapable of motion of change; and thus neither the universe or nature or anything of the universe can exist without being made to exist by an uncaused immovable cause, distinct from the universe altogether, and called the THEISTIC GOD.

God is a name for whatever exists independently, without being made to exist by anything else, and which never came into existence. Religion is knowledge about whatever exists independently or about God. As it is impossible to conceive that nothing whatever—neither the universe of objects or nature, nor any particular object or objects pertaining to nature, nor something distinct from nature altogether, exists independently — it is impossible to find any man without religion. All, from the crudest savage to the professor in the university and the bishop in his cathedral, believe in some kind of religion. But there are two big divisions of religion (a) THEISM and (b) the NATURE religions. (a) Theists believe in a Theistic god that is distinct from nature and the universe altogether. (b) Nature religion is the religion of those who hold that nature or the universe is one god or many gods. Anti-theists, Atheists, and Pantheists believe in a nature god or gods. False and anti-scientific religious beliefs are called superstition. It is evident that as far as science is concerned all forms of atheism or pantheism or nature religion, ancient and modern, are the rankest superstition.

In conclusion, the Newtonian principle of inertia has no justification in mathematics, practical or theoretical physics. It remains in the textbooks as a relic of a false philosophical opinion, which Newton indeed adopted in all good faith; but which, however useful it may have been to the development of pseudo-scientific atheism and pantheism founded on the illusion of a self-sufficient universe, is surely no part of science.

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A NOTE ON MILTON'S CRITICS

Concerning Milton's place in English letters, any competent critic between 1700 and 1900 would have conceded that, with the exception of Shakespeare, Milton was the greatest of English poets. Dryden exclaimed after reading *Paradise Lost*, "This man cuts us all out, — and the Ancients too," and deciding upon *Paradise Lost* as the theme for his opera *State of Innocence*, he wrote of the epic as "being undoubtedly one of the greatest, most noble and most sublime poems which either this age or nation has produced."[1] Alexander Pope, who declared that the most valuable quality in poetry, and yet the most difficult to achieve, is the 'vivida vis animi' went on to assert that "in Milton, it glows like a Furnace kept up to an uncommon Fierceness by the Force of Art: In Shakespeare, it strikes before we are aware, like an accidental Fire from Heaven."[2] Joseph Addison, surely the most respected critic of the eighteenth century, said, "Milton . . . by the choice of the noblest Words and Phrases which our Tongue wou'd afford him, has carried our language to a greater height than any of the English Poets have ever done before or after him, and made the Sublimity of his Style equal to that of his Sentiments."[3] Dr. Samuel Johnson, who had no love for the proud regicide poet, declared, nevertheless, that "the characteristic quality of his poem (Paradise Lost) is sublimity. He sometimes descends to the elegant, but his element is the great. He can occasionally invest himself with grace; but his natural port is gigantick loftiness. He can please when pleasure is required; but it is his peculiar power to astonish."[4] To the soul which was like a star that dwelt apart, William Wordsworth beconed

> raise us up, return to us again;
> And give us manners, virtue, freedom, power
>
> Thou hast a voice whose sound was like the sea;
> Pure as the naked heavens, majestic free.

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[1] John Dryden, *Dramatic Works*, ed. M. Summers (London, 1932), Vol. III, p. 417.

[2] Alexander Pope, *The Iliad of Homer* (London, 1720), p. 5.

[3] Joseph Addison, *On Paradise Lost*, ed. Edward Arber (London, 1868), p. 37.

[4] Samuel Johnson, *Lives of the English Poets*, ed. George Birkbeck Hill (Oxford, 1805), Vol. I, p. 177.

'Time,' Byron sang in *Don Juan*, makes the word 'Milton' mean 'Sublime'[5]. For Tennyson, Milton was the "God-gifted organ voice of England"[6] and Mathew Arnold, certainly the greatest critic to come out of the Victorian Age, declared that Milton was the "ideal of high and rare excellence".[7] Cardinal Newman, who felt that good Catholics should feel a repugnance for Milton's ideology, admitted that the "proud rebellious creature of God" was "gifted with incomparable gifts."[8] "Milton's art is incomparable," Gerard Manley Hopkins wrote to Dixon, "not only in English literature, but I should think, almost in any; equal, if not more than equal, to the finest of Greek or Roman."[9]

But the reputation of a famous poet undergoes various mutations. Such has been the fate of Dante, and such is the fate of Milton. The sublimity of Milton's achievement was for two hundred years hardly ever questioned, but now the twentieth century — the second and third decades, to be exact — has witnessed a startling change. For J. Middleton Murry who feels "there is death in Milton," the poet has "little intimate meaning for us . . . He does not, either in his great effects or his little ones, touch our depths."[10] Sir Herbert Read feels that it was Milton who "did more to destroy the true tradition of Metaphysical poetry than any other agent."[11] He tells us that "his thought was a system apart from his feeling . . . he did not think poetically but merely expounded thought in verse."[12] Dr. Frank Leavis speaks of the versification of *Paradise Lost* as "dull and empty" even thought "there are intervals of relief" and feels that Milton "forfeits all possibility of subtle or delicate life in his verse."[13] After making further observations on *Samson Agonistes*, he asks a most exasperating question, "How many cultivated adults could honestly swear that they had ever read it through with enjoyment".[14] Mr. F. L. Lucas declared that Milton imposed "marmoreal stiffness"[15] on the language, and Sir Herbert Grierson, who generally has a favorable impression of Milton, maintains that the poet "failed completely to penetrate with his thought the characters and events of the story he tells."[16]

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[5] Logan Pearsall Smith, *Milton and His Modern Critics* (London, 1940), p. 4.

[6] Kenneth Muir, *John Milton*, London, 1955), p. 2.

[7] E. M. W. Tillyard, *Studies in Milton* (London, 1951), p. 3.

[8] H. J. C. Grierson, *Cross Currents in English Literature of the XVII Century* (London, 1948), p. 254.

[9] *A Hopkins Reader*, Intro. John Pick, (London, 1953), p. 88.

[10] J. Middleton Murry, *The Mystery of Keats* (London, 1949), p. 218.

[11] Herbert Read, *Collected Essays*, "Nature of Metaphysical Poetry," (London, 1938), p. 84.

[12] *Ibid.*

[13] Frank Leavis, *Revaluation* (London, 1936), p. 53.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 67.

[15] F. L. Lucas, *Studies French and English* (London, 1934), p. 232.

Milton was an early obsession of Mr. Ezra Pound. In one of his early volumes entitled *Make It New*, he speaks, in typical Poundish fashion, of his personal loathing and disgust for Milton and Milton's "asinine bigotry".[17] Later, he casually speaks of the "gross and utter stupidity and obtruseness of Milton."[18] Mr. T. S. Eliot, who owes much to Mr. Pound, il miglior fabbro,[19] was probably the most influential in the attempted disthronement of Milton. Mr. Eliot is far too urbane to express his disapproval of Milton in such eccentric prose as that of his colleague. Pound shouted abuse, but Mr. Eliot's quiet, subtle but conspicuous hints proved more effective, more deadly. After speaking of "the peculiar kind of deterioration . . . to which he (Milton) subjected the language,"[20] Eliot concludes that the "badness of the bad verse of the eighteenth century" must be traced back to Milton[21] and that Milton's poetry could only be an influence for the worse upon any poet whatever. Eliot, in acknowledging his debt to Pound, described his colleague as not only the most important English poet alive but also a very *learned* poet. As to Mr. Pound's poetry, posterity must be the judge. But with regard to the scholarship of Mr. Pound, Logan Pearsall Smith in his stunning, crisp study of the problem of Milton's critics observes, "Scholars are capable of passing an unquestionable verdict, and about Ezra Pound, the opinion of scholars is unanimous. He has published translations from, or paraphrases of, Latin, Provencal, Chinese and Japanese poems; but specialists in these subjects are apt, I have noted, to laugh when his name is mentioned."[22] Smith feels that even a schoolboy would be ashamed of some of the mistakes in Latin that Pound has been responsible for. In one instance, he mistakes the verb "canes" (thou shalt sing) for a noun and translates it "dogs," and in rendering the phrase 'Cimbrorum que minas et benefacta Mari,' he translates the word "minas" as "mines," all, of course, setting great classical scholars into gales of laughter.

But the position of Ezra Pound in the world of scholarship is hardly the point at issue here. Of greater concern is Mr. Eliot's charge against

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[16] Grierson, *op. cit.*, p. 267.

[17] Ezra Pound, *Make It New* (London, 1934), p. 109.

[18] Ezra Pound, *ABC of Reading* (London, n. d.), p. 103.

[19] Critics have noted that Eliot's *Wasteland*, dedicated to Pound, is constructed in a similar structural framework as Pound's *Cantos*.

[20] T. S. Eliot, *On Poetry and Poets* (New York, 1957), p. 138.

[21] *Ibid.*

[22] Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

Milton in his 1936 period of criticism. In commenting on Milton's method, Eliot observes that "the sensuous effect of these verses is entirely on the ear"[23] that the "arrangement is for the sake of the musical value, not for significance"[24] and the "syntax is determined by the musical significance."[25] Obviously, Mr. Eliot feels that the poet's devotion to the art of music produced a weakness in his visual imagination which had already been weakened by his early education and preparation for a career of letters; and consequently, we find in Milton an undue devotion to the sounds of the words. This is quite a valid observation on the part of Mr. Eliot, but the fact that this observation is presented as a charge against Milton, as a defective element in the poet's verse, is something that will never cease to puzzle modern critics. Do not all the arts blend harmoniously in the common task of enriching man's life with beauty? If literature draws, as it often does, from its fellow art, music, does it not benefit from it with a richness of visual and musical imagination? If Milton's long passages of verse seem to echo melodiously his own musical background, can we seriously regard this enrichment of his verse as the ground, as Mr. Eliot would have it, of a charge against him? I hardly think so. One has just to read the opening lines of Eliot's *Prufrock* or the beginning of *Burnt Norton* and he will come away, quite ignominiously, with the impression the "the sensuous effect of these verses is entirely on the ear." However, the climate of Miltonic criticism has become milder in recent years. Mr. Eliot has withdrawn some of his strictures, especially since "the poetic revolution led by himself and Pound had been successful"[26] and in his later (1947) and more generous estimate of Milton, the poet, he says, "The emphasis is on the sound, not the vision, upon the word, not the idea; and in the end it is the unique versification that is the most certain sign of Milton's intellectual mastership."[27]

Milton's poetic statements are often criticized on grounds that show, I think, a misunderstanding of his intentions. Also, a misinterpretation of the fundamental concepts of literature and the function of poetry has been the cause for so much adverse criticism. John Dryden, probably the first to praise *Paradise Lost* unstintingly, is yet the first critic to interpret it incorrectly. He feels that Milton would have a better claim to a great epic if the devil had not been his hero instead of Adam.

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[23] Eliot, *op. cit.*, p. 140.
[24] *Ibid.*, p. 142.
[25] *Ibid.*
[26] Muir, *op. cit.*, p. 6.
[27] Eliot, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

Dryden has had many distinguished successors in this Satanic school of criticism.[28] This school feels that Adam and Eve were denied heroic action in their recovery after the Fall and this resulting vacuum was filled by an action that had heroic pretentions — the action of Satan escaping from the fiery lake in Hell. Consequently, Satan is the hero of the epic. For a reader who has not read deeply and profoundly into Milton, this is a natural conclusion at which to arrive. But for Milton, the deed is far inferior to the motive out of which it was performed. As seen in so many of his prose pamphlets and other poetic works, the result of an action matters less than the state of mind out of which the action was performed. Milton felt that results in this world do not matter and that what does matter is the proper intention behind the attempt, whether successful or not, to achieve results. Milton saw that activity in this is insecure, that often the good die young, that preparation for noble deeds often ends in frustration, that the good and virtuous suffer, that the wicked prosper. It's a painful vision — however, a true one. It was the plight of Lycidas who died young and insignificantly. He achieved little in this life but his mind was one of moral principles and high ideals and his reward of heaven is his ultimate victory over what he failed to achieve by earthly action. For Samson, "Now blind, disheart'n'd, sham'd, dishonour'd," it is much the same. He accepted complete responsibility for what he had done and his strength was regained through humility — humility that meant salvation and victory. The general scheme of *Lycidas* and *Samson Agonistes* embodies *Paradise Lost*. The action of Satan's causing man's fall, an act motivated from a proud and rebellious state of mind, is far more unheroic than the small acts of love and repentance of Adam and Eve, the final resolution to confess their sins to God, and the "natural tears they dropped" as "hand in hand with wand'ring steps and slow, Through Eden took thir solitary way."

Some wild Romantics have been responsible for another misinterpretation — one almost too ridiculous to consider — a ludicrous "disappointed in love" theory. They see *Paradise Lost* in the light of Milton's pamphlets on divorce. The whole epic is the outcome of an embittered Milton, spurned and cruelly treated by his first wife. Adam "overcome with Femal charm" partook of "That crude Apple that diverted Eve..." and all Paradise was lost. Adam bemoans, "O why did God . . . create at last This noveltie of Earth, this fair defect of Nature." Why didn't God "fill the World at once with men as Angels without Feminine." And finally, the whole moral of *Paradise Lost* is that the wife should know her proper place, "hee for God only, shee for God in him." That the poet's experience in marriage is reflected at times in *Paradise Lost* is obvious. Adam (like Milton when he was teaching small boys) felt that he would like a companion, he was tired of being alone among the animals; though he had only had three days of it, it seemed a lifetime. It was after the Fall that Adam deplored women and gave his views on marriage (as it was after Mary Powell's departure that Milton produced his divorce tracts), and, Eve, seeking pardon, was partially forgiven, even as Mary had been when she returned to the poet's home. However, to see in these few minor parallels the key to the meaning of the whole *Paradise Lost* is to deduce a complete biographical interpretation based on a minimum of evidence, thereby ignoring much more important and relevant material which augments the true and central meaning. That Milton was a "spurned lover," then, can be catalogued with all the other far-fetched deductions, that he was an Aristotelian, a masked materialist, a 'moral monster,' a syphilitic, a sinister apostle of the Zohar, a prim Victorian liberal, an albino, a congenital liar, a proto-fascist, a ruddy forerunner of Marx, Lenin and Stalin. Of his kingdom, seemingly, there is no end.

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[28] Cf. "Satan is a Problem: Problem of Milton's 'Satanic Fallacy' in Contemporary Criticism," *Franciscan Studies*, XVII, (Sept. 1957), 173—87.

Another strong objection to reading Milton springs from the problem of the poet's ideology as opposed to the belief of the reader. Here an aesthetic response is governed, in the end, by a kind of belief, by agreement or disagreement, with what is thought to be Milton's belief. This type response arises from the failure to view the object for what it is, fundamentally. Often the reader forgets that *Paradise Lost* is primarily a poem — an epic poem governed by those principles of the great epic tradition and modified by Milton's aesthetic judgment. A poem is first of all and last of all a creation. There may be obstacles (technical, factual, ideological) between us and the poem. The reader's task is to force these aside in order to come to an objective evaluation of the work. It is true that Milton had an intellectual system from which he drew — a mixed and muddled eclecticism of the Renaissance, but the reader's repugnance for such a system should not be his objection to Milton, the poet. The greatness of a system does not necessitate the greatness of poetry; and likewise, the inferiority of a system does not necessarily produce inferior poetry. Dante drew from St. Thomas for his epic, where Homer drew from a vast system of classical mythology, but it is not the Thomism of Dante that makes Dante the greater poet. There is no denying that a great intellectual system is an asset, still its own intrinsic greatness does not necessarily add to the greatness, as poetry, of the poetry produced. Dante employed Thomistic thought and created great poetry. Francis Thompson employed elements of Thomistic thought and often produced third-rate poetry. That Milton was a Puritan, or Arian, or Anti-Trinitarian is all very helpful in evaluating him as a man, but as a poet these things are not of primary importance. One can reject Milton's belief, can be opposed to his thought and still accept his poetry. The point is how does Milton use these erronous statements of dogma in relation to the whole poem he has created. How does he incorporate these ideas toward a total structure of meaning. It is the poem we are interested in — that is, a speech construct framed for aesthetic contemplation — and Milton's statements (which may be utterly opposed to our own beliefs) are not to be considered as a profession of faith but as a part of the sum total of characteristics making up this speech construct. The activity of the poet is not the activity of believing but the activity of making, and the reader should come to the poem to enjoy what is made and how it is made. Not only the thing said makes poetry, but the way of saying it.

This is not to suggest that the reader come to *Paradise Lost* only after he has suspended his beliefs and then begin to believe what he reads. *Paradise Lost* is no moral handbook for the Security Council of the United Nations and Milton's central values won't necessarily cure our world of all its ills. Nor is this a plea for the "art for art's sake" of Walter Pater which would certainly end in the sheerest hedonism. The reader, in order to fully appreciate a poem, is called upon not to sympathize with the poet's statements but to understand them. Milton's thought is involved at every point with belief, and what is more troublesome, with belief that is heterodox. Consequently, understanding will not necessarily imply sympathy. But the reader can approach *Paradise Lost* with sufficient objectivity and humility to see the order of things there presented. He can view the poem as an object made up of language, sound and meaning; and if the poet has achieved the finest harmony by accurately fitting these elements of the product together toward a total effect, the reader more than likely will come away with a legitimate aesthetic response. The reader is asked to view the object only for what it is — a poem, and not a theological treatise, a philosophical argument, or a seventeenth century discourse on Puritan morality. Poetry can rest on its own merits, and for the poetic value, a devout Protestant can accept the poetry of the Catholic poet, Dante, and likewise, a Catholic may enter into the world of the Protestant poet, John Milton.

Despite twentieth century prejudices to the contrary, Milton's poetry can be a valuable experience. The poet is never at odds with the truths of human nature; his poetic statements correspond with reality as it really is. He certainly perceives that truth is preferable to falsehood and loyalty to faithlessness, that courage is far more noble than cowardice, that humility is greater than pride, that justice reigns supreme over ambition. Whether he lived these propositions is irrelevant, what is important is that he perceived that this is the way things are, this is the hierarchy that prevails. His great art never contradicts the nature of man. The trials and sufferings of his Christ, Adam and Samson have purged away all thought of pride. Their one reward is the knowledge which Dante had to come to. "In His will is our peace." And when Milton says, in the dismissal of the human sinners from the garden of Paradise "not disconsolate . . . Though sorrowing, yet in peace," we see that it was a knowledge that Milton had to come to himself. In a world of science and technology, Milton is no longer a potent influence on the modern mind — and the loss is ours. What better literary experience can help us return to the true nature and goal of mankind than an epic concerned with the fall of mankind?

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THE PLACE OF MUSIC IN A FRANCISCAN VOCATION AND APOSTOLATE

In the Rule of the Friars Minor we read, that when the brethren are blessed by the Lord with ability in some form of work, they should do their work faithfully and out of a sense of dedication. By so doing they will avoid dangerous idleness and at the same time will preserve the spirit of prayer and devotion.[1] In the early days of the Order this chapter of the Rule had reference to manual labor, even outside the convent. But gradually the work of the brethren was done within the convent rather than outside, and the care of souls became the chief work of the friars, manual labor being assigned almost exclusively to laics.[2] For Francis and the early friars, all work took on an apostolic aspect and purpose, and with the gradual formation of the Order came the gradual division of labor. In our times the division of labor, ordinarily a sign of high civilization,[3] has become more extensively specialized both in society as such and within the structure of the Church, to which Francis bound his followers in an explicit manner, by insisting on devotedness to the Holy See. The apostolate of the Order is therefore not a simple but rather a diversified thing, whether we analyse a cross section of the work we are presently engaged in, or whether we take the perspective of history into consideration. Since we live in a complex society, which by our apostolate we hope to infuse with the message of Christ, our entire approach to that society must in a real sense be complex, even though we retain an evangelical simplicity. As Franciscans, we will be able to contact certain strata of society, only if we can approach it on its own terms, i. e., if we have equipped ourselves with the specialized training, that will make the message of the Gospel — in teaching and example — even more readily acceptable. Providence has already equipped us with varying gifts, no one having been left out, and no one being in any sense unimportant. The task of the Order and the individual is to discover how these many and varied gifts can best be employed, and then to employ them by dint of hard work and the grace of God. There is a missionary task and an honored place for everyone.

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[1] *The Marrow of the Gospel* (A study of the Rule of St. Francis of Assisi by the Franciscans of Germany) trans. and ed. of *Werkbuch zur Regel des Heiligen Franziskus* (Werl, Westfalen, 1955) by Ignatius Brady O.F.M. (Chicago, Franciscan Herold Press, 1958) p. 145. Father uses the newer translation 'ability in some form of work' rather than the older version 'the grace of working.'

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 56.

[3] Sachs, Curt, *The Rise of Music in the Ancient World East and West* (New York, Norton, 1943) p. 57—70, High Civilization and Music.

In our times, the apostolate of education (which needs no special defense) has become increasingly important, though it is by no means the first time in our history that education has been the arena of apostolic work. The recent criticisms of American Catholic education — which can also apply to Franciscan education — are an indication that we have reached a certain point of maturity: that we realize we can no longer profer the Catholic message to the human race with anything less than first rate scholarship and institutions.[4] God, the message of the Gospel and of Franciscanism are all first rate. But we have the duty of measuring up to the ideals we profess and the salvation we profer, by being spiritually minded and motivated, but holding in suspicion any spirituality of the apostolate which caters to an oversimplified view of the work to be done; by being Christocentric in our endeavors without falling into the easy snare of a type of quietism or obscurantism. In an age when only deep, honest and painstaking scholarship and teaching count in education, when one can qualify as an "authority" only after many years of consistent publication and / or teaching, we cannot let ourselves be content with half-measures or with work that is acceptable only in Catholic circles. We are being challenged to show our mettle in the forum of open competition. If we can meet that challenge, we can become that much more useful as an instrument of grace. At least this is the ordinary way providence works. Miracles can happen, but as long as we have the grace of working, God prefers our using that gift, rather than throwing the entire burden on Him. To be effective instruments of grace, we have to take pains to measure up to the best in the educational apostolate also, an apostolate that imparts first rate techniques and training along with the message of Christ.

Within the specialized field of Catholic and Franciscan education is the further specialized apostolate of music and musicology. One often hears the remark that music is a luxury or that it is unimportant and impractical in the work of a priest and / or religious, despite the fact that the recent encyclical on sacred music calls musicians the helpers of

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[4] *National Catholics Educators' Association Bulletin*, 1956, passim.

Christ in an important apostolate.[5] Remarks about musicology are less frequent, because the term is somewhat forbidding. In the course of this article we shall try to see what musicology is and implies, particularly in a philosophy and theology of music.

It would seem almost unnecessary to state the case of music to Franciscans, in view of the fact that non-Catholic authors[6] (practically the only real authorities on Catholic music, at least in the U.S.A.) give the Order full recognition for the part we once played in the development of music and the liturgy throughout the seven centuries since the Poor Man of Assisi composed his *Cantico al Sole.*[7] Francis was in the truest sense of the word *il giullare di Dio*, the troubador of God.[8] He came into the world at a time when the world was singing: the *trobadori*, the *trouvères*, the *minnesingers*, the *jongleurs*, the *Gaukler*. And his followers sang along, whether *laudi spirituali* or, in the course of time, the hymns and chant of the Church as such. Franciscanism is important in the history of music, even the heretical offspring, the *flaggellanti (die Geißler)*, who are remembered for their *Geißlerlieder.*[9] Whether we look to the famous medieval preacher, Berthold von Regensburg, who gave composers a simple formula for making *Kirchenlieder*,[10] to Roger Bacon who in his *Opus Tertium* discusses the properties and source of musical tone and the place of music in the liturgy,[11] or to a host of other musicians and theorists from Julian of Speyer, through Gioseffo Zarlino, Costanzo Porta, Ludovico Grossi da Viadana, on to Martini — all outstanding in music history, we find Franciscans engaged in the apostolate of music.[12] The influence of Fransicans on the development of the breviary, the liturgy and hymnology has been shown time and again.[13] We might well add that there was a corresponding development of spirituality and a closer approach to the Humanity of Christ. This is to be seen concretely in the work of the brethren in propagating the *Croce Dipinta Italiana,* the Painted Cross, and in Byzantine-Italian art in general.[14] In short, Franciscanism was a ready and willing member of a colorful, song-filled culture. This has been recognized in the present day by Italian[15] and German Franciscanism, to mention but two European nationalities. A colorless and songless Franciscanism is culturally out of step — and spiritually, too — with the best Franciscan traditions. It is for us, therefore, to resume rather than take up the musical apostolate and to reintegrate our apostolate with our contemporary culture — for this is indeed a cultural problem.

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[5] Pius XII, *Musicae Sacrae Disciplina* in *Acta Apostolicae Sedis*, Jan. 28, 1956.

[6] Bukofzer, Manfred, *Studies in Medieval and Renaissance Music* (New York, Norton, 1950) p. 149.

Leichtentritt, Hugo, *Music, History and Ideas* (Harvard, 1950) p. 21.

Besseler, Heinrich, *Die Musik des Mittelalters und der Renaissance* (Potsdam, 1931).

Reese, Gustave, *Music in the Middle Ages* (New York, Norton, 1940) p. 237.

Apel, Willi, *The Harvard Dictionary of Music* (Harvard, 1953) Lauda, p. 394.

Lang, Paul H., *Music in Western Civilization* (New York, Norton, 1941) p. 113.

[7] Meyer, Wendelin, O.F.M., *Franz von Assisi, Sonnengesang* (Leipzig, 1922) p. 14—17: texts from the "Codex" S. Antonii in early Italian and from the Codex Triverensis in Latin. According to Reese (footnote 64), the text of the Assisi MS has come down to us with space for musical notation, but the space is exasperatingly blank.

[8] Pidal, Ramón Menendez, *Poesia Juglaresca y Juglares, Aspectos de la historia literaria y cultural de España* (Espasa-Calpe, Argentina, tercera edición, 1949) p. 64.

[9] Ursprung, Otto, *Die Katholische Kirchenmusik* (Potsdam, 1931) p. 103.

[10] *Berthold von Regensburgs Deutsche Predigten*, ed. Pfeiffer (Wien, 1862) p. 405.

[11] Pfrogner, Hermann, *Musik, Geschichte ihrer Deutung* (Orbis Academicus, Problemgeschichten der Wissenschaft in Dokumenten und Darstellungen) (Freiburg, 1954) p. 135.

Elsewhere, the present writer has endeavored to point up some cultural problems facing the Catholic missionary.[16] This is but a specialized facet of the general problem facing the Church and the Order. If the missionary faces complicated sociological and psychological problems in his attempt to bring the message of Christ to cultures other than his own, the modern Franciscan faces the same problem in different guise: he must bring the Christian and Franciscan message to a partly neo-pagan culture. He, too, must face the question of cultural change and mixture, culture as a religious-political pattern, culture as a basic esthetic problem. Time was when music was far better integrated with society than it is today in America. Perhaps the dissociation of music from our contemporary living patterns is at the base of our lack of comprehension of the place this cultural study was meant to have in a Franciscan apostolate. Today, music does not flow spontaneously from the ordinary individual, the family, the "clan," as it did in ancient and medieval cultures, and even in so-called primitive cultures where music is the very marrow of religious and civic affairs, of story telling, of war, of marketing and in some cases of language.[17] Music is considered almost as an external to our daily existence, and highly dispensable, rather than as something springing up from the full joy of living and loving. What music we do have has been either stylized and institutionalized, as in the case of the formal concert, or else we have the drab clichés of the trite harmonies and rhythms, the sterile progeny of commercialized and overworked jazz. To be sure, there are positive values in modern jazz and swing, and we can speak of jazz classics or of the influence of jazz on "serious" music.[18] All we object to in either classical or jazz music is the commercialized atmosphere, in which classical music has been ripped from its cultural setting and embalmed and laid out in our concert halls; in which both jazz and the classics often appear to be serving purely commercial aims. This is a dissociation from normal living patterns, from an integrated cultural web. This is the death of anything like a genuine esthetico-cultural experience, one which means not a giddy flight into unreality (as in the last century art-sakist movement), but rather a down-to-earth, full-blooded enjoyment of life and of the love of God and man in its full and coordinated life-matrix, as expressed in music and the creative arts. It was this full enjoyment of life and song, as one cultural entity, that inspired Francis Bernardone, the gay, spirited youth who could be seen leading a band of young men his age through the winding streets of Assisi, their, boisterous and healthy tenors and basses resounding far down into the valley below.

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[12] Cleven, Sigismund O.F.M., *Musik und Musiker im Franziskanerorden unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der sächsischen Provinz* in *Franziskanische Studien,* 1932, p. 12 f; Fr. Sigismund had projected a history of Franciscan music and musicians, but all the materials he has painstakingly collected were destroyed in an air attack during the war. A comprehense work of this type still waits to be done — in any language.

[13] Besseler, H., *op. cit.,* p. 113.

[14] Vavalà, *La Croce Dipinta Italiana e l'Iconografia della Passione* (Verona, 1929).

Van Marle, *The Development of the Italian School of Painting,* chapter 6, The Franciscan Byzantine Influences. (Den Haag, Nijhoff, 1924).

[15] *Studi Francescani,* Luglio, 1951. The entire issue devoted to Franciscan music.

[16] *Music should be Native, too* in *Worldmission,* Winter, 1957, p. 14.

Provençal influence was rampant in Italy at that time. The name "Francesco" comes from such influence, as is well known. Not only Francis' name, but much of the music he sang had its origin in the poet-musicians of southern France, men such as Peire Vidal or Reimbautz de Vaquieras. The *laudi spirituali*, sung by the Franciscans, were closely related to the Italian *ballata* and the French *virelai*. But it was not the question of musical form and history that interested the early friars as much as the living web of life, love and song — which we would now call the vital esthetic experience of the living web of medieval culture. And music fitted as an integral part into this pattern. The love of Francis took flight in song, and like the song of the skylark, ascended ever higher and higher, until it lost itself in the eternal hymn of those who kneel before the Throne, singing, "Holy, Lord God of Armies." Thus, a cultural pattern became the matrix of a spiritual evolution; a cultural *Gestaltung* in an age of faith was but a means of uniting oneself to God.

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[17] Lachmann, Robert, *Die Musik der außereuropäischen Natur- und Kulturvölker*, (Potsdam, 1931).

Nettl, Bruno, *Music in Primitive Culture* (Harvard 1956) p. 6, Chapter 2, The Role of Music in Primitive Culture.

[18] Berendt, J. E., *Das Jazzbuch, Entwicklung und Bedeutung der Jazzmusik*, (Frankfurt am Main, 1953).

Hodeir, André, *Jazz, its Evolution and Essence*, (New York, Groves, 1956), transl. David Noakes.

Theology and Music

Both a philosophy and theology of music are possible. But we shall save the definition and scope of musicology-philosophy till last, since this phase is more involved, not because it is necessarily deeper than theology, but because more work has been done in this line. Some attempts have been made in recent years to develop a modern approach to the theology of music, both in Catholic[19] and Protestant circles.[20] Those of the clergy and laity, actively engaged in the apostolate of music (whether as organists, composers, writers or teachers), have some difficulty concealing their pleasure at having — in the recent papal encyclical on sacred music — an *argumentum ad hominem* for those who can be convinced only by virtue of ecclesiastical pronouncements.[21] If a theology is to begin principally with an analysis of the *vivum magisterium*, then one cannot rightly overlook this document, which acknowledges music not only as an integral part of the divine liturgy but also mentions its definite place in the development of piety and spirituality . . . something that may come as a surprise. One could easily give a Franciscan flavor to this wholesome idea, in view of the materials already discussed in this article. The encyclical confirms and brings up to date the *motu proprio, Fra le sollecitudini dell' ufficio pastorale* of Pius X. The work recognizes the twofold element in music: both natural enjoyment and spiritual joy. There is nothing wrong in enjoying the majestic strains of an organ Toccata or of a full choir. Far from being wrong, this experience is meant to heighten the spiritual enjoyment of the liturgy. Those who are overly fretful of being distracted by music in church have overlooked the whole idea of the religio-cultural meaning of the liturgy. This has an historical reason also, as we shall see shortly. There is no need for liturgical anemia and strained austerity in church music, though there is certainly need for keeping the banal and unsuitable styles out of the liturgical service. The vagaries of Romantic opera are certainly unsuitable for the church, but the banalities of the strict Caecilians are hardly less unsuitable. At least Romantic opera was good art. The welter of compositions ensuing from the Regensburg Caecilians a hundred years ago, were at the worst boring exercises in counterpoint, and at the best rather poor art, trite imitation of sixteenth century polyphony, and that under a number of false conceptions of real Renaissance art. To their credit, one must admit that the good intentions of this school helped promote the rebirth of the older masters. The Protestant imitators of Palestrina were worse than the Catholics, and "stricter." This "severity" of church music, whether of chant or polyphony, was a contortion of the reality. A spirituality of the liturgy, founded on these warped ideas, is also a contortion of spiritual verities. The "austerity" of chant, as represented by the strict Solesmes followers, is a suspect and contrived thing, not consonant with the acknowledged facts of history.[22] The bareness and "etherealness" of Renaissance polyphony, as often heard in church today, comes from a mistaken notion of how sixteenth century music was actually performed. Actually, the scores we now sing with such utter "fidelity" to the notes were in reality but the frameworks, in which several solo voices and solo instruments (not a massed choir singing "*a capella*") performed improvisations according to what was known as the *ars diminuendi*.[23] The false ideas about the rendition of polyphony are the outcome of the enthusiasm and false assumptions of the early and middle Romantics and the reactionary Caecilians, who helped "rediscover" the classic masters of the Renaissance and the Baroque eras. This influence made its way to America through the Society of St. Caecilia, though the present society of the same name has gotten over such ideas and assumptions. This is also true of the Caecilienverband in Germany. As Franciscans, we must realize that we have been influenced by the false notions of the early Caecilians, both in sacred music as such and in our theology and spirituality of church music. We must take steps to eradicate these false conceptions, and must not let such unanalysed "austerity" dampen the natural spontaneity, which is the hallmark of true Franciscanism, even in church music.

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[19] Cleven, Sigismund, O.F.M., *Unser kirchenmusikalisches Apostolat* in *Musica Sacra,* Aug./Sept. 1957, p. 261. At the time this is being written, a symposium on the theology of music, under the sponsorship of the Cäcilienverband in Köln, is in galley form.

[20] Wallau, René H., *Die Musik in ihrer Gottesbeziehung,* (Gütersloh, Bertelsmann, 1948).

Schlink, Edmund, *Zum theologischen Problem der Musik,* (Tübingen, 1950) (Sammlung gemeinverständlicher Vorträge und Schriften aus dem Gebiet der Theologie und Religionsgeschichte, No. 188).

[21] Cf. the writer's article on the entire encyclical in *The Musical Quarterly,* Oct. 1957, p. 461.

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[22] Murray, Dom Gregory, *The Editorial Methods of Solesmes* in the *Downside Review* (Bath, England) Oct., 1956; reprint in *Caecilia*, Feb. 1957. Subsequent articles: *Gregorian Rhythm in the Gregorian Centuries* (Aug. 1957); *Accentual Cadences in Gregorian Chant* (Feb. 1958) J. R. Caroll's reply in *Caecilia* (May 1957) does not seem to come to the point. Further references in this matter: Dom Jeannin, *Études sur le Rhythme Grégorien;* Dom de Malherbe, *L'École Neo-Solesmienne de Chant Grégorien;* Besseler, *Die Musik des Mittelalters und der Renaissance;* Reese, Gustave, *Music in the Middle Ages*, p. 148; Curt Sachs, *Rhythm and Tempo, a Study in Music History;* Willi Apel has just written a book on chant (Indiana University Press) which at the time of the writing of this article is unavailable for consultation; the same can be said of the new work by Vollaerts; in *The Central Problem of Gregorian Chant*, in the *Journal of the American Musicological Society* he takes up the problem of Franco-Roman chant rather than the rhythmic problem as such; the various schools of thought are given an airing in the *Havard Dictionary of Music*, and the mensuralists are said to have the weight of argument on their side; Nemmers, E. E., *Twenty Centuries of Catholic Church Music*, pp. 36—38. This bibliography is fully discussed in the writer's article on the encyclical and Franciscan music in *Studi Francescani* (Aprile-Giugno, 1958) p. 220 and 221. The treatment given here is fuller than that given in *The Musical Quarterly* article already noted. So far, Solesmes had observed a strange silence and distance.

A theology of music will have to be linked to a philosophy and esthetics of music, especially in dealing with such questions as musical time, content and form, in analysing the place of musical being within the total pattern of cultural reality. The *Musicae Sacrae Disciplina* repeats the idea of Pio Decimo that church music must possess *bontà delle forme* — the encyclical calls it *verae artis specimen*. This brings up the whole discussion of art in general, and of religious art in particular: a review of the various schools of thought and an attempt at a mature contemporary synthesis. The question of the "universality" of church music, also brought up in the encyclical, will set off an immediate discussion on the idea of national and universal music, as such. And this can be solved only by a discussion of world culture and the possible connotations of the word "universal" in this connection.

The third requisite for church music is that it be "holy." This question brings us into the depths of theology and in a certain sense possibly of mysticism, minus the false trappings of the latter. To place music as a *cultural* entity within the liturgy, a liturgy centering on Christ in the Trinity and redounding to the spiritual joy and advancement of the faithful who partake thereof, is to plumb the depths of a possible

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[23] Haas, Robert, *Aufführungspraxis der Musik* (Potsdam, 1931).

Fellerer, K. G., *Zur Aufführungspraxis der altklassischen Polyphonie* in *Musica Sacra*, Oct. 1957, p. 296. Actual scores of this type of interpretation are obtainable from the Verlag Müller at Heidelberg; they will displace the new approach to the theology of liturgical music.[24] This in turn could give birth to a new slant in theology, i. e. a theology which finds its complete setting in a study of world culture. The church's task is to go forth and teach all nations; therefore it also will have to penetrate all cultures. For such a task, preparation is necessary. One of the vehicles of its vital dogma will be a musical liturgy, understood in a more profound sense, as a cultural entity, coming in contact with the total reality of world culture, and everything this connotes and entails.

The encyclical on sacred music likewise emphasizes a very practical point, namely the training of musically talented seminarians. All the fine ideals and statements of Pius XII concerning sacred music would come to naught, if his directives were not carried out. Realizing that church music cannot remain merely at the documentary stage, the Pope makes it clear, that musically endowed seminarians are to be given training all during the seminary years and eventually are to be sent to the Pontifical Institute of Sacred Music for the completion of their studies.[25] In order to be able to advance in the field of music nowadays, one must have a doctorate; hence such students ought to be given the chance to go the whole way, that they may be that much more effective in their future apostolate. Policies of expedience, no matter how seemingly justifiable, should give way to more purposeful planning. This is the mind of papal documents in general and especially of the papal encyclical on sacred music. The time for action must be the present, as pointed out by Cardinal Pizzardo.[26] The Pope calls musicians the *ministri et adiutores Christi* and looks upon their work as an indispensable part of the Catholic apostolate. But in order to do their work competently, they must be trained. Musical training, since it demands both theoretical

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old scores in the course of time. Meanwhile, in view of the theoretical and practical work done on this subject, the pedagogy of modal counterpoint and polyphonic literature (and "conducting") is due for a revolutionary revision. There may have to be far less emphasis on Fux's *Gradus ad Parnassum*, which has served as the basis of contrapuntal pedagogy up to modern times, even for Jeppesen's *Counterpoint, the Polyphonic Vocal Style of the Sixteenth Century*, transl. from the Danish by Glen Haydon.

[24] This brings up the identical cultural question regarding the Old Testament, in which music played an integral part not only in the liturgy of worship but also in the general civic culture. The same is true of Sumerian, Egyptian, Greek, and in general of most of the Mediterranean cultures. Cf. Sachs, *Die Musik der Antike* (Potsdam 1931); Gradenwitz, *The Music of Israel* (Norton, New York, 1949); Idelsohn, S. Z., *Jewish Music* (New York 1948); Sachs, Curt, *The Rise of Music in the Ancient World East and West* (New York, Norton, 1943).

[25] Pius XII, *Musicae Sacrae Disciplina* in *Acta Apostolicae Sedis*, Jan. 1956, p. 23.

[26] Pizzardo, Cardinal, *Epistula ad excellentissimos ac reverendissimos locorum ordinarios* in *Acta Apostolicae Sedis*, Dec. 22, 1949, p. 618.

and instrumental work, should not be delayed in the case of gifted seminarians. Such is the clear mind of ecclesiastical documentation, even from other sources besides the encyclical.[27] By following the directives of the church in this matter, we would witness a renaissance of musical culture within the church we love so well, and which Francis wanted us to obey.

Philosophy and Musicology

The spirit of Franciscanism was born of a cultural life-pattern in which music played a vital part. So much for music as such. One can understand the place of the organist and his choir,[28] but what of that dread term, "musicology?" What is that? Let us be frank in saying that it is a linguistic label that has arisen from the institutionalization of the study of music; and as an historical term, from the preface of Friedrich Chrysander in the *Jahrbücher für musikalische Wissenschaft* — hence the German word "*Musikwissenschaft* and its translations: musicology, *musicologie*, *musicologia*, *muziekwetenschap*, etc. This word-label, like any linguistic symbol, is nothing but an attempt to point up a certain approach without claiming complete success in reaching an adequate and end-valid definition. Willi Apel, prominent musicologist and outstanding authority on chant, takes the term *musicology* through its various meanings and possible connotations in his *Harvard Dictionary of Music*, and finally settles for the idea of research in music history.[29]

Such work would result in a number of types of research and studies. To begin with, there would be the publication of Urtexts, based on the critical collation of pertinent manuscript families. An example of this type of research would be the publication of the *Micrologus* of the medieval music theorist, Guido d'Arezzo; of Jacob de Liège's *Speculum*

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[27] *Acta Pii X*, 1. c., pp. 68—77, Letter to Cardinal Respighi.

Pius XI, *Divini Cultus Sanctitatem* in *Acta Apostolicae Sedis*, 1929, p. 33.

Cf. also: *A Music Programm for Seminaries* (master's thesis by James Collignon, M. M., M. A., Catholic University, 1955); likewise: Enrico Buondonno O.F.M., *Programma per l'insegnamento del canto e per le studio del pianoforte-organo dal Collegio Serafico al Sacerdozio* in *Studi Francescani*, Luglio, 1951, p. 145.

[28] The study of music as such comprises courses in organ, piano or any instrument; harmony, counterpoint, fugue and creative composition; instrumentation and orchestration; choral and orchestral conducting; sight reading of instrumental music, and score reading of orchestral works, etc. Musicologists will study also harmonic and symphonic analysis, acoustics, music history in general and in specialized periods, the decoding of mensural notation, paleography if needed in certain "majors," aesthetics, the philosophical and cultural aspects of music, and so forth, liturgy and chant theory, etc.

[29] Apel, Willi, *The Havard Dictionary of Music* (Harvard 1953) p. 473.

Musicae; or the reprinting of facsimile books, such as Adrian Coclico's *Compendium Musices.*[30] Besides the publication of such critical Urtexts and fascimiles (Faksimile-Neudruck) there are also publications of medieval and Renaissance music in the original notation, particularly post-Franconian mensural notation. The music of Baroque composers is not neglected. Translations of texts will also be made and published, as for example the *Isagoge* of Glareanus;[31] or commentaries will be written on specific historical documents, such as on Vincenzo Galilei's treatise on counterpoint.[32]

So far, this has little to do with "philosophy." But we have only begun. The archivistic type of work is but the first phase. Apel's idea of research in music history covers likewise such studies as, for example, a biographical work on Obrecht,[33] or a discussion of the mathematical basis of Philippe de Vitri's *Ars Nova.*[34] Manfred Bukofzer, an outstanding authority on medieval, renaissance and particularly baroque music, agreed with Apel in this definition of musicology, setting this study the task of research work in music history. Yet he also stated that the inner meaning of music could procede only from an esthetic approach.[35] This statement, hidden as it is in the body of the text — otherwise concerned chiefly with research in music history — has been taken up with more directness and completeness by Paul H. Lang (sole Catholic authority on musicology in America) in several editorials in *The Musical Quarterly;* Curt Sachs has editorialized on this subject, and specifically on the need of placing musicology in an esthetics of all the arts, in the *Journal of the American Musicological Society.*[36] In his work, Bukofzer tends toward much more than mere research into the "facts" of music history; he tends markedly toward stylistic critcism,[37] which is definitely one of the most important tasks of musicology. This brings us at once into the allied arts; for in order to be able to criticize musical styles, one must know the period in its full cultural background, in other words, in the patterned complexity of total reality, in as far as is humanly possible. Musicilogy of today seeks to delimit itself, in getting away from an overglorification of mere research techniques and historicism, and in avoiding isolation from the allied arts and the cultural matrix of life itself. To this end, the Institute of Musicology at the Sorbonne has established an international Colloquium, whose first fruits are the remarkable essays and discussions in *Musique et Poésie au XVI Siècle*, an interdisciplinary endeavor.[38] (A similar work is being done by the new journal *Wissenschaft und Weltbild*, also an interdisciplinary endeavor, though not begun by musicologists. It aims at the totality of all disciplines, whether the arts or the sciences, in order to help counteract the modern tendency toward specialization.)[39]

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[30] *Guidonis Aretini Micrologus* (Corpus Scriptorum de Musica, American Institute of Musicology, Rome and Amsterdam, 1955) ed. Jos. Smits van Waesberghe, J.J.

Jacobi Leodensis Speculum Musicae (Corpus Scriptorum de Musica, American Institute of Musicology, Rome, 1955) ed. Bragard.

Compendium Musices, Adrian Petit Coclico (Bukofzer: Faksimile Neudruck, Bärenreiter, Kassel und Basel, mcmliv) — Documenta Musicologica: Association Internationale des Bibliothèques Musicales.

[31] *The Isagoge of Glareanus, a Translation* in the *Journal of Music Theory*, April 1958 (Yale School of Music).

[32] Palisca, Claude V., *Vincenzo Galilei's Counterpoint Treatise, a Code for the Seconda Pratica*, in the *Journal of the American Musicological Society*, Summer 1956, p. 81.

[33] Murray, Bain, *New Light on Jacob Obrecht's Development- a Biographical Study*, in *The Musical Quarterly*, Oct. 1957, p. 500.

[34] Werner, Eric, *The Mathematical Foundation of Philippe de Vitri's Ars Nova* in the *Journal of the American Musicological Society*, Summer 1956 p. 128.

[35] Bukofzer, Manfred, *The Place of Musicology in American Institutions of Higher Learning* (New York, Liberal Arts Press, 1957)

[36] Lang, Paul H., *Editorial* in *The Musical Quarterly*, Oct. 1949, p. 602 and April 1951, p. 237; Curt Sachs, *Editorial* in the *Journal of the American Musicological Society*, 1949, p. 3 — see article on Sachs by Karl Geiringer

Hence there can be no musicology for musicology's sake. Musicology, as theory, historical research and critical analysis, cannot do without the reality of music itself, and not merely by itself but as understood in the total cultural web of its particular period. Yet this is not enough. In an article in the *Journal of Research in Music Education*, Oleta A. Benn has stressed the need for further research into the field of the philosophy and esthetics of music.[40] The work of Ferretti, *La Estetica Gregoriana*, would not serve as a systematic treatise on the whole field of musical esthetics, and Pius X's mention of a higher

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in *Zeitschrift für Musikwissenschaft*, 1930—31, p. 491. One of the finest articles available on the for synthesis in musicology itself is Wolf Franck's *Musicology and its Founder* in *The Musical Quarterly*, 1949, p. 588. He roots historistic tendencies in the colorless and isolated figure of Forkel, and calls for a value foundation in musicology. Clerx, whom he cites (*Définition de la musicologie et sa position à l'égard des autres disciplines qui lui sont connexes*, in the *Revue Belge de Musicologie*, I, 46/47) seems guilty of Forkelism in advocating a transcendentalism of music apart from music. From p. 599 on, an excellent analysis of the goals of musicology.

[37] This is most evident in his book, *Music in the Baroque Era;* it is also evident in Alfred Einstein's *Music in the Romantic Era*, especially the first section.

[38] *Musique et Poésie au XVI Siècle* (Colloques internationaux du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Sciences Humaines, V.) Paris, 1954.

[39] *Wissenschaft und Weltbild* (Für alle Gebiete der Forschung) 7. Jahrgang, (Herold, Wien und München).

[40] Benn, Oleta, A., *Esthetics for the Music Teacher; the Maturation of the Esthetic Sense* in the *Journal of Research in Music Education*, Fall 1956, p. 123.

esthetics of chant is apt to be taken as an excuse for sermonizing or moralizing.[41]

In order to understand music fully, we must also do research and creative thinking in philosophy and the esthetics of world culture, in which music is an important factor. This brings one head on with a number of fascinating topics. One would need a background in philosophy but also a specialized study of the whole field of esthetics, in its historical perspective and in its problematic. A beginning can be made by a study of Gilbert and Kuhn's *History of Esthetics.* This will lead to a large reading list in as many periods as humanly possible and will lead especially to articles in the American, French, and German professional journals. At the present time, the impetus for the study of esthetics comes from the United States and France.[42] Germany was in the lead before the war, and is now in the process of catching up.[43] England is following America's lead in this matter. It is evident that no single person or even single group of scholars in one country can do all the work satisfactorily. It is difficult enough keeping up with all the work going on in the field of esthetics, as speculative, let alone keeping abreast of all the symposiums of estheticians and philosophers, of musicologists and artist-esthetes, of students of anthropology and world culture. A selection of topics from the many journals of culture, esthetics, musicology and the fine arts — which the writer has already employed in his university work — would cover such subjects as the "materials" of music,[44] the basis of musical communication,[45] form as a value notion,[46] form in music as a time pattern,[47] the study of creativity as an historical interrelation between God and the artist,[48] the importance of cultural background in musical interpretation,[49] the sociology of musical life,[50] and even historical-analytical studies such as Kant's music aesthetic,[51] or the question of Herder's founding of musical esthetics as such.[52] Further problems and questions would be concerned with the phenomenology of music,[53] the iconic signs in esthetics,[54] the problem of meaning in music and the arts,[55] symbolism in music,[56] semiotic esthetics,[57] the relation between speech and music[58] and the allied arts.[59] The possibilities are endless and it would take several lifetimes to be able to delve deeply into every possible aspect. At best, one can channelize one's interests, reading and study, but counteract too much specialization by keeping abreast of the articles in professional journals and symposiums, while at the same time trying to do one's own constructive and if possible creative work in the field of musical esthetics.

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[41] The writer has surveyed the history and problems of esthetics in its musical, philosophical and theological patterns in the sixth chapter of *Music in the Catholic Church* (World Library of Sacred Music, Cincinnati, 1958). The chapter heading "Towards an Esthetics of Sacred Music" should not mislead the reader into thinking that the contents are only liturgical and theological. The chapter was published in its first version in *Caecilia,* April, 1958, where most of the footnotes were arbitrarily left out. Similar materials can be found in the writer's article on the encyclical in *The Musical Quarterly,* Oct. 1957, and with some further developments in *Studi Francescani,* Aprile-Giugno, 1958, p. 210. Subsequent work on aesthetics, mostly from a philosophical angle, is being incorporated in a new book, entitled, *The Esthetics of Music as a Life Semantic,* to be published in Germany. This work embodies the theories of the writer concerning: a theory of scholarship in musicology; language, thought and reality as a preamble to cultural musicology; time, being and music; consonance-dissonance as an esthetic problem; tensor being and creativity in composition; a critique of a metaphysics of the arts and world culture; the esthetics of music as a life semantic.

[42] *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism,* June, 1952, Editor's Comment: Recognition for Aesthetics as a Major Field of Scholarship, p. 364.

[43] *Zeitschrift für Aesthetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft* (no longer published).

[44] Reich, Othmar, *Was ist eigentlich „das Material in der Musik?"* in *Acta Musicologica,* X, 1938, p. 118. Cf. esp. pp. 121 and 129.

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[45] Clark, Henry L., *The Basis of Musical Communication* in the *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, March, 1952, p. 242.

[46] Finagin, *Form als Wertbegriff* in *Melos, Zeitschrift für Musik*, p. 201.

Engel, Gustave, *Der Begriff der Form in der Kunst und in der Tonkunst insbesondere* in *Vierteljahrsschrift für Musikwissenschaft*, 1886, p. 181.

[47] Gurlitt, W., *Form in der Musik als Zeitgestaltung* in *Akademie der Wissenschaft und der Literatur*, 1954, p. 13.

Briner, Andres, *Versuch über die musikalische Zeitgestaltung und ihre Wandlung in der europäischen Musik seit der mensuralen Mehrstimmigkeit* (Zürich, 1955).

[48] Badt, Kurt, *Der Gott und der Künstler* in *Philosophisches Jahrbuch der Görresgesellschaft*, 1956, p. 372.

[49] Brusotti, M., *Importanza della preparazione culturale nella interpretazione della musica* in *Revista Musicale Italiana*, 1953, p. 202.

[50] Tegen, Martin, *Musikforskning och Musiksociologi* in *Svensk Tidskrift för Musikforskning*, 1949, p. 161.

Moberg, Carl-Allan, *The Function of Music in Modern Society* in *Svensk Tidskrift för Musikforskning*, 1954, p. 84.

Serauky, *Wesen und Aufgaben der Musiksoziologie* in *Zeitschrift für Musikwissenschaft*, 1934, p. 232.

[51] Schering, A., *Zur Musikästhetik Kants* in *Zeitschrift der Internationalen Musikgesellschaft*, 1909—10, p. 169. Cf. influence of Kant's *Anschauungsformen* on Nicolai Hartmann, in *Aesthetik* (Berlin, 1953) p. 118; on H. J. Moser in *Musikästhetik* (Berlin, 1953) p. 20; on Friedrich Kainz, in *Einführung in die Philosophie der Kunst* (Wien, 1948) pp. 57, 104. Cf. Kant, *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, ed. Vorländer (Leipzig, 1922) p. 180.

[52] Huber, *Herders Begründung der Musikästhetik* in *Archiv für Musikforschung*, 1936, p. 103.

[53] Eimert, *Zur Phänomenologie der Musik* in *Melos, Zeitschrift für Musik*, April, 1926.

[54] Amyx, Clifford, *The Iconic Signs in Aesthetics* in the *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, Sept. 1947, p. 54.

[55] Greene, Theodore M., *The Problem of Meaning in Music and the other Arts* in the *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, June, 1947, p. 308.

[56] Lippman, Edward A., *Symbolism in Music* in *The Musical Quarterly*, Oct. 1953.

[57] Rudner, Richard, *On Semiotic Aesthetics* in the *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, Sept. 1951, p. 67.

[58] Kutterer, Fritz, *Die verborgenen Beziehungen zwischen Sprache und Musik* in *Musica*, 1051, p. 13.

Runge, Paul, *Die Musik als Hilfswissenschaft der Philosophie in Bezug auf das mittelalterliche Lied* in *Monatsheft für Musikgeschichte*, vol. 36, 1904.

[59] Sachs, Curt, *Die Musik im Rahmen der allgemeinen Kunstgeschichte* in *Archiv für Musikwissenschaft*, 1924, p. 255.

As far as the present writer is aware, no one has attempted to name this branch of musicology. It is not so much a branch as a window from which one views the intellectual struggles going on all around and trying to absorb what one can into one's speciality. In other words, it is a question of trying to approach reality as it is: one gigantic and patterned entity, even though one does so from one's own limited viewpoint. This type of musicology, which presupposes training in music, music theory and research techniques, perhaps could be called "speculative." But that word has been worn rather thin. Another possibility would be "esthetico-musicology," but a better term would be "cultural musicology." One runs out of doxographical labels.

It is already evident that these topics are of interest to the professional philosopher. Philosophy is also of great interest to the cultural musicologist. For only in philosophy can he get many of the "final" answers he seeks. Every musicological and esthetical problem will eventually end up as a philosophical question of some sort. The problem of the essence of contemporary music is a philosophical headache both to the musicologist and the composer. What is "con/temporary?" What is time and what is being? How are they related? Need something be *new* or *old*, or need it only be *valid*?[60] The whole plot of Wagner's *Die Meistersinger*, in which Hans Sachs and Stolzing are pitted against one another, has this philosophical question behind it. "Now" Wagner's music is "old." In breaking with Romantic music and subsequent impressionism, "contemporary" composers in all fields of composition,

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Anschütz, *Das Verhältnis der Musik zu den bildenden Künsten im Lichte stilistischer Betrachtung* in *Archiv für Musikforschung*, p. 3, 1938.

Besseler, Heinrich, *Grundfragen der Musikästhetik* in *Jahrbuch der Bibliothek Peters*, 1926, p. 62.

[60] Liess, Andreas, *Carl Orff, Idee und Werk*, (Zürich, 1955) p. 35. Orff uses "old" materials for his contemporary music, and finds them not "old" but "*gültig*." He also warns against a *Gegenwartshistorismus*. Cf. text and music of *Carmina Burana; Carmina Catulli*.

Wouters, Josef, *De nieuwe Muziek in Historisch Perspectief* in *Orgaan, Koninklijke Nederlandsche Toonkunstenaars Vereeniging*, Sept. 1957 "In sterkere mate dan dit ooit in de muziekgeschiedenis het geval is geweest weerspiegelt zich juist in de vormgeving van de hedendaagse muziek een orientering op het verleden, de traditie is de voedingsbodem geworden voor de 20e eeuwse vormconstructie."

even opera, battle with the identical problem. We have "*neo*-classicism" in the works of Hindemith, and yet another contemporary, Aaron Copland, styles this contemporary movement as already outdated, as "old."

The battle over the meaning of words such as "new" and "old" and "valid" brings us a step farther: we criticize the linguistic substructure of musicological and philosophical treatises on time and being. Do our Indo-European (in better terminology: Standard Average European) treatises on these problems, clothed as they are in Western word-style, grammar-style, syntax-style and thought-style, present us with specific problems that non-Western languages do not have to face? How much of the problem of time and being is a language problem and how much a "philosophical" one? What is the relation between a linguistic expression of "thought" and a non-linguistic one, as for example in the arts? What is their relation to a different linguistic thought style? And we are still not satisfied after having asked so many questions; for now we want to inquire into the substructure of the question itself, i. e. what is the philosophy of questioning.[61] And when we speak of a "substructure," we use a metaphor. What is the relation of meaningful content in a metaphor to the word-style of thought-style in Western and non-Western philosophy? This goes on endlessly, and one begins to perceive the comfort and need of faith, even in reason. Whether we read Augustine,[62] or Husserl, who despairingly exclaims that we cannot get much farther than Augustine in the time problem,[63] or Heidegger,[64] on the time-being problem, we will begin to realize how close to one another philosophy and musicology are.

The problem which the musician-musicologist-philosopher is trying to solve is this: how to adjust his sights to total reality, to total "validity" in its total cultural complex. To do this thoroughly he must also consider the relation between thought and language.[65] The more approaches he has to reality, the surer he is of not getting bottled up in his natural limitations. Yet in turning philosopher, he cannot abstract musical problems away from music. In his book, *Einführung in die Metaphysik,* Heidegger treats of the etymology of the word, "sein."[66] He mentions the danger of the infinitive form of the word "sein," and adds that when ones says "sein" one had better hurry to fill it in with "ich bin, du bist, er ist . . ." Both musicologist and philosopher want to avoid the error of abstractionism, which under the guise of acumen and subtlety can destroy the correct understanding of reality. It is possible in scholastic philosophy to strip away the individuating notes and arrive not at a universal but at the ruinating of the full esthetic content of being, as it actually exists in the vital pattern of reality. The musicologist-philosopher, therefore, is wary of becoming so theoretical as to abstract himself from music in its total world complex. Thus he seeks to synthesize music and philosophical thought about music, cultural and esthetic studies, realizing then while making use of the advantages of the technique of abstraction, when necessary, he will not eviscerate but reassert *musical* being. He will also be wary of the traditional doxographical terms "theoretical" and "practical," which have found their way from Greek philosophical and musical treatises, through the music theory of Cassiodorus and Boethius down to modern times.

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[61] Rombach, Heinrich, *Über Ursprung und Wesen der Frage* (Freiburg, 1958).

Heidegger, *Einführung in die Metaphysik* (Tübingen, 1953) p. 57, Die Frage nach dem Wesen des Seins. Cf. esp. *Sein und Zeit* p. 5—8, Die formale Struktur der Frage nach dem Sein.

[62] *Divi Aurelii Augustini Confessionum Libri Tredecim*, liber xi, caput xiv ad xxxi.

[63] Husserl, Edmund, *Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins*, herausgegeben von Martin Heidegger (Halle, 1928) p. 368. One realizes what a great man Augustine was, after reading the chapters on time in the Confessiones, as cited. Cf. also p. 378—386, where Husserl discusses "Ton."

[64] Heidegger, Martin, *Sein und Zeit* (Tübingen, 1957) p. 301—436 (Originally published in *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, ed. Husserl, 1927).

In studying the question of a metaphysics of the arts, he will review the history of this philosophical study, recognizing historical trends for what they are and citing contemporary crises. In other words, he will have to place metaphysics realistically in its entire historical context, not pick out one age or author and ignore all the crises that have occurred since then. But here he faces the identical problem of "old," "new" and "valid," as already discussed. Again, what does "contemporary" mean, whether one seeks to know what is valid contemporary music or philosophy, or philosophy of music? There are those esthetes who hold that metaphysics is indispensable in esthetics,[67] and there are also those who are sceptical of the recent upsurge of this study. The former often show some of that German weakness for exaggerated speculation, while the latter may show influences of a type of neo-positivism. In *Metaphysik Heute?*,[68] Wilhelm Weischedel, who has also written on the metaphysic of the arts,[69] examines the current problem of the questionability of metaphysics, surveys the present situation of this study and scans possibilities for its further development or collapse. He warns that the recent revival of metaphysical questions is no guarantee for its restoration as a philosophical discipline, and that it may even be but the final breath of total disintegration. Eugen Fink would claim that the word "metaphysics" is one of the many doxographical terms, which make up the burden of a tradition, perhaps not analysed in its full historical and linguistic setting.[70] However, a careful reading of his book will assuage the sensibilities of that school of thought which looks on metaphysics as the final science of sciences. Weischedel claims a "*metaphysische Erfahrung*" based on the philosophies of Jaspers and Heidegger as a positive starting point for a contemporary metaphysics. Of course, this depends on what one thinks of these two philosophers. In philosophizing one cannot forget the problem of *new-old-valid*. One cannot neglect the *valid* insights of traditional thought, scholasticism included.[71]

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[65] Whorff, Benjamin, *Language, Thought and Reality*, Cf. The Relation of Habitual Thought and Behaviour to Language (M. I. T., 1956) Cf. *Das Wesen der Sprache*, lecture given by Heidegger, Nov. 4, 1957, University of Freiburg aula; also his *Was ist das — die Philosophie?* (Pfullingen, 1956) pp. 12, 13, 15, 16, 44, 45, 46.

[66] p. 40 Zur Grammatik und Etymologie des Wortes "sein".

[67] Kuhn, Helmut, *On the Indispensability of Metaphysical Principles on Aesthetics* in the *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, Dec. 1950, p. 128 One can understand his mentality from an analysis of the sections of the book which he wrote jointly with Mrs. Gilbert, i. e. *A History of Esthetics*.

All this material is a necessary preamble to a deeper approach to the study of esthetics, a philosophy of the arts and cultural musicology. This article can only point up various trends of such a study, without getting beyond a mere sketch of the situation. It is evident that there is abundant material for serious study for a Franciscan who is interested in philosophy, in the fine arts, has a footing in applied music and musicological research, and especially who has developed a balanced attitude toward the philosophy-theology problem. It is only through such a serious study that he will be able to perceive the real problems of music, as problems of reality in general and particular. Music uses the "materials" of sound but it is also an expression of the creativity of the human being, and provides a valid phenomenological subject for examination. Susanne Langer considers music as the inconsummate symbol of life. Whether we review the works of Hunter Mead, Walter Abell, Torossian, Nahm, Read or Mumford, and a host of other esthetes, we will see that the arts in general connote much more than the mere "materials" used, and in the case of music, heard. The link between philosophy and music is more than even such casual and somewhat contrived connections as those between Wagner's *Götterdämmerung*, for example, and Schopenhauer's philosophy.

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[68] Weischedel, Wilhelm, *Metaphysik Heute?* in *Philosophisches Jahrbuch der Görresgesellschaft*, 1956, p. 60.

[69] *Die Tiefe im Antlitz der Welt, Entwurf einer Metaphysik der Kunst* (München, 1952).

[70] Fink, Eugen, *Zur ontologischen Frühgeschichte von Raum, Zeit und Bewegung* (Den Haag Nijhoff, 1957) An exceedingly refreshing approach to the entire problem, dispensing with a mystical "metaphysician's mien."

[71] Coreth, Emerich, *Auf der Spur der entflohenen Götter — Martin Heidegger und die Gottesfrage* in *Wort und Wahrheit*, Feb. 1954. Cf. also critique of Heidegger by Simon Moser in *Metaphysik Einst und Jetzt* (Berlin, 1958), a far better treatment than that by Hans Meyer in *Geschichte der abendländischen Weltanschauung*, Band V., Die Weltanschauung der Gegenwart, p. 430.

It is clear, then, that music and musicology have their rightful place within the Church, in the apostolate of the priest and religious, and certainly in that of a Franciscan. Music, likewise, has its in the education of seminarians, in order that the future clergy may be well posted on the place and importance of music in the cultural mission of the Church. Such an education can be imparted only by those specifically endowed and trained. The entire purpose of a musical and musicological study is intellectual and personal honesty vis-à-vis reality in its *total cultural aspect*, and to God in a dedicated apostolate. In studying music and its philosophy, one faces reality in a creative way, whether as interpreter of the musical patterns of world culture, or as a composer who molds and creates new possibilities, be he composer of thought or of sound or of both. In this way, musicology does not remain learnedly impotent but becomes existentially productive in a world culture, integrated in and centered upon the full reality of life: God, mankind, and the mystery of their relation to one another.[72] This article has been but an overview of the many facts and problems in music and cultural musicology, without being able to delve into any phase of the question in a profound sense. But it will perhaps help to give an understanding of the place of such a study in the vocation and the apostolate of those, who glory in being the followers and sons of God's troubador, Francis Bernardone.[73]

FIDELIS SMITH O. F. M.

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[72] though in scholastic philosophy, God cannot have a "relation" to a creature.

[73] whom even Luther respected. Cf. *Colloquia oder Tischreden Doctor Martini Lutheri* (Frankfurt, Aurifaber, 1567) p. 342a "Franciscus war ein Wahle ausz der Stadt Assis on zweiffel ein frommer Mann gewesen . . ." But what he says about Franciscans is unprintable.

THE AMERICAN FRANCISCANS IN MARY'S CENTURY: 1858—1958

Mary's Franciscan Champions: Anima franciscana, naturaliter mariana! The Franciscan soul, by nature a Marian soul! Such is the story of the ever more glorious fulfillment of the prophecy of Our Lady: "Behold, henceforth all generations shall call me blessed" (Luke 1, 48).[1] Characteristic of the whole life of St. Francis was his admirable love and devotion to the Blessed Mother. The little chapel of the Portiuncula, the cradle of the Order of Friars Minor, was dedicated by him to the heavenly Queen of the Angels.[2] It was here, St. Bonaventure tells us, that Francis "poured out constant prayers to her who had conceived the Word full of Grace and Truth, that she might vouchsafe to be his Advocate." The Order, in turn, true to the spirit of its founder, produced such ardent lovers and promoters of Mary's privileges and prerogatives as St. Anthony of Padua, who championed and expounded the doctrine of the Assumption with vibrant enthusiasm; Friar Juniper of Todi, who authored the "Stabat Mater;" St. Bonaventure, who decreed at the Chapter of Pisa (1263) a form of Marian devotion out of which the Angelus evolved; Venerable John Duns Scotus, the unrivaled defender of the Immaculate Conception; St. Bernadine of Siena, the "echo of St. Bernard," whose extraordinary knowledge of Mariology was matched only by his uncommon love for Mary.[3]

The "Hail Mary" owes much to the Seraphic Order. Franciscans were the first to add the final words: "pray for us sinners, now and at the hour of our death." The thought of May brings the thought of Mary. A Franciscan Capuchin, Father Lawrence Echnuffs, can claim the honor of "giving May to Mary." Another Capuchin, Father Jerome of Forli, instituted the custom of publicly and solemnly crowning images of the Immaculate Queen of Heaven.

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[1] Buening, Ulric, O.F.M.Cap., Franciscans and Mary Coredemptrix: The doctrine of Coredemption, in Round Table of Franciscan Research 19 (1954) 54.

[2] Schmidt, Firmin, O.F.M.Cap., Mary's Universal Queenship in Franciscan Theologians, in Regina Immaculata, Romae, 1955, 87.

[3] Scannell, Francis M., O.F.M.Cap., Queen of the Seraphic Order, in Round Table of Franciscan Research 19 (1954) 130—136.

In the period of modern Mariology, extending from the 16th to the 19th century, the Franciscans can proudly boast of such distinguished men as St. Lawrence of Brindisi, John M. Zamora, Peter de Alva y Astorga, and Charles del Moral.

Within the past century, the Age of Mary, many factors indeed have contributed to the present flourishing state of Marian studies. Doubtless, first among these is the efficacious influence of the Papal Magisterium. The late supreme Pontiff, Pius XII, may rightly be hailed as the greatest Marian Pope in modern times. However, even here the sons of St. Francis throughout the world were not wanting in expressing their traditional love and devotion to Mary! They encouraged pilgrimages to Marian shrines; wrote numerous books, pamphlets and articles on Our Blessed Mother, and organized several Marian conventions for the purpose of promoting a better appreciation of her privileges and prerogatives.[4]

Franciscan National Marian Commission in the United States:

But what can be said about the sons of St. Francis in this newly-founded land of ours, which has been placed under the patroness of Mary Immaculate? Have they remained steadfast in their great Marian heritage in this Age of Mary? What contributions have they made to the science of Mariology?

It may be stated at the very outset that the role of the American hierarchy in matters Mariological is comparatively recent. Among the Franciscans, who brought the Faith to this land, its beginning may be traced back in a remarkable manner to the institution of the Franciscan National Marian Commission by the General Chapter of Friars Minor in 1947, for the purpose "of elucidating more aptly and presenting in a scientific manner each and every privilege of the Blessed Virgin Mary and to promote and foster Marian studies and Marian Conventions in order to lead up to and bring about the successful culmination of this purpose." Almost immediately thereafter, the American Franciscans became the first to celebrate the proclamation of the dogma of the Assumption on a national scale by organizing a Marian Congress in Burlington, Wisconsin, October 8—11, 1950, in acclamation of the papal definition announced to the world in the Apostolic Constitution: "Munificentissimus Deus." Four years later, a Second Franciscan

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[4] Carol, Juniper B., O.F.M., The Mariological Movement in the World Today, in Marian Studies 1 (1950) 25.

National Marian Congress was held in California from May 4—9 to celebrate the Marian Year in honor of the Centennial of the definition of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception. This year, as we commemorate the renowned apparitions of Our Lady to Bernadette Soubirous at Lourdes, a special Franciscan National Marian Day was inaugurated in Chicago on May 31 — June 1.

We would also like to make special mention of the remarkable contribution made by the Franciscan, Father Juniper Carol, one of America's prominent Mariologists, through the edition of his Marian Studies.

Division of Paper: The task of this paper will be restricted to an examination and presentation of the scientific writings of the Franciscans in North America within recent years. A survey of the Franciscan Marian cult in our times has been submitted by Father Maurice Grajewski.[5]

Indeed, the doctrine of Mary and the doctrine of Christ are so interrelated that a denial of the dignity of one implies a denial of the dignity of the other; a glorification of one demands the consequent glorification of the other. Therefore, we have divided our paper into the following articles:

Art. 1 — Predestination of Mary
Art. 2 — Divine and Spiritual Motherhood
Art. 3 — Immaculate Conception
Art. 4 — Universal Mediation of Mary
Art. 5 — Death of Mary
Art. 6 — Assumption of Mary into Heaven
Art. 7 — Queenship of Mary[6]

Art. 1

PREDESTINATION OF MARY

Notion: With God, there is no time; everything is eternally present. If then, we find our Blessed Lady fulfilling a specific mission entrusted to her by the Almighty, it is obvious that this mission is the result of a positive act on the part of God's will from all eternity. This divine will determining the existence of Our Lady, ordaining her to the beatific vision and charging her with a specific function in the divine plan reveals her special predestination to glory. We may define "predestination," then, as an act whereby God from all eternity destines an elect to glory, and provides him with the means that will infallibly lead him to glory.[7]

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[5] The Franciscan Marian Cult in the United States in our times, in First Franciscan National Marian Congress (Studia Mariana, VII) Burlington, 1952, 120—125.

[6] Maholy, Noel F., O.F.M., St. Irenaeus, the Father of Mariology, in First Franciscan National Marian Congress (Studia Mariana, VII) Burlington, 1952, 184.

The Franciscans: The theology of the Franciscan school is one of love: Deus est formaliter caritas. Love is the reason of every divine activity. Now, right order demands that the first divine activity should be that whereby God loves Himself above all things. Whence, the Father associates Himself with the Son through Generation, and with the Holy Ghost through Spiration.[8]

But, over and above the Person in the Blessed Trinity, God, in His super-abundant love, wills out of love and for the sake of love to draw yet other beings into the ambit of His love: bonum est diffusivum sui. It was fitting, therefore, that God should call into existence creatures who would in some way receive Him by sharing in His life. First among these and in an absolute sense is Christ, the very apex of the hierarchy of being, Who by reason of His personal union with the Word, can offer supreme worship that is worthy of God and share in the very happiness of God. In virtue of its hypostatic union with the Word the Humanity of Christ would share in the very happiness of God.

This happiness would certainly suffice for its eternal felicity. But from another point of view Christ's human nature would be lacking the properly divine joy of giving itself and of making others happy. Truly, God was in no way bound to grant His future Christ the sovereign joy of manifesting His liberality and of making others happy; but if He wished to accord Him this privilege, He must of necessity grant existence to at least one other creature. Now, the creature that follows Christ immediately and stands nearest to Him, the creature that will render — next to Christ — the greatest glorification to the Blessed Trinity, is Mary, the Mother of God, who was to give her own human nature to the future Christ.[9] In the words of father Frederick W. Faber: "She was their (the Three Divine Person's) eternal idea, nearest to that Idea which was the cause of all creation, the Idea of Jesus; she was necessary, as they had willed it, to the realization of that Idea."[10] In conformity with this, Pope Pius XII, before his elevation to the Sovereign Pontificate, had already taken a stand in favor of the doctrine of the primacy of Christ and the Blessed Virgin, as well as of the priority of their predestination: "Wishing, at the beginning of time, to create the world, to pour forth His love and to grant existence and happiness to others besides Himself, God *first of all* (if one may speak thus, in accordance with our successive manner of understanding and acting), cast His eyes on Him who would be their Head and King . . . There is God's masterpiece, the most excellent of His works; whatever may be the date and the circumstances of His manifestation in time, this was assuredly what He willed *first, and in view of which He made all the rest.* But wishing that this unique object of His complacency be born of a woman, He cast on thee, O Mary, a very gentle glance and predestined thee to be His Mother."[11]

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[7] Bonnefoy, John F., O.F.M., The Predestination of Our Blessed Lady, in Mariology (ed. J. B. Carol) Milwaukee, 1957, II, 154. Cf. also: Carol, Juniper B., Fundamentals of Mariology, New York, 1956, 21.

[8] Shircel, Cyril, O.F.M., The Position of the Blessed Mother in the Franciscan Theological Synthesis, in Franciscan Educational Conference 35 (1954) 97.

[9] Bonnefoy, John F., op. cit., 173; Shircel, Cyril, op. cit., 99—101.

Now, in virtue of this primacy of Mary under Christ, she must be, with Him and in dependence upon Him, the meritorious, exemplary, and final cause of all that is beneath her. Consequently, God's plan concerning the world would have been conceived without recourse to the famous thesis: If Adam had not sinned, the Word would not have become Incarnate. In other words, Mary's predestination was not conditioned by that of Adam or any other creature;[12] she had been predestined to eternal glory in one and the same decree with Christ.

Predestination of Mary, Basic Principle of Mariology: The Predestination of Mary to glory is accepted by the Franciscan School as the veritable cornerstone on which the entire edifice of Mariology rests. Scotus himself observes that "anyone who wills in an orderly way first wills the purpose and then, closer to hand, those things which are more immediately connected with that purpose." If this be true and if God wills firstly the purpose or end and then those things ordained to that end, it must likewise be true that God wills first her *glory*, and then the graces and merits ordained to her eternal glory, among which would be the grace and merits of her divine maternity.[13]

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[10] Unger, Dominic J., O.F.M.Cap., Christ and His Virgin Mother in God's Eternal Decree according to Frederick W. Faber, in Marianum 17 (1955) 384.

[11] Pacelli, Card. Eugenio, Discorsi e Panegirici, 2nd edition, Milano, 1939, 633—634.

[12] Bonnefoy, John F., op. cit., 176; Kerrigan, Alexander, O.F.M., The Predestination of Mary according to St. Cyril of Alexandria, in Alma Socia Christi 3 (1952) 39.

[13] Shircel, Cyril, op. cit., 106.

It is interesting to note how this basic principle of Mariology lends to a ready solution of other Mariological problems and to a greater and more profound understanding of Mary's prerogatives. Thus, as a logical consequence of the priority of her predestination in one and the same decree with Christ, Mary was endowed with certain graces which were ordained to her eternal glory: a) her Immaculate Conception, this was a gift of Christ to His future Mother; b) her Divine Maternity made it possible for her to glorify and thank God; c) her Universal Mediation established her as co-principle of our redemption, subordinate to Christ; d) her death revealed her likeness unto Christ, who, while enjoying the right to immortality, freely accepted death that she might co-redeem the human race together with Him; e) her Assumption into heaven exempted her from the corruption of the grave and of waiting until the end of time for the glorification of her body; f) her Queenship placed her next to Christ, the Primate of all creation, as the Queen of heaven and earth.[14]

Art. 2

DIVINE AND SPIRITUAL MOTHERHOOD OF MARY

A plea for unity is in keeping when discussing the Mariological truths of the Divine and Spiritual Motherhood of Mary. Just as we cannot separate the Divine Son and His Mother, so also a separation of the Divine and Spiritual Motherhood of Mary must not be expected: "She, by the very fact that she brought forth the Redeemer of the human race, is also in a manner the most tender mother of us all, whom Christ our Lord deigned to have as His brothers."[15] The Spiritual Motherhood, then, follows as an effect or consequence from her Divine Motherhood.

A. *DIVINE MOTHERHOOD*

Notion: In His wisdom, God chose and appointed a mother for His only Begotten Son, on whom He showered more love than on all other creatures, and with whom He was most pleased. The Divine Motherhood of Mary was indeed God's first grace (means) ordained to her eternal glory.

Mary is truly the Mother of God, as any other woman is the mother of her own child. In a sense, she is even more than a mother, for she alone, with the overshadowing of the Holy Spirit, formed a body which from the very first moment of its existence was the body of God. Can we conceive of any other motherhood as true and as perfect as that of Mary with regard to the Son of God?[16]

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[14] Bonnefoy, John F., op. cit., 175; Shircel, op. cit., 105; Unger, Dominic, op. cit., 391.

[15] Quinn, Edmund W., O.F.M.Cap., The Divine and Spiritual Motherhood of Mary, in Marianum 15 (1953) 57.

Sacred Scripture and Tradition: The idea of the divine maternity was contained quite clearly in the mind of the early Church. This was but the natural of two truths already familiar to the first Christians, namely, that Mary is truly the Mother of Jesus and that Jesus is at the same time true God and true man. There was no need for tradition to make this idea more explicit. Yet, thanks to the Christological controversies of the first centuries, it was able to offer gradually a clearer expression of the Divine Maternity. Thus, in speaking of the birth of Jesus, tradition replaced the words *Son of God* by the simple word *God*, a development which was to facilitate the creation of the word *theotokos*, Mother of God, which became the hymn of every Christian heart.

Mary's Relationship with the Trinity: As Mother of God, Mary assumed a special relation with the three Divine Persons: she became the "Associate of the Father" in the production of Jesus, in this sense, that the same person who is the Son of God is also her own Son; the "Mother of the Son of God," fulfilling the obligations and possessing the rights of a true mother; the "Spouse of the Holy Spirit" in virtue of the divine motherhood, for it was by the operation of Holy Spirit that she conceived Jesus.

B. *SPIRITUAL MATERNITY*

Existence: Mary's Spiritual Motherhood is one of the most certain and most universally accepted doctrines of Mariology. It has its foundation in the Divine Maternity. The Protogospel (Gen. 3, 15) foretells Mary the Mother of the Redeemer; it foretells also Mary the Mother of mankind. In the heavenly vision of the Apocalypse she is the glorious Mother of the glorious Son; she is also our Mother of glory dispensing the fruits and graces of the redemption. By her "fiat" (Luke 1, 26—38), her willingness and free consent to be the Mother of God, she became the Mother of us, the Mother of the whole Christ.[17]

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[16] Stefun, Bonaventure, O. F.M.Cap., The Mother of God in Brownson's writings, in The American Ecclesiastical Review 134 (1956) 318.

[17] Quinn, Edmund W., op. cit., 58.

Nature: Just as the existence of the Spiritual Motherhood depends on the Divine, so also the nature of the Spiritual Motherhood finds in the Divine the basis of its explanation. Mary is the Mother of Christ's members, because with full knowledge and consent she conceived "in her virginal womb Christ our Lord," who "already bore the exalted title of Head of the Church." Further, she is now perfectly the Mother of Christ's members through the added title of pain (Co-redemptrix) because as Christ became Head of the Church of the Mystical Body, in the full and complete sense of the word, when the Church, already conceived at the Incarnation, was born from His pierced side on Calvary, so also Mary assumed full and complete Motherhood by reason of her maternal compassion on Calvary. Mary is, then, our Mother by reason of the Incarnation and Coredemption.[18]

But Mary is not our natural Mother. Christ was her only natural Son. Still, Mary is our real Mother, in the sense that she really and truly communicated to us the life of grace which makes us children of God. On the analogy of natural life we say that she has given us birth to a divine form of life: "Thus she who corporally was the Mother of our Head, through the added title of suffering and glory, became spiritually the Mother of all His members."[19]

Extent: Mary is Mother not only of all Christians, but also of the whole human race. In the words of Pius XII she is the Mother "of Christ's members." In an actual and perfect manner, she is the Mother of all the just who enjoy the life of grace; imperfectly, she is the Mother of all sinners, who still remain united with Christ by faith. Potentially, she is also the Mother of all infidels, because they are destined to be united with Christ through faith and charity.[20]

The personal love and filial devotion every Christian bears to Mary gives evidence of the dignity of her Spiritual Motherhood. Every Catholic claims Mary for his Mother, precisely because she is the Mother of God. It is for this reason that the Church in full confidence prays the Memorare: "Inspired with this confidence I fly unto thee . . . my Mother . . ."

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[18] Sebastian, Wenceslaus, O.F.M., Mary's Spiritual Maternity, in Mariology (ed. J. B. Carol) Milwaukee, 1957, II, 335—336.

[19] Carol, Juniper B., op. cit., 48.

[20] Quinn, Edmund W., op. cit., 71—72; Carol, Juniper B., op. cit., 54.

Art. 3

IMMACULATE CONCEPTION

The full story of the development of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception after Scotus covers some five hundred and fifty years.[21] It reveals that the ultimate criterion to which the Church refers herself at the moment of a dogmatic definition is her own "consciousness" of the truth. This consciousness is arrived at through a slow process of evolution whereby the truth was at first perhaps even ignored for a time; then discovered, analyzed and finally set forth as an article of faith. Briefly, it may be stated that as regards the Immaculate Conception, the Church has become in time more conscious of the double dignity of Mary as the Mother of God and the New Eve.[22]

Notion: Our first parents had been endowed with original justice, that is the harmonious agreement of all the powers of man, not only for themselves, but also for their descendants, to whom they were to transmit it as a heritage, just as a king would transmit his dignity to his posterity. In sinning, however, this justice was taken away from them. As a result, they were no longer to transmit it to their descendants, any more than a king who has lost his kingdom could bequeath it to his sons. In its stead, sin was communicated to posterity. The Immaculate Conception of Mary consists essentially in her exemption from this sin: "We declare, pronounce and define that the doctrine which holds that the Most Blessed Virgin Mary, at the first instant of her conception was preserved immune from all stain of sin, by a singular grace and privilege of the Omnipotent God, in view of the merits of Jesus Christ, the Savior of the human race, was revealed by God, and therefore, must be firmly and constantly believed by the faithful."[23]

Mary, then, by a unique privilege from Almighty God, was not included in the moral headship of Adam, and therefore she was never "from the creation and infusion of her soul in her body" (Alexander VII) under the curse of Satan, never for an instant stained with the sin of

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[21] Brady, Ignatius, O.F.M., The Doctrine of the Immaculate Conception in the Fourteenth Century, in Second Franciscan National Marian Congress (Studia Mariana, IX) San Francisco, 1954, 70.

[22] De Amato, Norbert, O.F.M., The Fathers of the Church and the Dogma of the Immaculate Conception, in Second Franciscan National Marian Congress (Studia Mariana, IX) San Francisco, 1954, 117.

[23] Carr, Aidan and Williams, Germain, O.F.M., Mary's Immaculate Conception, in Mariology (ed. J. B. Carol) Milwaukee, 1954, I, 328; Wolter, Allan, O.F.M., Doctrine of the Immaculate Conception in the early Franciscan School, in Second Franciscan National Marian Congress (Studia Mariana, IX) San Francisco, 1954, 30.

Adam. This preservation was the result of the application of the foreseen merits of the Redeemer.

Sacred Scripture and Tradition: In the bull of definition, Pope Pius IX himself brings forth two biblical passages in particular as containing the doctrine of Mary's original sinlessness, namely, the Protoevangelium (Gen. 3, 15) and the Angelic Salutation (Luke 1, 28). More recently, Pius XII in the Apostolic Constitution "Munificentissimus Deus," has interpreted the Protoevangelium as implying Mary's intimate share in Christ's total victory over Satan.

The witnesses of Tradition relative to the Immaculate Conception may be conveniently divided into the four following periods: a) period of implicit belief (I—IV century); b) period of gradual development (IV—XI century); period of controversy (XI—XV century); and d) period of universal belief (XV—XIX century). The Franciscan Pope Sixtus IV (1471—1448) was the first to have encouraged officially this doctrine.[24]

The Franciscans: Fifty years after the definition, it was decided, on the occasion of the International Congress of the Friars Minor held in Rome, that the foremost defender of this exalted privilege of the Mother of God, the Venerable John Duns Scotus, should receive his meed of consideration and praise.[25]

Though St. Anthony of Padua preached eloquently about the sanctity of Mary, it is certain that he did not defend the prerogative as such. He merely repeated the more or less common doctrine of his era.[26]

The main reasons hindering the Scholastics from accepting the Immaculate Conception were these: a) the Augustinian theory according to which original sin had infected the human flesh, which, in turn, automatically infected the soul at the time of its infusion in the body; b) the biblical passage, especially Romans 5, relative to the universality of original sin and the universality of Christ's redemption.[27]

To the ultimate solution of the problem the early Franciscan School made a distinct contribution by accepting the theory of St. Anselm, which placed the essence of sin in what he calls the "absentia justitiae debitae," reducing concupiscence in the Augustinian notion to a mere effect or sequel of the privation of original justice. Still, they were not able to abandon the Augustinian notion entirely. As a result, some tried to integrate the two theories. In St. Bonaventure, the actual founder of the Franciscan School, we discover an approach to the problem of the Immaculate Conception which contributed towards the ultimate triumph of the Marian prerogative. But he too could not bring himself to accept the Immaculate Conception.[28]

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[24] Latko, Ernest F., O.F.M., The Franciscan Position on the Immaculate Conception before Duns Scotus, in Franciscan Educational Conference 25 (1954) 1—4.

[25] Baldwin, Louis, O.F.M., John Duns Scotus and the Immaculate Conception, in L'Ordine dei Frati Minori al Congresso Mariano Internazionale, Roma, 1905, 59.

[26] Latko, Ernest, op. cit., 15—16.

[27] Carol, Juniper B., op. cit., 101; Huber, Raphael M., O.F.M. Conv., The Immaculate Conception in the Western Church, in Miscellanea Francescana 54 (1954) 194—195.

Among those who have been traditionally regarded as the most illustrious champions of the Immaculate Conception is the Franciscan theologian, Venerable John Duns Scotus (died 1308), rightly styled the Marian Doctor.[29] To the reasons mentioned against Mary's immunity from sin, Scotus answered substantially as follows: a) original sin does not come about through the transmission of guilt from the infected body to the soul upon the latter's creation and infusion. Original sin consists rather in the privation of sanctifying grace which, owing to Adam's sin, is lacking in the soul at the time of its creation. b) Whoever descends from Adam by way of ordinary generation does contract original sin, unless he is preserved by grace from contracting it. This is true of Mary. c) The fact that Mary did not contract original sin does not mean that she is not indebted to Christ's redemption. On the contrary, she owes more to that Redemption than anyone else, for the grace of Christ prevented sin from ever reaching her soul.[30]

Accordingly, the Immaculate Conception means that Our Lady was preserved, not from a sin which she should have contracted, but rather from a sin which she would have contracted, had God so decided. If our Lady ever contracted any debt at all, it was not a debt of sin, but rather a debt of grace, in the sense that at the very first instant of her existence God owed it to Himself to endow her with the fullness of grace which He himself had from all eternity decreed to give her at that particular moment.[31]

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[28] Latko, Ernest, op. cit., 23—52.

[29] Vogt, Berard, O.F.M., Duns Scotus: Defender of the Immaculate Conception, in Franciscan Educational Conference 25 (1954) 79—86; Bennett, O., O.F.M. Conv., Mary in the Liturgy, in R. J. Truce, In Praise of Mary, St. Meinrad, Grail Publications, 1955, 143.

[30] Hug, Pacific, O.F.M., Modern Challenge against the Franciscan Tradition as having taught an Immaculate Conception incompatible with Redemption, in Virgo Immaculata, XI, 1957, 381—382; Huber, Raphael, op. cit., 195—196.

[31] Carol, Juniper B., Our Lady's Immunity from the debt of sin, in Marian Studies 6 (1955) 167—168.

Almost contemporaneously, Peter Aureoli became the first Franciscan to write a treatise exclusively in defense of the Immaculate Conception. Franciscus de Mayronis, founder of Scotism as a school, bluntly expressed the fact of the Immaculate Conception in the following words: God could preserve the Blessed Virgin lest she contract original sin; it was fitting that Christ perserve His Mother; therefore, God actually preserved her from original sin. With him we have the famous trilogy: *potuit, decuit, ergo fecit.* From him, it passed into the Scotistic School.[32]

Though the Franciscans could give no unqualified assent to the Immaculate Conception, we cannot doubt what their personal sentiments were. Certainly, the name of Scotus will ever be held in esteem and veneration as the instrument chosen by God to glorify His Blessed Mother by indicating the great prerogative of her Immaculate Conception. Four years after the definition of the bull the apparitions of Mary to little Bernadette Soubirous at Lourdes, and the title Our Lady had chosen to identify herself (I am the Immaculate Conception), were a confirmation from heaven of the declaration of the Solemn Magisterium of the Church.[33]

Art. 4

MARY'S UNIVERSAL MEDIATION

In general, a mediator is one who places himself between two persons in order to unite them, either because there is a reconciliation to be achieved or a favor to be obtained. In the order of Redemption, Jesus alone is our perfect mediator before God, because He was able to merit in all justice our reconciliation with God and the graces which man would be in need of. When applied to Mary, the term "mediatrix" designates a twofold function: first, reconciling mankind with God through her cooperation in the redemptive work of Christ while she was still on earth; second, making available to each individual soul the graces which were earned by Christ and by herself through the work of Redemption. The first phase of her mediation was accomplished on Calvary; the second is being carried out and will continue until the end of the world. In virtue of the first function Mary is called "Coredemptrix"; in virtue of the second "Dispenser of all graces."[34]

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[32] Brady, Ignatius, op. cit., 91—93.

[33] Bennett, O., op. cit., 145.

[34] Carol, Juniper B., Fundamentals of Mariology, New York, 1956, 55.

A. *COREDEMPTRIX*

Notion: Mary could have participated in Christ's redemptive work immediately (directly, proximately) and mediately (indirectly, remotely).[35] All admit the latter cooperation, in the sense that throughout her life she united her sentiments, prayers and sufferings to those of her divine Son, desiring to be associated with His saving mission out of love for the human race. Disagreement, however, is had concerning the immediate cooperation, that is, whether her merits and satisfactions were accepted by God together with the merits and satisfactions of Christ to bring about the selfsame effect, namely, the restoration of the human race to God's former friendship.[36]

It is only recently that the Popes have turned their attention to this specific prerogative of Mary. Benedict XV (1914—1920) was the first Pope to formulate the doctrine of Mary's Coredemption in unequivocal terms, though he did not use the word "Coredemptrix," stating that she is said to have redeemed the world with Christ in a direct participation in the sacrificial act of Christ, in order to make satisfaction for the sins of the world.[37] Since the definition of the Assumption in 1950, Mariologists with renewed vigor have taken up their pens in defense of Mary under the title of Coredemptrix: Mary is the co-principle of our redemption.[38]

Sacred Scripture and Tradition: It is common knowledge that Sacred Scripture contains no clear and explicit statement to the effect that Our Lady was destined to fulfill a coredemptive mission in behalf of the human race. However, Catholic writers in general agree that this mission is implied in the written word of God. For example, viewing the Protoevangelium in the light of later revelation, one can discern the role of Mary in the redemption of mankind, in that from other premises derived from later revelation one discovers that the Messiah will obtain this victory for the human race, not merely as a descendant of Eve, but as the son of Mary, the immaculately conceived.[39]

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[35] Buening, Ulric, op. cit. 55.

[36] Carol, Juniper B., Our Lady's Coredemption, in Mariology (ed. J. B. Carol) Milwaukee, 1954, II, 378.

[37] Idem, 382.

[38] Buening, Ulric, op. cit., 54.

[39] De Guglielmo, Antonine, O.F.M., The Immortality of Mary in the Light of Sacred Scripture, in First Franciscan National Marian Congress (Studia Mariana, VII) Burlington, 1952, 115.

The Franciscans: Father Juniper Carol has brought forth several hundred authors in his work "De Coredemptione B. V. Mariae, disquisitio positiva" to substantiate the claim that the doctrine of Mary's coredemption is fully endorsed by Catholic Tradition. A synthetic presentation of the available data found in the book is presented in his article: "Our Lady's Coredemption"[40]: The germ-idea embodied in the concrete "New-Eve" expression, found in the early days of the patristic period, underwent a long and, at times, imperceptible process of evolution before it attained to the stage of maturity. In the beginning, and up until the XI century, the Fathers and ecclesiastical writers seem to have considered the doctrine in its more generic and fundamental concept, namely, Our Lady, by supplying her free consent to the redemptive Incarnation, was instrumental in bringing about our spiritual rehabilitation through Christ. The XI century ushers in the period of transition from the implicit to the explicit. It is at this time that Mary's compassion and oblation begin to receive more and more attention, and to be considered as having soteriological value in behalf of the human race: Mary suffered in her heart all that the Most Pure Heart was capable of suffering. But the doctrine as a whole did not reach its peak until the 17th century. It was during this "Golden Age" of Mariology that Our Lady's prerogative, exactly as we profess it today, became the generally accepted teaching among theologians and Catholic writers.

St. Bonaventure's explanation of Mary's part in the work of our Redemption was very similar to that taught today. According to the Doctor, Mary actively and proximately shared in our Redemption during her entire life: "Through her it (the price) was paid for the redemption of the human race." Bonaventure speaks of Mary as being longed for as the liberatrix just as Christ was desired as liberator.[41]

Subsequent scholars have worked on a theological elaboration and scientific systematization of the acquisitions of the past. It is not surprising that the Franciscans should be among the most outstanding proponents of Mary as the Coredemptrix of the human race, because Franciscans are lovers of Christ crucified, and there beneath the Cross was Mary, fulfilling her role as Coredemptrix. In 1630, Roderick of Portillo, a Franciscan, tersely remarked: "There is no doubt that (at the foot of the cross) the Blessed Virgin merited the same thing which her Son merited." A few years later, 1659, the Franciscan Bishop of Arceno, Franciscus Guerra, could calmly refer to this doctrine as "the common opinion of theologians."[42]

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[40] Carol, Juniper B., op. cit., 408.

[41] Schnur, Ward, O.F.M.Cap., Franciscans and Mary Coredemptrix: Franciscan Teaching from St. Bonaventure to St. Lawrence of Brindisi, in Round Table of Franciscan Research 19 (1954) 58.

Nature and modalities of Mary's Coredemption: As regards the nature and modalities of Mary's Coredemption, several opinions have been advanced. The area of its disagreement may be reduced to three: a) as regards the nature of Mary's coredemptive merit, she merited proximately and immediately for us that which Christ merited, with this difference, namely, that while Christ's merits and satisfactions were infinite, self-sufficient and *de condigno ex toto rigore justitiae,* those of our Lady's were finite, totally dependent on the merits and satisfactions of Christ whence they drew all their value, and *de congruo;* b) as regards the nature of Mary's cooperation by way of sacrifice, Our Lady's sacrifice constitutes a sacrificial and sacerdotal act in a true and proper sense; c) as regards the nature of her influence or causality with reference to the redemptive actions of Christ our Redemption depends on Christ's renunciation as a formal element, and on Mary's renunciation as a material element, that is, by surrendering the right she had to protect her Son's life from unjust agressors, she removed an impediment to her Son's sacrificial immolation, and thus furnished the material principle for the redemptive act.[43]

The term "Coredemptrix": In trying to establish the legitimacy of the term "Coredemptrix," Father Carol sustains that the Church has a perfect right to select any term she deems suitable to convey a given doctrine. The present title of Coredemptix, used in the Church for several centuries, has been repeatedly endorsed by the Holy See in recent years. This, in the author's opinion, more than sufficiently warrants its legitimacy. Therefore, the currect doctrine of Mary's direct cooperation in the objective redemption bears the unmistakable mark of a genuinely Catholic truth authentically developed from the original deposit of revelation.[44]

The mind of Pius XII, though he has never employed the term "Coredemptrix" in any of his official documents, is clear from several utterances in this connection: "It was she (Mary) who, always most intimately united with her Son, like a New Eve, offered Him up on Golgotha to the Eternal Father, together with the sacrifice of her maternal rights and love, on behalf of all the children of Adam, stained by the latter's shameful fall."[45]

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[42] Fehring, Nathan, O.F.M.Cap., Franciscans and Mary Coredemptrix: Franciscan theologians to the present, in Round Table of Franciscan Research 19 (1954) 62—63.

[43] Carol, Juniper B., op. cit., 409—416.

[44] Idem, 416—417.

B. *DISPENSER OF ALL GRACES*

Notion: Christ, indeed, fulfilled the office of mediator while on earth by reconciling the human race with His heavenly Father. This mediation, however, did not come to an end on Calvary. The graces He earned for us had yet to be distributed to mankind until the end of time.[46]

Now, Mary's mediation is but a particulation in Christ's own mediation. We have one Mediator and one Mediatrix, but the result of their joint causality is only one mediation. When, therefore, we say that Mary is the dispenser of all grace, we mean that Mary now dispenses every grace to us for she had previously cooperated with Christ in the acquisition of those same graces. Every single grace which God grants to man is given in view and because of Mary's intercession. Hence, theologians will call her the moral instrumental cause of grace, insofar as, while God is the one who grants the grace, yet He does so only when moved by Our Lady's prayers and intercession in our behalf.[47]

Sacred Scripture and Tradition: The Protoevangelium (Gen. 3,15) shows Our Lady as intimately associated with Christ in the whole process of Redemption. Since the actual dispensation of graces is but an aspect of that whole process, it follows that Mary should have her share in it.[48]

As regards the teaching of the early Church the doctrine is at most implied in Mary's role as the Second Eve. The first to use the title "Mediatrix" seems to have been St. Ephrem (373). From the 8th century on, however, the texts become more explicit. The "Ave Maris Stella," existing since the 9th century at the latest, presumed for Mary the power of dispelling all evils and of obtaining all graces. St. Bernardine of Sienna (1444) had this to say: "I do not hesitate to affirm that this same Virgin has a certain jurisdiction over the torrent of all graces . . .;

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[45] L'Osservatore Romano, Dec. 8, 1937, 3. Cf. also: Fehring, Nathan, op. cit., 65; Buening, op. cit., 55.

[46] Carol, Juniper B., Mary, Mediatrix of all graces, in Our Lady's Digest 6 (1952) 419.

[47] Idem.

[48] Idem, Fundamentals of Mariology, New York, 1956, 69.

therefore, all gifts, virtues and graces of the same Holy Spirit are administered through her own hands to whom she wishes, when she wishes, in the manner she wishes, and as much as she wishes."[49]

In his broadcast to the faithful gathered in Fatima in 1946, Pope Pius XII says that just as Mary had been associated with Christ in the work of man's Redemption, so likewise now she is perpetually associated with Him in the distribution of all graces, which flow from that Redemption: "She gave her Son to the agony of redemption and became as a result, the Mother of flesh through which grace has been purchased and communicated to us."[50]

The movement for the definition of Mary's universal mediation originated in Belgium during World War I and specifically under the enthusiastic leadership of the saintly Cardinal Mercier, Archbishop of Malines. The movement, however, received new impetus when Pius XI organized three commissions of theologians in Rome, Belgium and Spain, charging them to make a conscientious and scientific study of this question as a preliminary step toward the desired definition. Today, the Church has approved the feast of Mary's universal mediation, whose text teaches the distribution of all graces by the Blessed Virgin Mary."[51]

The Franciscans: The feast of the Portiuncula necessarily reveals the power of Mary's mediation. Anyone acquainted with Franciscan tradition knows of the apparition of our Lord and His Blessed Mother to St. Francis in the little chapel of St. Mary of the Angels in Assisi. According to this tradition St. Francis petitioned Our Lord, at the suggestion of Mary, to grant full pardon to anyone who would contritely confess his sins and pray in this little Church. Our Lord told Francis to go to His Vicar and make the same request. The then reigning supreme Pontiff, Honorius III, granted the extraordinary indulgence for one day of the year, namely, August 2, the anniversary of the dedication of the Portiuncula. The pontificate of Pius X witnessed the fullfillment of Francis' petition in its entirety and the extension of the indult of Honorius III to every day of the year.[52]

The doctrine of Mary's universal mediation could scarcely be expressed in clearer terms than those found in the prayer which is recited in the various parts of the Franciscan office as well as the Mass for the feast of the dedication of the Portiuncula. In this prayer it is stated as a truth concerning which there is no question, that God desires that men obtain all blessing through His most Blessed Mother: "O God, who hast wished to dispense all favors to men through thy Most Holy Mother." The prayer continues with the petition that through her we may now obtain the pardon of our sins and an abundance of grace, and in the future life be associated with the angels in the possession of heavenly bliss.[53]

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[49] Idem, 69—70.

[50] Stefun, Bonaventure, op. cit., 321.

[51] Carol, Juniper B., Mary Mediatrix of all graces, in Our Lady's Digest 6 (1952) 417.

[52] Baier, David, O.F.M., The Franciscan Office of St. Mary of the Angels and the Mediation of grace, in Orate Fratres 10 (1936) 399.

The liturgy of the Franciscan Order goes hand in hand with its theology. While the doctrine of the universal mediation does not belong to any particular school of theology, yet it seems to stand out in bolder relief in the light of the teaching of the predestination of Christ and His Blessed Mother. Indeed, Mary is Mediatrix because of her role in the redemption of mankind. However, since Christ is mediator of God and man, not only on account of the redemption of the human race, but also and fundamentally on account of His predestination, so also Mary is fundamentally mediatrix of all graces, because of her predestination by God before all creatures as the Mother of Christ and the Queen of the universe. In virtue of His predestination, independently of the redemption, Christ is the primary head of mankind; in virtue of the same divine decree Mary is the secondary head, subordinate to Christ. The same decree, which predestined her to the exalted dignity of mother of Christ, raised her to the office of mediatrix for the rest of mankind.[54]

Art. 5

DEATH OF MARY

History tells us nothing about the time and circumstances of Our Lady's death. Sacred Scripture is also silent on these points. Catholics, however, from time immemorial, have universally believed that Mary underwent natural death at the close of her earthly career.[55]

Sacred Scripture: It is well known that there exists no record of Mary's death or translation from this earth in Holy Writ. However, a brief survey of pertinent Biblical texts makes it clear that Sacred Scripture teaches: a) death is the punishment for sin; and b) all men must die. But it may be asked whether the law governing the universality of death should be understood in an absolute or moral sense? We know that there are some passages in the Bible which would appear at least to contain exception to this universal law, as, for example, the case of Henoch and Elias, and those living at the time of the Parousia.

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[53] Idem. 400.

[54] Idem, 402.

[55] Carol, Juniper B., Fundamentals of Mariology, New York, 1956, 167.

It seems then that the universality of the law must be accepted in a moral sense. Concerning Mary, one thing is certain from the doctrine of the Bible: Mary did not have to undergo death. If she did, and there is no record either of her death or of her escape from death, it was because of a divine plan with regard to her. But no such plan is offered by the Bible. Therefore, if we are to look for a solution, it must be found in the other source of divine revelation, namely Tradition.[56]

Tradition: All the great Schoolmen taught that Mary died. This was but a logical consequence of their denial of the Immaculate Conception in the sense in which it was defined by Pope Pius IX. After the definition of the Immaculate Conception, however, the question of whether or not Our Lady died gradually became a subject of wide theological discussion and is today one of the most widely disputed Mariological problems.

The Franciscans: The position of the early Franciscan School may be summarized in the following four points: a) without abandoning the Augustinian theory entirely, the School advanced a new concept of original sin drawn from St. Anselm. It is made to consist primarily in the loss of the "iustitia orginalis." b) in consequence of this theory of sin, the immortality of innocent Adam depends primarily on some power in the soul, rather than on the effects produced in the body by the tree of life; c) death is considered as a punishment due to man that arises from the lack of orginal justice and the loss of "vis contentiva" of the soul; d) there is no application made to Our Lady by the School, because the doctrine on original justice is not sufficiently developed.[57]

Later Scholastics, as Matthew of Aquasparta, explicitly state that Christ did not have the gift of original justice as found in Adam; therefore, had He not be slain in early manhood, He would gradually have grown old and come at last to death. From such principles, it is clearly evident that Matthew would not have taught the immortality of Mary.

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[56] De Guglielmo, Antonine, op. cit., 33—49.

[57] Brady, Ignatius, The Relation between Sin and Death according to Mediaeval Theologians, in First Franciscan National Marian Congress (Studia Mariana, VII) Burlington, 1952, 54.

In fact, he very explicitly declares that she did die, though soon assumed into glory in body and soul. And her death is attributed to the "conditio humanae naturae."[58]

Scotus, on the other hand, proposes a new theory of original justice. He denies that original justice affected Adam's immortality. Adam, indeed, would not have died; but, this prerogative is simply to be explained by saying that man would have been transferred to Paradise before death would overtake him. For, any physical agent would eventually become worn and debilitated through its very action, and as a result there would follow a constant gradual loss of energy, until even in Adam the physical system would have worn out and death would have resulted. Therefore, lest this happen, God would have transferred him to heaven after a period on earth. In glory, the body would not have corrupted.

But how, then, is death a punishment for sin? Simply in this, says Scotus, that God would allow the gradual corruption actually to take place, and would not transfer man to heaven without death. In state of innocence, man, indeed, had the same "potentia moriendi" we now possess, but God would have prevented its actualization by such a translation; this would have been the ordinary and regular; now such a transfer would be miraculous. Applying this to Mary, she possessed an intrinsic mortality, by means of her very human nature.[59]

Today we have diametrically opposed views on the death of Mary supported by outstanding Mariologists. The most outspoken proponents of the thesis that Mary did not die are G. M. Roschini and T. Gallus. The Franciscan, Father Charles Balic, on the other hand, asserts that "the terminus a quo of the Assumption is the death of Our Lady, the terminus ad quem is the glorification of her body in heaven."[60] Father J. F. Bonnefoy, another Franciscan, goes so far as to state that "the death of the most Holy Virgin may be considered as historically proved and explicitly revealed; and as such it may be the subject of a dogmatic definition. There is no reason why it should not be."[61]

It is little wonder, then, that Cardinal Pizzardo, the Secretary of the Holy Office, in an address on the occasion of the First International Mariological Congress in Rome, 1950, referred to the question of the end of the life of the Blessed Virgin as a very obscure problem, and one which demands further study and clarification.

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[58] Idem, 75.

[59] Idem, 77—78.

[60] De Definibilitate Assumptionis B. V. Mariae, Romae, 1945, 42.

[61] Définibilité de l'Assomption, in Congrès Marial du Puy-en-Velay, Paris, 1950, 241.

All theologians agree, of course, that Mary was not subject to death as a penalty for sin. The reasons brought forth by those who maintain that Our Blessed Mother actually died may be reduced to the following two: a) conformity to Christ: As the Mother of the passible and mortal Redeemer from whom He took His mortal flesh, Mary, too, had to be passible and mortal. This was the will of God for her although her death was not a penalty for sin but a condition of her human nature; b) Mary's role of Coredemptrix: Due to the teaching of the Second Council of Orange (529): "if anyone shall say that (corporal) death alone, which is the punishment of sin, and not sin itself . . . was transmitted through one man to the entire human race, he attributes an injustice to God," many theologians who assert that Mary died claim she had a right to immortality, but, like her son, freely accepted death in order that she might coredeem the human race together with Him.[62]

The Question of Mary's Death After the Munificentissimus Deus:

Authors are divided into three groups: a) some few (Roschini, Gallus) believe that the theory of Mary's death has lost most (if not all) of its force in the light of the new papal documents. They point out that the Pope not only did not define Mary's death, but whenever he mentions it in the bull, he is referring to someone's views, not to his own; b) others (Bonnefoy, Cuervo) feel that the thesis of Mary's death has been clearly endorsed (though not defined) in the new bull. They reason that in one paragraph of the document the Pope states that the faithful, under the guidance of their legitimate shepherds, did not hesitate to admit that Our Lady had actually died. Moreover, most of the witnesses enumerated by the Pope in favor of the Assumption mention also Mary's death. Hence, the Pope implicitly, at least, endorses their views. c) others, with Balic, claim that the Holy Father purposely left the question of Mary's death in the same status as before. The bull, therefore, neither endorses nor rejects the thesis that Our Lady died.[63]

As a final consideration, let it be said that whether Mary died or was assumed immediately into heaven, it redounds in the final analysis to her greater glory. If she died and was assumed into heaven body and soul, her glory lies in the fact that she was the first after Christ to be gloriously resurrected from the dead. If she did not die, but was assumed into heaven by a special act of Christ her son, then her glory flows from the fact that she was permitted to enter into celestial beatitude without experiencing the bitterness of death.

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[62] Carol, Juniper B., The Immaculate Conception and Mary's Death, Dayton, Ohio, The Marian Library, Marian Reprint, n. 27, 1954, 1—8.

[63] Idem, Fundamentals of Mariology, New York, 1956, 179—181.

Art. 6

ASSUMPTION OF MARY INTO HEAVEN

Notion: On November 1, 1950, Pope Pius XII, in his Apostolic Constitution "Munificentissimus Deus," defined that "the Immaculate Mother of God, the ever Virgin Mary, having completed the course of her earthly life was assumed body and soul into heavenly glory." The glorification, then, of the flesh, which will take place for mankind only at the end of time, was granted to Mary at the conclusion of her earthly life, as it was for Jesus; but with this exception, that Jesus arose from the tomb and ascended into heaven by His own power, Mary by the power of her Son.[64]

Tradition: Just three years before the definition, however, Father Martin Jugie's, *La mort et l'Assomption de la Sainte Vierge: Etude historico-doctrinale*, was literally a bombshell capable of shattering the arguments advanced by theologians in favor of Mary's resurrection and bodily assumption into heaven, He seemed to have emphasized the necessity of positive and evident historical data reaching back to the very first centuries for the bodily Assumption of Mary.[65] However, it must be noted that in order to establish the continuity of a given doctrine throughout the ages it is not necessary that we possess an uninterrupted chain of explicit testimonies linking our times with the apostolic period. Since the custody and infallible interpretation of the deposit of faith has been entrusted by God to a *living* organism which is the Church, and since the Church of today is the same moral person it was in the first and second century, it follows logically that whatever the Church of today holds and teaches was also held and taught by the Church, at least implicitly, from the very beginning, and therefore, pertains to the original deposit of revelation.[66]

Too much stress cannot be placed on the fact that the living Magisterium of the Church, as exemplified by the Catholic Episcopate, has exactly the same divine assistance which it had in the beginning. And since the Catholic Episcopate believes Our Lady's Assumption to be of faith, as has been manifested by their petitions to the Holy See, we can only conclude that this doctrine forms an integral part of the original deposit of revelation, even in the absense of the so-called "historical evidence." Pius XII himself, on November 1 of the Holy Year, 1950, referred to the petitions received from the whole Church as well as the answers of the bishops to his Encyclical "Deiparae Virginis"[67] in the following manner: "This outstanding agreement of the Catholic prelates and the faithful . . . by itself and in an entirely certain and infallible way, manifested this privilege as a truth revealed by God."[68]

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[64] Idem, The Definability of Mary's Assumption, in The American Ecclesiastical Review 418 (1948) 161.

[65] Idem, Fundamentals of Mariology, New York, 1956, 186.

[66] Idem, The Definability of Mary's Assumption, in The American Ecclesiastical Review 418 (1948) 162—164.

The Franciscans: The real origin of the Assumptionist Movement in the Order of Friars Minor as an organized effort dates from July 19, 1946, when the Very Reverend Valentine Schaaf, Minister General, in a letter addressed to his religious throughout the world, invited them to redouble their zeal to hasten the day of the solemn definition of Mary's assumption. After reminding the brethren that by following the teaching of the Venerable Duns Scotus the Order had already in earliest times become the advocate and defender not only of the Immaculate Conception, but, from its very inception had also fought for the doctrine of the glorious Assumption of the Holy Mother of God, which follows from the Immaculate Conception as an effect from a cause, he asked that the Friars thoroughly investigate every argument possible by which the doctrine of the Assumption of Mary might be proved to be contained in the deposit of faith. Thereupon the Minister General enjoined that each Provincial with his Definitorium, and every University and House of theological studies of the Order send petitions to the Holy Father signifying their desire that the corporeal Assumption of the Blessed Virgin be defined as a dogma of faith.[69]

We can hardly speak of a "tradition" in favor of Mary's bodily Assumption within the exegetical works of Franciscans. The references are too few to justify such a tradition.[70] Yet, the very same exegetes firmly believed the fact of the Blessed Mother's Assumption and celestial glory, and they crystalized this belief in popular sermons and devotional works. Among these, we may mention St. Anthony of Padua, who simply asserted: "The Blessed Virgin Mary was assumed into Heaven." St. Lawrence's "Mariale" rules out that Mary's Assumption is due to her being the Mother of God; it rather is because Mary chose the part of grace and virtue in this life that she was rewarded with the best part of glory in the next which will not be taken away from her forever (Luke 10, 42). Her assumption, then, is the reward of merit, of Mary's intrinsic worth.[71]

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[67] Of the 1232 residential Bishops, 1210 believed that the Assumption could be defined; 16 hesitated concerning the opportuneness of the definition; and only 6 doubted that the Assumption could be defined. Cf.: Carol, Juniper B., op. cit., 185.

[68] Idem, 165.

[69] Ohlmann, Ralph, O.F.M., The Assumptionist Movement and the Franciscan Marian Congresses, in Studia Mariana 7 (1952) 24.

[70] May, Eric, O.F.M.Cap., The Assumption in the Exegetical Works of Franciscans, in First Franciscan National Marian Congress (Studia Mariana, VII) Burlington, 1952, 285—301.

Contemporary friars, such as Lawrence of Fonzo, David of Sousa, Jean Bonnefoy, Dominic Unger, Juniper Carol, and others, examining the Bible in the light of recent interest in the Assumption, argue most powerfully for Mary's bodily translation into Heaven on the basis of an implicit revelation in Sacred Scripture. The texts on which these modern exegetes lean most heavily in proposing a scriptural proof are: the Protogospel (Gen. 3, 15), the Angelic Salutation (Luke 1, 28), and the vision of the woman crowned with stars in Apoc. 12, 1[72].

The Assumption of Mary is not only a formal recognition of her unique dignity; it is also the exemplar and in a certain sense the pledge of our own: "She, by an entirely unique privilege completely overcame sin by her Immaculate Conception, and as a result she was not subject to the law of remaining in the corruption of the grave, and she did not have to wait until the end of time for the redemption of her body."[73]

Art. 7

QUEENSHIP OF MARY

In 1949 Pope Pius XII granted to the Franciscan Order the feast of "Mary, Queen of the Friars Minor." This official declaration came as a climax to the rich, living Marian tradition in the Franciscan Order.[74]

Sacred Scripture and Tradition: Sacred Scripture nowhere expressly calls Mary Queen. Yet, the most important biblical passage in support of her Queenship is to be found in Gen. 3, 15, where Mary is formally (though implicitly) introduced as Christ's intimate associate in the work of the Redemption. Since it was precisely the Redemption that gave Christ the title of King by right of conquest, it follows that Mary, too, in her capacity as Coredemptrix, shares Christ's kingship also by right of conquest. In the New Testament, Luke 1, 30—35 is often adduced in favor of our thesis, for the Angel Gabriel announces to Mary that she is to become the Mother of King who will reign forever.[75]

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[71] Sonntag, Nathaniel, O.F.M.Cap., The Assumption of Mary according to St. Lawrence of Brindisi, in First Franciscan National Marian Congress (Studia Mariana, VII) Burlington, 1952, 269—282.

[72] May, Eric, op. cit., 301; De Guglielmo, Antonine, Mary in the Protoevangelium, in Catholic Biblical Quarterly 14 (1952) 115.

[73] Pope Pius XII, Munificentissimus Deus.

[74] Schmidt, Firmin, Mary's Universal Queenship in Franciscan Theologians, in Regina Immaculata, Romae, 1955, 83.

It was around the fifth century when Mary began to be expressly called Queen. By the time St. Francis laid the foundation of his Order the fact of Mary's Queenship was universally acknowledged. The little chapel was dedicated to Mary, Queen of the Angels. However, the true significance of her royal dignity and the extent of her authority were many years away from the ultimate clarification. It will certainly redound to the glory of the Franciscan Order to have been an instrument in God's providence to help place Mary on the royal pedestal that was assigned to her by God Himself[76].

The Franciscans: An uninterrupted chain of Franciscan writers from St. Anthony to the Franciscan theologians of the 20th century bears witness to the glorious Franciscan tradition concerning Mary's Queenship. St. Anthony sees in the Divine Maternity the foundation of every prerogative, including Mary's Queenship. St. Bonaventure, in his second sermon on the Assumption, reveals a clear grasp of the meaning of Mary's Queenship, when he speaks of her as "the glorious Empress who was exalted above the choirs of the heavenly citizens." St. Lawrence of Brindisi teaches that Mary is Queen by reason of the fact that she is God's bride and God's mother, the King's consort; by reason of her divine predestination and conquest.[77] A new impetus came in the person of Duns Scotus. A careful analysis of Scotistic thought will reveal that Scotus defended not merely the Immaculate Conception but rather the Immaculate Queen. Scotus championed the doctrine of Christ's absolute primacy. The Incarnation was willed primarily to give glory to God. Everything in the universe was created in view of the Incarnation, and not vice versa.

This concept shed a bright light on Christ's universal dominion over all creatures. It shows Christ as truly King of the Universe. Furthermore, the doctrine of absolute primacy and universal kingship has a direct bearing on Mary's royal status: if Christ was predestined absolutely and independently of sin, then Mary was too; if Christ is the Universal End, Exemplar, and Mediator of all creatures, then Mary is also the End,

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[75] Smith, Eustace J., O.F.M., The Scriptural Basis for Mary's Queenship, in Marian Studies 4 (1953) 115.

[76] Schmidt, Firmin, op. cit., 86.

[77] Unger, Dominic, The Heavenly Queenship of God's Virgin Mother according to St. Lawrence of Brindisi, in Collectanea Franciscana 24 (1954) 307.

Exemplar and Mediator of all creatures, but in a secondary role. Recognizing Christ as the King of the universe, Scotus could not help but find Mary next to Christ as Queen. The Most Rev. Leonard Bello, Minister General of the Friars Minor, while speaking of Mary's universal mediation, said: "According to the opinion of Blessed Scotus regarding the motive of the Incarnation, the Blessed Virgin is predestined before all others unconditionally as the Queen and the Sovereign of the universe, and she is most intimately associated with the royal dignity and office of Christ the King."[78]

In the 15th century St. Bernardine of Sienna shed new glory on the Franciscan tradition in the field of Mariology. Basing himself on the text of the Apoc. 12, 1, he explains that Mary is our Queen, enjoying universal jurisdiction in the realm of grace.[79]

St. Lawrence of Brindisi, popular preacher of the 16th and 17th centuries, whom Roschini has called "the greatest Mariologist of his time," bases Mary's Queenship on her divine maternity and coredemption: "The Virgin Mother of God is a Queen of such a type and nature that her kingdom is no less than that of God, nor her sovereignty less than that of Christ."[80]

Concerning the fact of Mary's Queenship, all theologians agree that she is Queen in the metaphorical sense, because of her unsurpassed sanctity and her consequent proximity with God; she holds the highest possible rank, primacy and dignity in God's creation. She is also queen in the proper-relative sense of the term, insofar a she shares the dignity and office of a King in her capacity as the King's consort or as the King's Mother. Wherefore, she has a right to that title both as Mother of the King of all creation (Christ), and as His intimate consort in His mission of leading all the members of that Kingdom to their common end.[81] Further, she is Queen by reason of the fact that she formally and actively cooperated with the King in the work of the Redemption.[82] Just as Christ is King because of the Hypostatic Union and the added title of conquest (Redemption), so Mary is Queen because of her divine maternity and role as Coredemptrix. In other words, she is Queen by divine relationship and by right of conquest: "Jesus is King throughout all eternity by nature and by right of conquest; through Him, with Him and subordinated to Him, Mary is Queen by grace, by divine relationship, by right of conquest and by singular election. And her kingdom is as vast as that of her Son and God, since nothing is excluded from her dominion."[83]

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[78] Schmidt, Firmin, op. cit., 91—98.

[79] Idem, 99.

[80] Idem, 102.

[81] Wilhelm, Wilfred, O.F.M.Cap., Father Frederick Faber on the Queenship of Mary, in Marianum 16 (1954) 479.

[82] Carol, Juniper B., Fundamentals of Mariology, New York 1946, 75.

Extent and nature of Mary's Queenship: The commonly accepted views on the extent and nature of Mary's Queenship may be summarized as follows: a) Our Blessed Lady's dominion is as vast as that of her Son. Her Queenship is co-extensive with His Kingdom. Hence, Mary is Queen of all rational creation. b) This Queenship refers primarily to the supernatural order, the order of grace. Secondarily, Mary's Queenship is also temporal, even as Christ's Kingship, though like her son, she, while retaining the right to temporal powers, voluntarily reliquished the exercise of that right.[84]

Mary participates in the legislative power of her Son in a unique way. In the Kingdom of Christ, law is primarily grace itself. Since Mary has a certain jurisdiction over the treasury of grace and since she is the dispenser of all grace, it follows that she shares directly Christ's legislative power. As regards her judicial and executive powers, these are not too easily determined. Authors will speak of an indirect or analogous power, by reason of the fact that since she is the dispenser of grace, her queenly influence necessarily (even though indirectly) has its effect on the manner in which the law (of grace) of this kingdom is applied and is fruitful.[85]

In conclusion, we would like to add that the various devotions to Mary as Queen of the Universe reveal an even deeper and more explicit understanding of the nature and extent of her Queenship. The solemn definition of the Assumption, moreover, has influenced a special impetus in this doctrine. Certainly, the signposts of Mary's Queenship have already made their appearance. It remains only for our Spiritual Father to determine the opportuneness of the definition of Mary's Queenship.[86]

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[83] Radio broadcast of Pius XII to the Catholic pilgrim gathered at Fatima on May 13, 1946. Cf. also: Schmidt, Firmin, Our Lady's Queenship in the Light of Quas Primas, in Marian Studies 4 (1953) 120; Carol, Juniper B., Mary's Universal Queenship, in Our Lady's Digest 8 (1953) 8.

[84] Carol, Juniper B., Fundamentals of Mariology, New York, 1956, 80—81.

[85] Schmidt, Firmin, op. cit., 127.

[86] Idem, 132.

Indeed, the Franciscan soul is by nature a Marian soul, for the Franciscans throughout the world, true to the spirit of their Seraphic Founder who dedicated his Order to the heavenly Queen of the Angels have remained steadfast in their filial love and devotion to the Queen of the Order of Friars Minor. Even in this newly-founded land of ours, they have played a major role in the ever more glorious fulfillment of the prophecy of Our Lady: "Behold, henceforth all generations shall call me blessed."

NORBERT DE AMATO O. F. M.

Immaculate Conception
Province

The following *Appendix* contains the various scientific writings of American Franciscans, published in official form for public consumption.

APPENDIX

Affelt, Francis, O.F.M., The Marian Doctrine of Bernardine of Siena, in Franciscan Educational Conference 3 (1956) 196—222.

Ambrozic, Bernard, O.F.M., Concerning Dr. Henry's and Rev. Dr. Carol's Discussion (on Mary's Virginity), in Homiletic and Pastoral Review 54 (1954) 636—638.

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*Bonnefoy, John F., O.F.M., The Predestination of Our Blessed Lady, in Mariology (ed. J. B. Carol) II, Milwaukee, 1957, 154—176.

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*Buytaert, Eligius M., O.F.M., The Immaculate Conception in the writings of Ockham, in Franciscan Studies 10 (1950) 149—163.

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The Holy See and the Title of Co-redemptrix, in Homiletic and Pastoral Review 37 (1937) 746—748;

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Utrum Beatae Virginis Corredemptio sit in Sacra Scriptura formaliter revelata, in Marianum 1 (1939) 283—326;

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De Corredemptione Beatae Virginis Mariae apud Scriptores saeculi XVII, Civitas Vaticana, 1950;

De Corredemptione Beatae Virginis Mariae disquisitio positiva, Civitas Vaticana, 1950;

The Apostolic Constitution "Munificentissimus Deus" and Our Bl. Lady's Co-redemption, in The American Ecclesiastical Review 125 (1951) 255—273;

Mary, Mediatrix of all graces, in Our Lady's Digest 6 (1952) 417—426;

Our Lady's Co-redemption in the Marian Literature of Nineteenth Century America, in Marianum 14 (1952) 49—63;

Mary's Universal Queenship, in Our Lady's Digest 8 (1953) 5—10;

The Immaculate Conception and Mary's Death, Dayton, Ohio, The Marian Library, 1954;

The Definition of the Immaculate Conception. Reflections on a Centenary, in Our Lady's Digest 9 (1954) 108—111;

On Mary's Virginity in partu, in The Homiletic and Pastoral Review 54 (1954) 446—447;
Our Lady's Immunity from the death of sin, in Marian Studies 6 (1955) 164—168;
On "Dangerous Marian Year Reefs," in The Homiletic and Pastoral Review 55 (1955) 698—699;
Mary's Co-redemption, in R. J. Truce, In Praise of Mary, St. Meinard, Grail Publications, 1955, 108—120;
Fundamentals of Mariology, New York, 1956;
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Our Lady's Coredemption, in Mariology (ed. J. B. Carol) II, Milwaukee, 1957, 377—425;
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Fehring, Nathan, O.F.M.Cap., Franciscans and Mary Co-redemptrix, Franciscan Theologians to the Present, in Round Table of Franciscan Research 19 (1954) 61—67.

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF ST. BONAVENTURE — A CONTROVERSY

INTRODUCTION

In the relatively recent past, there has been a reawakening of interest in St. Bonaventure, the great thirteenth-century Franciscan. As a consequence, several important problems have been debated regarding the proper understanding of his philosophy and regarding his place in Christian thought. It will be the purpose of this article to present some phases of this controversy.

The discussion will be limited to the views of three men whose works on Bonaventure are especially worthy of attention. They are Etienne Gilson, Fernand Van Steenberghen, and Patrick Robert. Such a limitation is deemed advisable since the above-mentioned have engaged from time to time in a three-way discussion on the more important problems of Bonaventure's philosophy. Numerous references to other critics may be found in the writings of these three scholars.

The controversy has centered for the most part around three main areas. I hesitate to call them questions, since each one is very difficult to isolate and formulate. With some trepidation, then, I would set down the following problems or groups of problems:

1. What is the nature of Bonaventure's philosophy? Does he admit a "separate philosophy"? What is the proper object of his philosophy? Is it really a philosophy at all, or is it rather a theology? What does he mean by Christian Wisdom?

2. What is the attitude of Bonaventure to Aristotle and Aristotelianism? Was it sympathetic or hostile? Can his thought be characterized as basically Aristotelian or Augustinian?

3. What was the real issue behind the Averroist controversy? Was it Augustinian thought vs an Aristotelian, therefore separate, philosophy? Or was it Christian thought, including schools differing among themselves on some issues, against a common enemy represented by the rationalistic and naturalistic extremes of Averroism?

The above divisions are put down merely as guides for any approach to St. Bonaventure. This is not to say, therefore, that the three men whose works are under discussion have set them down in precisely the same way, much less that they have followed the same order.

In the interest of simplicity (if such is attainable in so complex a matter), and as a starting point for discussion, we shall try to handle the following two questions: (1) Did St. Bonaventure admit the possibility of a „separate philosophy"? (2) Can his thought be characterized as basically Aristotelian or basically Augustinian? It will soon become evident that several of the other questions stated above will inevitably become involved in our treatment.

Our procedure will be to discuss the views of Gilson as presented in his famous work on the philosophy of St. Bonaventure,* and then to review the reactions of Van Steenberghen and Robert. Though in the course of this article much attention will be given to the criticisms of Gilson's position, it is actually a tribute to his great volume on Bonaventure. For any analysis of the Seraphic Doctor's thought could hardly be made without giving serious attention to Gilson's scholarly work.

I. THE PROBLEM OF A SEPARATE PHILOSOPHY

Gilson answers this problem by stating that St. Bonaventure consciously rejected the possibility of a separate philosophy, that is, a philosophy distinct from theology, independent of revelation, having its own object and method. Gilson arrives at this conclusion from two approaches: (1) from an analysis of the Averroist controversy, and (2) from an analysis of Bonaventure's view regarding the place of human knowledge in the whole context of Christian wisdom.[1]

In Gilson's opinion, the Averroist controversy meant different things to different people. For St. Thomas, the whole problem consisted in a refutation of Averroism in the name of the principles of Aristotle himself. For the Aristotelians in general it was a metaphysical error which had presented a danger to Christian truth, and hence the battle was joined on the ground of pure philosophy. The contemporary Thomist, too, looks at it from this viewpoint.

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* Etienne Gilson, *The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure*, trans. Illtyd Trethowan (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1938). The original French edition appeared in 1924 (Paris: Vrin), and in 1943 a second revised edition without any significant changes.

[1] For the most part, these two problems have been treated by scholars as though they were almost independent questions. This is true of Gilson and Robert who first deal with Averroism and only later take up the nature of Bonaventure's philosophy, its object, method, etc. It is my feeling that the real issue behind the Averroist controversy can be determined only after the other problems have been settled. It is also my suspicion that the above-mentioned writers were nevertheless influenced in their discussion of Averroism by their own position regarding Bonaventure's philosophy. Had the awareness of this dependence been more explicit, their treatment of Averroism would perhaps have been more satisfactory. In spite of my own personal views, and since this article is primarily the presentation of a controversy, I shall follow the order of the disputants and treat Averroism first. I shall hopefully leave to more competent hands the task of starting out from a doctrinal analysis of Bonaventure's approach to philosophy as means of shedding light on the nature of the Averroist dispute.

In reality, the issue was much larger. For the Augustinians, it was Christian wisdom itself that was threatened, and they attempted to refute Averroism by denying the possibility of a philosophy independent of revelation. In other words, it was not this or that philosophical doctrine that was at stake, but the very notion of philosophy.[2]

In support of his position, Gilson appeals to the works of St. Bonaventure. Already in the *Commentary on the Sentences* the latter had seen the danger, and in this work he rejected the notion of a separate philosophy over which theology would have no jurisdiction. The *Christus unus omnium Magister* was directed against the invasion of theology by pagan philosophers. Here Christ is portrayed as our one Master and hence true wisdom is given neither by Aristotle nor by Plato. It can be attained only with the help of revelation and this procedure is represented by St. Augustine.

The *Collationes de septem donis Spiritus Sancti* are contemporary with the dispute between Siger of Brabant and St. Thomas. The eighth lecture examines the errors of the Averroists. But again, according to Gilson, the issue concerns the general problem of human knowledge. This is evident in the fourth lecture, for example, which contains "a sharp criticism of every philosophy which would claim to be self-sufficient."[3]

The *Collationes in Hexaëmeron* likewise take up the problem of a separate philosophy. Bonaventure is anxious to maintain peace, reluctant to enter personally into the conflict. Consequently he directs his words to the spiritually-minded that he might draw them from *sapientia mundana* to *sapientia christiana*. The centre is Christ and hence the philosophy of St. Albert the Great and St. Thomas was necessarily in error for, "while it situated Christ in the centre of theology, it did not situate Him in the centre of philosophy."[4]

For Bonaventure, curiosity as to the things of nature is reprehensible; Scripture alone is the true source of knowledge. To help us in the interpretation of Scripture, we must have recourse to the Fathers, and to interpret the latter we must go to the Summas of the theologians. But in the Summas lies danger since they use the language of the philosophers and thereby draw us to read the works from which the philosophical expressions are derived.

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[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 28—29.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 30.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 31.

Finally, it is in these lectures that we find the arguments which led to the condemnation of 1277.

> If St. Bonaventure's weighty strictures upon the legitimacy of certain theses of St. Thomas found their echo in the condemnation uttered by Etienne Tempier, it was because in the eyes of the Bishop of Paris as in the eyes of the Seraphic Doctor a fundamental error vitiates St. Thomas' doctrine. That error was the belief in philosophy as a separate science.[5]

Gilson now attempts to establish the same point from an analysis of Bonaventure's view regarding the place of human thought in the context of Christian wisdom. Though Gilson writes a work on the *philosophy* of Bonaventure, it is quite clear that in his opinion this philosophy can be understood only in terms of a world-vision which is *theological*. According to this viewpoint, Bonaventure, like Augustine his master, would maintain that Christian thought considers man in his historical setting, that is, man elevated to a supernatural destiny from which he fell and to which he had to be restored. Man's vocation as a Christian, then, goes far beyond a merely natural knowledge and love. It consists ultimately in the vision of God.

Under the influence of his Franciscan spirituality, Bonaventure adopted as the directive influence of his whole doctrine a total adherence to God by the savour of contemplation.[6] The ultimate goal of knowledge is ecstatic contemplation which is the highpoint of the *Itinerarium mentis in Deum*, and in our human experience it is the one thing that comes closest to the experience of the elect in heaven.

> It is this Divine contemplation that St. Bonaventure places at the very centre of the Franciscan ideal; and consequently the peace towards which all his thought is to be directed and to direct us is rightly to be called ecstacy. To follow the way of the soul towards God means to strive with all one's strength to live a human life as close as possible to that of the blessed in heaven.[7]

This ideal can be reached only after careful preparation which includes penance, the long-continued exercise of love of neighbor, and constant meditation and prayer. At the basis of prayer is the desire for Christ — "a desire intimate, profound, unceasing, a cry of the soul to

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[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 33—34.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 68.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 74.

God, the necessary condition of ascent to Him."[8] All this must be accompanied by the practice of the virtues by which the intellect and affections are purified. Finally, there is the constant need of grace.

The goal of man, moreover, is not something which is imposed from without. There is in the human soul the restless desire to know all that is intelligible and to possess all that is good. The soul of man is made for the infinite and no merely finite good is capable of satisfying it.

So far, we find nothing which is peculiar to St. Bonaventure, or which would indicate any difference of outlook regarding philosophy. Allowing for the specific influence of Franciscan spirituality, one could say that in his view of man St. Bonaventure is in full accord with the whole stream of Christian tradition.

However, it is when Gilson begins to discuss the place of human knowledge in this ideal that we discern an attempt to attribute to Bonaventure a viewpoint which makes him differ sharply from his mediaeval contemporaries. In a transition which is a bit startling in its abruptness, Gilson introduces the problem:

> Now since our knowledge always tends beyond each finite object towards some other object, and since our desire always tends beyond each finite good towards another good, we shall never find in what is finite our completion, our achievement and our peace. For him who can see, all philosophy is bound up in this initial experience: *nata est anima ad percipiendum bonum infinitum, quod Deus est, ideo in eo solo debet quiescere et eo frui:* it remains for us to explicate it. Before setting about this task, one question forces itself upon our attention: does this philosophy exist already?[9]

This, to my mind, is a key text for the understanding of Gilson's whole approach. It indicates that in his view Bonaventure's thought is exclusively theological, that it looks upon man's destiny as an unbroken line moving on to a supernatural goal, that all knowledge must be judged according to its ability to achieve that goal. One can see immediately what Gilson's attitude will be towards a "separate philosophy." We have noted it already when we discussed Gilson's treatment of the Averroist controversy. Here, proceeding from a different starting-point, he will arrive at the same conclusion.

Gilson goes on to show how Bonaventure subjects previous philosophies to the test. Inherent in the notion of a true philosophy is the doctrine of exemplary cause. Without this, reason stops short and makes things autonomous instead of going beyond them to God. This was true of Aristotle who never reached the notion of exemplary cause, nor consequently the notion of Providence and the ends of the world.

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[8] *Ibid.*, p. 75.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 89. cf. I *Sen.*, d. 1, a. 3, q. 2, concl., T. I, p. 40; *Sermo II de reb. theol.* 9, T. V, p. 541—542. All references to the works of St. Bonaventure pertain to the *Opera Omnia* (Quaracchi: 1882—1902).

Plato, however, assisted by grace according to the times in which he lived, was able to proceed to the knowledge of exemplary cause. Yet even the Platonic tradition, since it was without revelation, inevitably led to error; in metaphysics, since reason can never arrive at the notion of a God Who is one and three, infinitely powerful and infinitely good; in logic, since man cannot arrive at true notions of the useful and harmful with which logic deals; in ethics, since man cannot know the ways by which his goal is achieved.[10]

According to Gilson, then, Bonaventure will not admit a separate philosophy as legitimate even though it may arrive at some limited truth about God. For what is lacking to it destroys the validity of what is attained.[11] Without the light of faith, every philosopher is doomed to error. This is true not only in what he says about God, but also in what he says about the world of things. For if things are not related to God, or to a God known by revelation, then the whole system of knowledge is vitiated.

> For St. Bonaventure, . . . reason is only competent in its own field if it keeps its gaze fixed upon truths beyond its competence. As this works out in practice, there is *no* field that belongs to reason alone: and with that, St. Bonaventure turns his back upon the modern separation of philosophy from revelation.[12]
>
> Every science deals with things or the symbols of things. But if we consider the mass of our knowledge of things and their symbols absolutely and in themselves, it breaks up into a multiplicity of particular and diverse sciences: and this is how pure philosophy sees it. But if we consider the mass of our knowledge from the point of view of faith and theology, all these diverse departments of knowledge receive a unity which of themselves they had not and find their place in the one single Knowledge. Just as all beings are ranged under one single Being and we have one single knowledge in one single book, so likewise we have one single science of all the signs of things and all the things signified inasmuch as they are related to God, alpha and omega; and that science is Theology.[13]

In this, the system of St. Bonaventure differs profoundly from that of St. Thomas. The latter admits a separate philosophy, even if subordinate to theology; it is sufficient within its own sphere. Although it would be difficult to know all the truths of philosophy without the aid of faith, it would not be theoretically impossible.[14] St. Bonaventure, on the other hand, is shown to be resolutely opposed to such a philosophy.

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[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 98—101.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 104.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 114.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 116. cf. I *Sen.*, proem., q. 1, ad 3—4, T. I, p. 8.

Having singled out those elements of Gilson's treatment which interest us here, we are now in a position to present the views of Robert and Van Steenberghen in opposition to these elements. Following Gilson's order, we shall first take up Robert's position regarding the Averroist controversy.[15] According to Robert, the real issue has not always been accurately understood.

> For reasons which it would take too long to detail, the doctrinal struggles which led to the Church's intervention in 1270 and 1277 are usually described by authors as having been a fight for intellectual hegemony between the Augustinian Neo-Platonism of the traditional past and a new and conquering Aristotelianism that wanted nothing so much as to serve the faith and organize theology with scientific method at last. The struggle gradually became that. But when it did, it was only a split among partisans of the same cause. And it did not reach its full intensity until after the common enemy had been definitely overcome. The main struggle was more serious. It was not a disagreement over the conceptions of philosophy equally acceptable to the Catholic conscience; it was a struggle between Christian thought itself and a pagan rationalism incompatible with any supernatural belief. Latin Averroism was really a medieval Modernism; it left no point of Christian faith or morals untouched, as a glance at the 219 propositions condemned by Etienne Tempier in 1277 would show.[16]

According to Robert, St. Bonaventure was the first to point out the dangers of Averroism. He attacked it as early as the *Commentary on the Sentences*, at least four years before St. Albert the Great's *De unitate intellectus contra Averroem* and six years before the *Summa contra gentiles* of St. Thomas.

But this was only a preliminary battle. During the years of Bonaventure's preoccupation with the business pertinent to his own Order, Averroism was more completely unified under Siger of Brabant and presented more formidable dangers. Upon his return to Paris in 1267 Bonaventure began his two series of university sermons, *Collationes de decem praeceptis* and *Collationes de septem donis Spiritus Sancti*, which led to the Paris condemnation of 1270.

This condemnation, however, did not strike at the heart of the danger which was "the two-fold truth theory." Moreover, there were other problems which demanded another firm stand against Averroism.

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[14] *Ibid.*, p. 114.

[15] Patrick Robert, O. F. M., "St. Bonaventure, Defender of Christian Wisdom," *Franciscan Studies*, III (March, 1943), 159—179.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 165—166.

Thus in 1273, with the *Collationes in Hexaëmeron*, Bonaventure began the final phase of his struggle. In these lectures, he emphasizes the primacy of Christ in all fields, insists on the importance of the notion of exemplarism, points out the dangers of the exaggerated use of philosophy in divine matters and "unmasks the illusion of a separate philosophy."[17]

This treatment of Robert does not go beyond the question of the real issue behind the Averroist dispute and does not explicitly discuss Bonaventure's attitude toward a „separate philosophy." However, in a later article, Robert turns his attention to the latter question.[18] Appealing to the *Commentary on the Sentences*, he first shows that Bonaventure was very conscious of the distinction between what is known by faith and what is known by reason. For example, if Christ Our Lord were present before my eyes, I could know that the individual before me is a man. But only by faith could I know that to this human nature is hypostatically united the Word of God. Likewise, the intellect by reasoning can know that God exists and that He is one, but only by faith can it be brought to the knowledge of the Trinity. The same holds true for the limited knowledge of the transcendence and power of God, known by natural reason, as opposed to the knowledge of the Incarnation, or the immutability of a God Who creates in time.[19]

Robert concludes this section by saying that Bonaventure's manifest intention is to highlight the importance and necessity, even for philosophy, of a knowledge of a higher order which gives a clearer and more adequate conception of the divine Being.[20]

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[17] *Ibid.*, p. 177. This last phrase is interesting. If Robert means it literally, it upsets the thesis of a later article, to be discussed immediately, in which he denies that Bonaventure rejected a separate philosophy. That he does not mean it literally is evident from what follows: "Does that mean, as some pretend to think, that the Seraphic Doctor is not a philosopher, but solely a theologian or a mystic, or that he confuses the natural with the supernatural, philosophy with theology? These assertions have time and again been met by qualified answers. Bonaventure does not confuse the natural with the supernatural, no more than he confuses philosophy with theology. He gives them a hierarchy according to their rank of finality and ultimate perfection. To give a hierarchy to a thing means to establish a subordination, but it also means to establish a distinction among the elements put into it." This indicates to me that Robert is already aware of the importance of a correct viewpoint regarding Bonaventure's philosophy and hence, I feel, the viewpoint determines his stand regarding the Averroist controversy. At any rate, the phrase, "the illusion of a separate philosophy," would never have found its way into this article had it been written after the article which will be discussed immediately.

[18] Patrice Robert, O. F. M., "Le problème de la philosophie Bonaventurienne," *Laval Théologique et Philosophique*, VII (1951), 9—58. This is the second half of a long article. The first half appears in VI (1950) and will be considered later.

[19] Cf. III *Sen.*, d. 24, a. 2, qq. 1 and 3.

What about Gilson's statement to the effect that the limitations of philosophical knowledge will vitiate what is attained? To this Robert answers. If Gilson wishes to conclude that, according to Bonaventure, there is no purely rational science which has God for its proper object[21] and is specifically distinct from every other science, he is perfectly correct, although he is not saying anything new. This was the traditional teaching of the Scholastics and especially of St. Thomas. But if this phrase means literally what it says, the whole Bonaventurian doctrine on the connaturality of our knowledge of God stands against it. And here Robert produces texts to show Bonaventure's recognition of the distinction between natural and supernatural theology.[22]

However, to the present writer this answer by itself does not seem convincing. For one could simply reply that there is no contradiction on Bonaventure's part in admitting the ability of the unaided intellect to arrive at some knowledge of God, and asserting that the limitation of such knowledge destroys the whole effect and that a separate philosophy is therefore impossible. This is precisely Gilson's view of Bonaventure's position.

Fortunately, Robert approaches the question of a separate philosophy from the notion of the proper object of philosophy. Gilson had affirmed that the proper object must be God, a position which Robert claims is taken without any text to support it.[23] If this is true, then philosophy must be in some way continuous with theology and hence a separate philosophy is impossible.

In answer to this, Robert claims that Gilson confuses the problem of the end of our whole intellectual activity with the proper object of philosophy. This leads to a second confusion closely related to the first, namely, the confusion of the problem of the autonomy of philosophy in the domain proper to it with the problem of its sufficiency in the order of human destiny. As a matter of fact, Bonaventure is very well aware that philosophy cannot lead man to his ultimate goal and that it is therefore only a point of departure, an "acheminement" to a more perfect wisdom which has God for its proper object.

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[20] Robert, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

[21] When Gilson and Robert speak of God as proper object, they seem to mean the Triune God, known only by divine revelation, the goal of man's supernatural destiny.

[22] Cf. III *Sen.*, d. 23, a. 1, q. 4, ad 5; *Quaes. de theologia*, q. 2, Resp. 1. ad 3; q. 4, Resp. 1, ad 3.

[23] Robert, *op. cit.*, p. 12. Though this may be literally true, one should not conclude that Gilson has presented no evidence to support his position. One of the many valuable contributions of his work is his treatment of the inspiration, spirit and insights of Bonaventure's thought, elements that cannot be grasped merely by singling out this or that text.

To establish his position, Robert has recourse to the same texts as those used by Gilson. He points out, for example, that in the *Collationes de septem donis Spiritus Sancti* Bonaventure is engaged in a work of mysticism and is attempting to explain to his hearers the charisms by which the Holy Spirit disposes the soul, already purified by the supernatural virtues, for the joys of infused contemplation. And in order to show the role of grace in elevating and perfecting nature, Bonaventure in the fourth lecture is led to treat of the natural activity of reason and of philosophic knowledge.

It is here, as we noted above, that Gilson sees a very sharp criticism of every philosophy which pretends to be sufficient in itself. On the contrary, contends Robert, there is no depreciation of such philosophy, nor any confusion between the natural activity of reason and supernatural activity. Bonaventure merely states that the clarity of philosophical knowledge is small in comparison with the clarity of Christian wisdom.[24]

Each part of philosophy is only a partial and imperfect knowledge of reality. Philosophy, even in its entirety, when it attains its own object, is only a point of departure for the rational activity of man towards an end which it cannot attain of itself because the end is outside its own limits. It is only a step of reason towards infinite truth, the perception of which alone satisfies the soul's aspirations and brings its operations to a perfect completion. The occasion, not the cause, of error is found in the temptation, very natural for a philosopher deprived of faith, to forget the limitations of philosophy and to expect it to supply the solution of problems regarding the full explanation of the universe and of human destiny. Such a solution is above the natural power of human intelligence and these truths are known only by the light of faith.

Robert suggests that Gilson has mistranslated *sapientia mundana* and *sapientia christiana*. For Gilson, the terms signify an opposition between natural or separate philosophy on the one hand, and on the other a supposed Christian philosophy situated between pure faith and theology proper. Rather, maintains Robert, *sapientia christiana* means here the religious knowledge of God, or better the experimental or mystical knowledge of God, the gift of the Holy Spirit, the essential act of which consists in the taste of the divine sweetness. Mundane wisdom is that which seeks pleasure, riches, carnal delights, and worldly honors. The opposition therefore is not between a separate philosophy and a Christian philosophy but between mundane wisdom and Christian wisdom in the senses described.[25] Bonaventure's point of view here goes beyond that of philosophical speculation to that of man's destiny according to all its natural and supernatural exigencies.

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[24] Robert, *op. cit.*, pp. 27—28. cf. *De donis Sp. S.*, Coll. IV, nn. 3—4, T. V, p. 474.

This is the reason why Bonaventure notes with such insistence that, to come to this wisdom, one must begin with Christ, the sole Mediator between God and men. Robert maintains that Gilson is guilty of a misinterpretation when he says that the philosophy of St. Albert the Great and St. Thomas is necessarily in error, for "while it situates Christ in the centre of theology, it does not situate Him in the centre of philosophy."[26] Gilson thus "expresses in the name of the Seraphic Doctor a judgment which the latter never formulated and this in terms of a principle to which he had never given such a meaning."[27]

In order not to draw out this portion of our discussion beyond reasonable length, we shall summarize the rest of Robert's analysis of the *In Hexaëmeron*.[28] He shows that Bonaventure proceeds to exalt the study of Scripture and to point out the dangers of a spirit which would lead to a complete abandonment of Scripture, or to a rationalistic interpretation, or to a philosophy in no way compatible with Christian wisdom. At the same time, with frequent references to the texts of Bonaventure, he shows rather convincingly that the latter recognizes the legitimacy and respective autonomy of the two orders of natural and supernatural knowledge; that he attributes error in philosophy rather to a forgetfulness of the limitations of philosophy than to a disdain for our rational activity; that when there is a question of the natural activity of reason he consistently invokes the authority of Aristotle, especially in the philosophy of nature, in metaphysics and in ethics; that contemplative wisdom is not entirely foreign to the natural activity of intelligence and that once enriched by philosophical knowledge the soul is aided in its ascent to such wisdom. The whole point of Robert's criticism, then, is to show that it is by no means a "separate philosophy" which Bonaventure has examined and rejected.

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[25] Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 40—41. Also: III *Sen.*, d. 35, q. 1, Resp.; *In Hexaëm.*, Coll. II, n. 1, T. V, p. 336; *de donis Sp. S.* IX, nn. 2—7, T. V, pp. 499—500.

[26] Gilson, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

[27] Robert, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

[28] *Ibid.*, pp. 44 ff. cf. Coll. IV—VII; XIX.

Van Steenberghen likewise takes up the question of Bonaventure's attitude toward philosophy.[29] He points out that Bonaventure was well aware of the distinction between philosophy and theology, and the danger of error when philosophy is engaged in the difficult area of the knowledge of God and His action in the world.

According to Van Steenberghen, the *Commentary on the Sentences* does not treat *ex professo* of the state of the Christian philosopher. The "philosophers" are always the pagan philosophers and Bonaventure emphasizes on occasion the difficult conditions in which they find themselves. But in the *De reductione artium ad theologiam* and the *Itinerarium mentis in Deum* the state of the Christian philosopher is expressly considered; his work is a step in the acquisition of an integral wisdom.

In the *Collationes* the accent changes. Reacting against the attitude of Siger of Brabant and his followers, Bonaventure denounces the errors of a separate philosophy which takes no account of faith and theology and refuses to place itself in the tradition of Christian wisdom.

In comparing Robert's treatment with that of Van Steenberghen, one is immediately struck by the summary manner in which the latter disposes of the problem in question. Actually, he so minimizes the amount of pure philosophy in Bonaventure's work that it becomes almost non-existent. Further, as we shall see shortly, Van Steenberghen treats at greater length the problem concerning the relative influence of Aristotelianism and Augustinianism on Bonaventure's thought. Lastly, we notice in general that the Louvain scholar tends to emphasize the *Commentary on the Sentences* and to slight the *Collationes* — to the detriment, I am afraid, of his analysis of Bonaventure's thought.

It would be well at this point to make a few observations regarding the criticisms just discussed. First of all, in fairness to Gilson, it is generally admitted that his work is a brilliant presentation of the thought of St. Bonaventure. It must be a starting point for any critique. He has succeeded in showing the influence of Bonaventure's Franciscan spirituality on the development of his world-vision. He has handled with rare insight the difficult questions of illumination, exemplarism, and especially of the supernatural life, in man's activities. Finally, he has shown the great synthesis of Christian thought which Bonaventure made.

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[29] F. Van Steenberghen, A. Forest, M. de Gandillac, *Le mouvement doctrinale du IX*e *au XIV*e *siècle*, Vol. XIII of *Histoire de l'Église depuis les origines jusqu'à nos jours*, ed. Augustin Fliche, Victor Martin, J. B. Duroselle and Eugene Jarry (Bloud and Gay, 1934—), pp. 224—234.

On the other hand, it does seem that his eagerness to develop Bonaventure's concept of Christian wisdom has caused him to emphasize what has appeared to him to be a disdain for philosophy. He does not give ample attention to the fact that Bonaventure recognized the place of philosophy in human thought and respected it, even though he also recognized that its importance was relatively small in comparison with the larger concept of Christian wisdom. The works of Gilson's critics have helped to balance off what seems at times to be an extreme view.

II. ARISTOTELIAN OR AUGUSTINIAN?

The suggestion that Bonaventure was an Aristotelian will undoubtedly seem startling to many. However, no less a scholar than Van Steenberghen has proposed this view in his classic work on Siger of Brabant,[30] a work which has received as much respect among the works written about Siger as Gilson's has among those on Bonaventure. In addition, Van Steenberghen has raised some points in defense of his position which are worthy of attention and which have been the occasion of a number of articles. A consideration of this debate will help to clarify one's thinking on the Aristotelian elements in Bonaventure's work.

It should not be surprising that again a starting point must be made with Gilson's work on Bonaventure. In discussing the Franciscan's attitude to Aristotle, Gilson begins by objecting to the position of some who sympathize with Bonaventure for having been born too soon to profit by the theological reform of Albert the Great and the translations of Aristotle's works. For some, Bonaventure's thought is only a "potential and incomplete St. Thomas" which would have led to Christian Aristotelianism if he had not been stopped too soon. Actually, however, "from the first he had attached himself to a doctrine which was its radical negation. It was neither through ignorance nor by reason of a mere chronological chance that he did not become an Aristotelian." A careful study of the *Commentary on the Sentences* which contains "the totality of the philosophical and theological conceptions" of Bonaventure shows that for him Aristotelianism was a "doctrine condemned," "not a development of which he was unaware but an error on which he had passed judgment."[31]

Van Steenberghen reacted against this analysis and appealing to the *Commentary on the Sentences* sought to show that the Seraphic

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[30] Fernand Van Steenberghen, *Siger de Brabant d'après ses oeuvres inédites* (Coll. Les Philosophes Belges. T. XIII, Éditions de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1942), II, 464.

[31] Cf. Gilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 3—7.

Doctor's thought was basically Aristotelian. Bonaventure is a professor of theology with a lofty concept of sacred science, revelation, grace, and faith. He therefore rejects philosophical conceptions incompatible with traditional theology in questions concerning faith. He recognizes the weakness of reason left to itself.

On the other hand, philosophy is an auxiliary science valuable for theology. Moreover, Bonaventure's attitude toward Aristotle is not one of hostility or condemnation but one of esteem, respect and sympathy. He avoids opposing Aristotelianism to Christian orthodoxy or to the thought of St. Augustine.[32]

Limiting himself again to the *Commentary*, Van Steenberghen maintains that Bonaventure has written a theological synthesis. Though he recognizes the distinction between philosophy and theology and is aware of the errors of a philosophy unenlightened by faith, his philosophy is nothing but theological speculation, that is, the use of philosophical themes in the interpretation of revealed doctrine. In this he doesn't differ from St. Thomas, though the latter has more profoundly meditated on philosophical problems and has more carefully worked out his philosophy before using it in theology.

For this reason, it is difficult to characterize the "philosophy" of Bonaventure. Regarding the fundamental positions, it is an authentic Aristotelianism. He has merely eliminated certain Aristotelian themes incompatible with Catholic doctrine and has attempted to extend Aristotelianism in various ways.

On the philosophical plane, then, there can be no question of an Augustinianism for it is only a secondary source relative to Aristotelianism. In theology, however, Bonaventure belongs to the Augustinian school. The philosophy of Bonaventure is therefore "un Aristotélisme éclectique et néoplatonisant, mis au service d'une théologie Augustinienne."[33]

Robert wrote a refutation of Van Steenberghen's position and in the one discussion defends both the philosophical elements in Bonaventure's thought and its Augustinian influences.[34] He complains that Van Steenberghen limits his investigation mainly to the *Commentary on the Sentences*. A fair appraisal should also take into account the *De reductione artium ad theologiam*, the disputed questions *de scientia Christi* and

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[32] Cf. Van Steenberghen, *op. cit.*, p. 449 ff., and his numerous references to the *Commentary on the Sentences*.

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 464.

[34] Patrice Robert, O. F. M., "Le problème de la philosophie Bonaventurienne," *Laval Théologique et Philosophique*, VI (1950), 145—163. This is Part I of the article already treated.

de mysterio Sanctissimae Trinitatis, the *Breviloquium*, and *Epistola de tribus quaestionibus.*

Even in his treatment of the *Sentences*, Van Steenberghen fails to examine those passages which develop Bonaventure's own philosophical doctrine, that is, the origin and formation of first principles, the mechanism and function of sensible knowledge, the nature and process of intellectual knowledge, the ultimate foundations of rational certitude, the metaphysical constitution of created being, the origin of corporeal form, substantiality of the human soul and the manner of its union with the body, matter and form, and act and potency.[35] Robert concludes regarding the analysis of Van Steenberghen that "il est vraiment téméraire d'en tirer aucune conclusion d'ordre historico-doctrinal."[36]

In emphasizing Bonaventure's respect for Aristotle, Van Steenberghen forgets the Franciscan's more formal statements on the inspiration and character of his philosophical doctrine. In the *Sentences*, he treats of spiritual matter and his doctrine is that of Augustine whom he calls the most profound metaphysician. Aristotle is the most excellent of the philosophers (meaning here pagan philosophers) but Bonaventure has shown that he takes Augustine as guide, even in strictly philosophical problems.[37]

In the *Christus unus omnium Magister*, he prefers Augustine to Plato and Aristotle and considers him his master not only in theology but also in philosophy.[38] In the *Epis. de tribus quaes.*, though he warns against vain curiosity, he defends one who would pursue philosophical studies in order the better to understand and refute the doctrine of heretics. No less an authority than St. Augustine is cited as one who followed such a procedure.[39]

To the charge that Bonaventure has not sufficiently reflected on philosophical problems *for themselves*, Robert answers that this is quite normal for a theologian who is writing a work almost exclusively theological. One need not conclude, however, that Bonaventure does not meditate on them *sufficiently*, still less that he treats them theologically and not according to the principles of rational science.

Robert agrees with Van Steenberghen on at least one point; "pour l'heure, la seule conclusion légitime de son enquête;"[40] namely, the opinion that the attitude of Bonaventure towards Aristotle is one of esteem, respect and sympathy. Robert adds against Gilson that Aristotelianism is not a "doctrine condemned," "an error on which he had passed judgment." Aristotelianism is rather "the highest expression of ancient thought and the most perfect explanation of the universe ever conceived by human reason left merely to its own lights."[41]

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[35] *Ibid.*, p. 152.

[36] *Ibid.*, p. 153.

[37] *Ibid.*, pp. 154—155. cf. II *Sen.*, d. 3, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2, Resp.

[38] *Ibid.*, pp. 156—157. cf. *Christus unus omnium Magister*, nn. 18—19, T. V, p. 572.

[39] *Ibid.*, p. 157. cf. *Epistola de tribus quaestionibus ad magistrum innominatum*, n. 1, T. VIII, p. 331.

[40] *Ibid.*, p. 162.

In a later book, Van Steenberghen again takes up the question regarding the Aristotelianism in Bonaventure.[42] The work appeared in 1955, hence after the second French edition of Gilson's book on Bonaventure and after his review of Van Steenberghen's *Siger*, and between the first and second parts of Robert's article. All of these had criticized Van Steenberghen's theory. An opportunity was thus presented to answer these criticisms.

Gilson had appealed to two texts from the *Sentences*.[43] Here, says Van Steenberghen, "Bonaventure was supposed to state the complete inability of reason and philosophy to attain to truth, without the help of revelation; these texts would thus condemn the whole of pagan philosophy, including Aristotelianism."[44]

Gilson indicates that even if we concede an attempt of Van Steenberghen to present the first text as an excuse for Aristotle, we cannot explain away the second. "Saint Paul se proposait-il d'excuser les sages de ce monde? Nous laisserons aux exégètes le soin d'en décider."[45]

Van Steenberghen does not deign to quote the texts nor to attempt a direct answer to Gilson's statement. He is content to repeat that his own conclusion, "to which the study of the texts led me and against which nobody has been able to produce a single text of St. Bonaventure, was brought into full relief in the second part of Robert's study, against Gilson."[46]

Although one may be annoyed at Van Steenberghen's failure to discuss explicitly the rejoinder of Gilson, it is quite fair to say that the two texts and comment of Gilson are weak in the face of the textual evidence brought forward by both Van Steenberghen and Robert.

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[41] *Ibid.*

[42] Fernand Van Steenberghen, *The Philosophical Movement in the Thirteenth Century* (New York: Nelson, 1955), ch. IV.

[43] Cf. *La Philosophie de Saint Bonaventure* (2d ed. rev.; Paris: Vrin, 1943), p. 406; *Bull. Thom.*, VI (1940—1942), p. 15. The texts from the *Sentences* are: II *Sen.*, d. 18, a. 2, q. 2, ad 6^m, T. II, p. 448: "Necesse est enim philosophantem in aliquem errorem labi, nisi adjuvetur per radium fidei." III Sen., d. 24, a. 2, q. 3, ad 4^m, T. III, p. 524: "Propter quod dicit Apostolus [I Cor., 1, 20] stultam fecisse Deum sapientiam hujus mundi; quia omnis sapientia de Deo in via absque fide magis est stultitia quam vera scientia."

[44] Van Steenberghen, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

[45] Gilson, *La Philosophie de Saint Bonaventure* (2d ed. rev), p. 406.

[46] Van Steenberghen, *op. cit.*, pp. 68—69.

Van Steenberghen calls Robert's critique "the most considerable of all and the most interesting." He notes Robert's agreement with him regarding Bonaventure's favorable attitude toward Aristotle and his disagreement regarding the predominance of Aristotelianism. All this had been presented in Part I of Robert's article.

Van Steenberghen then makes a statement which looks suspiciously like an attempt to have us believe that Robert later came around to an agreement on the question of Aristotelianism vs Augustinianism. I quote the statement in full.

> The second part of Robert's study appeared in 1951 and was a long criticism of Professor Gilson in which the author absolutely rejected Gilson's fundamental idea that Bonaventure's philosophy is dependent and Christocentric. But as an appendix there is a little additional note which is very friendly towards me. To understand this note, whose tone is rather different from that of the first part of the article, it is necessary to know that my study on the doctrinal movement of the thirteenth century [*Le mouvement doctrinale du IX^e au XIV^e siècle*] had appeared in 1951, before Fr Robert's second article. In this last work I had the opportunity to explain myself more fully on St Bonaventure and thus Fr Robert could write: "We are pleased to notice that this study fully confirms the criticism we have just made of Gilson's work;" and alluding to my views on St Bonaventure's philosophy, he added: "We do not think that there is any irreducible disagreement between us on the other points of his interpretation."[47]

We are to suppose, then, that Robert, in seeing *Le mouvement doctrinal* where Van Steenberghen has "explained himself more fully," is prompted to modify his earlier critique regarding the "other points of his interpretation," presumably also regarding the relative influence of Aristotelianism and Augustinianism in Bonaventure's thought. At least, I can give no other interpretation to the above statement.

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[47] *Ibid.*, pp. 67—68. The appendix of Robert is as follows: "Cet article était déjà sous presse lorsque, grâce à l'aimable courtoisie de M. le Chanoine F. Van Steenberghen, nous avons pris connaissance des pages suggestives consacrées à la doctrine du Docteur Séraphique dans l'important ouvrage qu'il vient de publier en collaboration avec MM. A. Forest et M. de Gandillac sur *Le mouvement doctrinal du IX^e au XIV^e siècle* (Coll. *Histoire de l'Église depuis les origines jusqu'à nos jours*, T. 13 Bloud et Gay 1951), pp. 218—236. Nous constatons avec plaisir que cette étude confirme pleinement la critique que nous venons de faire de l'ouvrage de M. Etienne Gilson en ce qui concerne le point de départ, l'objet et la méthode de la philosophie bonaventurienne. Nous ne croyons pas qu'il existe entre nous aucun désaccord irréductible sur les autres points de son interprétation. La voie dans laquelle l'érudit et brillant professeur de l'Université de Louvain s'est engagé semble des plus intéressantes et des plus prometteuses pour l'avenir des études mediévales. Il convient de l'en féliciter." *Laval Théol. et Phil.*, VII, 58.

However, if this is what is meant, then I cannot agree. First of all, Robert is referring explicitly to the *second* part of his own article and is pleased to see that Van Steenberghen confirms his treatment of the point of departure, object and method of Bonaventure's philosophy. And though Robert's phrase, "les autres points de son interprétation," is admittedly vague, there is no indication that he refers also to the first part and intends to include the question of Aristotelianism vs Augustinianism.

But even if Robert wishes to indicate a change of opinion on this point, he shows himself to be far too modest. In view of his own handling of the problem, the treatment in *Le mouvement doctrinal* should not persuade him to modify his initial disagreement.

We are now in a position to set down some observations regarding the second problem under discussion. It seems fairly clear that Gilson's first estimate of a complete rejection of Aristotle on the part of Bonaventure will have to be reappraised. Subsequent criticism of this estimate, especially on the part of Van Steenberghen and Robert, has caused the student of Bonaventure to take a second look, and to realize that the latter, being a man of his times, would quite naturally be aware of the great current of Aristotelianism that was sweeping the west, and would feel the influence of its positive contributions to Christian thought. A re-reading of the texts brought forward by Gilson shows that they admit of another interpretation, one which, when the texts are placed in their proper context, indicates much less opposition to Aristotle than Gilson contends.

Just as one must be careful not to view the philosophy of St. Thomas as the complete rejection of Platonism and Augustianism, so must he be cautious about accepting the synthesis of Bonaventure as a complete rejection of Aristotelianism.

The judgment of Van Steenberghen to the effect that the philosophy of Bonaventure is an eclectic and Neoplatonist Aristotelianism put at the service of an Augustinian theology seems unfortunate and has received hardly any acceptance on the part of mediaeval scholars. In spite of Van Steenberghen's valuable insights regarding the Aristotelian elements in Bonaventure, he has allowed his enthusiasm to lead him into serious exaggerations.

Lastly, against both Gilson and Van Steenberghen, Robert has shown that there is a valid sense in which we may talk about a "philosophy" of Bonaventure without hedging it with so many distinctions that it is finally absorbed into his theology.

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GUILT AND VALUE PHILOSOPHY

In a Decree of the Holy Office, August 24th, 1690, Alexander VIII condemned the following propositions under the title *"Errores de bonitate actus et de peccato philosophico"*

> Bonitas objectiva consistit in convenientia objecti cum natura rationali: formali vero in conformitate actus cum regula morum. Ad hoc sufficit, ut actus moralis tendat in finem ultimum interpretative. Hunc homo non tenetur amare neque in principio neque in decursu vitae suae moralis. (Declarata et damnata uti haeretica.)
>
> Peccatum philosophicum seu morale est actus humanus disconveniens naturae rationali et rectae rationi; theologicum vero et mortale est transgressio libera divinae legis. Philosophicum, quantumvis grave, in illo, qui Deum vel ignorat vel de Deo actu non cogitat, est grave peccatum, sed non est offensa Dei, neque peccatum mortale dissolvens amicitiam Dei, neque aeterna poena dignum. (Declarata et damnata uti scandalosa, temeraria, piarum aurium offensiva, et erronea) (Denzinger 1290).

This very clear condemnation of the concept of philosophical sin by denying that there is any distinction between it and theological sin still allows the philosopher-theologian to speculate with the aid of revelation on the real hideousness of sin. The real viciousness of sin and wickedness can reveal itself to one who has a penetration of the idea of *macula* contained in the concept of *peccatum*. Any ethical system which refuses to recognize the seriousness of human sinfulness is in disconformity with the facts of human psychology and the testimony of human experience. The preoccupation at the present time in the theatre and the cinema as well as in literature with the harshest reality of tragedy forces us to reconsider the problems of philosophy associated with moral evil. In particular, we would like to point out that the value-philosophy of Von Hildebrand explores very profoundly the ugliness of sin and human frailty. We can shed some light upon the nature and quality of the *macula* implied in every sin by subjecting to a critical analysis whatever reason and faith offer on this point. There is no reason to deny that our moral reaction to wickedness appears to us as a genuinely ethical reaction. It is ridiculous to say that theology has contaminated ethics and moral philosophy with the notion of sin. From the condemnation of Alexander VIII and from our own study of the problem we would be inclined to agree with Professor A. E. Taylor (*The Faith of a Moralist*, p. 163) that moral philosophy has introduced the notion of sin into theology.

Reason corroborates the teaching of faith in the reality of sin. It was Pascal who said that man is more incomprehensible without the mystery of Original Sin than the mystery is incomprehensible to him. Cardinal Newman sets out an argument in much the same terms and although the reasoning is not absolutely conclusive it is not altogether valueless. Therefore we might admit that while reason can offer no sole demonstration of the root explanation for all the contradictions in man and assign to it the name of Original Sin, yet there are distinct characteristics which distinguish our human experience of guilt and wrongdoing from any other experience. Other creatures than man know no wants beyond their assigned limits but man's needs and desires are insatiable and he finds in himself the deepest misery associated with the loftiest pretensions. Shakespeare could say in one of his plays: "I am myself indifferent honest, but yet I could accuse me of such things that it were better my mother had not borne me." St. Paul so frequently refers to himself as a sinner: "Si dixerimus quoniam peccatum non habemus, ipsi nos seducimus." We are concerned here with the element of *macula* in sin whether that sin be original or actual; however the conclusions will be more acceptable to the evidence of moral psychology if we restrict ourselves to actual sin. What are the characteristics which sharply demarcate moral guilt from non-guilt? What are the radical explanations for these differences? Let us concentrate on the stain, the *macula* in every personal transgression.

The notion of *macula* in personal sin will be more easily discernible than in the original sin with which each one of us is born. Certainly even in the primitive sin of Adam it is clearly manifest if we concern ourselves only with the sin as *peccatum originans*. The very term "actual sin" discloses the presence of the person expressing itself in the act of disobedience to God. It is in this deliverance of our own personality in opposition to God that the real malice of sin is contained. The complete viciousness and disastrous effects of sin are proper to personal mortal sin and to nothing else. Original sin and venial sin share in the nature only incompletely and analogously. This is not to deny that that *macula* proper to venial sin and to original sin is still there. We should never allow ourselves to think of these three sins as if they denoted three kinds or species of one genus in rather the same way as we speak of any three sacraments sharing in the generic notion of external signs causing grace.

We shall first investigate the features of an act of guilt and then show how the value philosophy of Von Hildebrand is in accord with the traditional explanation of the theologians and offers the most satisfying exposition of the qualities of such an act of guilt.

The first quality that strikes us in an experience of guilt is the self-condemnation that it always involves. This is completely different from any discontent or dissatisfaction that we might find from an ordinary experience in which the personality is expressed but in no way responsible. Butler in his "Sermons on Human Nature" made much of this distinction in what Scholastics would say is the root division between an *actus humanus* and an *actus hominis*. From this psychological fact Butler insisted upon the supreme principle of conscience which for him had two aspects, a purely cognitive and an authoritative aspect. He merely reiterated the experience of everyone else when he said that the peculiarity of conscience is that it reflects on actions from the point of view of their rightness or wrongness. The very fact that we use words like "right," "wrong," "duty," etc., shows that there is an intellectual faculty within us which recognizes the terms denoted by these names. Otherwise such words would be as meaningless to us as the words "black", and "white" to a man born blind. We clearly distinguish between a right action and one that turned out fortunately. We clearly distinguish between a wrong action and one that happened to turn out unfortunately. Again, we distinguish between mere unintentional hurt and deliberate injury. Conscience is indifferent to the former and condemns the latter. Finally, conscience recognizes a certain appropriateness between wrong-doing and pain and between right-doing and happiness; i. e., it recognizes the fact of merit or demerit. If we see a man being hurt we judge the situation quite differently according to whether we think that he is innocent or that he is being punished for some wrong act. We always make the familiar explicit distinction between unmerited "hard luck" and deserved unhappiness. How often do we hear men appealing to our sense of pity for their misfortunes by insisting that their misfortunes are due "to no fault of their own!"

Why this distinction between real self-condemnation and mere discontent and dissatisfaction? Why do we smile when we read of the example cited by the famous Idealist, F. H. Bradley, who in a passage of his "Appearance and Reality" (p. 431 n) suggests something analogous and continuous with moral self-condemnation to be found in the sulky brooding of a beast of prey which has missed its "kill?" Certainly Bradley would not have concluded from this observation to a naturalistic interpretation by saying that a man, so overwhelmed by the sense of moral guilt, is nothing more than a sulky and discontented brute. He would not have used the example to lower the psychology of man but to elevate the sulkiness of the brute. Bradley himself saw the deepest reaches of the personality expressed in the psychological state of self-condemnation. If personality reveals itself transparently in any situation it is in that of guilt. It is there that the Existentialists study the enigma of personality and whether they depart far from the definition of Boethius of "naturae rationalis individua substantia" or remain close to it they are all obsessed by the fact of self-condemnation implied in every moral act that is responsible. Why this self-condemnation? Is it an admission by the very testimony of nature herself that there is a defilement, a desecration (which term Von Hildebrand uses so appropriately in his incomparable "Defense of Purity"), a disvalue, an acknowledgment of a stain, a *macula* in the very act itself?

Let us look at a second feature of the act of guilt. Moralists would say that this is the expression of the consequent conscience and manifests itself in the indelibility, the indestructibility of the sense of guilt. Confessors well know of the situations of some penitents in which such a condition can approach the state of questioning the forgiveness of the sin by God. Guilt has the terrifying property of asserting itself despite the lapse of time and of geographical position. Even the imposition of a sanction by civil society or by nature herself and accepted in its finality by the person himself as containing remarkable therapeutic effects, even such a sanction does not eliminate this ever consciousness of guilt. Why this permanency, why the continuation of such poignant suffering long after the offense has been committed? Why is it felt by someone when he is immoderately indignant or impatient? Why does it continue to remain in the soul of a woman who has lost an unborn child although the doctor advises her that it was not exclusively her responsibility? Surely the man who has repented for his offense and has made restitution ought to be free from all reproach. Why then this constant self-criticism? Society may have lost all right to censure this man but self-condemnation continues!! Think of the remorse of a Peter or of a Magdalen. A real penitent may be forgiven by the priest and by God, he may have redeemed himself before his fellow-men but he never seems to forgive himself or to condone his fault. St. Paul referred to himself as "the greatest of all sinners" and it requires no great imagination to conjure up the picture of the converted Apostle constantly bringing before the tribunal of his conscience the horrible scene of the martyrdom of Stephen. Psychologists tell us of the patient afflicted with an "idée fixe" and of the suffering that such a preoccupying notion can have on the harmony of a person's life. Should such a fixed idea be the result of an offense committed against God or more immediately against one's neighbor, would not the likely reason for it all be contained in this indelibility, this irradicability of guilt? Once again is it not the admission of the presence of a *macula* in the soul, of a defilement, of the discoloration of our souls as forbidden by God? For us those two elements are profoundly present — the element of *macula* against which the person always testifies his horror and repugnance and the undoubted fact of the centrality of the person that is reached in every act of guilt. Any explanation of the phenomena of the consequent conscience is bound to be superficial if it minimizes or omits these two important elements. It is Von Hildebrand who interprets these two factors so well and so much in accord with the observed psychology of ourselves and others in his exposition of value and disvalue. We can begin to get some glimmerings of the deep reasons why even the most upright individuals testify that self-humiliation is not a temporary concomitant of their sense of guilt but a continuous and permanent feature of their experience. We cannot help but think that the peculiar school of philosophy which holds that the metaphysical essence of personality is contained in the element of "incommunicability" touches very close to this situation in that the experience of an individual who is harassed by thoughts and preoccupations of guilt cannot be appreciated by someone who stands outside his experience. The ultimate reason why this self-condemnation belongs to the guilty party even after his forgiveness by the state and by society is that in this situation the personality is reached and touched at its metaphysical core — the very area of incommunicability which is his and no one else's. Possibly in guilt the person is closest to God because God touches his soul, his personality at the incommunicable core of his being. Little wonder that just as personality is incommunicable, so is guilt and no one can be held responsible for the personal sin of another save the person who committed it. We never saw this in such clear light as we did during one of the lectures of Von Hildebrand. It was not because he was applying the metaphysical theory of personality which radicated its deepest roots in the incommunicability of the self. However, we cannot see any other theory or explanation of personality which so perfectly reproduces or rather exposes the incommunicability of guilt. We might say that guilt touches personality more intimately than any other experience because it partakes so much of the very nature of the very thing it touches — the very incommunicability of personality. We could well see ourselves developing these notions into a much longer study of the metaphysical relationships that exist between personality on the one hand and sin and guilt experiences on the other. We know of the great disputes that raged in the early days of the Church on the proper understanding of the concept of person and how it differed from nature. The distinction between nature and person is crucial in the matter of the hypostatic union and this was so strongly felt by the Fathers of the Vatican Council that they prepared the following draft for a definition on the mystery of the Incarnation. They were very mindful of the errors current in Germany in the 19th century. The draft was as follows and it is important for us in view of the conclusion that we shall draw from it: "Just as in the Holy Trinity three distinct persons subsist in one nature, so in Christ, on the other hand, one person subsists in two distinct and different natures. Therefore, in accordance with the teaching of the Fathers all must understand that the notion of essence, substance, or nature is by no means to be confused with the notion of hypostasis, subsistence or person, lest one be led into making the statement — manifestly subversive of the sacred doctrines — that there are as many persons as there are intellectual or — to use the modern expression — conscious natures." From this proposition that was never defined we would like to assert the congruity of the following propositions as sequential and developmental of the ideas we have exposed above:

(1) Since person should not be equated with the intellectual or conscious nature of someone, and since guilt is a product of intellection and volition, it follows that guilt should be ascribed more immediately and more properly to the personality than to the nature.

(2) Since it is not incompatible with this proposition of the Vatican Council that personality is equivalent to incommunicability, we might conclude logically that since guilt touches the personality and appears to partake of its nature in a very profound sense, the root explanation of the phenomena of the permanency of guilt is found precisely here. Guilt touches personality, partakes of its nature and in its incommunicability it is and remains just as incommunicable as personality itself.

Just one other notion before we continue our analysis of the characteristics of an act of guilt which reveal the *macula* behind the guilt. Von Hildebrand refers to the "super-actual states" of the virtues which traditional theology calls by the name of "habitus." Frequently we use this term "habitus" of the infused virtues of faith, hope and charity.

The term itself is capable of confusion just as the word "faculty" in the same connection is. These *habitus* differ in various important respects from ordinary virtues. In the first place these "super-actual states" or "habitus" are not acquired as the result of repeated efforts and for this reason they are in theology called "infused" — that is produced directly in the soul by God. There is no reason to deny the possibility of such a state being natural too as opposed to supernatural. In the second place, they do not (at least directly and immediately) give us a facility and readiness in acting: what they do give us in the case of the theological virtues is a power of performing actions which are supernatural in character. Now from this term of Von Hildebrand we can easily understand the real cause of the permanency of the guilt experience. Since the constancy of this self-condemnation, as we have analyzed above, argues to the presence of a *macula* which is likewise permanent we might say that the *macula* has a "super-actual" experience at the root of this psychological state. The experience of guilt is permanent since it touches the *macula* which is super-actual and it is incommunicable since it participates in the very metaphysical nature of the very personality which it so intimately strikes.

Some critics of the constancy of the experience of guilt would lay it at the door of some morbid preoccupation with the ego. But if this be true then we would have to say that this morbid experience is universal. It is hard to see how any experience which can be described as something felt "quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus" is an experience that is morbid and unhealthy. The indelibility, the indestructibility of the guilt experience demands a more profound explanation than that and we humbly suggest that this exposition that we have given in accordance with the value-philosophy of Von Hildebrand offers the most plausible interpretation of all, perfectly consistent with psychology and the evidence of theologians on the formal nature of sin.

We should admit here that while it is true that memory often accentuates those guilt experiences that are associated with the least vicious of our offenses this same memory never succeeds in making of the guilt experience itself a mere delusion. While we may in a similar fashion testify that something is more beautiful than it really is, there is no denial of the fact that something aesthetic has been experienced by us regardless of how much we have exaggerated the evidence. Any person who attempts to make equivalent the sense of guilt and the sense of discomfort felt by a blunder or a faux pas is simply testifying that he has the experience although in the concrete he may be attaching the guilt feeling to the wrong objects. Implicitly therefore he is testifying to the presence of a *macula* in his soul and to the permanency and incommunicability of something which touches his personality at its most central core. Just as a person cannot strip himself of his own metaphysical personality so he cannot divest himself of this constant and poignant experience of guilt.

Gilbert Murray in his work "Rise of the Greek Epic" has demonstrated very conclusively that this sense of guilt to which we have been paying so much attention is not due in any way to certain superstitious impressions from some primitive belief. He maintains that the concept of guilt existed first in the ethical field and only then was transferred to the theological. The example that Professor Gilbert Murray uses of the horror that the Greeks had for putting poison on arrows and the sense of real guilt that would be experienced by anyone that was responsible for this offense proves for him and for ourselves that such a crime is believed to be unpardonable because the Greeks always looked upon it as a crime that *ought not* to be pardoned. In other words, they themselves in their instinctive repugnance to this offense give eloquent testimony of the defilement that they felt was done the soul by anyone guilty of placing poison on arrows. Homer also cites other offenses which he treats as unforgivable in some special or peculiar way. In the Old Testament as well we see this same phenomenon in which emphasis is placed upon the consideration that should be paid the orphan and the poor. How many times has the priest in the refectory listened to the assistance that was given by some saint mentioned in the martyrology to the poor and the distressed!! There appears to be manifested in these examples an ethical and moral judgment on the hideousness of these offenses that are directed to the unfortunate of God. It is useless to say that social convention played the constitutive part in the formation of this impression because certainly we could well conceive of cases where poisoned arrows would be of much help to the common weal. We should not find the primitive morality expressing itself in defense of the widow and the poor but in defense of the more important members of the tribal society. No palliation of this behavior that is granted by everyone can eliminate the distinct indelibility of guilt that is so much a part of our own psychology. How foolish some social psychologists will become in trying to explain this feeling of guilt that is the characteristic of "conscientia consequens" by asserting that animals betray the same expressions of regret when they have done something unclean in their masters' homes!! These lovers of animal psychology overlook the fact that these animals are the least convincing proofs to allege because they themselves have been domesticated by their masters and whatever poor and inadequate equivalent of the guilt-experience they manifest has been something projected upon them by the very individuals who are supposed to be so dependent upon the animals they train.

Therefore, we believe that we can say and in this regard the behaviour of so many others will bear us out — this abiding presence of the guilt experience, this continuous living with the past, this brooding over our responsible acts, all this points to something in our past which is the *macula* that exists in its super-actual existence if it has not been absolved and exerts its influence in memory even after absolution. This influence of a chastened past can become a strong instrument in the development of our personalities and possibly this therapeutic function and its manipulation by divine grace are the very reasons why God allows it to remain so long. Consider how permanent this guilt was felt by St. Augustine and how its presence was the occasion of so many graces from His hands!! Perhaps the continuation of this experience is a hidden sign of our own incapacity to redeem ourselves of our frightful pasts — hidden in the sense that it does not manifest itself formally as an indication of our own inadequacies. But the point is clear that the presence of the experience argues to the presence of the defilement felt by us at the commission of something we know to be unworthy of ourselves.

Let us advance to another feature of the guilt experience which will from another vantage point reinforce the same conclusion as we came to above. Independent of the conviction that we have from the faith that sin should be punished it appears to be from our own psychological behaviour that a concomitant of the sense of guilt is the recognition of the sanction of punishment that should go with it. We would not go so far as to say that every sin should have a vindictive sanction applied to it at once or that the condition of the world today is a sanction in justice placed upon it by God but it is unavoidable to assert that the feeling of punishment is a genuine ethical accompaniment of sin. We seem to feel in the very commission of an offense that something retributive should follow from it. In traditional Ethics we find the surest proof that a deordination of nature is just if we have nature itself in some way punishing the offender for the irregularity. The cogency of the argument from the perversion of a faculty depends upon this very detail and we assert simply that if nature rebels and punishes the offender we have in this very retributive sanction the strongest indication of the malice of an act. Why should this guilt experience contain with it the recognition of our guilt and the reasonability of punishment associated with it? Here we seem to be getting much closer to an analysis of the "macula" because in some vague way we are admitting that the defilement and desecration of our souls by sin is precisely that, i. e., a defilement and desecration, but the real metaphysical explanation stands in the stain that we have placed upon our souls as "imagines Dei." Thus, we see that this critical study of the guilt experience touches immediately our own persons and then touches the centrality of our persons as images of God. Yet in touching our persons and in defiling them we are touching God in some intimate way so that hell hangs in the balance. The notion of *poena* enters here so naturally then in this general conviction of the plausibility of retribution. We see a vindication of the explanation according to which the sinner by his offense subverts the order ordained by God. This is the evident interpretation of the punishment-feeling that accompanies the guilt-experience. The sinner, in disturbing this order of the world, rebels against it. He cannot disturb it objectively because God's will is sovereign and omnipotent, but he can pervert his own will and commit an act contrary to his final end, by adhering inordinately to an object of desire and enjoyment. If the order of the universe is to be maintained the sinner's will must of necessity be contravened and thwarted in the same measure as he himself has contravened and thwarted the due order God established. Now all thwarting of the will is sorrow, and if it is sorrow in consequence of sin, such sorrow is punishment. Punishment, therefore, must follow sin as its shadow. Punishment is the counterpoise of sin, demanded by intrinsic necessity to restore the level of righteousness. As water seeks its own level, so punishment succeeds sin. Sufferings may be self-inflicted, as when we do penance; or inflicted by God, and then they are called punishment. We shall see this recur in another feature of the guilt-experience.

The righteousness of retributive punishment or justice is almost instinctively admitted by every reasonable person. When misdeeds entail no suffering for the offender, when crimes pass unpunished — the wicked prosper and the good succumb — there arises in every human soul the irresistible conviction that something is lacking, something wrong in the arrangement of the universe; also that such wrong cannot last forever, and that in the end it must go well with the just and ill with the evil-doer. This profound conviction is based on the idea that sin and suffering are correlatives; we mean that every sin committed necessarily entails the liability to a corresponding punishment, so that the balance of justice may be maintained. Thus, we see that what we observed to be an observable fact of psychology, that to every guilt-experience there is a corresponding conviction of the unavoidability of an associated punishment — these ethical facts of experience are borne out in the very rational arguments that are alleged by theologians for the reasonableness of a place like Hell where all these disequillibria will be righted.

Therefore, we can conclude to another detail in the *macula* of the offense by observing that in every such experience of guilt the offender stands before a tribunal within himself and is convicted long before the legalities of civil society have taken their exactions. This tribunal operates even in situations in which society will never be heard; it condemns us for our disloyalties to our friends, for the uncharitable and impatient thoughts that we have been responsible for. This explains in itself the very therapeutic nature of sacramental confession because it is merely the articulation of an experience that we have already had ourselves when we delivered the internal word of condemnation against ourselves facing the tribunal in our own souls. Here too resides the real root for the sublimity of forgiveness — forgiveness given by a friend for something that we find so repellent in ourselves. We esteem a great act of forgiveness because we realize that the forgiver has had a true estimate of the gravity of the offense and yet offers us so much love in return for something that harasses our souls and makes us appear so defiled before the tribunal of our own personalities. We are told in the Gospels that he loves much to whom much has been forgiven and the proportion and dimensions of his love are measured by the depths of his own knowledge of the *macula* that is present in his soul because of the perversion of his nature by sin. This certainly shows the wisdom of Christ in instituting the Sacrament of Penance which introduced into the economy of salvation a tribunal that merely externalized the tribunal that is ever present in ourselves.

We still have two other features of the guilt-experience to which we would like to allude. In all literature the notion of pollution, of defilement, of desecration has always been associated with sin. We never saw this so clearly as we did when we read Von Hildebrand's work on Purity. These characteristics, of course, receive additional meaning when we understand that the body is the Temple of the Holy Ghost and that the same body is to be the recipient of the sacraments and the helpmate of the soul in supernatural progress towards God. But here in Moral Philosophy we are prescinding from our elevation by grace and merely considering a fact of psychology that we do look upon an offense as something defiling and polluting. We need not refer to some of the words which parents themselves use in referring to certain actions as "dirty," "filthy," etc. There is a deep reason beyond this attribution of such terms to sins other than those against the sixth commandment. It is the conviction that we are being false to ourselves and to our personalities by defiling them by sin. Anthropologists so frequently have observed this identification of offenses to individuals as causing certain forms of uncleanness in the individuals. Rituals of ablutions and cleansing have always been associated with specific offenses. Why?

A. E. Taylor refers to a very interesting observation made by Dr. Edwyn Bevan in a suggestive essay on "Dirt" from a book entitled *Hellenism and Christianity.* Dr. Bevan says that philosophers have taken far too little account of the fact that this specific emotional reaction of the polluting nature of certain offenses seems characteristic of humanity of all ages and at all levels of civilization. The philosophers tend to treat the "moral sense" too exclusively as a sense of obligation, and the mental disquiet occasioned by wrong-doing as only an uneasy consciousness of violated or neglected obligation. They seem hardly even to have tried to fathom the significance of the standing association in popular language between *sin* and *uncleanness.* It is certainly true that the man who is sorry for having done wrong does not only feel that he has violated an obligation; he feels unclean.

Saint Thomas has shown in addition how it is not always the sins that are the most destructive of our moral being that are commonly abhorred as particularly "vile." Gross sexual offenses, marked pettinesses, are commonly felt as "viler" than the more ruinous sins of spiritual pride, and self-complacency. St. Thomas says in the Summa, IIa IIae q. 117, art. 2 ad 2um: "non semper in actibus humanis illud est gravius quod est turpius. Decor enim hominis est ex ratione; et ideo turpiora sunt peccata carnalia, quibus caro dominatur rationi, quamvis peccata spiritualia sint graviora, quia procedunt ex majori contemptu." It is often pointed out that in Dante's Hell Ulysses and Bertrand de Born are placed lower down than Semiramis or Cleopatra, or Brunetto Latini.

Now we venture to say that this ethical fact by which pollution is ascribed to an offense can only be adequately explained in terms of a defilement of something which is noble and sublime. Just as we do not refer to something in the material order as being "dirty" unless it bears some relation to our body and has the capacity to defile it, e. g., a piece of moist clay, so nothing in the moral order can strictly be called desecrating unless there be implied the sanctity and sublimity of the rational soul in man as the "imago Dei." Nothing can be really morally "dirty" and "filthy" but a defiled rational soul. This is the root explanation for the polluting quality that we assign to offenses and this is the testimony of the examples that we could accumulate from the Old Testament and from the Greek classics as well. The guilt-experience is one which manifests the presence of a stain, a *macula,* which is impressed upon the soul and leaves there an indelible imprint so that its abiding effect is felt long after the commission of the offense. We see how the guilt-feeling is one that touches the soul so intimately because it is so incongruous with the nature of the rational principle which testifies to itself in this reaction as the "imago Dei." This sense of the ugliness of sin and of its peculiar polluting effect has always been present in the psychological behaviour of people and although we may attempt to consider that moral values will become more and more rationalized and that eventually these feelings will be looked upon as the "improper response" to certain offenses, certainly we can get little comfort from the evidence of the past, from the Old Testament and from the Greek classics. It is not only the overt action alone that gives testimony of the polluting nature of the offense; we experience it also in the case of the unworthy desire or thought, even the desire which is consistently repressed before it can exert any influence upon the external act. Any explanation of this reaction in terms of community scorn and dislike is a gross simplification and a distortion of the psychological evidence. Why should we feel this reaction to something which can never come within the purview of the community? Why do we feel this defiling quality in our souls when the action is purely interior and we see no consequences at all flowing from such a sin? Why do we suffer all the more when the defilement touches ourselves in the deepest reaches of our souls and the only observer is God Himself? If this polluting feature associated with the offense arose from the reaction that the community has assigned to it then should the act have no relationship at all with the community or with its reactions, then certainly we ought to be delivered from the judgment of conscience. But it is precisely here that we are most tormented and that the immanence of this experience asserts itself all the more. Why? The obvious truth is that we are again giving witness to the presence of a "*macula*" in our souls that has defiled them as they should not be defiled. We cannot escape our own personalities.

We can easily understand that any ethical system that would overlook the evidence that is so universal, so constant, so uniform in psychology would be dreadfully inadequate. A system that would frame its explanations of the psychology of the guilt-experience according to the judgments of the community or according to the hypotheses of a natural animal psychology would be a morality built on untruths. A morality has to be in accord with the testimony of the person and for that reason has to be a morality that is inward and metaphysical. Such a morality has to recognize that in the spontaneous and yet often very permanent reactions to guilt the person is testifying to the presence of a "macula" on his person which participates in the very nature of his incommunicable personality. It perdures because his personality perdures, because the *macula* is a stain that should not be on the soul of one redeemed by the blood of Jesus Christ.

Let us conclude with some remarks on the final feature of this guilt-experience. Just as we do not have a quality without a substance so we do not have a pollution or a stain unless we have something polluted, something stained. The subject that is defiled and desecrated (the terms are again Von Hildebrand's) is the personality which ethical experience would look upon as the ideal self but which we realize to be the *imago Dei*. In the offense that we have committed we have in some way poisoned the most sublime and noble part of ourselves. We recognize that we have been untrue to ourselves and ultimately have been false to a person of supreme excellence. Every offense in some way becomes an act of treason. It is ridiculous to say that we have been treasonous to a community or to a mere abstract frigid ideal. It is precisely because the final reference of this experience of guilt is not directed to God that so many ethical systems are inadequate. The procession is unavoidable — Sin — Macula — Personality — God. Eliminate any one of them and you have a perversion of psychology and morality. Sin brings us so strikingly in touch with the centrality of our own personality and with the very personalities of God. We must be true to psychology and metaphysics by maintaining that this is the only satisfying explanation of the guilt-experience.

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JOHN OF SALISBURY

I. EARLY LIFE AND STUDIES

It is difficult to imagine a man who was held as a friend by Popes, Archbishops, Bishops, Abbots, and Kings; who received the highest praise as a scholar from the learned Masters under whom he studied; and who wrote books that have been widely circulated and read from his time even up to the present. Such a man is indeed unique, but that the same individual should be revered despite the fact that he rebuked those in high places both civil and ecclesiastical, and whose personality was such that he was never, during his life nor after its cessation, a figure of controversy, makes him even more remarkable. Those that wrote about this man while he lived and down through the years seem to vie with each other to lend luster to his name. He has been called the most widely read man of his age[1] and the most learned classical scholar of the period.[2] We are told that his mind revealed encyclopedic learning and a catholic taste, and that his memory was more richly stored than any but the largest medieval libraries.[3] His works are characterized as examples of taste and style and he is recognized as being the most accomplished Latin stylist of the twelfth century.[4] In addition to his learning and written accomplishments, he has been acknowledged as a man of profound wisdom, firmly established in the fear and love of God.[5] Another insight into his character is given by the eminent scholar C. C. J. Webb who calls this extraordinary medieval giant of learning, a man of deep yet sober piety and quiet humor . . . convinced that the highest function of knowledge is to be an instrument of the good life.[6] Moreover, this outstanding product of the twelfth century is recognized as being the unrivalled master of the thumbnail sketch, witty and pointed, often charitable, occasionally unkind.[7] His works are regarded as the finest monument of the literary and humanistic culture to come from the influence of Chartres, then at the zenith of its fame.[8] These facts permit us to understand why he was the central figure of English learning of his time[9] and why his works stand nearly alone in medieval literature for the wide circle of readers to whom they appeal.[10]

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[1] *The Historia Pontificalis, John of Salisbury's Memoirs of the Papal Court* in Nelson's *Medieval Texts*, Translated by Marjorie Chibnall, London, 1956, xxxi.

[2] *The Letters of John of Salisbury*, Edited by W. J. Miller, S. J. and H. E. Butler, Revised by C. N. L. Brooke, Vol. I, London, 1955, xlii.

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] *The Historia Pontificalis, op. cit.*, xi.

[5] Benedict of Peterborough, *Materials for the History of Thomas Becket*, Rolls Series, 67. Also *Materials for the History of Thomas Becket, Archbishop of Canterbury*, Edited by J. C. Robertson, 7 Vols., Rolls Series, 1875—85.

[6] C. C. J. Webb, *John of Salisbury*, London, 1932, p. 177.

When the reign of Henry the First of England had reached about the middle of its course there was born at Old Salisbury, or Old Sarum, which was located on a neighboring hill to present-day Salisbury which has since been built up on the banks of the Avon, a boy who was known as Johannes Parvus, John Little or Short. Later the boy was to say in connection with his name: "Little in name, less in skill, least in worth."[11] However, history rarely accords the above surname to him and he is commonly referred to as John of Salisbury. The date of his birth formerly has been calculated from his death in 1180, at which time it was believed that he was seventy years old. Thus, the date of his birth was set at 1110. Further research makes it seem more probable to set his natal year between 1115 and 1120.[12] From his own testimony we learn that in 1136 on the occasion of his going to Paris he was only an *adolescens admodum*.[13] In regard to his lineage we have but meager facts, knowing nothing concerning his father. In one of his numerous letters,[14] we are informed that his mother, in a dying condition, welcomed him and his brother, Richard, back to England in 1170, the year when King Henry II and St. Thomas Becket were briefly reconciled at Fréteval, thus permitting the brothers to return to England after seven years' exile on the continent.

His brother Richard it seems left England in 1163 with John but soon returned to Exeter. Later, in 1166, he joined John and the two brothers were together during the last years of John's exile. Richard in later life became a canon regular of Merton in Surrey.

Robert, the son of Aegidia, is thought to have been a half-brother or very close relative of John of Salisbury. The only other kinsmen we know about are the son of Robert and a relative called Richard.[15] We do know that members of John's family held positions with the Chapters of Salisbury and Exeter, and that John himself held the treasurership of Exeter.

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[7] *The Letters of John of Salisbury, op. cit.*, xvi.

[8] *Op. cit.*, xiii.

[9] Webb, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

[10] Reginald Lane Poole, *Illustrations of the History of Medieval Thought*, London, 1884.

[11] Webb, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

[12] *Ibid.*; Also *The Letters of John of Salisbury*, xii.

[13] *Metalogicon*, Edited by C. C. J. Webb, Oxford, 1929, ii, 10.

[14] Webb, *John of Salisbury*, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

[15] Webb, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

As a little boy, he was sent to a priest to study and to learn the Psalter. In addition to pedagogy this clergyman dabbled in magic and included his students in his performances. John was uncooperative as an assistant, he tells us [16] and he refused to see anything in the sessions of magic except the common objects employed in staging the affairs, so he was finally excluded from the exhibitions of his teacher. John relates that eventually his instructor ceased to have anything to do with such unsavory affairs.

In the *Metalogicon*[17] John informs us that he went to France the year after the glorious King of the English, Henry the Lion of Righteousness, departed from human things. Here he had the remarkable good fortune to study under Abelard or as John styles him, 'the Peripatetic of Palais' because of his Aristotelian leanings and his Breton birthplace. John commenced his formal studies under this master who was lecturing at Mount Sainte Geneviève and at his feet John acquired the first rudiments of the dialectical art.[18] This place of study was the popular one of its day due to the vast influence of Abelard and in time it became the University that is so justly famed even today, and its site is the Latin Quarter of the present.

When, according to John, Abelard who was fifty-seven years old departed 'all too hastily'[19] John joined himself to the students of Master Alberic.[20] This Alberic says John was 'the bitterest opponent of the nominal sect.'[21] While he was at the Mount he also studied under his compatriot, Robert of Melun. Despite his English origin this Master was known by the name of the town close to Paris where he taught. John tells us that both teachers were 'of sharp intellect and in study unconquerable.'[22] However, while the one was in questions 'subtle and large, the other [was] in responses lucid, short and agreeable.'[23] With these two John applied himself for the full space of two years 'to practice in the commonplaces and rules and other rudimentary elements, which are instilled into the minds of boys and wherein the aforesaid doctors were most able and ready; so that methought I knew all these things as well as my nails and fingers.'[24] Then John taking cognizance of his learning resorted to the Grammarian of Conches, William of Conches, 'and heard his teaching for the space of three years; the while reading much, nor shall I ever regret that time.'[25] Thus we see that after diligently studying dialectic John turned to the pursuit of grammar. His instructor was also the tutor of the noble who later was to become King Henry II and John's sovereign. John does not tell us where he attended the lectures of William of Conches but from the many descriptive passages it is almost certain that the scene is Chartres. At this outstanding school John pursued the subjects embraced by the *Trivium* namely, grammar, rhetoric and logic. From the first of the Seven Liberal Arts, John went on to attend the lectures given by Richard l'Évêque, who later became Bishop of Avranches, who also communicated to him the subjects of the *Quadrivium*, arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and music. Concerning Richard l'Évêque, John relates that he was 'a man whose training was deficient almost in nothing, who had more heart even than speech, more knowledge than skill, more truth than vanity, more virtue than show'[26] and John says that he 'learned that which I had not heard before and which appertain to the *Quadrivium* wherein I had for some time followed the German Hardwin. I read also again rhetoric, which aforetime I had scarce understood when it was treated of meagerly by Master Theodoric [the brother of Bernard of Chartres, who had been chancellor of Chartres before Bernard held this same post] . . . The same I afterwards received more plenteously at the hand of Peter Helias.'[27] This last Master was a well-known commentator of Priscian and to him John acknowledges his debt for a deepened knowledge of rhetoric. During John's student days at Chartres, it appears that he came to know the renowned Gilbert de la Porrée, who was later to become the Bishop of Poitiers. John in his *Historia Pontificalis*[28] indicates that he knew both Gilbert de la Porrée and St. Bernard of Clairvaux and that he attended the celebrated theological discussion between the two.

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[16] *Policraticus sive de nugis curialium et vestigiis philosophorum*, Edited by C. C. J. Webb, 2 Vols., Oxford, 1909, ii, 28.

[17] *Metalogicon*, ii, 10.

[18] *Ibid.*

[19] *Ibid.*

[20] There is confusion as to the identity of Alberic. B. Hauréau, *Histoire de la Philosophie scholastique* I, p. 430 does not hold that this Master is Alberic of Rheims. Hauréau also distinguishes the Alberic mentioned by John from Alberic de Porta Veneris. Alberic of Rheims is mentioned by John in *Metalogicon* i, 5 but he in no way identifies this Alberic with his Master at Mount Sainte Geneviève.

[21] *Metalogicon, op. cit.*, ii, 10.

[22] *Ibid.*

[23] *Ibid.*

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[24] *Ibid.*

[25] *Ibid.*

[26] *Ibid.*

[27] *Ibid.*

[28] *Historia Pontificalis*, c. 12.

Around the year 1140, John divulges that he went back to Paris where he 'received the children of noble persons to instruct, who furnished me with a living — for I lacked the help of friends and kinsfolk but God assuaged my neediness — the force of duty and the instance, of my pupils moved me the oftener to recall what I had learned.'[29] In addition to acting as a tutor, John continued to study as a private student. At this time he made the acquaintance of Adam du Petit Pont, an Englishman who eventually was known as the Bishop of Saint Asaph. This Master gained his name from the fact that his school was located on the bridge connecting the City of Paris with what is now termed the Latin Quarter. John says, 'I made closer acquaintance with Master Adam, a man of exceeding sharp wits, and, whatever others may think, of much learning, who applied himself above the rest to Aristotle, in such wise, that although I didn't have him as a teacher, he gave me kindly of his, and delivered himself openly enough, the which he was wont to do to none or to few others than his own scholars, for he was deemed to suffer from jealousy.'[30] John's opinion of the personal learning of this Master was very high, so lofty, in fact that he placed him on a par with Abelard and Gilbert de la Porrée.[31] However, vastly different was John's regard for Adam as a writer for John condemns Adam's intended obscure and veiled manner of writing by saying that 'although his friends and advocates ascribe this to subtlety, most have explained it as proceeding from the folly or arrogance of a vain man.'[32] To make certain that his position is understood John remarks that 'I was his familiar by constant intercourse and exchange of books, and by almost daily discussion upon such topics of discourse as sprang up. But I was his disciple not for one day.'[33] It is interesting to note that John had a pupil, William of Soissons, who later became a student of Adam du Petit Pont.

At this point John left Paris for an undetermined stay, but feeling that he should investigate theology he once more made his way back to the same city. As his instructor in this subject as well as in logic John chose his old friend, Gilbert de la Porrée, who had moved from Chartres to Paris. He tells us that 'at the expiration of three years, I found Master Gilbert and heard him in logic and divinity, but too quickly was he removed.'[34] We learn that despite the exit of his teacher John of Salisbury still continued his studies for as he says, 'His [Gilbert de la Porrée] successor was Robert Pullus, whom his life and knowledge alike recommended. Then I had Simon of Poissy, a trusty lecturer, but dull in disputation. But these two I had in theologics alone. Thus, engaged in diverse studies near twelve years passed by me.'[35]

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[29] *Metalogicon*, ii, 10.
[30] *Ibid.*
[31] *Metalogicon*, iii, *prol.*
[32] *Metalogicon*, iv, 3.
[33] *Metalogicon*, iii, 3.

At the conclusion of his days of formal study John decided to return to the scene of his early labors. He reports that 'it seemed pleasant to me to revisit my old companions on the Mount, whom I had left and whom dialectic still detained, to confer with them touching old matters of debate; that we might by mutual comparison measure together our several progress. I found them as before, and where they were before; nor did they appear to have reached the goal in unraveling the old questions, nor had they added one jot of a proposition. The aims that once inspired them, inspired them still; they only had progressed in one point, they had unlearned moderation, they knew not modesty; in such wise that one might despair of their recovery. And thus experience taught me a manifest conclusion, that, whereas dialectic furthers other studies, so if it remain by itself it lies bloodless and barren, nor does it quicken the soul to yield fruit of philosophy, except the same conceive from elsewhere.'[36] Thus John expresses the regret he has for the lack of progress in studies among his former instructors.

About this time John paid yet another visit. This time he went for awhile to see his friend, Peter of Celle, who was now the abbot of the Cistercian monastery of Moustier la Celle near Rheims. At Rheims in 1148 Pope Eugenius III convoked a Council and John informs us in his *Policraticus*[37] that he attended the sessions. As we have mentioned both of the disputants, Gilbert de la Porrée and St. Bernard engaged in controversy at this Council and both were known and esteemed by John of Salisbury. John's *Historia Pontificalis* commences with an account of the proceedings of the Council. Here we find an account of the English King Stephen who refused to permit a Cardinal Legate to cross his realm on the way from Ireland to the Continent. This same King came under censure for excluding the Archbishop of York from his See and refusing to permit Bishops and Abbots to answer the papal summons to Rheims. The Archbishop of Canterbury, although he had been forced to escape from England in a fishing boat, begged the Pope to be lenient in behalf of his Sovereign. King Stephen, who escaped excommunication solely because of the Archbishop's intercession, was extremely displeased that a prelate of his realm attended the Council and made light of the Archbishop's pleas on his behalf. In turn, the Pope suspended from their positions those English Bishops and Abbots who had not attended the Council, but again on the request for a milder decision by Archbishop Theobald the decree was not enforced. For his participation in the Council, Archbishop Theobald was banished from England. John's account of the Council tells in detail the matter under consideration, but he often includes some asides that lend color to the affairs. He relates that the attending clergy was very disconcerted and took as an omen of grave disaster the fact that the server at the Pope's Mass spilled on the carpet the wine in the chalice. The marriage case of Count Ralph of Vermandois comes in for a prolonged discussion, but the event in which John and his friend Peter of Celle were most interested was the controversy between St. Bernard and Gilbert de la Porrée.

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[34] *Ibid.*
[35] *Ibid.*
[36] *Metalogicon*, ii, 10.
[37] *Policraticus*, ii, 22.

II. ADMINISTRATIVE CAREER

John gives the year in which he attended the Council of Rheims as the beginning of his administrative career, and well it might be, for here he met and made the acquaintance of many highly placed dignitaries. Shortly after the Council, John obtained a letter of recommendation from St. Bernard to Archbishop Theobald which John was later to use to obtain admission to the Archbishop's service as secretary, which post he held for seven years, and where he met Thomas Becket whom he was also to serve in the same capacity. St. Bernard, in writing to Archbishop Theobald,[38] speaks of John as 'my friend and my friends' friend'. The letter acquaints the Archbishop with the fact that John was well-educated but also divulges that he is in a poverty-striken state. Despite the expression in regard to John's lack of finances, John did not present this letter to the Archbishop until after a considerable lapse of time for in the meantime he was employed by Pope Eugenius III until his death in 1153, and by his successor, Pope Anastasius IV, in a clerical capacity which included drafting and completing official documents.

In 1154, John left the Papal employ and entered the service of Archbishop Theobald. Although this made a change of residence, John was to store up in his encyclopedic memory the many persons and events of his stay at Rome, and later he was to pass them on to us in the form of a book concerning the affairs at the Papal Court. For the duration of about twenty years John was to consider his residence to be at Canterbury, despite the fact that the official business of his patron frequently necessitated his absence and for seven years he was forced into exile when his future employer, Archbishop Thomas Becket clashed with Henry II. Because of the wide scope of John's cultural background and because of the number and rank of his friends in Rome, John was kept active in the service of Archbishop Theobald. In the *Metalogicon*[39] John relates that 'I have ten times passed the chain of the Alps on my road from England; I have twice traversed Apulia. The business of my lords and friends I have often transacted in the Roman church, and as sundry causes arose I have many times traveled not only around England but also Gaul.' During the Papacy of Adrian IV, it was John of Salisbury who obtained papal consent for Henry II's conquest of Ireland. At the request of John, his friend Nicholas Breakspear, now Adrian IV, gave him an emerald ring and a papal bull thereby conferring the investiture of Ireland on Henry II. This act of diplomacy, however, did not prevent John from falling under the royal displeasure of Henry II when John held a position differing from the King's in regard to secular and ecclesiastical jurisdiction. John's visit to Italy on the occasion of the Irish question lasted from September 1155 to February 1156, and many and varied were the transactions he undertook for his patron. Three months of this time he spent with the Pope at Benevento. On his trip home, John remained for awhile with Peter of Celle. However, the winters of 1156—7 and 1158—9 saw John back in Rome again in the service of the Archbishop Theobald. Because of these visits, the King held John responsible for the carrying of affairs from England to Rome. In order to obtain jurisdiction over ecclesiastical affairs King Henry had appointed a member of Theobald's household, namely the Archdeacon of Canterbury, Thomas Becket, as his Chancellor. To abate the royal displeasure cast upon him, John appealed to the Pope, Archbishop Theobald and Chancellor Thomas Becket to plead his case with the King. During the time of inactivity with regard to administrative affairs occasioned by this rupture with the King, John was not idle and he put the interim to good use and produced two books and two poems, all of which will be discussed in the following pages.

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[38] St. Bernard, *Epist.* 361.

When John was once again restored to royal favor, he took up his activities in the Archbishop's Curia as confidential secretary. No extant document accords any special title to John at the court but the very nature of the documents which he drafted precludes his being a mere clerk. The extant letters of John of Salisbury are of a very confidential nature and only one close to the Archbishop would have been entrusted with the information contained therein. His extant letters include the statement of cases, statements of legal decisions, letters of advice, letters of admonition, petitions to the Holy See and these give clear indication of the nature of the work entrusted to the openly-conceded most educated member of the Archbishop's court. About one half of the correspondence of John in his official capacity is addressed to the Roman Curia, while the remainder is to the King, to the higher and lesser clergy, and to laymen. During John's time at Theobald of Bec's and Thomas of Canterbury's courts, the number of appeals from the metropolitan to the Pope reached a previously unheard of multiplicity especially from 1140 onward. The majority of cases handled by John concerned the jurisdiction over parish churches, appeals on matters of ecclesiastical discipline, cases in regard to the rights over schools, and those regarding the administration of oaths, laws concerning marriage cases and laws in connection with inheritances.

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[39] *Metalogicon*, iii, *prol.*

Today we may wonder why this great impetus in cases addressed to the Curia occurred. Some appeals were written to postpone a decision which might not have been welcomed, others were addressed to the highest court in hopes of gaining Papal sanction, while still others which were sent to Rome had the advantages afforded by the Papal Court alone. Local court sessions were apt to be prolonged and characterized by tedious objections and counter objections, while such debate was usually eliminated in the cut and dried procedures of the Curia.

Archbishop Theobald was appointed a Papal representative and he was given the right to try certain cases, with the hope that the number requiring decisions in Rome be lessened. Around the year 1150, the Archbishop took the administration of the possessions of the monks of Christ Church, Canterbury into his own hand at their request in an effort to restore their precarious financial situation to its former economy. As time went on, they failed to appreciate the strictness with which the Archbishop dealt with their property and so they demanded that he return the control of their affairs to them. A sharp difference of opinion occurred and Theobald of Bec threatened to depose the prior, Walter de Meri, alias Walter Parvus, who had been appointed in 1149. The Prior sent his case to Rome on August 24, 1153, and Theobald arrested the Prior and placed an interdict on the cathedral. A peaceful settlement of the affair soon followed and the Prior was deposed by the Archbishop. The following is an extract from the letter[40] which the Archbishop forwarded to the monks around September 1153:

> He offends most grievously against Christ who strives to disturb those things which have been done for the peace of His church; for to Him a place where brethren dwell in unity is pleasing above all others. We have always loved the peace of the church of Canterbury; by God's blessing our charity towards our brethren has grown from day to day, and we desire that after our time every ground for offence be taken from them. Guided by our conscience, we have appointed (to the best of our ability) suitable guardians to rule the Order, men through whose ministry religion has by God's grace been increased for many a year, while your external possessions have been administered in a more praiseworthy fashion than they were wont to be. . . . As for Walter whom we have removed from the office of prior for his own fault, not that of the church, we now debar him in perpetuity from holding the offices in the church of Canterbury . . . And if he behaves well in his private capacity, we do not forbid him to be promoted to other obediences in our church, or to the rule of another church provided that he does not aspire to the office of prior or subprior and the other keys of the Order which we have forbidden him . . .

Some other letters written by John of Salisbury for the Archbishop reveal to us the story that the church of Chilham (Kent) had been given to the monks of St. Bertin (near St. Omer in Flanders) by William of Ypres in the course of the anarchy, and a ratification of the transaction had been forcefully obtained from Archbishop Theobald. The affair was not limited to coercion for there were two more complications to the affair. The church of Chilham which William of Ypres had disposed of was not his to give, and in addition he had given it to one of his followers called Odo as well as to the monks of St. Bertin, and both parties were sharing the revenues. The Archdeacon of Canterbury, Roger, forbade the monks to accept their share. When Henry II became King, the property was given to Hugh of Dover. Archbishop Theobald then received a papal mandate telling him to evict Hugh and to restore the property to the monks of St. Bertin. The Archbishop called upon his confidential secretary to appeal the case of Hugh to Rome, but before a decision was obtained another official letter from Rome ordered Theobald to make instant restitution of the property to the monks, whereupon Theobald took the property into his own hands until a settlement of the case was effected. In part John's letter[41] written for the Archbishop reads:

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[40] *The Letters of John of Salisbury*, Letter 1, p. 1.
[41] Letter 23, p. 37.

> In accordance with the mandate of your holiness we have diligently impressed upon the noble Hugh of Dover that he must restore the church of Chilham to the monks of St. Bertin, who complained that he had violently and without process of law taken it from them, although it was the lawful property of the monastery. In answer he promised that he would obey the Apostolic mandates and the law in every way and with the utmost devotion, but at the same time he sought to prove that the petitions addressed to you by the monks were in many respects false. First, he asserted that the church was not the lawful possession of the monastery . . . the monks had never possessed the church in their own name, but in that of a certain Odo, for whom that notorious tyrant and most grievous persecutor of our church, William of Ypres, had by some means or other secured leave to enter on possession, after ousting the feudal overlord from his inheritance.

The second letter in regard to the same affair[42] says in part:

> . . we therefore showing the obedience and respect due to your mandates, despite the fact that the knight [Hugh of Dover] continued to offer himself for trial, and the monks on the other hand shrank from the result of a judgement, sequestrated the church with all its appurtenances, even at some risk to ourselves, retaining it in our hand, until such time as the truth of the matter should be known to you, and your will more fully known to us.

Further correspondence between England and Rome followed and in the end a compromise was reached and Hugh of Dover himself granted the church to the monks.

Another case that required lengthy correspondence was the dispute between Philip, Abbot of l'Aumône, and the Abbot of Waverley, which seems to have concerned a schism in the Abbey of Waverley. It appears that Kingswood Abbey was a daughter house of Tintern Abbey, Tintern and Waverley Abbeys of the Abbey of l'Aumône, and l'Aumône of Cîteaux. There was a meeting of the English Cistercian Abbots at Kirkstead, at which Philip Abbot of l'Aumône, Henry Abbot of Waverley and Pain Abbot of Tetbury (Kingswood) were present to settle the dispute between the Abbots of l'Aumône and Waverley. Finally, the case was referred to the Archbishop for settlement and John of Salisbury composed the following document which reads in part:[43]

> To our sons most beloved in the Lord, all the abbots that are sprung from the mother house of Waverley, greetings. We have written to admonish those brothers who, casting off their obedience to their abbot, listened to the voice of another to whom they were not tied by any bond of profession, and departed with him from the congregation and unity of their monastery. Nonetheless, we are told that they persist in their schism to the disgrace of

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[42] Letter 24, p. 40.
[43] Letter 106, pp. 168, 169.

> your Order and to the injury of the chapter of Cîteaux (to which the abbot of Waverley appealed); and despising our admonition, they continue to persecute the abbot . . . I would have you order these same brothers by our authority to return, and make it their study by the bond of charity, by the fruit of obedience and in unity of spirit, to bind up the wound that has cloven their mother in twain. But, if despising our command, they prefer to persist in their schism, we shall ratify the sentence which their abbot has canonically pronounced, and shall by the grace of God cause it to be inviolably observed throughout the English realm.

Some of the extant letters of John of Salisbury were not directly connected with his secretarial duties. Such a letter of a personal nature is the one sent by John to his close friend, Peter of Celle at the time when he wanted his friend's opinion on the newly completed *Policraticus*. The book was completed about the time of the siege of Toulouse which occurred around July to September 1159. William Brito had the text for a time and then it was forwarded to the Abbot of Celle shortly afterwards. John writes to Peter:[44]

> Virtue lays it down that all the property of friends should be shared between them, and the judgement of wisdom excludes from the shrine of friendship all those who claim even their feelings as their own rather than their friends . . . Therefore, since I have professed myself to be your friend I gladly acknowledge our partnership of mind and possessions, save for the trouble of spirit which has been engendered in me by the long and mysterious malady of my lord and father [Archbishop Theobald had become seriously ill in 1155 and from then until his death he was never free from sickness] — from the misery of which I desire all my friends to be more immune as they have been more near and dear to me in loyalty and truth. Let this then, as it should, be mine and mine alone; for it is not to your profit that it should be yours . . . I have published a book about the trifles of courtiers and the footsteps of the philosophers, which please me or displease me according to the judgement you pass upon it. It is unpolished and, as I have proclaimed, it desires to be corrected by you friends of mine. It was speeding on its way to the illustrious chancellor of the English king, but do you keep it back unless you approve of its proceeding on its journey. For it is a garrulous piece of work, and such as will scarce find a single friend at court. But I should not like to make me an enemy to the courtiers. I beg you to start on its improvement without delay, and as soon as it has received your castigation, send it back to your expectant friend . . .

In his administration of justice the Archbishop did not seek to curb abuses among the male members of his flock alone, but his censures extended to Consecrated women as well. From recorded history we are acquainted with the affair of September 7, 1159 when a double election to the Papacy occurred in Rome. The Emperor chose as lawful ruler of

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[44] Letter 111, pp. 180—2.

Christendom, Victor IV, but the rest of Europe accepted Alexander III who was officially recognized by late 1160. The Abbess of Amesbury for reasons of expediency did not prefer the latter for the Chair of Peter. In reprimand the Archbishop had John of Salisbury pen the following epistle:[45]

> When in defiance of all law ecclesiastics violate the ordinances of the Church, they deserve all the heavier punishment, since they seem to come near to the crime of sacrilege and the guilt of apostasy. The rigour of the law is deservedly enforced against those who under the habit of religion and an impious mask of piety seek to subvert justice with impunity. We have often heard that you have conceived such designs; but if what is said be true, your impiety is now breaking out openly and you rejoice alike in the Roman schism and in our infirmity in order that you may exercise your audacity in doing hurt to the innocent. But God has power to restore peace to His Church, to relieve our suffering at His good pleasure and to answer you as you deserve. We had postponed the penalty of suspension for a time, but I am informed that you will not suffer the penalty to be suspended any longer. For you are striving to tear to pieces the statutes of the Apostolic See and you are inciting the axe that is in haste to hew away the very root of our foundation. For it is an established fact that our beloved son Jordan, treasurer of the church of Salisbury, was confirmed by Pope Adrian in possession of the church of Froyle, and you, as his complaint informs me, have, to the injury of the Apostolic See and of ourselves, presumed to deprive him by violence and armed force, a thing which does not become any woman, nun, or religious. Since we cannot default in our administration of justice, we instruct and command you that without delay you restore the church with all that you have taken from him or else appear before us on the octave of the Assumption of the Blessed Mary to answer the charges against you. For although we might lawfully punish your disobedience, we prefer to wait in patience for you to make speedy reparation of your errors and thus deserve to escape the scourge that hangs over you . . .

The Abbess of Amesbury did not heed this letter from the Archbishop and so John directed another letter[46] to the recalcitrant lady:

> The authority of the king compels me to punish a wrong done to the holy Roman Church and an affront to the king's majesty, not to say to ourselves. That we might not be forced to do this, we admonished you with fatherly mildness to restore to our beloved son Jordan, the treasurer, his possession of the church of Froyle, which is known to have been confirmed to him by the Roman Church during the papacy of the blessed Adrian, and from which you, after the ordinance of our lord the king and in contempt of the Roman Church, ejected him with violence and without any process of law, as his repeated complaint makes clear. Since you still persist in your

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[45] Letter 114, pp. 187, 188.
[46] Letter 115, p. 189.

> contumacy, we instruct and command you that, in accordance with the mandate of our lady the queen which you have received, you should suffer Jordan to hold the church . . . Otherwise we shall not be able to pass over with impunity the contempt which you show for the Roman Church . . . Further by the authority of the Roman Church and of ourselves we forbid you to disperse the tithes and goods of the church until the matter has been investigated in a court of law.

Upon occasion it was required that the Archbishop through his confidential secretary send words of a sympathetic nature rather than those of reprimand. Such is the case in the letter to the Chapter of Exeter gathered to elect a new bishop:[47]

> Although we sympathise with your bereavement with all a father's compassion, yet we have this great solace for the grief with which it has filled our hearts. We believe that your blessed father has passed to the world above, where by his prayers (which are the same as of old but now of greater efficacy) he will win protection both for us and you from the Father of all mercies. But since the widowed state of your church thus left desolate cannot be prolonged without peril of souls and loss of possessions, we ask you, beloved, and exhort you in the Lord to be of one mind and diligently to avoid all occasion of scandal and schism, walking in the house of the Lord in unity of spirit, and preferring the things which are of Christ Jesus to all private interests.

The ill health of the Archbishop caused him to call all the members of his court to residence at Canterbury. His summons was not heeded by one member, Thomas Becket, who was absent with Henry II, as his Chancellor. To remedy this state of affairs, Theobald instructed John of Salisbury to write the following[48] in order to effect the return of the Archdeacon of Canterbury:

> On every side we hear the clash of kingdoms, new shapes of things swim into view, and, owing to our sins, evil increases ever more and more. We are filled with special anxiety for your safety, on which the safety of so many peoples depends — an anxiety which day and night afflicts our mind, more even than the scourge of God which by His grace now lacerates our body. We are compelled to enquire by our messenger (would we could see it with our eyes!) how things stand with you. We remember that we implored you, that, since the evils of these days deny us your bodily presence, you would at least allow our archdeacon to return to us, the first of our counsellors and our only stay. He ought to have come even without our summons and would have been convicted of disobedience before the eyes of God and men, did not your needs excuse him. But since we have always set your will before our own, and have resolved to do so as long as it is possible, we

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[47] Letter 117, p. 191.

[48] Letter 120, pp. 197, 198.

condone his offence, because it was your will; and we are willing for him to continue in your service so long as necessity demand it. We command him to devote all his loyalty and diligence to meet your need, on the understanding that as soon as you can dispense with his assistance you will please to permit him to return.

This letter and others written in the same vein did not effect the return to England of Thomas Becket, so among John's correspondence we find a message which he sent in his own name to the Chancellor written with the hope that Thomas might return to the service of the Archbishop:[49]

In accordance with your command, my dear friend, I had drafted my lord's letters to our lord the king and to yourself in such austere terms, that the necessity of your speedy return might be impressed upon you, unless you should prefer to be charged with disobedience and to suffer the penalty of my lord's anathema and the loss of all the possessions which the church of Canterbury has conferred upon you. But since the unexpected arrival of Hugh of Dover with the King's request coupled with promises and cajolements, I have been compelled by the urgent instructions of my lord to temper the rigor of my language and to make some concessions to necessities of state. If the statements of persons returning from overseas are true, as I pray that they may be, the King and all his court are so dependent on your counsel that there is not a hope of peace in the near future, unless your wisdom pave the way for it. This has made my lord to be at times perplexed as to the reason why our lord the King and yourself from time to time make contradictory demands and give different reasons in your letters for hastening or postponing your return, seeing that common report and rumor seems to indicate that you are so strongly of one heart and mind, that in view of such intimate friendship your desires and dislikes must coincide. He also has sometimes asked whether there may not be some collusion between you in this matter. But I think I have an inkling of the truth, and realize almost as vividly as if I were on the spot what your situation is in the midst of your labors in a distant land. And so when I was compelled to cancel the letters I had already drafted, I began to doubt whether it would not be better to keep back my messenger rather than send him at once. But because he had already received the license, which we had contrived to get in advance, and was on the point of setting out, I at length decided to explore your feelings; and I have managed to send letters, which I have made as urgent as I could, though they make some concession to the King's will, both to yourself and to him. . . . Farewell, and let me know what you decide. But you should realize that it is in every way expedient for you to return before our lord dies, even if you have to cross the sea at once. Fare you well again and always. God knows that he for whom the archbishop makes this petition is entirely ignorant of all that I have told you.

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[49] Letter 128, pp. 221, 222.

The Archbishop was unaware that his personal secretary had written to the Chancellor and since the Primate's health was rapidly declining he once more had John draft the following correspondence:[50]

> You have often been recalled, and you ought to have returned in answer to a single summons of your father, now old and ill. Indeed it is to be feared that God may punish your tardiness, if you shut your ears to the call of obedience, forgetting the benefits you have received and despising your father whom you should have carried on your shoulders in his sickness. You were wholly inexcusable and in great peril of our curse, had not our lord the King excused your absence on the pretext of his necessity. . . . But beware lest in any way you abuse this indulgence of mine; for you may be sure that the justice of God is not deceived by the error of any man.

John of Salisbury handled the official correspondence in connection with one of the most celebrated cases in the middle ages. It seems that William de Sackville had been betrothed to Albereda prior to his marriage to one Adelicia by whom he had begot a daughter named Mabel. Then Mabel's parents were divorced by Henry of Winchester acting on instructions from Innocent II who had ruled in regard to the technicalities which prevented the proper consumation of the marriage bond. Then arose the question as to whether or not Mabel's parents, William and and Adelicia, had been truly married, and whether she herself was legitimate. Vast and complicated was the doctrine in regard to what constituted a marriage in the 1150's and a variety of opinions was held with four expounded by Eugenius III, Hugh of St. Victor (popularized by Peter Lombard and known as the Parisian doctrine), Gratian (known as the Bolognese doctrine), and Alexander III as the most common. This case opened in the secular courts in 1158, almost immediately following the death of William de Sackville, and then was taken to the ecclesiastical courts in January 1159, due to the fact that the pivotal point of the case was in regard to canon law. The case was heard eighteen times before the Archbishop, and finally Richard of Anesty appealed to the Pope on October 18, 1160 for a decision on March 26, 1161. John of Salisbury drafted the appeal in October and November of 1160 but the message was delayed awaiting the official recognition of Alexander III in November. The Pope referred the case to judges-delegate on April 8, 1161, who decided in Richard's favor. Mabel, of course, appealed her case but she was not successful and finally in 1163 the inheritance of William de Sackville was awarded to Richard of Anesty who was declared the lawful heir. In part John's letter for Archbishop Theobald to Pope Alexander III[51] reads:

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[50] Letter 129, pp. 224, 225.

[51] Letter 131, pp. 227—237.

It is our duty to set forth the statements of the parties concerned with faithful accuracy, when causes quit us to fly to your Apostolic majesty. For this reason we have been at pains to send you a detailed account of the sequence of events in the lengthy controversy between Richard of Anesty and Mabel de Francheville as far as it has been possible to assemble the various issues that have arisen. The aforesaid Richard, kinsman of William de Sackville and his nephew, as in common parlance a sister's son is styled, in order to obtain his uncle's estate, claimed that it was his by hereditary right. In reply Mabel, William's daughter, asserted in the secular court where the suit was being tried, that a daughter's claim to her father's inheritance must be preferred to that of a nephew. Richard denied that she had any hereditary right, since she was not born in lawful wedlock, but was the child of an adulterous union. Since a question of matrimony was involved, and matrimony is annulled or confirmed in accordance with ecclesiastical law, the court of our catholic sovereign Henry II, king of the English, decreed that the case should return for judgement to an ecclesiastical court, where the question of marriage might be duly determined in accordance with canon law, which the clergy know, whereas the common people do not. In obedience to the King's command we appointed a day on which the parties should appear before us, and at length after sundry postponements which Mabel secured for divers reasons, Richard renewed his claim. To make his case more clear and prove his adversary to be illegitimate, he asserted that his uncle William entered into a contract of marriage with a certain Albereda de Tresgoz, then broke his promise and deserted her; after which he took to wife Adelicia the daughter of Amfrid the Sheriff, and by her he had Mabel and other illegitimate children. He further asserted that when William went through a form of marriage with Adelicia, Albereda his previous wife protested her claim to be his lawful wife at the marriage ceremony, forbidding her supplanter by the authority of the Church to pass into the illicit embraces of her husband. Since she failed to make herself heard by reason of the crowd and the frowardness of her husband, she approached the Bishop of Winchester, then legate of the Apostolic See, and as he testified by his letters, at length obtained his decree that her husband should leave his second partner and be restored to her.

Marriage cases, documents to erring subjects, correspondence with the King, letters to the Chancellor and the like kept John busily engaged. Coming from his pen we also have the will of Archbishop Theobald. The work under consideration is certainly not the first disposition of his earthly goods made by the eminent Churchman for we know that a similar legal draft was drawn up in the middle of the year 1155. This will is impossible to date accurately but it is assumed that it was composed between the years 1158 and 1161 and may even have been drawn up at the death bed of the Archbishop. As John drafted it, it reads in part:[52]

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[52] Letter 134, pp. 245—248.

To all the faithful of Holy Mother Church, Theobald humble minister of the holy church of Canterbury, greetings and the Lord's blessing. The law lends its support to the last wills of those who are near their end, and he who opposes and contradicts their pious desires provokes God's anger by his inhumanity. Now it is our will, which by God's blessing shall never be changed, that the residue of our movable goods, which by reason of our domestic necessities and our long sickness we have thought fit to keep to the end of our life, should be devoted in its entirety to the use of the poor, even as God has inspired us to do; and we have given instructions to this effect to our venerable brother, Walter, Bishop of Rochester, and to our faithful friends, Philip, our chancellor, Master Ralph of Lisieux and John of Salisbury whom we have appointed to distribute our alms. . . . on behalf of Almighty God and under pain of anathema we forbid any officer of our lord the king to presume to lay rash hands on any property that is dedicated for the sole use of the monks of the church of Canterbury, and we ordain that the latter shall hold all their property in that entirety and freedom, which we have caused to be confirmed to them by a privilege granted by the lord Pope and by ourselves. . . . To the monks of St. Martin of Dover and to the canons of St. Gregory at Canterbury and the other religious houses in our diocese we confirm all their rights with free disposal thereof . . . We forbid also any alienation of lands or selling of woods, until a suitable successor to us be appointed, unless such action should be ordered by the king's own mouth. Farewell, most beloved sons, and remember us in your prayers.

These excerpts give us a view of the pursuits of John of Salisbury while in the service of Archbishop Theobald. His letters after 1161, continue as a record of the Archbishop of Canterbury in the person of Thomas Becket, who in the following year was installed in that office. We know that the letters written during the period of John's employment by Archbishop Theobald were welcomed by Peter of Celle to whom they were addressed as 'one who thirsts in blazing heat, weary beyond measure of waiting for the drink so long desired, I received the goblet of your letters with eager affection, reading, rereading, ever turning back to read again; and now I have drained it to the bottom of the cup, tasting twice over the abundant sweetness of its flavor . . . If I seek wealth of opinions, sound teaching, enjoyment, verbal structure, or the truth and delight of love — all these I find in abundance in your letters'.

III. LATER LIFE AND SECOND LITERARY PERIOD

We have seen that John's administrative career had been somewhat curtailed due to the displeasure of King Henry, but due to the illness of his employer, Archbishop Theobald, John was once more immersed in ecclesiastical cares. We have a letter from John in which he explains to his dear friend Adrian IV that he had incurred King Henry's displeasure afresh because of certain information conveyed to King Henry by Arnulf, Bishop of Lisieux, a close friend of the King. In an additional letter we find John requesting Peter of Celle's opinion as to whether or not he should remain in England under the circumstances. John felt that if he left England before the King's return from the conquest it might appear that he was guilty of the charges brought against him. A third letter of John's addressed to Thomas Becket sought his advice as to what to do. As we have seen, both Archbishop Theobald and Pope Adrian IV wrote at various times in defense of John. However, the letters of the Pope were not too helpful because they added to the feeling that Henry had wherein he regarded John of Salisbury as the real power behind the Archbishop. Another letter from Queen Eleanor, however, tells us of a changed situation, for she informed John that he was no longer under royal censure. Even with this unexpected propitious news, John still had troubles aplenty because his lack of finances placed him in a precarious position, and the illness of the Archbishop forced heavy correspondence and weighty decisions upon him. In the spring of 1161, in April, Archbishop Theobald died and he was succeeded by Thomas Becket. As we have indicated, John was appointed as one of the executors of Theobald's estate and he was also delegated as one of the commission appointed to go to meet Pope Alexander III at Montpellier to receive the *pallium*, the sign of office, bestowed by the Holy Father by special permission upon the delegation in the absence of the one for whom it was intended, namely Thomas himself.

Thomas continued to use the services of John of Salisbury in matters of official and personal correspondence. However, he added new tasks for his confidential secretary. Because the new Archbishop had a special regard for one of his predecessors, namely Anselm, he took the initial steps toward his canonization. He requested John of Salisbury to compose a work which is today known as *The Life of St. Anselm*. This work was written in 1163 and it is a compilation of the facts of the Saint's life taken from a longer work on the same subject written by Eadmer. It is characterized by a nicety of style and well turned phrases. The work accomplished its purpose and it was most influential in the cause for promoting Anselm to Sainthood.

Later, John was to do the same thing for Thomas Becket himself when he wrote *The Life of St. Thomas of Canterbury*. This latter hagiography has been criticized as being too brief, but it should be kept in mind that John intended only to write a curtailed account of the martyr as a preface to Thomas' letters. He felt that at the time in which he was writing the sanctity of his murdered employer was sufficiently well known to make it unnecessary to compose a detailed account of his deeds.

Quite the contrary attitude is taken by him in regard to the compilation of the *Historia Pontificalis*, for here he expressly attempts to record incidents which occurred at the Papal Court with the hope that the events will go on record for future generations. Although the years covered by John's account are few in number — 1148 to 1152 — many and varied are the events described. John's account gives us details in regard to Europe during and following the Second Crusade as well as the problems faced by Pope Eugenius starting with his forced departure from Rome due to the civil unrest there and tracing his ensuing diplomatic relations with the rulers of Italy, France, Germany and England. Although deprived of his Roman residence, Pope Eugenius kept and extended Papal authority as witnessed by his legislation and by the influential Council held at Rheims where over four hundred bishops, abbots and ecclesiastical leaders assembled at his request.

The exact date of the composition of the *Historia Pontificalis* is not known but from a study of the text and from a close scrutiny of his life, we are led to believe that the date probably was around 1164. We know that the *Metalogicon* deals with the years of John's student days, the *Policraticus* gives us an account of his years at the English court and the *Historia Pontificalis* relates the period of his life when he had completed his student days but had not yet entered into the service of Archbishop Theobald. It appears that John composed the first two books, the *Metalogicon* and the *Policraticus*, and since the events of the four years mentioned did not fit into either, he later treated them in a separate work. The few slight inaccuracies that are to be found in the chronicled events lead us to suspect that he was writing at the time when he did not have his notes or diary at hand, while the copious classical references indicate that he had access to a well-stocked library. Furthermore, he mentions that the *Historia Pontificalis* was compiled at the request of Peter of Celle, the Abbot of Celle and later Abbot of St. Rémi and a former noble from the region of Provins in Champagne, who was ever the close friend and benefactor of John, and to whom the *Historia Pontificalis* was dedicated. Since the quotations are given in a broad way and it seems that John is quoting from memory it appears possible that the account of affairs connected with the Papal court could have been written when John was staying with his friend Peter of Celle in 1164 at the time when the latter had been appointed Abbot of St. Rémi.

An old catalog of the Abbey library for those years indicates that the very works from which John quotes at length were to be found at St. Rémi. Such references came from St. Jerome's *Letters to Paulinus*, Geoffrey of Auxerre's *Libellus*, St. Hilary's *De trinitate* and *De synodis*, St. Ambrose's *De fide* and St. Augustine's *De trinitate* and these were included in the collection of St. Rémi.

John's memoirs of the events connected with the Papal court remain in a sole manuscript written towards the conclusion of the thirteenth century. Because of its placement after the chronicle of Sigebert of Gembloux, together with further writings of Anselm of Gembloux together with the *Continuatio Gemblacensis*, the *Historia Pontificalis* was formerly believed to belong to the same works. In fact, the first printed edition of 1868 found the editor, Wilhelm Arndt, convinced that the *Historia Pontificalis* belonged to the chronicle and its continuation and that its author was unknown. Since that time, however, further research in regard to this so-called anonymous work has revealed that it is to be attributed to John of Salisbury. In arriving at this conclusion, scholars sought a man possessing a wide and profound knowledge of Holy Scripture and the classics, one who had first-hand acquaintance with the situations described in the manuscript and one who was at St. Rémi of Rheims toward the last third of the twelfth century. All the clues pointed to John of Salisbury and this judgement has been verified by additional facts to be found in the internal structure of the work itself. The title, *Historia Pontificalis*, is not John's choice, for the manuscript is without title, but is one of recent origin arising from the content of the work, for in the discussion of the theological teachings of Gilbert de la Porrée John adds "*. . . superest ut ad pontificalem redeamus historiam.*" The manuscript which is today identified as Ms 367, Berne came from the monastery of Fleury and it is incomplete. It terminates with extreme abruptness at f. 124v in the center of a columm leaving three whole leaves blank and unruled which suggests that the scribe either did not have the remainder of the text or that he had the text but failed to complete its transcription.

It is the author's purpose, he says, to relate only those events to which he was a personal witness or which he knows to be so because of the authorities whose testimony he believes to be unimpeachable. His aim is to present affairs in as an unbiased manner as possible. He has the vindication of the confirmation of his views by historians of the past several centuries who have paralleled John's characterizations of the many figures who were his contemporaries. He was of such a nature that he could see the noteworthy aspects of those holding opposing views such as in the case of Gilbert de la Porrée and St. Bernard. He readily acknowledged the word of both and held each as a close friend, the first as his former Master and the latter as his patron who introduced him to Archbishop Theobald.

We have to keep in mind that John of Salisbury was not by profession an historian for in his day the Seven Liberal Arts into which he delved so deeply admitted no such formal discipline as History. It was not the aim of the man of scholastic attainments to write History as such nor was it a regular subject of the curriculum. In no wise is this to be construed that events were not recorded because the vast number of chronicles, biographies, hagiographies, day books and civil as well as ecclesiastical record books attest to the contrary. Rather only secondarily was the writing of history the pursuit of the scholar of John's day. Also it should be recalled that John was writing about events that had taken place about fifteen years previously. Not being trained in the recording of historical events, John had considerable difficulty in deciding whether to order his work according to the chronology of the events or according to subject matter. In some places he writes along with consistent regard for a time sequence only to switch over abruptly to the second method of ordering. However, despite these obvious shortcomings we are deeply indebted to John for knowledge of affairs of which we would otherwise be ignorant.

The prologue reviews some of the chronicles of the past and John says that 'amongst them one of the latest is [by] Master Hugh, Canon of St. Victor of Paris, who relates the order of events from the beginning of the world up to the time of Pope Innocent II and Louis, most Christian King of the Franks, and includes all the vicissitudes of kingdoms in a concise narrative.'[53] Another chronicle written prior to John's was that by 'Sigebert, monk of Gembloux, [who] wove the patterns of his narrative from the year of Valentinian and Gratian to the Council of Rheims, celebrated in the year of Our Lord 1148, in the time of Louis, King of the Franks, when Conrad was reigning in Germany.'[54] Then John gives his reason for composing his own text by saying:[55]

> From that time, however, there is not a single chronicle that I can discover; though I have found in church archives notes of memorable events which could be of help to any future writers who may appear. Sigebert, however, did not even describe everything that took place in the time of Pope Inno-

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[53] *Historia Pontificalis*, p. 2.
[54] *Ibid.*
[55] *Historia Pontificalis, Op. cit.*, pp. 2, 3.

cent; he was silent on several important points, either because they had escaped his notice, or for some other reason. For although he was anxious to handle great events in many kingdoms, he gave more space and care to those which concerned his Germans.

In the prologue also John tells his friend, Peter of Celle, that he will not be led astray by events particular to the English, for he says,[56] 'And so, my dearest friend and master, I gladly obey your command; and will undertake, by the grace of God, as you bid, to give a short account of events touching Papal history, omitting all else. My aim, like that of other chroniclers before me, shall be to profit my contemporaries and future generations. For all these chroniclers have had a single purpose: to relate noteworthy matters, so that the invisible things of God may be clearly seen by the things that are done, and men may by examples of reward or punishment be made more zealous in the fear of God and pursuit of justice.'

The body of the *Historia Pontificalis* commences with an address to his friend and relates the starting point of the work,[57] 'And now my Peter — named like the apostle from the strength of your faith as a presage of future virtue — in order to make my chronicle a continuation of Sigebert's I will begin mine at the Council of Rheims, where he ended his; but I will add the things he omitted which may be useful to those who have the conduct of church affairs.' Well may we congratulate John for his choice of events that he chose to record for alongside the legal details that he had to include to make his account factual he had the foresight to include little colorful anecdotes that makes his account most readable and saves it from being dull and trite. For example, in addition to mentioning the petition of Alberic, Archbishop of Trèves, John goes on to tell something special that sets this petition apart from the others. He records that when this worthy prelate uttered his claim for the subjection of Rheims[58] 'such a clamor arose among the French that it was impossible to answer in the public audience; for although he was a most worthy man they thought him insane in his claims, above all for daring to assert such a thing at Rheims.'

From the *Historia Pontificalis* we learn that King Henry had incurred the Pope's displeasure and in retaliation the King decided that he would detain the Bishops and Abbots of his realm who had been summoned by the Pope to the Council of Rheims. The King sent minor clerks to convey the regrets of the higher clergy to the Council and the

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[56] *Op. cit.*, p. 3.
[57] *Op. cit.*, p. 4.
[58] *Op. cit.*, p. 6.

King himself came to Canterbury to see that the Archbishop did not leave English soil. But, according to John:[59]

> [The Archbishop] trusting in God's mercy went aboard a fishing smack which he had hired and hidden in a remote bay far from the haunts of men; a vessel that would carry no more than a dozen men and lacked even the most essential equipment; and so he crossed the channel rather as a survivor from a shipwreck than in a ship. Certain of his clerks had been sent ahead with the King's permission, ostensibly to make his apologies to the Council; and so when he himself arrived there unexpectedly, he was received everywhere with honor. This proved in the end to the King's advantage; for on the last day of the council the Pope rose to excommunicate the King for the reasons I have given. The candles had been lighted, and the prelates and leading men, who were assembled there to promise that the King would give satisfaction, could obtain no more delays for negotiations, when my lord of Canterbury most movingly begged for mercy; and he was the only one of them all, as the Pope himself has openly avowed, who could gain a hearing. Dumbfounded, not to say thunderstruck, by the boundless charity of this man, the Pope at first meditated in silence and then, sighing, spoke as follows: "My brethren, behold this man who enacts the gospel in our own time by loving his enemies and never ceasing to pray for his persecutors. For although the king has by his effrontery deserved our wrath and the wrath of God's church, nevertheless we cannot but commend such love or refuse to hear his prayers. Yielding to his entreaties we now suspend the sentence and grant the king three months' delay to give satisfaction. If he fails to do so by that time, the sentence shall then fall on him and his kingdom with heavier damnation than before."

At times we gain the impression that John purposely includes some happening of lesser importance to relieve the formality attached to the weighty affairs that he chronicles. Every so often he will include a reference to some little incident such as the one which informs us that the Council pronounced a ban on multi-colored cloaks for the clergy. This legislation was received in an affable way by most of the members who were questioned about it but Reynold of Hildesheim and the other German delegates who protested explaining that the decretal would be disliked by present and future generations.

Some of those present at the Council asked for an exposition of the canon which states that anyone who had laid violent hands on clerks, monks, lay-brethren or nuns must go to the Pope for absolution. John records[60] that:

> The Pope made his intention clear by saying that this canon was not to be applied to those who had committed such violence in performance of their just duty. I say just, because if anyone had used force to carry out a tyrant's

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[59] *Op. cit.*, p. 7.
[60] *Op. cit.*, p. 9.

> unrighteous command or wreak another's violence he would not be spared the rigors of the law, but would share the penalty with the instigator or tyrant who was the author of his guilt. But the case would be different if by chance a doorkeeper, trying to hold back a crowd of clerks from rushing through a door, accidentally struck one with his staff; or if an acolyte struck somebody with his rod or baton, colloquially called a birch. Again the canon would not apply if a master in the schools struck his pupil, or one pupil another, or one monk another monk, or one lay-brother another . . .

After the dissolution of the Council, the most eminent prelates remained to arrange further business. During his final visits with the Supreme Pontiff, the Archbishop of Canterbury, 'who had won great favor in his sight'[61] was granted the privilege of either absolving the Bishops and Abbots who had failed to attend the Council or of leaving them under sentence as he saw fit.

Another incident that occurred after the closing of the Council happened while the Pope was celebrating Mass in the Cathedral and the chalice was being brought to him by one of the assistance as is proper according to the Roman Ritual, and the minister had the misfortune to spill the consecrated wine on the rug lying before the altar. This incident was generally upsetting and upon the request of His Holiness his chancellor, the Cardinal Deacon Guy of Pisa, removed the piece of stained carpet on which had fallen the Precious Blood. Some of the onlookers felt that this episode augured ill and that the Holy See was to fall under dire consequences as foretold by this affair. Many later recalled this incident when misfortunes did beset those who sought to free the Holy Land.

Of all the events that John of Salisbury committed to paper perhaps the one of most interest to the philosopher regards the dispute between Gilbert de la Porrée and St. Bernard. We do not have to rely solely on John's account for Otto of Freising and Geoffrey of Auxerre also have left us accounts of this affair, but John's rendition is by far the most unbiased, the most interesting and the most informing. As we have stated, he knew and respected both parties and he tried his best to do an objective job of reporting the conflict. He says in part:[62]

> Master Gilbert, Bishop of Poitiers, the most learned man of our day, was summoned to the court to answer the Abbot of Clairvaux — a man of the greatest eloquence and highest repute — on certain matters which had been brought up the year before at Paris, but postponed until then. [The suspect teachings of Gilbert which were under consideration were preferred in 1147 and their examination was commenced by the Pope in a Council at

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[61] *Op. cit.*, p. 11.

[62] *Op. cit.*, p. 15 ff.

> Paris during the Eastertide.] For certain statements had been found in the Bishop's commentary on the *De trinitate* of Boethius and the writings of his pupils which seemed reprehensible to the learned, either because they were inconsistent with accepted beliefs or because, through novelty of expression, they seemed inconsistent. Many attacked him, but the fiercest assailants were Suger, Abbot of St. Denis, a learned and eloquent man, and two canons of Poitiers, Calo who later became Bishop of the same church, and master Arnold nicknamed 'straightface': the masters of the schools also, Peter Lombard, later Bishop of Paris, and Robert of Melun afterwards Bishop of Hereford, led an embittered attack on him. I cannot say whether they acted out of zeal for the faith, or jealousy of his fame and merit, or a desire to propitiate the Abbot, whose influence was then at its height and whose counsel was most weighty in the affairs of church and state alike.

John tries to exercise extreme care when he characterizes the two opposed parties. In one place in his memoirs he states that among those present at the Council 'was a man of great sanctity and weigthy influence, Bernard Abbot of Clairvaux, fervently attached to Count Theobald because of his pursuit of justice and reputation for uprightness, his reverence for the church and generosity towards the poor.'[63] In another passage John gives further details about St. Bernard:[64]

> Various opinions are held of the Abbot himself, some saying one thing and some another, because he attacked the two men most famous for their learning — Peter Abelard and this same Gilbert — and pursued them with such zeal that he secured the condemnation of Peter and only just failed to have the other condemned. For my part I cannot believe that a man of such sanctity was not guided by the love of God, or that a bishop of such prudence and learning should commit to writing anything whose meaning was not clear to him, however obscure it might seem to others. For he was a man of the very keenest intelligence, who had read most things and who, I may say from intimate knowledge, after spending almost sixty years in reading and close study, was so learned in the liberal arts that no one could surpass him in all subjects; nay rather he was held to surpass all in every subject. And I am sure that now he no longer disagrees with the Abbot and the other saints, for they both see face to face the truth they spent their lives in seeking. [When this last sentence was written both parties were dead, Bernard in 1153, and Gilbert in 1154.]

John of Salisbury tells us that in giving his account of the difference between the Abbot of Clairvaux and Gilbert de la Porrée he would be most meticulous about what he tells. He says,[65] 'I speak and write what I myself have seen, knowing that I would imperil my immortal soul and my worldly reputation if I should either relate or write anything untrue in a matter such as this.' Those assembled to hear the conflicting opinions of the two scholars were men of high repute and included Archbishop Theobald of Canterbury, Geoffrey of Bordeaux, Henry of York, Abbot Suger of St. Denis, Abbot Baldwin of Châtillon-sur-Seine, Thomas Becket, Roger of York and 'many others whom it would be tedious to enumerate.' John's account discloses that St. Bernard, prior to the first meeting of the parties, sent a message to all the clergymen requesting that they meet him privately at his residence, but both Otto of Freising and Geoffrey of Auxerre declare that the meeting took place at a later date.

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[63] *Op. cit.*, p. 14.
[64] *Op. cit.*, p. 16.
[65] *Op. cit.*, p. 17.

It seems best to let John[66] himself describe the manner that the prelates heard the Abbot's position:

> The Abbot, the most pious and learned among them, then delivered a short and eloquent discourse, concluding that it was their duty to remove all scandals from the church of God, and beseeching them to correct him if they thought he was mistaken in the case he had brought against master Gilbert. If he had pressed his argument foolishly, it was because he had been carried away by charity and zeal for the faith. But if he was not mistaken, he asked them to do their duty and preserve the purity of the faith. For cases such as this were the business not of monks and hermits, but of the prelates of the church who were bound to lay down their lives for their sheep. And to help them in judging whether he was right or wrong, he asked them to listen to the articles in which he differed from the Bishop, and then approve or reject them. On their agreeing, he said he believed that 'God is deity, and the converse.' As he made this statement Geoffrey of Auxerre, one of his monks, wrote it down word for word and then read it out with the question, 'Do you accept this?' after the fashion when decretals or laws are promulgated. And they replied, 'We do.'

The Abbot continued in this manner and proposed article after article wherein he differed from Gilbert, but this way of presenting his side of the question was not wholeheartedly approved. John says:[67]

> The more thoughtful men did not approve of this method, but they feared offending the Abbot and his followers if they did not fall in with his wishes.

When several statements had been proposed, written down and voted upon, Robert de Bosco raised his hand, called for silence and made a plea that the matter be not decided in a hasty manner. He continued that[68] he had heard this very matter under consideration propounded in the schools of the renowned doctors, brothers Anselm and Ralph of Laon but rejected by them because they did not wish to go beyond the definitions of the Fathers. In the same passage this Master continues:

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[66] *Op. cit.*, p. 17.
[67] *Op. cit.*, p. 18.
[68] *Op. cit.*, p. 18.

> For the same reason neither Gilbert the Universal, who later became Bishop of London, nor Alberic of Rheims, afterwards raised to the Archbishopric of Bourges, had been prepared to accept it. He knew this because he had heard them lecture, and questioned them on the subject. Again, Gilbert Abbot of Westminster near London, whom he considered even more learned than the others, had never been willing to admit this. Consequently his advice was that they should not make a hasty judgment on so weighty a matter, especially as such men had expressly declined to make this definition. The Pope and the cardinals should be present and the most distinguished men in the western world had met to discuss it. His advice was followed, and the assembly broke up.

When the Cardinals learned what the Abbot had done, they were deeply disturbed and they decided to throw their support behind Gilbert. They recalled that the Abbot of Clairvaux had used the same tactics in connection with the dispute which he had formerly had with Abelard. The Cardinals decided that they had reason to suspect, or at least they made a pretense that they had such reason, that St. Bernard wished to win the English and French portions of the church to himself as his partisans in order that the Papacy be helpless in pronouncing any judgment in opposition to them, particularly since the Council was meeting on French soil. As John recalls:[69]

> . . . there was not a single Cardinal except Alberic Bishop of Ostia of holy memory who was not wholeheartedly opposed to the Abbot in spirit and deed; saying — falsely as I believe — that the Abbot of St. Denis, who was acting as regent for the King in France, and the leading men of the church had been called together for the express purpose of forcing the Papacy to accept the Abbot's views under threat of schism.

While during the period under inspection they did not have television, radio or other means by which messages are conveyed rapidly, nevertheless, in short order the Abbot learned what had been discussed among the Cardinals and their feeling in regard to the matter, so he hastily took himself to the Papal presence as a friend, and swung His Holiness around to his way of thinking. In reference to his persuasive powers John remarks:[70]

> For he was a man mighty in deed and word, with God as some believe, and with men as we all know. Once given the chance of speaking, he almost always made his will prevail. Besides, it was certain that some of the Cardinals were filled with envy of him, and could not refrain from slander.

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[69] *Op. cit.*, p. 20.
[70] *Op. cit.*, pp. 20, 21.

When it finally came to pass that Gilbert de la Porrée was questioned by the Council, he placed his trust in the expert advice and support of the Cardinals and throughout long and searching arguments he maintained a scholarly attitude and avoided being tripped up in wordy clashes. Finally, says John, 'they left the court, the cardinals and several others saying of the Bishop that never had a man spoken like this man.' On another day, the questioner was the Pope sitting in consistory, who ordered Henry of Pisa to read aloud the book which was said to contain the Bishop's error. John reports that:[71]

> Thereupon the Bishop cried out that he ought to be judged on his own works, not the works of others; and that no-one, least of all a Bishop, ought to be condemned unless he had either confessed or been convicted of a crime. He was not, he said, an heretic and would never be one, for he was ready and always had been to recognize truth and respect apostolic doctrine.

The Bishop declared that he had always taught openly in schools and churches and that he had written on the Psalms and the epistles of St. Paul. If there were any errors in these works, he was willing to submit to correction and punishment. In addition, he remarked that he had written on *De trinitate* of Boethius, and that if there should be any error in this text he would be willing to make amends. At the conclusion of Gilbert's reply the clerk continued te read a passage reported to give Gilbert's position in regard to Baptism whereupon the Bishop burst forth to the Pope:[72]

> You see, Father, how you treat me when the errors of others are recited in your holy consistory to my shame. I avow that I have several pupils who, admittedly have all heard me lecture, though some of them have not understood a word I said; what they have written is their interpretation, not my meaning. Amongst them were two who stand out for their eccentricity . . . Like you I pronounce anathema on this book and all the heresies written in it, and on its author; whoever he is may he be condemned to eternal death on the Judgment Day with all other heretics, unless he first repent and return to the Catholic faith.

Spontaneously, the Cardinals cried out that the Bishop had sufficiently defended himself against the accusation based on the book from which the readings had taken place. In the presence of all assembled the book was cut into minute parts and scattered. The Pope explained to the laity assembled, using the vernacular for their benefit, that the book did not belong to Gilbert de la Porrée, but on the contrary 'he had been found orthodox on all points and faithful to apostolic doctrine, and was at one with the Roman church in condemning these and all other heresies.' The Pope then requested that the Bishop's commentary on the *De trinitate* of Boethius be given to him for correction. His Holiness said that he would delete and change whatever he deemed necessary but the Bishop answered:[73]

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[71] *Op. cit.*, p. 21.
[72] *Op. cit.*, p. 22.

> Forbid it, Master, that anyone else should undergo a toil that is rightly mine. It is just that if I have erred in writing I should be punished by expurgating and deleting my own errors will be a part of my penance; do you rather command what should be erased, and I will carry out your instructions to the last letter.

The Holy Father then recommended that four changes be made and that the Bishop bring the corrected copy to him. The corrections, John of Salisbury says, were possibly made by Master Geoffrey of Auxerre, who became the fourth Abbot of Clairvaux after St. Bernard, with the knowledge of the Holy Father. The changes themselves were made known in a T-shaped hall in the Archiepiscopal palace called *Tau* before the Archbishops and Bishops who had remained behind to bring this case to a conclusion after the Council in general had been dissolved.

John of Salisbury informs us that St. Bernard 'often wrote many things to his [Gilbert's] discredit, both in letters and in his book *De consideratione* to Pope Eugenius, and also in that most subtle and precious exposition of the *Song of Songs*, which assuredly the Holy Spirit dictated through his mouth; but he at least seems to have been inspired by zeal for the faith and ardent charity in all he wrote.' As an aside, John remarks that some people held the opinion that Gilbert was not as sincere as he professed to be and that his display of great humility was a pose. Likewise, there were those that believed that the Bishop used subtle and cunning devices to verbally overcome his opponent. Here John just reports these observations without giving us the benefit of his own opinion. We do find a personal note in the affair on the occasion when peace was made between St. Bernard and the Bishop. Many persons advised the latter to appeal to authors at hand in order to confound St. Bernard but the Bishop would not acquiesce. For his part John says:[74]

> I myself on behalf of the Abbot entreated the Bishop to meet him in some religious house in Poitou, or France, or Burgundy, wherever he preferred, to discuss the writings of the Blessed Hilary amicably and without rancor. He, however, replied that they had already disputed sufficiently on the matter, and if the Abbot wished to reach a full understanding of Hilary he should first seek further instruction in the liberal arts and other preliminary studies.

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[73] *Op. cit.*, p. 23.

[74] *Op. cit.*, p. 26.

As though to soften the effect of that last sentence the author of the *Historia Pontificalis* adds that both men were exceptionally learned and eloquent but they excelled in different branches of learning. He credits the Abbot with being such a distinguished preacher that after St. Gregory there was none comparable to him, while he surpassed all in the elegance of his style which was simply saturated with references to Holy Scripture and the words of the prophets and apostles. However, remarks John, '. . . he had little knowledge of secular learning.' John further opinioned that while the Bishop had not the Abbot's knowledge of Sacred Scripture, he was the most learned man of his day in secular matters. Also, Gilbert was the more conversant with the Doctors, for example, Hilary, Jerome, Augustine, etc. While his doctrine was difficult for beginners, the mature scholars found it compendious and profound. With skill Gilbert utilized all branches of learning for he held that all the disciples were interrelated and mutually illuminating. Although he was 'slow to be roused, he could be stimulated by discussion, and if attacked became fuller and more intelligible in his argument.'

At this point John interrupts the *Memoirs of the Papal Court* with a lengthy discussion of the theological doctrines espoused by Gilbert de la Porrée. The Bishop's beliefs depend heavily upon St. Hilary's *De trinitate*, and to some extent upon St. Ambrose's work of the same title. John explains his long digression by saying:[75]

> I have dwelt on these matters, my dearest friend, longer perhaps than the nature of the subject required; but I was anxious to give you a fuller picture of the man whom you have had the good fortune to know though not to hear, and to obey your request by explaining to the best of my ability the Bishop's interpretation of these propositions. Now I return to papal history.

John takes up his narrative at the point where the Council of Rheims is in after-session. To those dignitaries who had been detained after the meetings were declared closed, John says, special assignments were given. To Archbishop Theobald of Canterbury fell the task of adjusting matters in England in regard to those ecclesiastics who had not obeyed the summons to the Council. To execute this task, the Archbishop set sail for England, but upon landing he was met by a delegation of his retainers, among them Richard de Lucy, his justiciar and William Martel, his steward, who seriously advised that he leave England with all possible haste. He was also informed that his property had been seized and that the King was sorely vexed because of Theobald's participation in the recent Council. John remarks that for 'the time being' the Archbishop remained at St. Omer.

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[75] *Op. cit.*, p. 41.

In a manner that is characteristic of the *Historia Pontificalis*, John abruptly ceases to discuss the affairs of Theobald just mentioned and resumes the activities of the Papal retinue on its journey from Rheims. At the earnest request of the Abbot of Clairvaux and the entire Cistercian Order, His Holiness was invited to break his trip at the famous Abbey to legislate in regard to Philip, a monk of Fontaines-les-Blanches in deacon's orders who had been irregularly elected to the Bishopric of Tours in 1133. This clergyman had been ordained and consecrated by Anacletus II. When he was expelled from Tours, Anacletus had given him the Archbishopric of Taranto to make satisfaction. His troubles, however, were not at an end because he was later degraded by Innocent II in 1139, and thereafter he became a monk of Clairvaux. It was the desire of the Abbot and the members of his Order that Philip be restored to his former rank but all their influence with the Pope availed nothing to effect this for Eugenius consistently repeated that the case was to be decided by the Cardinals. Delays because of administrative details such as these made the journey of the Papal court a protracted one, but when news reached the Court that the entire Christian army in the East had suffered a complete defeat, the Court made haste to go to Italy at once. Despite the desire to reach Rome as soon as possible, Pope Eugenius upon arriving at Cremona on July 7, 1148 delayed for the purpose of holding a council of Italian Bishops because the only Italian Bishop to have been present at Rheims was Crassantinus, Bishop of Mantua. The Council promulgated the decrees of the Council of Rheims and settled the question of the proper precedence among such Sees as Ravenna, Milan, Genoa, etc. The ancient city of Modena, because of the disobedience of her citizens, was reduced from an Episcopal city, but later this decision was changed. As an aside John remarks that he is unable to account for the number of decisions of Pope Eugenius that were nullified in the future. He does suggest that the case may possibly be explained:[76]

> First that he had merited it by so readily revoking the sentences of his predecessors, not to mention his fellow-bishops, and secondly that he was too ready to rely on his personal experience or the highest authority. I think that there were two reasons for this suspicion: both weaknesses of character and consciousness of the failings of his 'flanks,' as he used to call his assessors and counsellors.

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[76] *Op. cit.*, p. 51.

Upon the completion of the affairs at Cremona, Pope Eugenius renewed his journey to Rome where a magnificent reception from the nobles awaited. John of Salisbury says that the affair was dictated by the fact that their 'noses had sensed the gold and silver of Gaul.'

Having related the incidents connected with the course of the Papal court from Rheims to Rome, John takes up the plight of the Christian Kings whose armies were routed in the East. We are told that the King of the Franks, in addition to suffering defeat at the hands of the Infidels, had to bear with a Queen who desired to quit him for her Uncle, Prince Raymond, at whose residence in Antioch she and the King stopped to recuperate and to prepare for the trip back home. The King's ire was aroused by the 'constant, indeed almost continuous, conversation' of the Prince and the Queen. The King's suspicions of his wife were magnified by the fact that the Queen desired to remain at Antioch. John says that prior to the King's departure from that city, back in France, Bartholomew, Bishop of Laon had calculated the degree of relation between Prince Raymond and the King. One of the King's secretaries, Terricus Gualerancius, who did not enjoy the Queen's favor and hoping to add to her displeasure, persuaded the King to avoid the shame that would be his if the Queen deserted him. As a result, the Queen was forcefully removed from her Uncle's residence and compelled to accompany her husband back to France even though the discord between them was evident to all.

Misfortune was not limited to the French party because it likewise 'befell the Christians through the deceit of the Byzantine Emperor and the forces of the Turks.' The Christian armies were weakened also by the jealousy of princes and the wrangling of priests. The Germans refused to aid in the transportation of the baggage of the French and at first indicated that they would sail without the French who were still a few days' journey from the port of embarkment. However, King Conrad finally consented to wait for the French contingent. Then things went from bad to worse because the French army which had been disorganized before now became completely disordered.

Another source of grave trouble lay in the fact that Arnulf, Bishop of Lisieux and Godfrey, Bishop of Langres both claimed to hold the office of Papal Legate in the army despite the fact that neither had documentation to back their boasts. John relates:[77]

> Whatever one recommended the other decried; both were smooth-tongued, both extravagant, both (it is said) [were] mischief-makers, devoid

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[77] *Op. oit.*, p. 54.

of the fear of God; but of the two the Bishop of Langres was more prudent and more highminded. Few, if any, have brought more harm on the Christian army and the whole community. Each had his own following who believed in him, and both received large sums of money from the sick and dying whom they attended and absolved in the name of the Pope, claiming to be his representatives. Indeed, they are believed to have accumulated more wealth during the expedition than they paid out of their own pockets.

That any of these things took place was to be regretted because neither of the two claimants was validly appointed as the representative of the Holy See. The legates sent by the Pope were Theodwin, Bishop of Porto, who was of German extraction and Guy, Cardinal-priest of St. Chrysogonus, who was a Florentine. Of them John records:[78]

> [They were] decent men, but far from equal to such high office. For Theodwin, differing from the Franks in language and customs, was regarded as a barbarian. As for Guy, he had scant knowledge of French; he was liberal in outlook, with a kindly nature and a sweet mien, wholly devoid of Roman arrogance; a lover of letters and an insatiable bookworm, who hated crowds, delighted in learned disputations, and welcomed any chance of threshing out dialectical and philosophical quibbles. The failings of these men put great authority into the hands of the two Bishops, who — to tell the truth — would have been great service if they had worked together in the Lord.

The Bishop of Langres was arrogant in his claim to special consideration because he had been Prior of Clairvaux and he proclaimed that it had been the Abbot of Clairvaux, St. Bernard, who had preached the Crusade and who had committed the King to his care. John says that among those on the expedition 'no-one . . . was held to be more highminded.' The Bishop of Lisieux, however, depended on his eloquence and skill in affairs, on his reputation for broadmindedness and courtly jests, which he uttered in the guise of wit. He mocked the Bishop of Langres who was more impulsive by saying that he was 'just like the wine of Cyprus, which is sweet to taste but lethal unless diluted with water.'

After relating somewhat about the departure of the defeated forces of the Christian princes and the bickering that took place between the pseudo and actual representatives of the Holy See, John commences an account of military operations of the Christian forces prior to their fall before the Saracens. His account is by no means chronological but it contains so many facts that are interesting that the reader shakes off a temporary displeasure at the lack of continuity and still follows the narrative because of the anecdotes that John relates. After several digressions, John finally picks up the account of the King and Queen of France who in the course of time finally reached Europe. They were met at Ceprano by the Cardinals and Church dignitaries of high rank who provided them with an escort to Tusculum and to the presence of the Pope who warmly received the royal guests. John says in regard to their welcome that they were received 'with such tenderness and reverence that one would have said he was welcoming an angel of the Lord rather than a mortal man.' At private audiences with His Holiness both the King and Queen confided their personal antipathies in regard to each other and the Pope was able to effect a reconciliation. He forbade any further mention of their consanguinity. Their marriage was confirmed verbally and in writing and they were further forbidden to mention or to attempt dissolution under any pretext whatsoever. During the duration of the royal visit, the Pope had a chamber fitted out with a special bed which was bedecked with the finest of drapery and His Holiness bestowed lavish gifts upon the couple. John remarks that 'when the moment for their departure came, though he was a stern man, he [Eugenius III] could not hold back his tears, but sent them on their way blessing them and the Kingdom of the Franks, which was higher in his esteem than all the kingdoms of the world.' Nor was the Pope to be outdone in his hospitality for:[79]

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[78] *Op. cit.*, p. 55.

> The King had scarcely set out from Tusculum when behold, the Roman senators and nobles came hastening to meet him and place themselves and the city in subjection to him; and the nearer he drew the denser became the throng of cheering people. As he went from one holy place to another in the city the Nuns and boys poured out acclaiming him and saying: 'Blessed is he that cometh in the name of the lord.' The cardinal deacons Gregory of St. Angelo and Hyacinth of St. Mary in Cosmedin, and officials of the Pope accompanied him from Ceprano to Aquapendente to minister to his needs and those of his retinue. Then by God's aid he journeyed to France in safety.

Having concluded the tale of King Louis' affairs in the East and his return to his Kingdom, John of Salisbury relates the events connected with the discord between the Pope and the Romans. Negotiations for peace were under way but numerous causes prevented the actual culmination of hostilities. John held the opinion that the greatest cause of ill feeling came from the fact that the Romans refused to expel Arnold of Brescia from their midst. It was reported that Arnold had bound himself by oath to uphold the honor of the city and the Roman republic. On their part the Romans had promised him aid and counsel against all men, and explicitly against the Pope for the Church had excommunicated him and ordered him to be shunned as an heretic. Of Arnold John tells us:[80]

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[79] *Op. cit.*, p. 62.

> This man was a priest by office, a canon regular by profession, and one who mortifies his flesh with fasting and coarse raiment. [He was] of keen intelligence, persevering in his study of the scriptures, eloquent in speech, and a vehement preacher against the vanities of the world. Nevertheless he was reputed to be factious and a leader of schism, who wherever he lived prevented the citizens from being at peace with the clergy. He had been Abbot of Brescia, and when the Bishop was absent on a short visit to Rome had so swayed the minds of the citizens that they would scarcely open their gates to the Bishop on his return.

Because of this affair, Pope Innocent had deposed him and expelled him from Italy. Arnold of Brescia had then crossed the Alps and made his way to France where he had become the disciple of Peter Abelard, and a friend of another student, Master Hyacinth. The friend and Arnold had taken sides against the Abbot of Clairvaux. After Peter Abelard had left Paris for Cluny, Arnold remained at Paris on Mount Sainte Geneviève, where he lectured on the scriptures at the church of St. Hilary. John informs us that Arnold had 'no listeners except poor students who publicly begged their bread from door to door to support themselves and their master.' As in other places, Arnold of Brescia stirred up the populace. John remarks that 'to the Bishops he was merciless on account of their avarice and filthy lucre; most of all because of stains on their personal lives, and their striving to build the church of God in blood.' Another target of his was St. Bernard, whom he attacked as a seeker after vainglory, envious of all who won distinction in learning and religion unless they were his own disciples. Because of his words and actions, St. Bernard requested the French King to expel Arnold from France, which he did. After the death of Pope Innocent, Arnold of Brescia returned to Italy after promising reparation and obedience to the Roman Church and he was received at Viterbo by Pope Eugenius. After a period of fasting and the keeping of vigils together with the recitation of certain prayers, Arnold claimed to have made satisfaction for his misdeeds and he once again took a solemn oath to show obedience to the Church. During the period of his penance, Arnold resided in Rome and he won the people to him by his display of repentance. Because the Pope was absent in Gaul, Arnold gathered disciples around him who were to be known as the heretical sect of the Lombards. His followers imitated his rigorous penances and won the approval of the people. Chief among his supporters were to be numbered pious women.

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[80] *Op. cit.*, p. 63.

It was common for Arnold to address the people at public gatherings and despite his oath he soon denounced the cardinals saying:[81]

> . . . their college, by its pride, avarice, hypocrisy and manifold shame was not the church of God, but a place of business and a den of thieves, which took the place of the scribes and Pharisees amongst Christian peoples.

Nor did he limit himself with directing abuse against the College of Cardinals, but the very Holy Father himself came under his attack. He declared that "the Pope . . . was not what he professed to be –- an apostolic man and shepherd of souls — but a man of blood who maintained his authority by fire and sword, a tormentor of churches and oppressor of the innocent, who did nothing in the world save gratify his lust and empty other men's coffers to fill his own.' Since Arnold of Brescia's activities interest John only insofar as they concern the Papal Court, John makes no further mention of Arnold of Brescia after recounting his charges.

In June 1150, the Pope left Rome, John states, because of the turmoil caused by the disorderly conduct of the Romans which was no longer tolerable to His Holiness. Furthermore, the Pope was hopeful of healing a rupture between the King of Sicily and the Church. For a considerable time, the tyrannical King had forcefully decided which candidates should fill vacant ecclesiastical positions. The Church had forbidden the consecration of persons selected by the King and as a result there were few sees with Bishops of their own. Most sees were administered by appointments of the King who had not been properly consecrated. In addition, the Kingdom had been deprived of consecrated oil as a punishment for the capture of Pope Innocent II. It was to ease such an involved situation that the Pope went to meet the King. John relates that:[82]

> . . . the king sought for a conference with the Lord Pope, and flinging himself at his feet near Ceprano on the boundary between their dominions agreed to grant free elections to churches and allow the Pope to examine elections already made, approving or rejecting them as he thought fit . . . Then he sought the Pope to accept his homage and renew his privileges . . .

Peace was finally made between the Church and the King, and the Pope and the temporal ruler parted friends, with the king offering devoted service to the Pope and Curia, and placing his lands at their disposal.

Another case calling for Papal decision, John relates, occurred after the death of the Bishop of Beauvais, a monk of Clairvaux, Henry, succeeded him because he was a brother of the French King. But within a short time there was such strife between the brothers that the King summoned an army and was hastening to annihilate Beauvais when the Bishop of Soissons, Jocelin, and Suger, Abbot of St. Denis, and above all, Queen Adelaide urged the Bishop to be less reckless. In the same year, 1151, the Bishop set out for Rome. The Pope received him very graciously out of respect for the King, out of regard for his office, and out of deference for the Cistercian Order. The Bishop placed the petition that he be allowed to give up his Bishopric, but the Pope decided that he could not lay down the burdens of office. Upon his return to France, he wrote to the Pope renewing his request, but in his own hand to prevent the correspondence passing through the hands of secretaries, the Pope 'enjoined him to undertake the duties of his office with all care, reminding him that he had never been absolved from them, brushing aside his scruples and soothing him with words of consolation.'

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[81] *Op. cit.*, pp. 64, 65.
[82] *Op. cit.*, p. 66.

During the years 1150—1, delegates of the princes and of the Church from Ireland petitioned the Pope for a legate and after due consideration the Vicar of Christ decreed that Archbishops should be consecrated for Ireland. Four *pallia* were sent to Ireland by John Paparo, a former deacon who had been raised to the dignity of Archbishop. Going to Ireland, this Archbishop consecrated two more Archbishops there, held a council and published canons that are still to be seen in the local archives. Among them was the decree that the Brigittine abbesses should no longer take precedence over Bishops in public assemblies, for they had formerly been accustomed to sit at the feet of the bishops during such affairs.

As previously noted, John of Salisbury is a master at thumb nail sketches. Most of the characterizations by him are extremely restrained, although they penetrate the human advantages and weaknesses of those portrayed. However, very unflattering vignettes of the two legates *a latere* requested by the German King Conrad are to be found in the *Historia Pontificalis*. John has the following to say in part about the Cardinal priests, Jordan of St. Susanna and Octavian of St. Cecilia:[83]

> [They were] equally unlike each other in character and habit, except that both were greedy and grasping after their own fashion. For Jordan, wearing wretched clothing, stern in speech and mien, and saving of expense, hid his avarice under the cover of his Carthusian habit; and — since like order attracted like — was made Papal chamberlain. Octavian on the other hand, noble of birth, more affable in countenance and more openhanded in his generosity, was yet proud and pompous, a sycophant of the Germans and

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[83] *Op. cit.*, p. 75.

> an avid seeker after Roman favor (which he never won). Each was at heart a wolf in sheep's clothing. And although the Pope had bound them to act in concert, they had no sooner set out than strife began between them as to whom was the greater.

After chronicling their misdeeds which brought discredit on themselves and on the Church, for they were John says, 'tormentors of men and extorters of money [who] oppressed the innocent and emptied coffers,' they were recalled by the Pope. At first the legates suppressed the documents demanding their appearance at Rome to answer charges, but their plight was made known by those who returned from visiting the Pope for the purpose of reporting their scandalous conduct.

Octavian, knowing that he must return to Rome, made every attempt to win the magistrates to his side, and entered into a mutual bond of aid and counsel with them. He likewise obtained letters of recommendation from them to the Pope and as a result, henceforth he was the advocate of the Germans at the Papal court, but in Germany he left nothing but hatred and contempt for the Papacy. While Octavian returned to Italy, Jordan turned aside into France using a visit to his brethren at Mondaye as an excuse for his real purpose which was for seeking further monetary gain. He was received at Mondaye, where he had once been a novice, with all the respect and pomp due a Cardinal. However, when he was about to depart, he offered Prior Hugh twenty marks of the money he had illegally gained, but despite the utter need of the place, the Prior refused the money and spiritedly remarked that he hoped that Jordan's money would perish with him, and that they at Mondaye wished to have no part with him. The Prior fearlessly charged Jordan with incident after incident of his evil life. John of Salisbury tells us that Jordan's misuse of weights in measuring was known to all. He says:[84]

> Jordan made his Charterhouse a byword by means of the standard weight, heavier than others, with which Papal dues were weighed while he was chamberlain. Indeed there is still a saying at Rome, 'A man is foolish if he does not use the Carthusian weight in taking payments, let him use the town measure when he lends.' Such was Jordan's reputation in business dealings.

Not only was he humiliated in his former cloister but upon his return to Rome further humiliation was heaped upon him by Pope Eugenius.

Turning from Italy to England, John takes up the task with which Archbishop Theobald had been charged at the conclusion of the Council of Rheims. He had released all prelates from censure except Henry of Winchester, the brother of the King of England. Henry of Winchester went to Rome to make his peace in person. After a public reconciliation he began to intrigue with Guy of Summa, Bishop of Ostia, Gregory of St. Angelo and other friends to secure a *pallium* for him. He also sought to become Archbishop of western England and to effect a release from the jurisdiction of Canterbury. The Pope, however, would grant not a single one of his desires except the dispensation from his former censure for failure to attend the Council of Rheims. The Pope took the position that he did for he was of the opinion that Henry was influential in the English King's wrongs against the Church. In fact, while Henry was seeking to further his affairs with the Pope, his brother was guilty of additional injustices, and Henry remarked that it was just as well that he was not in England at the time, for otherwise he would have been accused of having part in the latest misdemeanors of his brother. The Pope replied that he knew a story that was a parallel of this affair. Once the devil and his mother were conversing and while so doing a severe storm wrecked vessels and towns, and the devil told his mother that it was well that he was not in that vicinity or otherwise he would have been accused of causing the wreckage. His mother replied that it was true that he was not at the spot for the moment but no doubt he had not long ago trailed his tail in the vicinity. In regard to the current happenings in England the Pope said while Henry was not there at present, no doubt he had not too long ago trailed his tail in the affairs there. The Bishop realized that it was futile to hope for any concessions from Pope Eugenius and since his mission was a failure he set about to procure a number of Roman statues before his departure from Rome. His lengthy beard made him a conspicuous figure in and about Rome and recalled to one Roman's mind a former bearded purchaser of statues in antiquity thus causing this bit to be written:[85] 'Buying old busts is Damasippus' craze.' And also this morsel was from the pen of the same man concerning the same incident: 'For this good counsel, Damasippus, may gods and goddesses grant you a barber.' It is, of course, realized that though these barbs were aimed at the Bishop by a contemporary they first saw light in the *Satires* of Horace where in older days Damasippus went on a buying spree of sculpture. This same wit was to say about Hugh, Bishop of Winchester that he was doing his best to deprive the Romans of their gods to prevent them restoring the ancient rites of worship, as they seemed apt to do, because they had an inborn, inveterate and ineradicable avarice to start with, which made them apt idol-worshipers in spirit. The populace of Rome was accused of an inordinate love of gifts and an urge to strive for rewards so great that in the Bishop's day the people were more blinded by money than in the days of pagan error. They received little material gratification of Bishop Henry of Winchester because John says that he 'gave little and that to few.' Quitting Rome, he crossed Spain, paying a visit to St. James of Compostella and finally he arrived in England 'safe and prosperous.'

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[84] *Op. cit.*, p. 77.

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[85] *Op. cit.*, p. 79.

Another case requiring Papal attention, John informs us, was the one in regard to the marriage of one Count Hugh, born in Apulia but of Norman origin. The Count sought release from his wife who was of even nobler stock of the Lombards and Romans by bribing the witnesses. The Pope saw through the evil designs of Count Hugh and imposed a perpetual silence regarding the affair and forbade any further attempt to impeach the validity of the marriage. John of Salisbury reports the episode and tells that at its conclusion:[86]

> [The Pope] bursting into tears . . . hastened down from his seat in the sight of all, great as he was, and prostrated himself before the Count so utterly that his mitre, slipping from his head and rolling in the dust, was found after the bishops and cardinals had raised him under the feet of the dumbfounded count. And he begged and entreated him, as far a father's affection, an orator's eloquence and the venerable dignity of the Roman pontiff in the church could prevail, to put aside all ill-will and take back his wife affectionately, not merely in enforced obedience to the law, but with all the trust and love of a husband.

The Pope made a promise to the Count of a worthy reward if he did as he was requested, and taking a ring from his own finger he placed it on the count's adding, 'Let this ring, a token of faith and contract, be a witness before God between thee and me, that I have given thee a wife in the sight of the church, and that thou hast received her into thy protection.'

Two other cases proposed for Papal intervention concerned affairs in England. In one, Henry, the Archbishop of York, sought to induce the Pope to crown Eustace, the King's son, but the petitions of the Archbishop did not receive a favorable answer. In the other, the King himself was involved.Upon the death of Hugh, the Abbot of St. Augustine's at Canterbury, the Sovereign of England accepted five hundred marks for agreeing to permit a free election, but since the monk, Sylvester who had effected the deal was elected Abbot, the whole transaction was suspect. Nobody dared contest the election because of the part played by the King, and even the Archbishop of Canterbury was forced to ratify the election. The Abbot-elect, when it came time for the Consecration, claimed that it was his privilege to have the affair held in his local Abbey, but since the handwriting of the document by which he claimed this right was in a decidedly different hand from other such decrees, the decree's authenticity was questioned. Further study of the text and the Bull divulged that it was impossible that such had been issued by the Popes whose names were affixed. The scrutiny of the questionable documents was done by John of Salisbury himself who was acquainted with the methods of detecting forgeries issued in the Papal Curia. After a year-long dispute the matter was referred to Pope Eugenius who decided that Archbishop Theobald should consecrate the Abbot without exacting profession from him. However, the Archbishop again brought the case before the Pope who at length decreed that the ceremony should be held and that the customary formula for profession be included.

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[86] *Op. cit.*, p. 81.

In the *Historia Pontificalis,* John includes the affair regarding Odo, Abbot of St. Denis, and his harshness to the relatives of the former Abbot Suger, who 'died leaving his Church in perfect order.' The final complete entry deals with another case where the King demanded five hundred marks for a 'free' election that proved to be anything but free. After a death rumored to have been caused by poison, a successor to Robert, Bishop of London, was sought. The Pope decreed that within three months a man of good morals, literate and 'clad in the habit of religion' was to be elected by the clergy of London. The clergy, hoping to elect a so-called 'secular' sought an interpretation of the phrase 'clad in the habit of religion.' They proposed that anyone receiving the clerical tonsure was 'clad in the habit of religion' and hence any clergyman was eligible to be elected. After the payment of the five hundred marks the King permitted the election, where Richard, Archdeacon of London, was elected but 'not without suspicion of simony, since he was known to have handed over the money.'

Abruptly, without explanation, the *Historia Pontificalis* concludes with the words:[87]

> King Stephen and Matilda his wife founded the monastery of Faversham in Kent, and Clarembald.

As indicated by the excerpts from the *Historia Pontificalis* John's account of incidents connected with the Papal Court, the work is not a systematic presentation nor is it characterized by any attempt to relate the events in any sort of order. Some authors say that John had all the astuteness required of a statesman but he lacked the gifts needed by an author. Be that as it may, his pen was seldom still. His most copious work and the one that permits us to see his skill to the fullest is the *Policraticus*. It is also his most influential writing and the one that was to enjoy the greatest popularity. This volume is not intended as a work regarding morals, nor is it intended as a satire although it partakes in part of both aspects. Despite the fact that the deft touch of the master of prose is evident, it is in a deeply serious fashion that the author regards the whims of the courts.

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[87] *Op. cit.,* p. 89.

The main part is introduced by a poem called *Entheticus*. John also composed another poem entitled *Entheticus de dogmate philosophorum*. The two poems are written in elegaic meter and while the former is a short dedicatory work wherein the author bids his text make its way to the person for whom it was written, namely Thomas Becket, the latter is a lengthy work designed as a résumé of the history of philosophy and as a jibe at certain members of the Court of King Stephen, who were referred to by names other than their own. Extant documents relate that the *Policraticus* and the introductory *Entheticus* were sent to Peter of Celle with John of Salisbury's request that all matter likely to be controversial or pointed enough to cause displeasure at Court was to be deleted before the work was sent to England to Thomas Becket. The introductory poem commences with an appeal to the Angel of Counsel to guide men's minds, goes on to laud letters and includes a warning to one whose conduct John does not approve, and to whom John gives a fictitious name, 'Lanvinus' and 'Cornifius' after the one against whom Terence wrote his prologue and after the defamer of Virgil, respectively. 'Cornifius' represents the opponent of the classical culture so deeply reverenced by John and he appears in the *Metalogicon* as well as in the introductory poem.

Although the *Policraticus* is commonly known as *The Statesman's Book* it has a subsidiary title, *De nugis curialium et vestigiis philosophorum (Concerning the Trifles and the Traditions of the Philosophers)*. Scattered throughout John's writings one perceives a liking for certain words and phrases; for example, he has a penchant for the term '*nugae*.' At times these toys or trifles refer to John's degratory opinions of official business, but in this title he refers to his opinion for letters and court life in general as found in his own day, for in the main this work gives his recollections of service at court, chiefly in England.

The work consists of nine divisions, the first five of which concern the trifles of those who dwell at court while the last four deal with the theme of philosophy and its traditions. Just prior to the composition of this work a number of nobles had met violent deaths while in the pursuit of game. Accordingly, the first trifle to be censured by John is the chase, which the author points out, leads the courtiers to neglect estates and families and to perpetrate deeds of cruelty. Gaming, singing, acting and conjuring are in turn discussed and their evil aspects laid bare. Each of these trifles is amply illustrated by references from classical literature, and at times John even injects a personal note. For instance, he indicates his preference for Church music that is simple and not over-embellished, and relates that he is in accord with Gilbert of Sempringham who forbade the Nuns under his jurisdiction to sing at all. This clergyman was considered as father and guide to the only purely English community of women during the Middle Ages, and he commanded that they desist from all melodious pronunciation *(melica pronuntiatio)*. In regard to conjurers or those practicing legerdemain he says that he holds their practices lightly and that he relies very little on commonly accepted omens. We may recall that when John was but a school boy he refused to assist his master in crystal gazing and now in adult life he has not developed an appreciation for any display of magic. To show his contempt for omens he remarks that, although most people consider it a sign of misfortune to behold a rabbit on the wayside and particularly if it runs from one, he prefers to think of hares on the table where they are good eating.

Leaving aside all levity, John continues to discuss omens in a serious fashion in the second book of the *Policraticus*. Here he classifies omens and dreams. The latter, he remarks, admit of five categories: *insomnium, phantasma, somnium, oraculum,* and *visio*. Each division is explained by references to Scriptures or classical literature. At length he castigates those who seek to know the future by commonplace events. He admonishes that it would be far better to seek the cause and remedy of sneezing rather than to expend effort in interpreting the aspects of prophecy connected with the same act. Commonplace events have commonplace explanations, John believes, and dreams are sent by good and evil spirits. Evil spirits, the author of the *Policraticus* maintains, are responsible for dreams in which the Queen of Night and her attendants snatch children from their cradles for the purpose of devouring them, while good spirits are accountable for dreams in which an individual is instructed in regard to some worthwhile matter.

After an exhaustive discussion of dreams, John of Salisbury takes up the errors of the *mathematici*. Some mathematicians pursue a genuine mathematical science and follow the good mathēsis, John concedes, while others or the pseudo-mathematicians, he believes, pursue the evil mathēsis, and go beyond the study at hand and delve into the future. In condemning astrology, John divulges his position in regard to God's omniscience by stating that he would rather be illogical where a principle of philosophy is concerned than be heretical in denying God's omniscience. He vigorously attacks all the foibles of soothsaying and admonishes all who place credence in signs.

The enemies of the commonwealth are next brought to task, for such is the content of the third book. Of all the enemies of the state, John feels that those to be most distrusted are the flatterers. All their wiles and deceits are brought forth in the setting of a drama. John has his own version of the fact that 'all the world's a stage' and aptly does he show that the part of one actor has a marked influence on the other players. Human life presents many facets, some partaking of comedy while still others have a marked tragic aspect. John feels that just as in the theater an audience is an integral part of the performance, so too in the drama of life, God and His angels are the audience of the drama of life in which man is engaged.

Of special interest to the student of political theory is the next section of the *Policraticus*. In this division John develops his notions of the prime requisite of any organized state, namely its leader. Here the ideal prince is described, and John's lofty ideals of what the director of any state should be come into full play. A noble ruler is one who has no will of his own but is the servant of his subjects. Since he is the image of Divine authority, equity rests with him. His first obligation is to God with that to his country following thereafter. A proper ruler is one who seeks peace and justice for his subjects and who observes the four cardinal virtues. John relates that:[88]

> Between a tyrant and a prince there is this single or chief difference, that the latter obeys the law and rules the people by its dictates, accounting himself as but their servant. It is by virtue of the law that he makes good his claim to the foremost and chief place in the management of the affairs of the commonwealth and in the bearing of its burdens; and his elevation over others consists in this, that whereas private men are held responsible only for their private affairs, on the prince fall the burdens of the whole community.

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[88] *The Statesman's Book of John of Salisbury*, Translated by John Dickinson, New York, 1927, p. 3.

With great clarity John propounds the doctrine that it is established by Authority of the Divine Law that the prince is subject to the Law and to Justice. Likewise, the prince should be chaste and avoid avarice and he should have the Law of God ever before his mind and eyes. It is befitting that he should be learned in letters, be taught the fear of God, be humble, but maintain his humility in such a way that his authority be not diminished. The ruler should learn that some precepts are inflexible while others are flexible. He should strive to effect a reconciliation of Justice with Mercy, and should so temper and combine the two to promote the well-being and advantage of the commonwealth. Throughout the *Policraticus*, John refers to the ruler and his domain by the anatomical parts of the human body. As is to be expected, the prince is the head, but the instructions that John gives to the right and left hands is quite unexpected. In the form of a commandment John states that 'He shall not incline to the right hand nor to the left.' To incline to the right hand signifies:[89]

> . . . to insist too enthusiastically on the virtues themselves. To incline to the right is to exceed the bounds of moderation in the works of virtue, the essence of which is moderation. For truly all enthusiasm is the foe of salvation and all excess is a fault; nothing is worse than the immoderate practice of good works . . .

On the other hand to incline to the left means:[90]

> . . . to slip or deviate from the way of virtue down the precipices of vices. Therefore one turns aside to the left who is too ready to punish his subjects, and take revenge on them for their faults; on the other hand, he deviates to the right who is too indulgent to offenders out of excess of kindness. Both roads lead away from the true path; but that which inclines toward the left is the more harmful.

Not all the fourth book of the *Policraticus* contains directives for the ideal prince, but some considerable space is devoted to showing the sovereign the advantage which he may draw from the practice of justice and holding before him other rewards. The section concludes with a consideration of the reasons for which the kingship or princely power may be transferred. While justice comes in for considerable scrutiny in the initial portions of the work, it is treated most particularly in the fifth book in connection with the commonwealth and its members and especially the administration of justice. At the outset, John quotes what he reports is Plutarch's letter for the instruction of Trajan, and goes on to expound what a commonwealth is, according to Plutarch, and what constitutes the place of the soul and the members in such an organization. To introduce his notions in regard to this last mentioned category John indicates that what he is about to state comes from a little treatise entitled, *The Instruction of Trajan*, which he inserts as a part of the *Policraticus*. As we now know, the little inserted work also came from the pen of John of Salisbury who used it to introduce political theories which he feared to utter in his own name. The little treatise was so highly regarded that the Italian jurists quoted at length and freely from it. In connection with the place of the components of the commonwealth John says:[91]

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[89] *Op. cit.*, p. 43.

[90] *Op. cit.*, pp. 43, 44.

> The place of the head in the body of the commonwealth is filled by the prince, who is subject only to God and to those who exercise His office and represent Him on earth, even as in the human body the head is quickened and governed by the soul. The place of the heart is filled by the Senate, from which proceeds the initiation of good works and ill. The duties of eyes, ears, and tongue are claimed by the judges and governors of provinces. Officials and soldiers correspond to the hands. Those who always attend upon the prince are likened to the sides. Financial officers and keepers (I speak now not of those who are in charge of the prisons, but of those who are keepers of the privy chest) may be compared with the stomach and intestines, which if they become congested through excessive avidity, and retain too tenaciously their accumulations, generate innumerable and incurable diseases, so that through their ailment the whole body is threatened with destruction. The husbandmen correspond to the feet, which always cleave to the soil, and need the more especially the care and foresight of the head . . . Take away the support of the feet from the strongest body, and it cannot move forward by its own power, but must creep painfully and shamefully on its hands, or else be moved by means of brute animals.

Recent research reveals that the doctrines that John advances under the guise of coming from the pen of another are believed to have come to John from his former teacher, Robert Pullen.[92] As an integral part of this division of the book, John gives his notions of the manner in which a law suit should proceed, and the formula of the oath against malicious litigation which the plaintiff and the defendant are required to take. Considered also are the consequences of refusing to take the oath. Things which pertain to the duty of proconsuls, governors and ordinary judges are inventoried. The crime of extortion and the penalty for those who accept anything for doing which is their duty to do are treated. Judicial matters finally terminate with advice that money is to be despised in comparison with wisdom, and John goes on to a treatise regarding the armed hand of the commonwealth, as well as its unarmed hand. 'The armed hand is that which performs the soldiering of camps and bolls; the unarmed is that which administers justice and, keeping holiday from arms, is enlisted in the service of the law.' It was John's contention that military service required selection, science and training and that braggart soldiers were of no use for service for 'the more boastful they are in the hall, the more certain it is that when it comes to the issue of an actual battle, they will send ahead their servant into the fight in droves.'

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[91] *Op. cit.*, p. 65.

[92] H. Liebeschütz, "John of Salisbury and Pseudo-Plutarch," *Journal of the Warburg and Courtland Institutes*, VI (1943), pp. 33—39.

It is in the sixth book that John explains the custom of placing a sword upon the altar. He indicates that:[93]

> though some of them [soldiers] do not regard themselves as bound to the Church by a solemn oath, because today by general custom no such oath is actually taken, yet there is none who is not in fact under an obligation to the Church by virtue of a tacit oath if not of an express one. And perchance the solemnity of the oath has been given up for precisely the reason that the requirements of their office and the sincerity of their faith are a sufficient inducement and guarantee of the same result. Whence the solemn custom has now taken root, that on the day on which a man is girt with the belt of a soldier he goes solemnly to the church, and placing his sword on the altar like a sacrificial offering, and making as it were a public profession, he dedicates himself to the service of the altar and vows to God the never-failing obedience of his sword, that is to say, of his performance of the duties of his office.

John recommends that the commonwealth should be ordered to the pattern of nature, and that its ordering should be borrowed from the bees. He reminds his readers that in different fashion both Cicero and Plato have written of organized government as it ought to be, but both laid down the same formula for the body politic, namely that its life should imitate nature, which has repeatedly been called the best guide of life. Again and again, in the general plan of the commonwealth John returns to the head of the state, for he feels the importance of the position of the prince. Book six is replete with admonitions for the prince and he is warned that levity or rash carelessness is to be avoided, and although the vices of rulers are to be endured by the subjects because there is to be a mutual dependence of the head and the members of the commonwealth, none the less the prince is strictly bound to certain general practices that are for the good of the commonwealth. This book concludes John's report on the trifles of the court *(nugae curialium)* and in the following sections he takes up the traditions of the philosophers *(vestigia philosophorum)*.

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[93] *The Statesman's Book of John of Salisbury, op. cit.*, p. 203.

The seventh book deals chiefly with ambition and the wiles of the ambitious. Cupidity and like vices are to be considered as the companions of folly for the ambitious dissimulate their desires and with excuses veil their true objectives. Hypocrites are censured for hiding the stain of ambition under the false pretense of religion. In addition to examining the wiles of the ambitious John includes a summary history of ancient philosophy. The eighth book covers tyranny and tyrannicide. In this division of the *Policraticus*, John dwells at length on the doctrines espoused by the Epicureans, or those devoted to pleasure. These are divided into two categories and each section is represented by a character taken from the play, *Eunuchus*, by the poet Terence. The soldier who is a strutting braggadocio is called Thraso while the obsequious, fawning and subservient of his is Gnatho. All manner of vices and excesses are brought forth for censure in this eighth book. One of the most elaborate treatments is given to gluttony. In his exposition John brings out his wide acquaintance with classical authors from whom he culls scenes at the banquet of other years. After pertinent passages regarding vice in general and many specific vices, John again takes up the theme that concerned him in the fourth book, namely tyrants and tyranny. Once again he gives his views on what the good prince should be and then by way of contrast shows the evils resulting from the reign of the tyrant. In brief, it is John's opinion that the tyrant is the devil's image just as a worthy prince is God's. At this point he voices his often misquoted opinion that the tyrant should be put to death because he has forfeited his right to life by the abuse of his position. Often, John remarks, tyrants come to violent ends and to illustrate this theme he turns to the pages of history which bear out his contention. John holds that the overthrow of laws by the tyrant is the supreme treason and such should be avenged by any citizen. John's teaching has been misconstrued and he has been charged with holding the belief that the penalty of tyrannicide be invoked for any unworthy ruler, while quite the contrary John pointed out that such a sentence be leveled only against rulers who ruthlessly overthrow the laws of the commonwealth. Tyranny has its beginnings in the love of power and neglects the well-being of the individuals for whose protection laws were instituted. Love of power, John points out, is not limited to the secular ruler but it is prone to debase other rulers as well.

At the conclusion of his book John admonishes his friend, Thomas, that the Epicureans' mode of existence is to be shunned for their way of seeking happiness and pleasure is a false one. He cautions his patron to pursue a life that will be marked by righteousness and the fear of God for such a course will eventually lead to true happiness. John commits the *Policraticus* to the benevolence of his friends and readers and asks that they remember him prayerfully. Thus, John concludes his most intricate work and the one which has proved to be his most popular.

While the *Policraticus* gives us a rather complete picture of the courts of dignitaries of the period, biographical details in regard to the author are rather sparse, but such is not the case in regard to the *Metalogicon*.

Although the *Metalogicon* is designed as a defense of logic, it is with the other two branches of the *trivium*, namely grammar and rhetoric, that the work commences. John feels that they also need defending because of the detractions of the Cornificians, the latter term being one that John coined to represent all detractors. The name Cornificius was the fictitious one that Donatus applied to the detractor of Virgil. John remarks that the Cornificians place rhetoric in ill repute by saying that those men naturally endowed with the gift of words need not rhetoric, while those lacking such a proficiency would not profit from the study of this discipline. To counter such attacks, John develops at considerable length a treatise on the merits of this subject. Likewise, in his defense of grammar John explains that he considers it to be the ground and root of all true learning and science, and without mastering it no man can be considered lettered. After a discussion of these two disciplines, John turns to logic, which he insists must be studied for a practical purpose. The author seems to realize that the little book lacks a nicety of continuity, because he tells the reader that the work was composed during intervals of all too infrequent free moments that he could snatch away from his particularly heavy administrative tasks, which had been made more burdensome due to the illness of Archbishop Theobald. To bolster his opinions he indicates that he uses frequent quotations from authors, both ancient and modern.

John has a very poor opinion of those pseudo-scholars who devote their time to hair-splitting in regard to logic. "They called it neglecting the letter for the spirit to find in the statement that Hylas was the son of Hercules the inner meaning that a valid argument comes from a bold and vigorous disputant or in the five vowels the five 'pleas of the crown,' the names of which happened each to have a different vowel in its second syllable. They discuss whether a pig going to market was driven by a man or by a rope, whether one has bought a hood when one has purchased a whole cloak. Men brought up among such follies, finding their time wasted and their hopes disappointed, fell away from logical studies into other walks of life."[94]

The author of the *Metalogicon* discusses four courses followed by those educated in the schools given to such trivial discussions. Those that were wise sought the cloister where in true humility they repented of their past folly and espoused a life that seriously aimed at lasting values in place of the fleeting nonsense they had studied in the schools. Some students took themselves off to medical schools, such as Salerno or Montpellier, where they took up the pursuit of healing with the same alacrity as they had formerly shown for philosophy. Their paramount concern was not with the curing of human ills but the quest for a lucrative practice. Others who had formerly studied pseudo-philosophy took up service in the courts of the great men of the land. To these John identifies himself and to the trifles of the courts he devoted a whole book which we have previously discussed. The fourth group was composed of men of the ilk of Cornificius, and these gained a living in the pursuit of profit in the marketplace. All four groups instead of following their studies in the *trivium* by arithmetic, geometry, music and astronomy which composed the *quadrivium*, ceased their studies because of the distaste fostered by the foolish dialectical discursions offered in the schools in the name of true learning.

While the Cornificians took their instructors to task and belittled their eloquence, John defended with pride those true Masters from whom he was indebted for an education that has been considered for many years as the finest of any man of his day. To the praise of eloquence John wrote a complete chapter, giving to it a place second only to virtue and wisdom. John readily admits that all men are not endowed by nature with the gift of eloquence, but he denies that the study of rhetoric is in vain for those not possessing this gift. For example, he says, all men are not gifted with all languages, but a study of various languages gives one facility in their use. Study of rhetoric, too, helps one to speak in an elegant fashion and its study should certainly be fostered. In this chapter John tells us what he considers to be the qualifications of a philosopher. He writes, "The mental temperament which is best suited to a philosophical training is to adopt a classification employed by Bernard of Chartres, neither the impatient and high-flying, nor the unambitious and grovelling, but that which is in the mean between the two."[95]

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[94] C. C. J. Webb, *John of Salisbury, op. cit.*, p. 76.

[95] *Op. cit.*, p. 79.

Next, John takes up the defense of Grammar which he feels is a necessary part of the education of any man who would be considered learned. The cultured man, he believes, will use Grammar to advance to Poetry, which the medieval scholar considered as closely related to Logic and Rhetoric, and then pass on to the study of the mathematical sciences of the *quadrivium*. Nor should one's education cease here, but one should investigate Natural philosophy and finally advance to Moral philosophy, which John believed to be at the head of rational pursuits.

To illustrate what he considered as exemplary methods of teaching John relates the pattern set by the illustrious Bernard of Chartres and the work of his successors in the classroom who taught himself, namely, William of Conches and Richard L'Evêque.

In the second book of the *Metalogicon* John takes up the consideration of the proper theme of the entire work, that is logic. Here the author makes an inquiry in regard to truth commencing with a brief review of the logic taught by the ancients and including the contributions of logicians up to the time of Aristotle. John is considered to be the first medieval scholar to evidence knowledge of the books comprising the *Organon*. Many scholars of his day knew the first two books, *On the Categories* and *On Interpretation* from the translations of Boethius, but in addition to these John had studied the *Topics* and the *Prior Analytics* under the tutelage of Thierry of Chartres. Thus, John is considered as the means by which the *Organon* was introduced into England, and Otto of Freising is believed to have performed the same task for Germany. John must also have been acquainted with the *Posterior Analytics* because he divulges that he knows the Aristotelian division of logic into demonstration, probable and sophistical reasoning; and he states that he is unable to achieve the level of demonstration such as discussed by Aristotle in the *Posterior Analytics*. He mentions that demonstrative science is to be had most particularly in geometry, which in his day was pursued only in Spain, Africa, Egypt and Arabia in a scientific, methodical manner. While John shied away from demonstration, he dwelt at length on dialectics. Over and over again he evidences displeasure at those "logic choppers" who spend their time in a futile manner. His notions of dialectics he takes from the *Topics* where Aristotle states the dialectical problem and the methods to be used in its solution.

The final portion of the second book deals with universals and here John lists nine positions espoused by eminent logicians. The first three groups he combines and refers to them as nominalistic while the last six are classified as various branches of realistic positions. Most interesting is John's own position whereby he tells us that his doctrine is according to Aristotle and that universals are not independent realities but are objects of thought. John cautions that it would be more fruitful if his contemporaries concentrated on Aristotle and dwelt less on the work of Porphyry. That avowed enemy of Christianity wrote a treatise which at most was intended as an introduction to Aristotle. John's feeling in the matter is that Plotinus' biographer did not even accomplish this introductory aim and that those wishing proper knowledge would abandon Porphyry in favor of the Peripatetic, who together with his School held that the supreme good for man is the knowledge of truth, and the quest for it is characterized by the discernment of the difference between truth and error, good and bad. John's deep reverence for the teachings of Aristotle is attested by the fact that he devotes most of the *Metalogicon* to giving an account of the rules laid down by Aristotle.

It has been said that while John of Salisbury writes well and his topics are of interest he lacked the prime requisite for writing a book, namely to stay with the task at hand. In this book, John follows his usual custom and strays into autobiographical accounts. It is here that his much quoted passage which we have already mentioned occurs, wherein he relates that after nearly twelve years of study he returned to his former school at Mount Sainte Geneviève and found that his teachers had not added one proposition to their teaching but had retrogressed in that they had unlearned tolerance.

The misstatements of the Cornificians come under attack in the third book. John apologizes to his reader for the fact that he has not studied logic for over twenty years, but the violent mistaken judgments of the Cornificians force him to defend logic. He bolsters his opinions by those authors ancient and contemporary and among the latter he includes Gilbert de la Porrée, Abelard and Adam du Petit Pont. In this book and throughout the rest of the *Metalogicon* we find John commenting upon the *Organon* as well as Porphyry's *Isagoge*. In the third book he handles the *Categories*, *De interpretatione* and the *Topics*, while in the following book, the fourth, he deals with the *Prior* and *Posterior Analytics* and the *De sophisticis elenchis*. He advises his readers to neglect Porphyry's *Isagoge* and to consult the first and fourth books of the *Topics* regarding *genera* and *species*. The *Categories* he calls *elementarius*, the *De interpretatione* is for him *syllabicus*, the *Topics* is *dictionalis*. John credits *Aristotle* with having the best account of reasoning although he believes the language most trying and the subject matter both difficult and incomplete. From Boethius, John learned that Aristotle might well be supplemented by the works of Aristotle's commentators, Theophrastus and Eudemus. John admits that his understanding of the initial portion of the *Organon* is greater than the final parts which he is forced to interpret by means of the writings of other authors. He remarks that, aside from the treatment in regard to modals, Aristotle has no specific work on hypotheticals. John says that after reading the contributions of other authors on this subject he feels that it would have taken the sibyl to unravel Aristotle's meaning in regard to this topic if he had written in his accustomed manner.

After a commentary on the *Organon,* John deals with a discussion of Truth and its nature. John is the forerunner of those who in the Middle Ages will devote much effort and space to *Questions of Truth* in their *Summae* and other writings. In addition to a lengthy discussion of the nature and other aspects of Truth, there is introduced an exposition of Reason and Truth. The reader is reminded that in the pursuit of Truth there are limits beyond which unaided human reason is incapable of progressing.

In no wise does John of Salisbury indicate that he holds Aristotle's views to be infallible, in fact, he knows that some of the Peripatetic's notions were erroneous, but he feels that in logic he had no peer and that a study of the laws laid down by him in regard to correct thought processes lead to Truth. However, John suggests that man augment his powers of reasoning by recourse to God's power, wisdom and goodness.

An abrupt transition occurs in the text at this point. John surveys the affairs of men during that October in 1159 when he was writing and he declares that he has little heart to continue his writing. He bemoans the fact that Christian princes war with one another. Here he is referring to the siege of Toulouse, which state of affairs had ceased to exist, but of which John was unaware due to the slowness with which news was brought from the continent to England. Even more disconcerting to him is the fact that on August 31, 1159 his dear patron, Pope Adrian, had died. John tells us that he and his friend were closer in affection than were the Pope and his parents. The Holy Father ceaselessly showed his amanuensis copious courtesies and John had an open invitation to dine at table with His Holiness whenever he (John) was in the proximity of the Pope. John recalls that it was at his request that the Pope bequeathed Ireland, which was reported to be Papal property by Constantine's gift, to Henry II, and it was John who carried the symbol of the investiture, an emerald ring, to his Sovereign. Example after example of the bond of friendship that existed between John and His Holiness are cited as though by penning the kind acts of his friend John is somehow assuaging his grief for his departed countryman.

Another cause of consternation to John is what he terms 'the ministry of a second Judas,' namely the reign of Octavian, who as Victor IV was set up by the Emperor Frederick Barbarossa as an antipope in opposition to Alexander III. His heart is heavy with the defection of the Catholics of Germany to the side of this unworthy Victor IV. Worry too comes to John on account of the illness of Archbishop of Canterbury, Theobald. Thus, sorely tried by the affairs of men, John has recourse to prayer and recommends the same course to Thomas Becket to whom he is addressing the *Metalogicon*. He concludes this work with the request directed to the reader that he pray for him. His final prayer is that 'May He, I say, by whom kings reign and princes exercise lordship, set over His universal Church a fit Pastor and one pleasing in His eyes; and may He defend our kings and princes from all adversity and cause them to preserve the flock committed to their charge to the honor and glory of His name. I pray also those who read or hear me to intercede for me, poor wretch that I am, with the Virgin's Son, who is the Way, the Truth and the Life, that He may remove from me the love of vanity, may pour upon me the light of the knowledge of Himself and may make me an assiduous seeker after truth and no less a lover and worshipper of it when found.'

As well as the works that we have mentioned John composed an eighteen hundred fifty-two verse elegiac-metered poem entitled *Entheticus de Dogmate Philosophorum*. Since we possess no critical edition of this work, further study must be accorded it before we can disclose much about it. In 1843 Christian Petersen published at Hamburg a copy of this work but it is so faulty that it cannot be used for scientific study. The abbreviated *Entheticus* which we have mentioned as being an introductory part of the *Policraticus* contains some verses that are identical with the longer *Entheticus*. Until some scholar devotes himself to the study of these two poems, we can only state that they are clearly written admonitions for those journeying in John's day against the dangers that lurk in inns, hospices and other guest houses. Both poems are filled with references to persons and objects known to the author. Sometimes he disguises the persons to whom he is alluding, but more often he calls them by name. At this late date, to identify many of them would involve immense research. However, without knowing exactly to whom John is referring in the poems, we can gain a keen insight into the sociological conditions of his time, into the extraordinary tensions present in the life of noble and servant, and into the complex and disparate movements afoot. Internal criticism causes us to place the writing of the longer poem around the time of the *Policraticus* and the *Metalogicon*, but additional study is still necessary for absolute verification of its place among John's other works.

As we have related, these literary productions of John of Salisbury were written whenever he was able to take time out from his administrative career and during the time when he was in exile due to the displeasure of the King of England. Throughout most of his life he was in debt and he was constantly seeking sources of revenue. After his last exile in France, he returned to England and at long last his financial troubles seemed over because the King consented to John receiving sufficient revenues to abolish monetary cares. His new tasks included being secretary to Richard the Archbishop of Canterbury. Thus, he held the position of secretary to three Archbishops. Furthermore, he was appointed as Canon and Treasurer of Exeter. However, he did not remain long in any of these capacities because there soon arrived a document from his friend and benefactor, King Louis VII of France acquainting John with his appointment to the bishopric of Chartres. At the instigation of his friend, William Archbishop of Sens, the cathedral chapter had elected John to this position on July 22, 1176 and on August 8 of the same year he was consecrated at Sens by Maurice, Bishop of Paris.

One of his earliest acts upon taking up his official duties as Bishop was to excommunicate the prominent Count of Vendôme who had gravely harmed a religious house in the domain under his jurisdiction. The Count was to be under sentence for four years and it was only terminated when the ruler of England pleaded in the Count's behalf. Even though the charge was lifted, the Count had to go in person and barefoot to make a public apology to the Chapter of the House he had wrongly usurped. Perhaps, the most noteworthy event of John's brief rule as Bishop was the reconciliation between the French and English Kings who at long last concluded many, many years of strife.

On September 21, 1177, John was present as a witness on the occasion when these two kings drew up plans for a crusade to rescue the Holy Land. Although the preparations were ambitious, the expedition never took place. As Bishop, John attended the Third Lateran Council and once again a Sovereign Pontiff entrusted to him a mission requiring delicate handling. It was an appeal case from his native land and John was charged with the formulation of his findings in regard to the case prior to a Papal decision. Countless numbers of such cases had been cared for by him as secretary to the English Archbishops under whom he served, so he readily effected a solution to the case in question to the joint satisfaction of all the parties involved.

The third Bishop of Chartres' life culminated on October 25, 1180, and he was interred in St. Mary's Chapel in the Monastery of Josaphat located on the outskirts of his cathedral city. He bequeathed a phial of the blood of St. Thomas Becket to his Cathedral along with vestments, sacred vessels and a portion of his books. John's successor was none other than his close friend and benefactor, Peter of Celle.

With the death of John of Salisbury ended the career of the finest product of the School of Chartres and the leading humanist of his day, a man who sought not learning for its own sake but as a preparation for a life as an ecclesiastical statesman who desired the blending of learning and conduct and who never stilled his pen in defense of a principle despite the resulting persecution and exile which came because those in high places cared not for the censure coming from one devoted to Church and State. While John of Salisbury was remarkably gifted in intellectual matters and has come to be known as the most eminent of the humanists, perhaps his most remarkable trait was his fidelity to his principles, to his patrons and to his friends.

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ST JOHN CHRYSOSTOM AND THE INTEGRITY OF THE HUMAN NATURE OF CHRIST

It has been said that the accentuation of the integrity of the two natures in Christ constitutes a no less firm foundation of St John Chrysostom's christology than it does that of his compatriots.[1] In this article, we propose to analyse one affirmation implicit in this statement, namely, that St John Chrysostom, in his christology, emphasized the integrity of the human nature of Christ. After an introduction treating of Chrysostom's doctrine on the reality of the flesh assumed by the Word, we shall proceed to a discussion of Chrysostom's doctrine concerning the soul of Christ, its spiritual activities in the domain of intellect and will, and finally of the operations of Christ.

I. THE REALITY OF THE ASSUMED FLESH

"Why", asks St John Chrysostom in his commentary on St Matthew's Gospel, "doth he call it a 'book of the generation of Jesus Christ', while yet this book hath not the birth only, but the whole economy?" He answers by invoking the supreme gratuitousness and importance of the Incarnation: "because this is the sum of the whole economy, and is made an origin and root of all our blessings . . . For that which teems with astonishment and is beyond all hope and all expectation is that God should become man".[2] By means of the Incarnation, the "Sun of Justice casts its rays through our flesh and illumines our souls".[3] The Incarnation surpasses all thought, for how shall we ever comprehend how "God the Unspeakable, the Unutterable, the Incomprehensible and He that is equal to the Father, hath passed through a Virgin's womb and hath vouchsafed to be born of woman and to have Abraham and David for forefathers".[4]

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[1] Cfr J. H. JUZEK, *Die Christologie des hl. Johannes Chrysostomus*, Breslau, 1912, p. 31: "Die Betonung der Integrität der zwei Naturen in Christus bildet auch bei Chrysostomus, wie bei seinen Landsleuten, einen eisernen Bestandteil seiner Christologie."

[2] *In Matth.*, 2, 3; PG, 57, 27. The patristic use of the term οἰκονομία and the variety of meanings attached to it are outlined by G. L. PRESTIGE, *God in Patristic Thought*, London, 1956, pp. 57—67. All the meanings developed by PRESTIGE in these pages might be illustrated by texts drawn from Chrysostom, with whom, as the author admits, "the word is a constant favourite" (p. 62). PRESTIGE concludes: "It need only be added that the supreme instance of divine economy, whether in the sense of dispensation, condescension, or special providence, was exhibited in the Incarnation, for which the word "ockonomia" without any verbal qualification, is the regular patristic term from the third century onwards" (p. 67).

[3] *In diem natalem*, 1; PG, 49, 351.

The Son alone of the Blessed Trinity assumed flesh, though in doing so, He lost none of the glory that was His by nature, and thus His Incarnation did not in any way make Him inferior to the Father.[5] The Son, therefore, enjoyed a twofold generation — the one like our own, the other ineffable and hidden. Through the birth according to the flesh, God was manifested "by means of a true flesh".[6]

The Evangelists have given us some details concerning the mode of the Incarnation. Christ's birth was of "a strange and wondrous kind",[7] since He was born of a Virgin who continued to be a Virgin, but the flesh from which the Holy Spirit has fashioned the Body of Christ is true virginal flesh, drawn from the same substance as our own; and the manner of Mary's parturition was natural. St. Paul, "by saying 'born of a woman' thereby stops the mouths of them that say Christ came us as through some conduit". If indeed it had happened in this way, as the Gnostics claim, asks Chrysostom, what need would there be for a womb? Furthermore, if this were so, Christ would have nothing in common with us, but the flesh would be of some other kind, and not of the mass which belongs to us.[8]

Christ's conception, then, was of a strange and wondrous kind, but His body was made of the same substance as ours, fashioned by the Holy Spirit from virginal flesh. Nevertheless, Chrysostom reminds us that even with such knowledge afforded us by the Evangelists, we are still ignorant of many things: How, for instance, the Infinite is in a womb, how He that contains all things is carried as unborn by a woman; how the Virgin bears and continues a Virgin; how the Spirit "fashioned the Temple".[9] Chrysostom's habitual reverence for the mystery of the economy prevents him from seeking a solution to these questions, "for neither Gabriel nor Matthew was able to say anything more, but only that it was of the Spirit; but how, of the Spirit, and in what manner, neither of them hath explained".[10]

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[4] *In Matth.*, 2, 2; PG, 57, 25.
[5] Cfr *De Christi Precibus (Contra Anomoeos*, X*)*, 6; PG, 48, 792.
[6] *In Joan.*, 15, 1; PG, 59, 98.
[7] *In Matth.*, 37, 2; PG, 57, 422.
[8] *In Matth.*, 4,3; PG, 57, 43.
[9] *Ibid.*
[10] *Ibid.*, 42.

If Chrysostom is reticent concerning the manner of the Incarnation, he is intensely preoccupied with the question of the reality of the flesh assumed by the Word. He affirms continually that the economy is true, that Christ has truly assumed flesh, that He has assumed a true flesh. Christ was clothed with "a true flesh".[11] According to the prophets, Christ was to come to us "in a true flesh".[12] His Incarnation was not "the change of the (divine) substance", but "the assumption of a true flesh"[13]: it was, in fact, the "manifestation of God by means of a true flesh".[14] Chrysostom constantly explains the human actions of Christ by means of their function in proving "the truth of the economy".[15]

In asserting that Christ's flesh was true, Chrysostom had in mind the Gnostics and docetists who denied that Christ's body was real, and denied that Mary's parturition took place according to the laws of nature.[16] Chrysostom insists, against these heretics, on the reality of the flesh. Christ's body was not a phantasy (φαντασία) nor a shadow (σκία) but, on the contrary, "a truth of nature" (ἀλήθεια φύσεως).[17] The Holy Spirit did not fashion Christ's body out of nothing but from the flesh of a Virgin. It was from the same mass as that from which our own bodies are taken. Had such not been the case, it might have been thought that "what is born is alien to our nature".[18]

The "flesh" is the normal, though by no means exclusive, expression employed by St John Chrysostom to designate the humanity of Christ. What precisely does he mean by the term "flesh"? JUZEK, in his essay on the christology of St John Chrysostom, affirms that Chrysostom employed the word σάρξ instead of ἄνθρωπος to denote the human nature of Christ concretely considered, in order to avoid the danger of positing two persons in Christ. "Flesh" signified a perfect human nature — a union of body and soul — whereas "man" meant for him, a perfect human person.[19]

No proof is alleged, however, for such a careful choice of terminology on the part of the Antiochian doctor. Neither is any proof given to show that Chrysostom habitually and consciously used the term "flesh" to designate a perfect and integral human nature. To understand what Chrysostom really meant by the expression "true flesh", we must enter upon the wider field of his doctrine on the integrity of the human nature of Christ.

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[11] *In Matth.*, 31, 2; PG, 57, 372.

[12] *In Joan.*, 15, 1; PG, 59, 98.

[13] *Ibid.*, 11, 2; PG, 59, 79.

[14] *Ibid.*, 15, 1; PG, 59, 98.

[15] *De Christi Precibus (Contra Anomoeos, X)*, 2; PG, *48*, 785; *In Matth.*, 8, 1; 13, 2; 49, 1; PG, 57, 83, 210; *58*, 496 etc.

[16] *In Matth.*, 4, 3; PG, 57, 43.

[17] *In eos, qui ad synaxim occurrerunt (Contra Anomoeos*, VII), 3; PG, *48*, 759.

[18] *In Joan.*, 26, 1; PG, 59, 153.

[19] JUZEK, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

II. THE INTEGRITY OF CHRIST'S HUMAN NATURE

A. *Direct affirmations of the existence of the soul of Christ*

It has been claimed that St John Chrysostom, in common with his Antiochian compatriots Diodore of Tarsus and Theodore of Mopsuestia, emphasized the integrity of the two natures of Christ in opposition to the Apollinarist heresy which denied a rational soul to Christ.[20] However, if we disabuse ourselves of all preconceptions concerning Chrysostom's place in the Antiochian school of theology, and restrict ourselves to a study of Chrysostom's own writings, we reach the surprising conclusion that Chrysostom seems to have been singularly unpreoccupied with the Apollinarist heresy. In the great bulk of his writings, we find only one reference to Apollinaris of Laodicea[21] and this is found in the commentary on the Epistle to the Philippians, very probably preached after his elevation to the See of Constantinople.[22] In the homily on *Philipp.* 2, 7 which follows upon this reference to the heretic, Chrysostom clearly affirms the existence of a soul in Christ, and attacks those who deny it.[23] We shall comment on this text, because it is the clearest affirmation in Chrysostom's writings of the existence of Christ's soul, and it also furnishes a key to the interpretation of several passages in Chrysostom's Antiochian writings.

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[20] *Ibid.*, pp. 18 f., 31.

[21] *In Philipp.*, 6, 1; PG, *62*, 218. Apollinaris of Laodicea is merely included in a list of heretics along with Arius, Paul of Samosata, Marcellus of Galatia, Sabellius, Marcion, Valentinus, Manes, Photinus and Sophronius whose heretical doctrines are refuted by *Philipp.* 2, 5—7. This is the only direct reference to Apollinaris in Chrysostom's writings. J. MONTALVERNE O. F. M., *Theodoreti Cyrensis Doctrina antiquior de Verbo "Inhumanato"* (Studia Antoniana, I), Rome, 1948, p. 67 finds an indirect reference in Chrysostom's commentary on St John's Gospel (*In Joan.*, 11, 2; PG, *59*, 79): "Joannes Chrysostomus contra apollinaristas verba S. Joannis 'Et Verbum caro factum est' pluries declarat minime 'mutationem' substantiae significare, sed 'verae carnis assumptionem'". However Chrysostom does not mention the apollinarists in this passage or indeed anywhere else during his Antiochian ministry. The passage is sufficiently explained by his anxiety to preserve the transcendance and the consequent immutability of the Divine Essence.

[22] J. STILTING, *Acta Ss.* Sept. IV, p. 464, followed by CHR. BAUR, *Der Hl. Johannes Chrysostomus und seine Zeit*, t. II, München, 1930, p. 62, assigns this commentary to the Antiochian ministry. However B. DE MONTFAUCON, *Monitum ad Homilias in Epistolam ad Philippenses*, PG, *62*, 177 f.; H. LIETZMANN, art. *Johannes Chrysostomus* in *Paulys-Wissowa Realencyclopädie*, 18e Halbband, col. 1819; and W. STODERL, *Kommentar zu den Briefen des hl. Paulus an die Philipper und Kolosser*, in *Bibliothek der Kirchenväter*, München, 1924, pp. 1—4, favour the Constantinopolitan origin of the commentary. M. VON BONSDORFF, *Zur Predigttätigkeit des Joh. Chrysostomus*, Helsinki, 1922, pp. 78—82, defends the latter opinion, and sets forth his arguments very convincingly.

In commenting *Philipp.* 2, 7, Chrysostom pauses at the words Ἐν ὁμοιώματι ἀνθρώπων γεγόμενος and remarks: "For we indeed are soul and body; but He (Christ) is God, and soul and body".[24] No clearer affirmation of the soul of Christ could be desired. In order to show the distinction between Christ's flesh and ours, Chrysostom has recourse to a parallel text in *Rom.* 8, 3 Ἐν ὁμοιώματι σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας and comments: "For indeed when he says 'in the likeness of sinful flesh', he does not say this, that He did not have flesh, but that that flesh did not sin, and yet it was similar to sinful (flesh). In what way was it similar? According to nature, and not according to malice: on this account was it similar to the sinful soul".[25] Here we find the striking substitution of "sinful soul" for "sinful flesh", Chrysostom thereby witnessing to the fact that the soul, and not the body, is the source of sin. It would seem therefore that Chrysostom uses the term "flesh" in this particular context to designate a human nature consisting of body and soul.

A little further on in the same homily, Chrysostom briefly and succinctly re-states his doctrine concerning the soul of Christ: "And again, we must speak against those who deny that (Christ) assumed a soul. If the form of God is perfect God, then the form of a slave is a perfect slave".[26]

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[23] *In Philipp.*, 7, 2—3; PG, *62*, 231—232.

[24] *In Philipp.*, 7, 2; PG, *62*, 231: Ἡμεῖς μὲν ψυχὴ καὶ σῶμά ἐσμεν· ἐκεῖνος δὲ Θεὸς καὶ ψυχὴ καὶ σῶμα.

[25] *Ibid.*, 3: κατὰ τί ὁμοία; κατὰ τὴν φύσιν, οὐ κατὰ τὴν κακίαν· διὰ τοῦτο ὁμοία ἁμαρτωλοῦ ψυχῆς. The transposition does not occur in the parallel passage in the commentary on Romans written at Antioch. Cfr *In Rom.*, 13, 5; PG, *60*, 514 f.: "But if he does say that it was 'in the likeness' of flesh that He sent the Son, do not therefore suppose that His flesh was of a different kind. For as he called it 'sinful', this was why he put the word 'likeness'. For sinful flesh it was not that Christ had, but like indeed to our sinful flesh, yet sinless, and in nature the same with us. And so even from this it is plain that the nature of flesh was not evil. For it was not by taking a different one instead of the former, nor by changing this same one in substance that Christ caused it to regain the victory: but He let it abide in its own nature, and yet made it bear off the crown of victory over sin, and then after the victory raised it up, and made it immortal". The doctrine is similar in both exegeses, the point of view is different. In the commentary on Romans, Chrysostom is impugning the doctrine of those who say that the material flesh — as opposed to the soul — is evil. In the context it is quite clear that Chrysostom understands by flesh, the body as distinct from the soul.

[26] *In Philipp.*, 7, 3; PG, *62*, 232: καὶ πρὸς τοὺς μὴ λέγοντας δὲ ἀνειληφέναι ψυχὴν, ἀναγκαῖον εἰπεῖν· Εἰ ἡ μορφὴ τοῦ Θεοῦ τέλειος Θεὸς, καὶ ἡ μορφὴ τοῦ δούλου τέλειος δοῦλος.

In his earlier works composed at Antioch, Chrysostom nowhere directly attacks Apollinaris, and the meagre data he provides us concerning the soul of Christ are found principally in those passages in which he uses the "Temple" image to describe the flesh of Christ. In his commentary on St John, he provides us with his clearest Antiochian reference to the soul of Christ. The Crucifixion took place, he tells us, "not through the weakness of the Crucified, nor because the Jews were stronger than He, but because 'God loved the world', therefore is *His animated Temple* (ὁ ἔμψυχος αὐτοῦ ναὸς) fastened to the Cross".[27] In his Christmas sermon, preached in the year 386, Chrysostom marks the inconsistency of the Manicheans who "transform rocks, wood, and common statues into divinities, enclosing them, as it were, in a prison", and yet "impute it as a crime to us when we say that God, by the Holy Spirit, has prepared *a living Temple* (ναὸν ζῶντα) through which He might save the universe".[28] A little later he sums up Christian doctrine on the Incarnation: "Our doctrine is this, namely, that God has prepared for Himself *a holy Temple* (ναὸν ἅγιον), through which He has transported the life of Heaven into our life".[29]

Thus in the commentary on Philippians, Chrysostom clearly and emphatically affirms the existence of a soul in Christ. In the same context he indirectly attributes sin to the soul. Conversely, when, in his Antiochian writings, he attributes holiness to the humanity of Christ by speaking of a "holy Temple" he seems to make an implicit reference to the soul of Christ. This inference is strengthened when we recall that he also qualifies the Temple as "animated" and "living". However, the context of these examples taken from the Antiochian writings suggests no polemic against the Apollinarists, and it would seem that Chrysostom's first conflict with these heretics arose after his elevation to the See of Constantinople.[30]

B. *Intellectual Activity of Christ*

For St John Chrysostom, one of the most telling proofs of the divinity of Christ is His perfect knowledge — a knowledge which extends to all things[31] and which embraces the secrets of the heart and events of the future, "for to bring hidden things out into the open, is an attribute of the divinity".[32] This perfect knowledge is not an attribute of Christ's human nature, but flows from the fact that Christ proceeds from the Divine Essence. "For", he says, "it is not by perception of sight or hearing that He knew what He knew, but in the (divine) nature, He possessed all, having gone forth perfect from the bosom of the Father, and having no need that anyone teach Him."[33] Thus He knew the Father as perfectly as the Father knew Him[34] and He knew the nature of all things.[35]

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[27] *In Joan.*, 27, 2; PG, *59*, 159.

[28] *In diem natalem*, 6; PG, *49*, 358 f.

[29] *Ibid.*, 359.

[30] It is of interest to note that ATTICUS, successor to Chrysostom in the See of Constantinople in 406, refutes those heretics who deny a rational soul to Christ in a letter to a certain Eupsychios. Cfr M. BRIÈRE, *Une lettre inédite d'Atticus, Patriarche de Constantinople (406—425)* in *Revue de l'Orient Chrétien*, t. 29, 1933—1934, pp. 378—424. Unfortunately, however, neither the date of composition, nor the addressee of the letter is known to us.

If then, Christ's knowledge is perfect and unlimited, how does Chrysostom explain the apparent "ignorance" of Christ which is recorded in some pericopes of the Gospel? Chrysostom lays down a fundamental rule for the interpretation of Scripture in general, and for such passages in particular, in a sermon on Christ's prayer in Gethsemane as recorded in *Matth.*, 26, 39:

> "What then do you say? Is He ignorant therefore whether that be possible or impossible? How could anyone dare claim it. Yet this language supposes ignorance. The presence of the conjunction 'if' indicates a state of doubt. But as I have said, we must not stop at words. We must go to the thought, know the purpose, the motive of him who speaks, the circumstances in which he speaks, and use the solution to these questions in order to seek the sense hidden beneath the words. How then could the ineffable Wisdom, the Son who knows the Father as well as the Father knows Him, how could He be ignorant of this point? For this knowledge of the Passion is not superior to the knowledge of the (divine) Essence, which He alone possesses perfectly."[36]

Thus, Chrysostom excludes the possibility of true ignorance. In another sermon on the same pericope, probably preached about the same time, he reveals "the sense hidden beneath the words": Christ knew from the prophets that it was not possible that this could not be. If, therefore, the prayer is of the divinity, there would be contradiction and opposition within the divinity itself. Therefore, when He says, 'If it be possible', He "shows the weakness of human nature, which was unwilling to be separated from the present life".[37] Thus the problem is removed from the domain of knowledge to that of the "will". The meaning of this unwillingness of the flesh will be precised in our next section.

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[31] *In Matth.*, 31, 2; PG, *57*, 372.
[32] *In Joan.*, 47, 2; PG, *59*, 264.
[33] *Ibid.*, 30, 1; PG, *59*, 172.
[34] *De Incomprehens.*, 5, 4; PG, *48*, 741.
[35] *In Matth.*, 33, 2; PG, *57*, 390.
[36] *In illud: Pater si possibile est*, 1; PG, *51*, 31 f. This sermon is of Antiochian origin, but offers no evidence as to its date of composition. However, by reason of its similarity of content and form of argument, it was probably preached about the same time as *In eos qui ad synaxim non occurrerunt (Contra Anomoeos*, VII*)*.

How, then, does Chrysostom explain Christ's apparent ignorance of the day of judgement?[38] This pericope is to be understood as a rebuke to those who (like the Anomeans of Chrysostom's day) would presume to enquire further of Christ. Christ "did not know" the day in the sense that He could not divulge it to His followers:

> "By saying, not the angels, He stopped their mouths, that they should not seek to learn what these angels know not, and by saying 'neither the Son', forbids them not only to learn but even to enquire . . . Therefore He refers it to His Father, both to make the thing more awful, and to exclude that which He had spoken from their enquiry. Since if it be not this, but He is ignorant of it, when will He know it? Will it be together with us? But who would say this? And the Father He knoweth clearly, even as clearly as He knoweth the Son; and of the Day, is He ignorant? . . . For He who made the worlds, it is quite plain that He made the times also; and if the times, even that Day. How then was He ignorant of that which He made?"[39]

According to St John Chrysostom, therefore, Christ's knowledge was perfect admitting no possibility of ignorance. This knowledge was not "by perception of sight or hearing", but "in the (divine) nature He possessed all". Nowhere in his writings does Chrysostom give any indication that Christ possessed a distinct human knowledge.

C. *Volitional Activity of Christ*

According to St John Chrysostom, Christ's death was a death "of a new kind", for indeed, "the whole lay in the power of the person dying, and death came not on the body before He willed it, and He willed it after He had fulfilled all things".[40] Therefore in saying ". . . I lay down my life, that I might take it up again (*John*, 10,17)", Christ "wished to prove that He did not approach death unwillingly — for if He were to die unwillingly, how could there be a bond of love?"[41]

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[37] *In eos qui ad synaxim non occurrerunt (Contra Anomoeos,* VII*)*, 6; PG, *48*, 765.

[38] Cfr *Matth.*, 24, 36: "But of that day and hour, no one knoweth, no not the angels of heaven, nor the Son but the Father alone". The phrase οὐδὲ ὁ υἱός is absent from the Vulgate and from many MSS. It may have crept in from the parallel text in *Mark*, 13, 32, where it is undoubtedly authentic.

[39] *In Matth.*, 77, 1; PG, *58*, 703.

[40] *In Joan.*, 85, 2; PG, *59*, 462; cfr *In Matth.*, 88, 1; PG, *58*, 776.

[41] *In Joan.*, 60, 2; PG, *59*, 330.

How, then, may the liberty of Christ's death be reconciled with the command He received from His Father (*John*, 10, 18)? Chrysostom refuses to regard this as a true command. Had it been so, why would Christ say, "I lay down my life of myself (*John*, 10, 18)?" Therefore, if He lays it down of Himself, He needs no command. Furthermore, Christ adds a reason why He lays down His life freely, when He says, "A good shepherd lays down his life for his sheep". A good shepherd needs no exhortation from another in order to do this, but does it freely. If this occurs in the case of men, how much more in the case of God. The command of the Father, therefore, signifies nothing else than the harmony (ὁμόνοια) that exists between the judgement of the Father and that of the Son.[42]

The liberty with which Christ approached the Passion, therefore, proceeded from the divine will. Does Chrysostom affirm the existence of a distinct human will in Christ?

In the seventh century, St John Chrysostom was invoked by St Maximus the Confessor as a witness to the twofold will and operation in Christ,[43] and when the doctrine was finally defined at the sixth ecumenical council in 681, Pope Agatho presented citations from Chrysostom among the patristic texts alleged in defence of the twofold will and operation.[44] In more recent times, JUZEK maintains that Chrysostom taught the presence of a twofold will and operation in Christ[45] and BAUR asserts that Chrysostom indirectly asserted the presence of a human will.[46] The texts cited by these authors are identical. However, we believe that these texts, considered in relation to other texts from Chrysostom's works, do not justify such a conclusion.

The texts invoked by these authors are taken from two different expositions of Christ's prayer in Gethsemane as recorded in St Matthew's Gospel.[47] In the first exposition, we read the following explanation of Christ's apparent unwillingness to suffer:

> "Here he shows us the weakness of human nature, which was absolutely unwilling to be separated from the present life, and trembled and hesitated *because of the love of the present life, put in it from the beginning by God*. For if,

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[42] *Ibid.*, 3, 331.

[43] S. MAXIMUS, *Tractatus de Ecthesi*, PG, *91*, 161 f. The text cited is taken from *In eos qui ad synaxim non occurrerunt (Contra Anomoeos*, VII*)*, PG, *48*, 765 f.

[44] J. P. MANSI, *Sacrorum Conciliorum nova et amplissima Collectio*, t. XI (ann. 653—687), pp. 260, 372, 396 f., 404 f., 424.

[45] JUZEK, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

[46] CHR. BAUR, *Der hl. Johannes Chrysostomus und seine Zeit*, t. I, München, 1929, p. 296.

[47] Cfr *Matth.*, 26, 39.

when He had said so many such things, some have dared assert that He had not assumed flesh, if He had spoken none of these things, what would they not have said? Therefore here, He predicts as God and desires the passion to approach; but He hesitates and beseeches as man. *For that He comes willingly to the Passion,* He affirms in saying: 'I have power to lay down my life: and I have power to take it up again' (*John,* 10, 18)."[48]

Why then does Christ ask to be delivered from this chalice? Chrysostom replies that it is in order that He might prove "the reality of the flesh". Then he continues:

> "These words express not only a state of anguish, but they indicate also two wills, one of the Son, the other of the Father, opposed, one to another . . . But if what is said refers to the divinity, a certain contradiction arises, and absurd consequences result. But if it be said of the flesh, it takes on a reasonable sense and noone will find anything to reprehend. *For the flesh is not to be condemned for its unwillingness to die,* for this is of nature . . . (These words) therefore indicate nothing else than that He is truly clothed with flesh which fears death (φοβουμένην θάνατον); for to fear death, and to hesitate and to have a horror of it, is a property of this (i. e. flesh)."[49]

At first sight, these passages may seem to indicate a divine and a human will in Christ. However, a careful study of the text reveals several features which militate against the thesis sustained by BAUR and JUZEK:

1) In the one place in this text where Chrysostom says definitely that Christ came "willingly to the Passion", he refers to the Divine Will. He nowhere affirms that Christ's *human* will played a meritorious part in the accomplishment of the Passion.

2) Chrysostom speaks of an "unwillingness to die" on the part of the flesh which is not in any way blameworthy, but proceeds from a "love of the present life" inserted in human nature by God at the time of its creation. He appears to be speaking of a "natural" repugnance to death, of an instinct of self-preservation.

3) Chrysostom speaks of an emotional fear, terror and horror of death, and not of a fully deliberated act.

In the light of these considerations, it appears to us that Chrysostom does not affirm the existence of two wills in Christ in this passage, but refers rather to an instinct of self-preservation which is found in nature.

The second exegesis of Christ's prayer in Gethsemane is similar to the first in content. Chrysostom comments:

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[48] *In eos, qui ad synaxim non occurrerunt (Contra Anomoeos,* VII), 6; PG, *48,* 765.

[49] *Ibid.,* 766.

> "Here, according to the words, we find two wills opposed, the one to the other: indeed the Father wills that He be crucified; but He Himself does not will it.[50] Yet we see everywhere that He wills the same things as His Father, and chooses the same things. For when He says: 'Grant unto them that as I and Thou art one, that they also may be one in us' (Cfr *John*, 17, 11), He says nothing else than that there is one will of the Father and the Son."[51]

Chrysostom proceeds once more to affirm the reality of the flesh, and to detail the proofs Christ had given in order that the truth of the economy might be believed. Then he continues:

> "Therefore, just as He was hungry and tired, just as He slept and ate and drank, so also did He turn away from death, indicating what is human and the weakness of nature, which does not endure without pain, being torn away from the present life. For if He had spoken none of these things, it could be said: 'If He were a man, He should have suffered what a man suffers'. But what are these things? Since He was going to be crucified, He should have been seized with fear and with anguish, and should not be torn painlessly from the present life, *for the love of present things is inserted in nature.*"[52]

The text is completely parallel to the one we have already cited and needs no further commentary.

However, two other texts, taken from the commentary on St John's Gospel establish our interpretation beyond any shadow of doubt. The first is Chrysostom's commentary on *John*, 12, 28[53] — a verse spoken in similar circumstances to *Matth.*, 26, 39. Chrysostom explains the verse by paraphrasing Our Lord's words:

> "Although my trouble urges me to say this, yet I say the opposite: Glorify Thy Name, that is, lead me henceforth to the Cross'; which greatly shows His humanity, and a nature unwilling to die, but clinging to the present life, *proving that He was not exempt from human feelings*. For as there is no blame in being hungry or needing sleep, so neither is there in desiring the present life; and Christ had a body pure from sin, yet not free from natural wants, for then it would not have been a body."[54]

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[50] JUZEK, *loc. cit.*, paraphrases only thus far, finding here the assertion of two wills in Christ. His paraphrase is interesting: ". . . denn nach den Worten: 'Es gehe der Kelch an mir vorüber' fügt er hinzu: 'doch nicht wie ich will, sondern wie Du willst', und offenbart so 'zwei einander entgegengesetzte Willen', da ja der Vater will, daß er sich kreuzigen lasse, er aber (als Mensch) nicht will, obwohl wir ihn sonst (als Gott) dasselbe wollen sehen wie den Vater". JUZEK does not seem even to advert to the problem he has created for himself, namely, the positing of a human will in Christ *opposed* to the Divine Will.

[51] *In illud: Pater si possibile est*, 3; PG, *51*, 36.

[52] *Ibid.*, 38.

[53] "Now is my soul troubled. And what shall I say? Father save me from this hour."

[54] *In Joan.*, 67, 2; PG, *59*, 371.

The unwillingness to die is placed on the same level as the need for food and sleep, and both series of actions are classed among the "human feelings" and "natural wants" to which no blame is attached.

The final text we shall cite is conclusive. In expounding Christ's prophecy to St Peter of his coming martyrdom,[55] Chrysostom clearly distinguishes between the natural "unwillingness to die" and a deliberate act of the human will:

> "But this he (i. e. Peter) willed and desired; for this reason also, He made this (i. e. Peter's martyrdom) clear to him. For since he had frequently said: 'I will lay down my life for thee' (*John*, 13, 37); and 'Yea, though I should die with thee, I will not deny thee' (*Matth.*, 26, 35), He grants him his desire. But what then does this mean, 'Whither thou willest not'? He speaketh of natural feeling and the necessity of the flesh and how the soul is unwillingly torn away from the body. *So that even though the will be firm*, yet still even then nature would be found in fault. For noone lays aside the body without feeling, God, as I said before, having economized this that violent deaths might not be too many."[56]

The distinction between an act of the will and the instinct of self-preservation is thus unmistakably affirmed. The texts cited by JUZEK and BAUR must be read and interpreted in the light of these parallel passages, and consequently, they may not be understood as affirming the presence of a human will in Christ. We may go further and say that the explanation given by these authors is completely untenable, since it postulates an opposition between the human will in Christ and the divine. This did not occur even in the case of Peter, whose will remained firm, despite the ever-present instinct to shrink from the separation of soul and body.

We must conclude, therefore, that Chrysostom nowhere affirms the presence of a human will in Christ.

D. *The Operations of Christ*

From the foregoing it is clear that St John Chrysostom nowhere attributes a human intellectual or volitional activity to Christ. What then does he say of the emotional and purely physical activities proceeding from the human nature?

Chrysostom's concern on the one hand with preserving the immutability of the Divine Substance and on the other with proving the reality of the economy, leads him to attribute such activities to the flesh. "If thou wilt absolutely understand all as referring to the Godhead", he says in his commentary on St John,[57] "then thou wilt make the Godhead capable of suffering . . . For if blood had flowed from that divine and ineffable Nature, and if that Nature and not the flesh had been torn and cut by the nails on the cross, on this supposition your quibbling would have had reason: but . . . not even the devil himself could utter such a blasphemy." The sufferings of the flesh are none the less real for being of the flesh, and indeed, just as Chrysostom insists so strongly on "the truth of the flesh", so also does he insist on the reality of the sufferings. The sufferings of the Passion "prove" the economy.[58]

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[55] *John*, 21, 18: "Amen, amen, I say to thee, when thou wast young, thou didst gird thyself, and didst walk whither thou wouldst; but when thou shalt be old, thou shalt stretch forth thy hands, and another shall gird thee and lead thee whither thou wouldst not."

[56] *In Joan.*, 88, 1; PG, 59, 479.

In a homily on the raising up of Lazarus, Chrysostom outlines his teaching on the human activity of Christ:

> "I have never left the assumed humanity unharmonized with the divine operation,[59] (acting) now as man, now as God, both indicating the nature, and bringing faith to the economy; teaching that the humbler things are to be referred to the humanity, and the nobler to the divinity, and by this unequal mixture of actions, interpreting the unequal union of the natures,[60] and by (my) power over sufferings, declaring that my own sufferings are voluntary; as God, I curbed nature, supporting a fast for forty days, but afterwards, as man, I was hungry and tired; as God, I calmed the raging sea, as man, I was tempted by the devil; as God, I expelled devils, as man, I am about to suffer for men."[61]

While Chrysostom speaks of a divine ἐνέργεια only, he does, nevertheless, affirm that Christ acts as man. The unequal mixture of actions — the humble and the sublime — point to the unequal union of natures — the human and the divine. Christ acts as man, but these human actions are controlled by the Divine Person in such a way that they bring faith to the economy without overshadowing the divine nature.

Chrysostom casts more light on his conception of the human activity of Christ in one of his expositions of Christ's prayer in Gethsemane:

> "Consequently, in saying, 'If it is possible let this chalice pass from me' and 'Not as I will, but as Thou wilt', He indicates nothing else than that He is truly clothed with flesh which fears death; for to fear death, and to hesitate and have a horror of it, is a property of this (i. e. the flesh). Sometimes therefore, He leaves it *destitute and deprived of His own operation*

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[57] *In Joan.*, 3, 3; PG, 59, 41.

[58] Cfr *In Matth.*, 83, 1; PG, 58, 745 f.

[59] οὐδαμοῦ τὴν ἀναληφθεῖσαν ἀνθρωπότητα τῆς θείας ἐνεργείας ἄμικτον ἀπολέλοιπα.

[60] διὰ τῆς ἀνίσου ταύτης τῶν ἔργων κράσεως τὴν ἄνισον τῶν φύσεων ἕνωσιν ἑρμηνεύων.

[61] *In quat. Lazarum*, 1; PG, 50, 642 f.

(γυμνὴν τῆς οἰκείας ἐνεργείας) in order that, having shown its weakness, He might bring faith to its nature; sometimes He hides this same weakness in order that you may learn that He is not a mere man . . . Therefore He varies and mingles both words and actions, that no pretext may be given to the disease and madness of Paul of Samosata, nor of Marcion nor of Manes: therefore He predicts what is to be, as God, and again He trembles (before death) as man."[62]

Here again, Chrysostom speaks only of a Divine ἐνέργεια, but he implies a human ἐνέργεια, which however is limited to subrational activities and passions, and which is subordinated to the higher designs of the one personal principle in Christ. Deprived of the divine ἐνέργεια the flesh exhibits its natural weakness and its fear and horror of death and thereby the reality of the assumed flesh is shown.

It is significant that Chrysostom never speaks of the human activity of Christ as that of a distinct human nature acting simply because it is human. Whenever Christ acted ὡς ἄνθρωπος or ἀνθρωπίνως, He did so for either of two reasons: to prove the reality of the economy, or out of condescendance (συγκατάβασις) to His hearers.

We have already met numerous examples illustrating the manner in which the "humbler things" are invoked as proofs given us by Christ of the reality of the flesh or the truth of the economy. We may add a few illustrations of the principle of συγκατάβασις.

Christ acted συγκαταβατικῶς by reason of the weakness of His hearers who considered Him a mere man. Christ therefore mingled lowly actions with the sublime, in order to raise men gradually from their earthly conceptions to a true idea of Christ.

Chrysostom invokes the principle of "condescendance" against the Arians and Anomeans particularly in his exegesis of those passages in Scripture which seem to subordinate Christ to the Father. By an act of divine providence, Christ, in affirming certain lowly things of Himself, descends to the level of His audience in order to raise them up little by little to the acceptance of His divinity and His perfect equality with the Father.

In one of his early sermons against the Anomeans, he explains the nature of this condescendance. Explaining the vision of Isaias in which the prophet saw the Lord seated on a throne surrounded by the Seraphim,[63] Chrysostom asserts that not even the Angels are able to look upon the Divine Essence in all its purity, but what they see is an aspect of God tempered by His condescendance:

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[62] *In eos, qui ad synaxim non occurrerunt (Contra Anomoeos,* VII*)*, 6; PG, *48*, 766.

[63] Cfr *Isaias*, 6, 1 f.

> "What is this condescendance? It is for God, the fact of appearing and manifesting Himself, not such as He is, but such as He can be seen by him who is capable of this vision, proportioning the aspect that He presents of Himself to the weakness of those who look upon Him."[64]

Since not even the angels could look upon the pure vision of God, in the case of men, Christ had to temper the manifestation of His divinity to the weakness of His hearers, and thus raise them little by little "to the proper belief concerning Him".[65] The weakness of the Jews was such, that those who heard Him for the first time were powerless to understand the sublimity of His words. Consequently, when He spoke in a language elevated, sublime, worthy of His glory — in a word, a language which surpassed human nature — they were repelled and scandalized, for they still considered Him as an ordinary man. On the other hand, when He spoke in a lowly, human way, the crowds flocked to Him. Thus, when Christ said (*John* 8, 58): "Before Abraham was, I am", the Jews took up stones to throw at Him. On the other hand, when He said (*John* 8, 28): "I do nothing of myself, but as the Father hath taught me, these things I speak", the crowds hastened to hear Him, and in order that we might understand that this was because of His humble words, the Evangelist adds (*Ibid.*, 30): "When he spoke these things, many believed in him". Therefore, concludes Chrysostom, if Christ expressed Himself, now in a human way (ἀνθρωπίνως), now in a manner befitting God (θεοπρεπῶς), it was at the same time to condescend to human weakness on the one hand, and to affirm the authority of His teaching on the other. Therefore, when He expresses Himself in a humble manner, this abasement is not to be attributed to His substantial weakness, but to the feeble understanding of His hearers.[66]

Elsewhere, Chrysostom likens the συγκατάβασις to the action of a schoolmaster who chatters with his chattering children, not thereby indicating a lack of knowledge, but rather showing his solicitude for the children. Likewise Christ does not indicate the commonness of His substance, when He speaks in a manner unbecoming the divinity, but rather shows His condescendance to the weakness of His hearers.[67]

Chrysostom makes use of the principle of συγκατάβασις particularly in commenting passages from St John's Gospel. Thus, when Christ said that He had finished the work *given* Him by the Father, He was speaking συγκαταβατικῶς. The prayer of Jesus before He raised Lazarus was an act of condescendance in favour of the assistants in order to show them that He was not an adversary of God.[68] The fact that Our Lord's body, "so subtle and light as to enter in when the doors were shut" and "free from all density", could be touched by His disciples, was again an act of condescendance in order to give proof of His resurrection.[69]

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[64] *De Incomprehensibili*, 3, 3; PG, *48*, 722.

[65] Cfr. *In Matth.*, 14, 1; PG, *57*, 218: ἐπεὶ μηδέπω τὴν προσήκουσαν περὶ αὐτοῦ δόξαν εἶχον. The phrase returns continually, e. g. *In Matth.*, 26, 3; 28, 2; PG, *57*, 336, 351 etc.

[66] *In eos qui ad synaxim non occurrerunt (Contra Anomoeos*, VII*)*, 3; PG, *48*, 760 f.

[67] *De Christi Precibus (Contra Anomoeos*, X*)*, 2; PG, *48*, 785.

We see, therefore, that Christ did not utter these words simply because He was human as well as divine. When He expressed Himself in a humble manner, Chrysostom does not ascribe it to the fact that as man, He was inferior to the Father; he explains it as an act of condescension on the part of Christ, by which He adapts His teaching to the weak understanding of His hearers. The συγκατάβασις was a pedagogical device employed by Christ, in virtue of which He accommodated Himself to their erroneous ideas about Him, in order to raise them up to the true belief concerning Him.

In fact, so subordinated is the human activity of Christ to the higher designs of the Divinity, that one receives the impression that Chrysostom conceives the flesh as the *instrument* of the Logos, though he nowhere employs this terminology. When speaking of Christ's fast in the desert, Chrysostom remarks that Christ did not fast longer than forty days for fear that through the excess of the miracle, "the truth of the economy might not be believed".[70] To explain the hunger of Christ recorded in *Matth.*, 21, 18, Chrysostom says that when "He permits the flesh, then it shows its feeling".[71]

We may say, therefore, that St John Chrysostom emphatically affirms the reality of the emotional and physical actions and passions of Christ, which are to be attributed to the flesh and not to the divine nature. However, the flesh acts and suffers only when permitted to do so by the Divine Person, and then for the purpose of proving its reality. Texts which apparently subordinate Christ to the Father are to be viewed in the light of Christ's condescendance to the weakness of His hearers, and not simply to the inferiority of His human nature.

If Chrysostom's doctrine on the operations of Christ tends to minimize the scope of His human activity by restricting it to sub-rational actions, it does presuppose the existence of one Personal Principle in Christ. It is the Divine Logos who permits the flesh to show feeling, and who "while economising the human things, did not permit the divine to be overshadowed".[72]

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[68] *In Quat. Lazarum (Contra Anomoeos,* IX*)*, 1; PG, *48*, 779 f.

[69] *In Joan.*, 87, 1; PG, *59*, 474.

[70] *In Matth.*, 13, 2; PG, *57*, 210.

[71] *Ibid.*, 67, 1; PG, *58*, 633: Ὅτε συνεχώρησε τῇ σαρκὶ τότε ἐπιδείκνυται αὐτῆς τὸ πάθος.

III. CONCLUSION

The "flesh" is the normal, though by no means exclusive, expression employed by St John Chrysostom to designate the humanity of Christ, and he insists again and again that Christ came to us in a true flesh. What does Chrysostom mean by the term "flesh"? We have already seen that according to JUZEK, Chrysostom uses the term σάρξ instead of ἄνθρωπος to denote the human nature of Christ concretely considered in order to avoid the danger of positing two persons in Christ. "Flesh" signified a perfect human nature — a union of body and soul — whereas "man" signified for him, a perfect human person. In view of our analysis of Chrysostom's teaching on the integrity of Christ's human nature, what are we to say concerning this judgement?

We may say first of all that Chrysostom does not explicitly exclude the soul when he speaks of the "true flesh" of Christ. But on the other hand he gives no indication of such a judicious selection of terminology; nor does he seem particularly preoccupied with the error of positing two persons in Christ.[73] In any case, JUZEK's supposition, made without any proof, places the problem in a false perspective. The word 'nature' could be used to convey the integrity of Christ's humanity, without any prejudice thereby resulting to the unique personal principle in Christ.

However, our examination of Chrysostom's doctrine on the integrity of Christ's human nature leads us to the conclusion that Chrysostom, in affirming the reality of the assumed flesh, has in mind the literal flesh of Christ, and prescinds from the question of Christ's soul. Our reasons for this conclusion are the following:

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[72] *In Joan.*, 31, 2; PG, 59, 177.

[73] J. TURMEL, *Histoire des Dogmes*, II, Paris, 1932, p. 318, seizes upon one obscure reference in the commentary on Hebrews to show that Chrysostom maintained the existence of two persons in Christ: "Chrysostome a été le disciple de Diodore, et il a accepté les idées christologiques de son maître, comme le prouve le texte suivant des homélies sur l'Epître aux Hébreux (hom. 3, I fin.): '(L'apôtre Paul) établit contre Marcel qu'il y a (dans le Christ) deux personnes séparées par la substance.' Toutefois ses préoccupations pastorales ne lui ont pas laissé le temps de disserter sur les natures du Christ." It would be difficult to find a text less representative of the whole of Chrysostom's christology than this vague allusion to two persons in Christ. J. MONTALVERNE, *op. cit.*, p. 71, note 49, rightly observes that this "obscura allegatio" is the only occasion in which Chrysostom uses the term πρόσωπον "pro rebus christologicis". The commentary itself was edited and published only after Chrysostom's death by an Antiochian priest named Constantine on the basis of notes taken down during the Saint's sermons.

1) Against the Gnostics, Chrysostom insists upon the fact that Christ's flesh is of the same substance as our own. It is not a phantasm or mere appearance, for in such a hypothesis, Christ's humanity would not be a true humanity. It is a truth of nature. Mary's parturition was according to the laws of nature, for if, as the Gnostics claimed, Christ came to us as through some conduit, Christ's flesh would have nothing in common with ours, and would be of some different substance. Chrysostom appears to have in mind the literal flesh of Christ.

2) In order to prove the truth of the flesh and the reality of the economy, Chrysostom constantly invokes the human actions of Christ. These actions and passions are either purely physical or of the emotional order. It was the flesh which was torn and cut by the nails on the cross. Hunger and thirst are attributed to the flesh, and likewise the fear and horror and dread of approaching death. These human activities are in no wise culpable since they are connatural to the flesh, and unless Christ possessed these human feelings and natural wants, He could not be said to possess a true flesh. By means therefore of His sufferings, His emotions and His purely physical activities, Christ proves the reality of the flesh. Such purely physical or emotional human actions and passions are clearly distinguished by Chrysostom from man's spiritual acts which proceed from his will and over which he has control. He clearly shows that Peter's will to lay down his life for Christ remained firm even though at the same time Peter dreaded and recoiled from his approaching martyrdom by reason of the love of present things inserted in the flesh by God. Chrysostom argues from the physical and emotional activities of Christ to the reality of the flesh. He never argues from the spiritual activity of Christ to the reality of the flesh. In effect, Chrysostom nowhere affirms an intellectual or volitional activity of Christ, nor does he ever explicitly indicate the presence of a human intellect and will in Christ. It would seem then, that in affirming the truth of the flesh, and proving it by means of Christ's human activities, Chrysostom is preoccupied with the material flesh of Christ.

3) Chrysostom, while on occasion speaking of the "union of the natures" or the "union ot the substances" in Christ,[74] normally views the Incarnation as an assumption of the flesh on the part of the Word.

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[74] It is beyond our purpose here to examine these texts. The most important are *In Joan.*, 11, 2; PG, 59, 80; *In Philipp.*, 7, 3; PG, 62, 232; *In Ps.* 44, 4; PG, 55, 188; *In quat. Lazarum*, 1; PG, 50, 643. These texts affirm a union of the substances which excludes separation and confusion.

In his exegesis of *John*, 1, 14 (καὶ ὁ Λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο), he affirms that the Evangelist used the expression "was made" in order to remove any foundation for the doctrine of those who claim that "the things of the economy" are a phantasy (φαντασία) or a piece of acting (ὑπόκρισις) or an allegory (ὑπόνοια). To remove the occasion for such a blasphemy, the Evangelist used the expression "was made", desiring thereby to show, "not a change of substance — God forbid — but the assumption of a true flesh".[75] Such a conception of the Incarnation presupposes the one personal principle in Christ; and this is indicated very clearly in the commentary on Philippians: "For lest when you hear that He emptied Himself, you should think that some change and degeneracy and loss is here, he says 'whilst *He* remained what He was, *He* took that which He was not, and being made flesh, *He* remained God, in that *He* was the Word'".[76] To this presupposed personal principle in Christ, the human activity is subordinated. "When He permits the flesh", says Chrysostom of Christ, "then it shows its feeling."[77] Human activity is therefore allowed or disallowed by permission of the divine personal principle in Christ. If by flesh, Chrysostom indicated the integral human nature of Christ, the human will would have some place in the control of the feelings and emotions of the sacred humanity.

We return, therefore, to the problem raised at the beginning of this article. Does St John Chrysostom, in common with his Antiochian compatriots, affirm the integrity of the human nature of Christ against the heresy of Apollinaris of Laodicea? We may state firstly that Chrysostom most certainly does affirm the integrity of Christ's human nature against Apollinaris. He does so in his commentary on Philippians, most probably preached at Constantinople, in unmistakable terms: We are soul and body; Christ is God and soul and body. In the same context, Chrysostom reiterates his teaching: Christ must possess a soul, for otherwise the "form of the slave" would be imperfect.

However, it cannot be said that Chrysostom was preoccupied to any great degree with the Apollinarist heresy. We may surmise that his early training had not sufficiently prepared him to meet the new heresy, and that he took a stand only when forced to do so in virtue of his position as shepherd of the faithful in the imperial city. This, however, is merely hypothetical. What is certain is that Chrysostom never attacked Apollinaris by name during his Antiochian ministry, and while he does seem to have implied the existence of Christ's soul during this period, the context in which he did so, suggests no polemic against the Apollinarists. If Chrysostom were particularly preoccupied with this new heresy during his Antiochian ministry, he had ample opportunity to refute it, and yet he failed to do so.[78]

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[75] *In Joan.*, 11, 2; PG, *59*, 80.
[76] *In Philipp.*, 7, 2; PG, *62*, 231.
[77] *In Matth.*, 67, 1; PG, *58*, 633.

While Chrysostom affirms that Christ does possess a human soul, he gives this soul no significance in the activity of Christ, nor in the accomplishment of the Passion. He nowhere affirms the existence of a human intellect and will in Christ, and consequently he does not indicate any intellectual or volitional activity on the part of the sacred humanity. The liberty with which Christ approached the Passion flowed from the divine will; the only corresponding reality in the flesh was an unwillingness to die connatural to the flesh and in no wise culpable. We have seen that it is to be understood as the instinct of self-preservation implanted by God in human nature. Chrysostom does not indicate either explicitly or implicitly that Christ's human will played any part in the Passion.

It can hardly be said, therefore, that St. John Chrysostom emphasized the integrity of the human nature of Christ. He most certainly insisted upon the reality of the flesh assumed by the Word, and upon the reality of the sufferings and the human activities of this flesh. While he affirmed the existence of a soul in Christ, the implications of this affirmation as regards the human intellect and will and the spiritual activity of Christ are apparently not envisaged, and certainly not developed in the christology of St John Chrysostom.

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[78] Chrysostom might well have emphasized the existence of Christ's soul in his exegesis of *John*, 12, 28: "Now is my soul troubled," yet he failed to do so.

DEUX TRAITÉS FAUSSEMENT ATTRIBUÉS À HUGUES DE SAINT-VICTOR

Depuis l'édition de Rouen de 1648, la liste des oeuvres du grand Victorin s'est réduite considérablement. Elle est encore trop longue. De monographie en monographie, on voit réapparaître sous le nom de Maître Hugues, des écrits dont les titres à l'authenticité ne résistent pas à un examen tant soit peu poussé. Dans un article précédent,[1] on a essayé de montrer que les commentaires sur Joël, Abdias et Nahum, attribués à Hugues depuis des siècles, ne peuvent être sortis de sa plume. A présent on voudrait apporter une preuve analogue pour deux autres ouvrages qui se trouvent dans le même cas, à savoir le *De Filia Iephte* et l'*Expositio in Regulam b. Augustini.*

De Filia Iephte

Le traité, imprimé sous ce titre parmi les *Opera Hugonis de Sancto Victore* dans la Patrologie latine, t. 177, col. 323—334, est-il authentique? Pour les auteurs de l'*Histoire littéraire de la France* la chose est incontestable, puisque, disent-ils, tous les manuscrits en font foi.[2] B. Hauréau est plus circonspect: tout en constatant que la critique n'a pas encore désavoué cet écrit, il reconnaît que les manuscrits qui le transmettent sont très rares et que les anciens catalogues n'en font pas mention.[3] Mis en éveil par ce jugement prudent, F. Vernet le range parmi les oeuvres douteuses[4] et R. Baron parmi celles qui sont probablement inauthentiques.[5] Seul D. Lasič l'accueille encore au nombre des oeuvres exégétiques certaines.[6]

Je m'étais mis à examiner méthodiquement le traité en question, lorsque l'idée me vint d'en rechercher les sources. Sachant par expérience tout ce que l'exégèse du XII^e siècle doit à Raban Maur, je commençai par consulter, au tome 108 de la Patrologie latine, le commentaire de cet auteur sur le Livre des Juges. A mon grand étonnement, je découvris que le prétendu traité de Hugues n'est qu'un simple extrait de cet ouvrage. Il se trouve en entier et à la lettre aux col. 1176 C—1190 B. Espérons que cette découverte donnera le coup de grâce à la thèse, plusieurs fois séculaire, de la paternité hugonienne du *De Filia Iephte.*

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[1] D. Van den Eynde, *Les Commentaires sur Joël, Abdias et Nahum attribués à Hugues de Saint-Victor,* dans *Franciscan Studies,* 17 (1957) 363—372.

[2] *Histoire littéraire de la France,* 3e éd., t. XII, Paris 1865, p. 27.

[3] B. Hauréau, *Les oeuvres de Hugues de Saint-Victor,* Paris 1886, p. 199.

[4] F. Vernet, art. *Hugues de Saint-Victor,* dans *Dict. Théol. cathol.,* VII, col. 247.

[5] R. Baron, *Science et Sagesse chez Hugues de Saint-Victor,* Paris 1957, p. xxxi.

[6] D. Lasič, *Hugonis de Sancto Victore Theologia perfectiva,* Rome 1956, p. 25.

Expositio in Regulam b. Augustini

A part A. Carrier et U. Chevalier, qui l'attribuent à Letbert de Lille,[6] les auteurs se montrent très favorables à l'authenticité hugonienne de ce commentaire, publié dans la Patrologie latine au tome 175, col. 881—924.

B. Hauréau l'accepte sans hésitation sur la foi de ce qu'il appelle "le plus grand nombre de manuscrits."[7] F. Vernet prétend, sans apporter de preuves, que c'est de tous les écrits absents de l'*Indiculum* de l'abbé Gilduin, celui dont l'authenticité est la plus probable.[8] D. Lasič se réclame de B. Hauréau pour l'inscrire sur la liste des oeuvres certaines de Hugues.[9]

Récemment, R. Bacon a consacré une étude speciale à la question.[10] Il constate que le titre de l'ouvrage manque dans l'*Indiculum* de Gilduin et que le texte en est transmis, sans nom d'auteur, dans les plus anciens manuscrits, originaires du *scriptorium* de Saint-Victor. Toutefois, ces indices négatifs, pour impressionnants qu'ils soient, ne lui paraissent nullement décisifs. Outre que l'*Indiculum* se donne lui-même pour incomplet,[11] le silence de la première tradition littéraire et manuscrite s'explique suffisamment, à son avis, par le caractère particulier de l'*Expositio.* C'était, paraît-il, un livre non à lire ni à étudier mais à vivre, lequel de ce chef n'avait pas besoin d'être cité ni par l'*Indiculum* ni en tête des manuscrits.

S'étant défait ainsi des difficultés ressortissant à la critique externe, R. Baron se sent parfaitement à l'aise pour affronter celles que soulève le texte lui-même. Sans doute reconnaît-il honnêtement que l'*Expositio* diffère par sa rédaction de tous les autres écrits de Hugues, mais cela également lui semble normal, vu que Maître Hugues change de style selon la diversité des sujets et la variété de son génie. L'auteur relève d'ailleurs que le traité présente, à côté de mainte divergence, nombre de traits qui sont caractéristiques de la pensée et du style du plus grand des Victorins. Comme tels il cite: l'emploi de la prose rythmique et rimée, avec parfois le parallélisme antithétique; l'importance accordée à l'idée de sagesse et de charité, au double mouvement du coeur qui s'appellent *timor* et *amor*, au thème des béatitudes; la présence de séries spirituelles, comme celle de *lectio-oratio-contemplatio* ou celle de *lectio-oratio-operatio*; l'antithèse entre l'*homo exterior* et l'*homo interior*; le recours à saint Augustin, à saint Grégoire, à saint Jérôme et aux texte de l'Écriture. Et R. Baron de conclure que ni le silence des manuscrits et de l'*Indiculum* ni l'examen du contenu n'obligent, pour le moment, à nier l'authenticité hugonienne de l'*Expositio in Regulam b. Augustini*. S'il concède qu'aucun argument en faveur de la paternité de Hugues n'est contraignant, il tient néanmoins qu'un ensemble d'indices la font considérer comme encore solidement probable.

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[6] Cf. R. Baron, *Hugues de Saint-Victor est-il l'auteur d'un commentaire de la Règle de saint Augustin,* dans *Rech. de Science relig.*, 43 (1955) 347—349.

[7] B. Hauréau, *o. c.*, p. 116.

[8] F. Vernet, *a. c.*, col. 248.

[9] D. Lasič, *o. c.*, p. 28.

[10] *A. c.*, p. 343—360.

[11] *Indiculum,* II, 19, éd. J. de Ghellinck dans *Rech. de Science relig.*, 1 (1910) 280: "Huiusmodi exposiciones et diversarum sententiarum infinite sunt in hoc volumine. Et ideo distuli earum principia scribere vel fines."

Pour ma part, je crois que l'*Expositio* ne possède aucun titre pour figurer parmi les oeuvres complètes de Hugues de Saint-Victor. Au contraire, les indices de la critique tant externe qu'interne exigent de la rayer de la liste de ses oeuvres.

Assurément, l'auteur de l'*Indiculum* note lui-même qu'il n'a pu citer les titres de tous les ouvrages de Hugues. Mais cette remarque vaut uniquement pour les innombrables "sentences", notices et autres écrits de faible étendue; elle ne concerne en aucune façon les traités importants, tels que l'*Expositio in Regulam b. Augustini*.[12] D'autre part, le silence de l'*Indiculum* se trouve pleinement confirmé par celui de tous les anciens manuscrits émanant de la bibliothèque de Saint-Victor. L'hypothèse, inventée par R. Baron, pour expliquer ce silence, ne convaincra, je crains, absolument personne. Comment sait-il que dès sa publication, l'*Expositio* jouit, à l'abbaye, d'une autorité égale à celle des *Collationes* de Cassien et à celle des Dialogues de saint Grégoire le Grand? En fût-il ainsi, pourquoi ce fait aurait-il amené l'abbé Gilduin et tous ses copistes à laisser sous le boisseau une lumière aussi éclatante, toute faite pour rehausser la gloire de Saint-Victor?

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[12] Voir note précédente. L'*Expositio* compte 45 colonnes de l'édition de Migne, alors que le *De vanitate mundi* n'en compte que 37, le *De tribus diebus* et le *De institutione noviliorum* chacun 27, le *Dialogus* 26, le *De sacra mystica* 24. Or tous ces traités sont expressément cités (avec *incipit* et *explicit*) dans l'*Indiculum* de Gilduin.

Les raisons d'ordre interne apportées par R. Baron sont encore moins consistantes. Quelle utilité y a-t-il à invoquer l'emploi de la prose rythmique, la présence de séries spirituelles ou le recours aux Pères et à l'Écriture? Ainsi que Dom J. Leclercq l'a fait remarquer à propos d'un autre article du même auteur, ces procédés conviennent à tous les écrivains du temps et ne peuvent prouver quoi que ce soit.[13]

Si au contraire l'on quitte le terrain des généralités pour s'engager en des voies plus sûres, on arrive aussitôt à des résultats tout contraires. En effet l'examen minutieux du texte de l'*Expositio* révèle, que, par le vocabulaire, les procédés de rédaction et le contenu, ce commentaire diffère essentiellement de n'importe quel ouvrage de Hugues de Saint-Victor.

Commençons par le vocabulaire. *L'Expositio* présente une interprétation exclusivement morale et ascétique de la règle augustinienne. Du début à la fin, elle est rédigée dans une langue simple et claire, sans étalage aucun de termes exotiques ou rares. Cette simplicité de pensée et de langage n'empêchent cependant pas le commentaire de contenir une foule de mots et d'expressions qui ne se rencontrent jamais sous la plume de Hugues. Malgré la sévérité du choix, leur nombre est élevé:

Pius dominus 881 B, se spoliare propria voluntate 882 B, Ecclesiae virtutes 882 B, mandata seniorum 883 A, passio inobedientiae et impatientiae 883 A, vivere de annona Christi 885 B et 887 A, primitiva Ecclesia 886 AB et 889 C, valetudo naturae 886 B et 893 A, superbia casum habet 887 D, librare actus et vitam 889 D, frequentandus est Salvator 891 C, turbulenta serenare 891 B, immittere cogitationum tumultus 892 B, vitalis cibus 894 B, delicationes quaerere 895 A, pullulatio virtutum 896 C, libera cervice contradicere 897 A, caelesti imperatori placere 897 B, corporalis coniunctio 897 D, vitalis sensus 899 C, beatus doctor (saint Augustin) 903 D, ex his duobus articulis (du précepte de la charité fraternelle) 907 A, oneris portatio 911 B, gratia vitae socialis 915 C, bestialiter vivere 915 C, accessus temporis 915 D, rerum articuli 919 D, doctor ecclesiasticus (le supérieur) 922 A.

Il est possible que, pour l'un ou l'autre des exemples cités, j'ai fait erreur. Dans l'ensemble toutefois, les usagers des écrits de Hugues conviendront que ces expressions lui sont inconnues. Cependant les contextes dont elles sont tirées se rapportent tous à des sujets qui lui sont familiers. Mais pourquoi Maître Hugues aurait-il changé et renouvelé son vocabulaire en rédigeant l'*Expositio in Regulam b. Augustini*, alors que, de l'aveu de R. Baron lui-même, ce traité se distingue par son style tout uni et par la régularité et la simplicité de ses développements ?

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[13] Cf. J. Leclercq dans *Scriptorium*, 11 (1957) 324—325: compte rendu de l'article de R. Baron, *Textes spirituels de Hugues de Saint-Victor*, dans *Mélanges de Science relig.*, 13 (1957) 157—178.

Certains procédés caractéristiques du style de Hugues font également défaut dans l'*Expositio*. J'en choisis deux, particulièrement significatifs, parce qu'ils font partie de ses habitudes, pour ainsi dire inconscientes, d'écrivain. Ce sont le recours constant aux mêmes idées et aux mêmes formules et la façon spéciale de marquer le retour au texte à commenter.

Comme on sait, Hugues se répète volontiers d'un ouvrage à l'autre. Une étude systématique de son oeuvre m'a appris que tous ses écrits sûrement authentiques sont reliés entre eux par de nombreuses concordances doctrinales et littéraires. Très souvent même, il s'agit de transcriptions pures et simples. Évidemment, le procédé ne revient pas avec la même fréquence dans chacun de ses écrits: utilisé au *maximum* dans la grand traité *De sacramentis*, il ne trouve que de rares applications dans la *Practica Geometriae*, le *De institutione novitiorum* et le commentaire *in Threnos*. Mais fréquent ou non, le procédé lui-même est tellement constant et régulier qu'un ouvrage dont il serait complètement absent devient par le fait même hautement suspect.

Or on a beau lire et relire l'*Expositio in Regulam b. Augustini*, on n'y découvre pas une seule phrase, pas une seule formule, qui soit caractéristique du style de Hugues de Saint-Victor. Des rapprochements signalés par R. Baron, aucun n'est *ad rem*. Ils nous remettent dans le climat commun à tous les auteurs spirituels du XII^{e} siècle, jamais dans celui qui est personnel au grand Victorin. Si l'*Expositio* était authentique, elle constituerait un cas absolument unique dans toute son oeuvre littéraire.

Quant aux formules par lesquelles l'*Expositio* marque régulièrement le retour au texte de la règle, elles sont différentes de celles que Hugues emploie de préférence dans ses commentaires, bibliques ou autres.

L'*Expositio* se sert du procédé une bonne trentaine de fois. Les formules qu'elle emploie à cette fin sont construites 14 fois avec le verbe *subiungit(ur)*, 9 fois avec *subditur*, 3 fois avec *subiectum est*, 2 fois avec *subinfertur* ou *adiungit(ur)*, une fois avec *sequitur*.[14]

Dans ses commentaires indiscutablement authentiques, Hugues s'y prend autrement. D'un côté, il néglige complètement la formule *subiectum est*. D'un autre, il a une préférence marquée pour les formules

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[14] *Subiungit(ur)*: PL 176, 884 B, 885 A, 888 D, 890 C, 891 D, 894 B, 894 D, 897 C, 902 D, 906 B, 909 C, 918 A, 924 C. — *Subditur*: 886 D, 896 C, 899 B, 899 C, 900 A, 901 D, 903 A, 921 C, 923 C. — *Subiectum est*: 887 A, 907 D, 921 D. — *Subinfertur*: 885 D, 892 A. — *Adiungitur*: 908 D, 910 A. — *Sequitur*: 904 B.

Sequitur ou *Ideo, unde, hoc est quod sequitur.* L'usage en est presque exclusif dans l'*Expositio in Hierarchiam caelestem*, où elles reviennent 170 fois, tandis que les autres toutes ensemble n'y apparaissent que 12 fois. Dans les commentaires bibliques, elles sont de loin les plus fréquentes. Dans les *Notulae in Pentateuchon*, in *librum Iudicum* et *in libros Regum*, on peut relever 27 emplois de *sequitur* contre cinq autres. Le commentaire *in Threnos* se sert jusqu'à 90 fois de *sequitur*, mais 40 fois seulement de formules équivalentes. Même l'*Expositio in Ecclesiasten*, qui fait un usage très sobre du procédé, — 38 cas en tout, — les constructions avec *sequitur* sont au nombre de 13, celles avec *adiungit* pas plus que 7, les autres moins encore.

On le voit, malgré une certaine variation, qui s'explique par le genre des divers commentaires, Hugues reste constant dans ses préférences pour la formule *Sequitur* ou celles construites avec le même verbe. Comment se fait-il alors que l'*Expositio in Regulam b. Augustini*, qui est pourtant un véritable commentaire, recourt, en tout, une seule fois à la formule *Sequitur* et lui en préfère régulièrement d'autres?

Reste à dire un mot sur le contenu de l'*Expositio*. Certains éléments doctrinaux de ce traité sont étrangers à la pensée de Hugues, s'ils ne lui sont pas contraires. Son auteur déduit par exemple du texte de la règle la nécessité d'une triple activité spirituelle, qui consiste, soit en *lectio-oratio-contemplatio*,[15] soit en *lectio-oratio-operatio*;[16] pour décrire les stades successifs que traverse l'âme pécheresse, il énumère la *cogitatio*, la *delectatio*, le *consensus*, l'*operatio*, la *consuetudo* et la *necessitas*.[17] Dans l'oeuvre de Hugues ces séries particulières sont introuvables.[18]

L'auteur de l'*Expositio* et Hugues s'intéressent, l'un et l'autre, aux deux préceptes fondamentaux de la morale: *Quod tibi non vis fieri, vide ne tu alteri facias*, et *Quae vultis ut faciant vobis homines, et vos facite illis*. Mais tandis que le premier y voit le résumé de toutes les obligations de la charité fraternelle,[19] le second y ramène la loi naturelle par opposition à la loi écrite.[20]

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[15] PL 176, 885 A. [16] PL 176, 911 D et 912 A. [17] PL 176, 900 A.

[18] La dernière série n'a pas de correspondant dans l'oeuvre de Hugues. Pour les deux autres, R. Baron, dans *Rech. de Science relig.* 43 (1955) 357, renvoie au *De meditatione* (PL 176, 993): ici cependant on trouve la série, passablement plus riche de *lectio-meditatio-oratio-operatio-contemplatio*.

[19] *In Reg. b. Aug.*, 8 (PL 176, 907 AB): "In dilectione proximi duo servanda sunt, ut: *Quod tibi non vis* . . . et *Quae vultis ut faciant* . . . Ex hac gemina virtute dilectionis in proximum omnes virtutes oriuntur . . ."

[20] *Dial.* (PL 176, 39 BC): "De illis autem quae vel praecipienda vel relinquenda erant, unum tantum praeceptum in corde hominis posuit: *Quod tibi vis, id aliis feceris; quod tibi non vis, aliis ne feceris* . . . Sed post cum lex subintrasset . . ." Cf. *De sacram.*, I, 11, 7 (PL 176, 347 AB).

L'*Expositio* connaît deux espèces de *superbia*, la *carnalis* et la *spiritualis*.[21] Hugues les remplace par deux autres, toutes diverses, la *superbia* proprement dite et la *iactantia*.[22]

Enfin, l'auteur de l'*Expositio* proclame, après Cassien, que la *gula* est le premier des vices capitaux.[23] Hugues par contre, qui nous a laissé au moins sept énumérations de ces mêmes vices, met la *gula* toujours à la sixième place.[24]

Aucune des particularités signalées, prise isolément, ne peut régler la question. Prises ensemble, elles ne laissent pas d'être fort suggestives. En tout cas, elles confirment pleinement l'argument basé sur le silence absolu de la première tradition manuscrite et littéraire, silence qui à lui seul suffit amplement pour enlever à Maître Hugues la paternité de l'*Expositio in Regulam b. Augustini*.

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S. Antonio
Rome

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[21] *In Reg. b. Aug.*, 2 (PL 176, 888 C): „. . . duo genera superbiae designantur: unum carnale, aliud spirituale."

[22] *De sacram.*, II, 13, 1 (PL 176, 526 B): "Superbiae duo sunt genera, unum intus, aliud foris: intus superbia est, foris iactantia." Voir aussi *Miscell.* I, 127 (PL 177, 548 B): "Duo sunt genera elationis . . . Superbia enim intus est, iactantia foris . . .;" *Epist. "Rogasti* me" (ms. *Munich Staatsbibl. lat. 4625*, f. 126v et *Brux. Bibl. royale 1422*, f. 111c): ". . . duo quoque genera sunt superbiae: unum quando animus apud semetipsum per superbiam inflatur, aliud quando foris per iactantiam extollitur;" *De septem vitiis* (ms. *Vat. Reg. lat. 167*, f. 2r): "Superbiae duo sunt genera, unum intus, aliud foris: intus superbia est, foris iactantia."

[23] *In Reg. b. Aug.*, 3 (PL 176, 893): "Primum vitium ex septem principalibus vitiis est gula."

[24] *De quinque septenis* (PL 175, 405 B); *Epist. "Rogasti me"* (cod. *Munich 4625*, f. 125v et *Brux. 1422*, f. 110d); *De sacram.*, II, 13, 1 (PL 176, 525 C); *In orat. domin.* (PL 175, 774 B); *De septem vitiis* (ms. *Vat. Reg. 167*, f. 2r); *Miscell.*, I, 173 (PL 177, 569 CD); *De laude caritatis* (PL 176, 976 A).

SOME CAPUCHIN VIEWS OF, AND CONTRIBUTIONS TO SACRED MUSIC

It has been objected by some that the Capuchin Franciscan Order is not interested in the field of sacred music, and that the Order has contributed little or nothing to this field of apostolic endeavor. This view is far from the truth either in the early years of the Order or in present times. History bears witness to the fact that the Order has always been interested in the arts and sciences that promote the glory of God and the welfare of mankind.

When we speak of views and contributions to sacred music, we must keep in mind the place of sacred music in the liturgical worship. For, unless we understand the place of sacred music in the liturgical worship of the Church, then sacred music becomes something of little use except as an art form for its own sake.

Why should not the Capuchin Order be the inheriter of that gay spirit of song that fills every page of the *Fioretti*? that marked every footstep of St. Francis from the streets of Assisi to the mountain of Alverno?

St. Francis was interested in music, not as an emotional thing only, but as a most fitting expression of worship. Music for him was not an end in itself but a means.

When his eye affliction was causing him much pain, St. Francis called to his side a companion who had been a lute player in the world and said, "Brother, I wish that you go and borrow a lute in secret, and compose a song, and thus bring comfort to my Brother Body who is full of pain." The companion replied, "I fear much, Father, that the people might attribute this to levity on my part." The Saint then answered, "Well then, brother, be it so. It is good to omit many things lest we give scandal."[1]

During the night, while rapt in prayer with God, St. Francis heard the marvelously sweet music of a lute. He could see no one, yet he heard the music as though the lute player was walking back and forth. The spirit of the Saint was so filled with the heavenly joy because of this angelic music that he thought he was in another world.

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[1] Felder, Hilarin, O. F. M. Cap., *The Ideals of St. Francis of Assisi*, Benziger, 1925, p. 234.

In the primitive days of the Franciscan Order religious song was fostered by St. Francis and his sons in all places and in all its forms "as choral, as hymn and prose, as unison and polyphonic cantilena, as rhyme poetry in the Latin as well as in the vernacular tongue."[2]

History shows us that this musical background is one of the reasons why the Order appealed so strongly to that exceptionally musical and poetic period. It explains why many gifted musicians joined the Order and dedicated their song, which they had once sung in praise of knightly adventure and love of fair lady, to the praise of the Eternal Knight and the Mother of God.

St. Francis wished to cultivate the spiritual song for the sake of spritual joy. He called himself the joyous minstrel of the Lord; he deplored deeply that musical instruments served any other purpose than to sound the praises of God. "Joyous minstrels of the Lord" is the title he gave to his disciples. "We are the minstrels of God who should lift up the hearts of men and move them to divine joy."[3]

The desire of St. Francis to foster the spiritual song for spiritual joy does not exclude a scholarly understanding of the art of music and must not be taken in a figurative sense only. The Order aimed to foster the arts and sciences, and not the least was the art of music.

The Golden Age of music appeared during the life time of St. Francis and extended half a century after his death. The Order, then, grew up in the best traditions of music. It was by the end of the 13th century that the period of decadence was under way. This period was the smuggling of a pagan influence into music, which was the more noticeable in music for the Church. This period is well known as the Renaissance. The rebirth consisted in an imitation of ancient Roman and Greek art. By the 1500's sacred music reached its most decadent stage. Unlike Literature and painting, music was not so much standardized. Much of the notation and method of execution was not at all clear. However, it seemed reasonable to the Renaissance composers to keep pace with the other arts; they did so by embellishing the existing forms of music. There resulted a distortion. Many abuses were to follow.

> While as many as eight parts were (often) sung together, no account was taken of the liturgical words, which were now drawn into length, now hastily slurred over, now drowned under a profusion of flourishes. Worse

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[2] *Ibid.*, p. 234.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 428.

still, the accompaniment to the liturgical themes was often derived from popular tunes. Masses therefore bore such names as "Farewell, My Love," "In the Shadow of the Bush," "Kiss Me," or "The Naughty Jealous One." And while the bass sang the words of the liturgy, the tenor would troll out the very words of folksongs, those at least which could bear a religious construction. In the *Kyrie* the tenor sang, "I never saw the like of her;" in a *Benedictus*, "Madam, let me know." The accompanying instruments themselves vie with the singers in capriciousness and virtuosity and shared in the prevailing disorder."[4]

We can understand why Christendom reacted so vehemently against such abuses. Martin Luther retaliated by writing simple hymns for the peasants. The Council of Trent at first took a very austere view of the same abuses, and almost condemned it outright. But it wisely let the music exist.

The Capuchin Order, coming into existence as a Franciscan reform in the 1500's, landed in the century of low ebb for sacred music. The Capuchins of necessity and as a matter of principle, took an extreme turn in their liturgical legislation. At least indirectly legislation was made regarding sacred music. The Divine Office was not to be chanted in a florid style but in a monotone. Sung Masses were at first frowned upon. What may at first seem like an aversion to sacred music in the Capuchin Order was really a situation brought about by the times in which the Order was born.

The first actions taken by the Capuchins concerning sacred music followed the general spirit of the Order. The sentiment was that devotions should be in keeping with holy poverty and the simplicity of the Capuchin life (keeping in mind the trend of music in that period). Capuchin Churches were small and distant from the towns; only a small number of people attended the services. The Fathers, therefore, felt that the ceremonies should be in keeping with the primitive and almost eremitical Capuchin life. As a result the Order forbade ceremonies customary in the larger churches of other Orders.

Nevertheless, in 1575, the Capuchins, desiring to conform themselves somewhat to the usage of other churches, introduced some change in the sacred rite by singing Mass in a voice similar to that used to chant the Office. This innovation met with complaints and disapproval so that it was condemned as an abuse and abrogated in the General Chapter of 1581. The previous custom of saying a low Mass was restored.

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[4] Udulutsch, Edgar, O. F. M. Cap., "Liturgy in the Capuchin Reform" in *Round Table of Franciscan Research*, vol. 20, No. 3, July 1955, p. 94.

It would seem that music was banished from the life of the Capuchin. The legislation of the following years (until 1900) say very little about sacred music or the use of instruments in Capuchin churches. In only a few places were instruments in use at all.

The custom of using an organ in Capuchin churches was considered an abuse. In one Sicilian church, through the use of an apostolic indult, an organ was used. However, in time the Capuchins considered this an abuse and legislated that the organ be removed.

In the Chapter held in 1847, the Capuchins deplored the fact that "musical chant and also instruments" were gradually being introduced into their churches. Thus there came the prohibition that music, either vocal or instrumental, was almost never found in Capuchin churches.

The severity of the ordinances concerning the use of organs was changed in 1884. New legislation granted the use of the organ, but only for a very grave reason and only on rare occasions was this permission to be granted. It was this same meeting that gave first encouragement to the Ministers Provincials to introduce the teaching of chant into Capuchin colleges and seminaries.

In 1912, a type of general permission was given concerning the use of the organ. The only thing demanded was the obtaining of permission from the General of the Order.

In the ancient Capuchin legislation there is no mention of chant in sacred functions or of instruments, either organ or harmonium. We can gather that music was almost entirely excluded from the *ratio vivendi* (the way of life) of the Capuchins. As late as 1841, 1847, 1859 (from the Generalate) we read of restrictions governing the use of singing and musical instruments in Capuchin churches. With the dawn of the 20th century, wider liberties are given to the field of sacred music. The new Constitutions[5] not only permit but prescribe that, in the course of theology, lectures also be given in the chant of the Church (n. 186); and the General Ordinances[6] of 1928 (n. 61) prescribe singing for sacred functions, especially recommending Gregorian Chant. In the norms[7] prescribed for seraphic seminaries and novitiates (n. 258) the students are to be educated in the chant of the Church. The organ and harmonium (n. 142) may be used in parish churches and in places where needed.[8]

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[5] *Rule and Testament of the Seraphic Father Saint Francis and Constitutions of the Capuchin Friars Minor of Saint Francis*, Province of St. Joseph of the Capuchin Order, Detroit 7, Michigan, 1945, No. 186.

[6] *Ordinances of the General Chapters of the Order of Friar Minor Capuchin*, Romae, Curia Generalis Ord. Min. Cap., Via Boncompagni, 71, 1928, No. 61.

[7] *Ibid.*, No. 258.

[8] *Ibid.*, No. 142.

The new Capuchin Constitutions of the 1900's, coming during the era of liturgical revival, may be said to breath more of a liturgical atmosphere than ever before. The idea of sacred music is brought out specifically in regard to studies embraced,[9] Ecclesiastical Chant and Liturgy being listed separately along with other philosophical and theological subjects (n. 186) in keeping with the requirements of Canon Law.

In our own day we are acquainted with the circular letter of the past Minister General of the Capuchin Order, Benignus of Sant'Illario Milanese, *On Fostering Sacred Music in Our Order.*[10] This document could well be called the *Musicae Sacrae Disciplina* of the Capuchin Order, for it preceeded that monumental encyclical of Pius XII[11] only by a short time and actually anticipated the wishes stated in the Holy Father's letter.

The letter of Father Benignus of Sant'Illario gives an appreciation of the place of sacred music in the liturgy of the Church and its place in the Capuchin Order. In this letter Father Benignus states that Gregorian Chant is to take first place over other forms of sacred music; polyphonic music and even more recent compositions may be sung on solemn feast days, provided these pieces "have a divine spirit and a peculiar characteristic of Gregorian notation and modulation to them, or certainly have nothing profane in their form or inspiration;" in singing and in playing the religious and choral character should stand out; capable masters are to be trained who will in turn teach others; in all houses of study, lessons are to be given in Gregorian Chant and polyphonic music; men gifted in music should be sent on for higher studies; superiors are to encourage teachers of sacred music.

How admirably do the two letters — the one of Pius XII, the other of Father Benignus of Sant'Illario — complement each other!

It would seem that the legislation of the Capuchins, at least until the 1900's, was so constructed as to stifle the progress of sacred music. However, the times of musical decadence and the attitude of Mother Church seemed to warrant this attitude. The Capuchins fought against the abuses of their times, but they fought as Holy Mother Church wanted to fight. Despite the restraint put upon the art of music in those early times, gifted musicians still entered the Order.

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[9] *Op. cit., Rule and Testament . . . and Constitutions,* No. 186.

[10] Benignus of Sant'Illario Milanese, O. F. M. Cap., "On Fostering Sacred Music in Our Order," in *Annals* of the Capuchin Province of St. Augustine, Pittsburgh, Pa., Vol. 9, No. 2, August, 1954, p. 9.

[11] Pius XII, *Musicae Sacrae Disciplina,* Dec. 25, 1955, translation National Catholic Welfare Conference.

The first record of a Capuchin who contributed something to music is found in the archives of Venice. Cherubino of Udine (Sandolino) Utinensis was considered well-versed in music. This Capuchin, who lived around 1580, seems to be better known in history as a clock-maker and author of books on astronomy.[12] (Of course it is good to recall that, at least in ancient times, music and mathematics were pretty much allied subjects; so it was with Aristotle and Plato.)

Of interest is the fact that Apollinarius of Sigmaringen (1584—1629), brother of St. Fidelis, was an accomplished musician, "musicus perfectus, poeta ingeniosissimus . . ."[13]

The Province of Flanders in Belgium gave the Capuchins, Tiburtius of Bruxelles. In 1625, he published *Litaniae Seraphicae B. M. Virginis* and musical compositions of three and eight voices.[14]

Leonardus of Tournai (Musel), of the Tournai Province in Belgium, published a work entitled, *P. Leonardi Nervii Ord. Cap. Cantiones Sacrae*, which contained a litany of the Blessed Virgin, hymns to the Blessed Sacrament and an eight-voice *Te Deum* with organ accompaniment.[15]

Some of the most gifted musicians of the Capuchins were those of the German speaking language. Most of these men were also recognized poets.

The most outstanding of this group is Laurentius of Schnueffis.[16] Before entering the Order he was an itinerant scholar who earned his living by teaching music. He held positions as director of the cathedral choir at Strasbourg, poet laureat for Emperor Leopold I, actor, playwright and director of the Court Theater at Vienna. Laurentius was both singer and composer. In the latter position, he holds the distinction of being one of the few monodic song writers of he 17th century.[17] As a Capuchin he made some fine contributions; to him goes the credit for establishing May as the Month of Mary.[18]

At this same time the Tirolese were given Justinus of Salzburg, better known as Bartholomew Unterwieser. He was both an organist and a singer.[19] Within this same Province was Phillippus of Neumarckt, who was a master of music.[20]

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[12] *Historia Generalis Ordinis Fratrum Minorum Capuccinorum*, Pars Prima (1525—1619), Romae, Institutum Historicum, 1947, p. 232.

[13] *Ibid.*, Pars Secunda (1619—1761), Romae, 1948, p. 406.

[14] *Lexicon Capuccinum*, Romae, 1951, column 1192.

[15] *Ibid.*, column 1191.

[16] *Ibid.*, column 1191.

[17] *Op. cit.*, *Historia Generalis*, Pars Secunda, p. 223.

[18] *Ibid.*, Pars Secunda, p. 417.

[19] *Op. cit.*, *Lexicon Capuccinum*, column 1191.

[20] *Op. cit.*, *Historia Generalis*, Pars Secunda, p. 417.

Procopius of Tempin (c. 1655), of the Hungarian Province, wrote 576 compositions of religious measured music. The majority of these were centered on the Blessed Virgin.[21]

Mary was the theme of many of the songs of Theobaldus of Konstanz (1723). His main work consisted of three poems set in regular music using symbolic figures and musical notes. The pieces were *Pomarium Marianium, Desertium Marianium,* and *Triumphus Marianus.*[22]

A lay brother, Lucas of Waasmunster (Vermernmen) compiled a collection of florid chant and measured music. This collection was republished in 1939.[23]

In more recent times, Bernardus of Napoli (D'Andrea) not only wrote poetic songs, but with varying success he produced works of art in measured music. True to the Capuchin love of Mary, the Virgin was the theme of many of his compositions.[24]

A recognized organist and choir director, Franciscus Borjas (Fleishmann, c. 1860), made Mary the object of his music.[25]

Damiamus of Bergomo,[26] (1771—1872), was outstanding in the art of organ construction. Many of the modifications made in organs were introduced through him. Victricius Nestl[27] of Innsbruck (1869—1910) constructed various types of musical instruments. Aegidius of Steuen (Kuendig) invented a musical instrument called the "Aegideon."[28]

Among the better known musicians of the 1900's was Bonaventura Weiss[29] and Nicolaus of Tolosa.[30] The latter composed many musical compositions on both religious and profane subjects. Almost all of his works were accepted with high praise.

The Marian Year of 1904 inspired Henricus of Marseille to write and send an Oratorio to Rome in honor of the Immaculate Conception.[31]

Saturnius of Legard and Josaphat of Stilfes wrote many musical compositions of all types. Saturninus published a study of music, *La musica en la liturgia.* Josaphat is reputed as a critic of music.[32]

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[21] *Ibid.*, Pars Secunda, p. 219, p. 416.

[22] *Op. cit., Lexicon Cappucinum,* column 1192.

[23] *Op. cit., Historia Generalis,* Pars Secunda, p. 417.

[24] *Ibid., Historia Generalis,* Pars Tertia (1761—1940), Romae, 1951, p. 407.

[25] *Op. cit., Lexicon Cappucinum,* column 1191.

[26] *Op. cit., Historia Generalis,* Pars Tertia, p. 407.

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 407.

[28] *Op. cit., Lexicon Cappucinum,* column 1192.

[29] *Op. cit., Historia Generalis,* Pars Tertia, p. 408.

[30] *Op. cit., Lexicon Cappucinum,* column 1192.

[31] *Ibid.*, column 1192.

[32] *Ibid.*, column 1192. *Op. cit., Historia Generalis,* Pars Tertia, p. 408.

One of the greatest musicians of our Order during this period is Josephus Antonius of S. Sebastian, Province of Navarre.[33] This Spanish composer and folklorist of the Basque nationalist group entered the Order in 1902. From his boyhood he had been devoted to the music of his native country. He had studied under Ismael Echezarra, Gabiola, and Ezquerra. At Paris, he became the student of the neo-classic composer, Eugene Cools. As a friar, he was for many years organist and choirmaster at the College at Lecaroz in Navarre. Because of his knowledge, he is considered as an authority in Basque music and folklore, and was elected to a membership in the Royal Academy of Fine Arts of San Fernando.[34] To his credit must be added the founding of the Spanish Institute for Musicology. Yet this knowledge that has helped him so much was gained in a truly Franciscan manner. He simply lived among the people, remembering the songs of the tramp, the peasant and the pilgrim. His compositions, in addition to the folk songs, consist in: — *Itinerarium mysticum*, based on Gregorian themes, in three volumes for organ; motets for three and four part mixed chorus; a Requiem for four part choir based on a Gregorian theme; a musical drama on the life of St. Francis; and many other compositions.

We have listed a number of Capuchin musicians, but this is only to mention a few of the musical names in Capuchin life from the early and the more recent times. Here, indeed, is a field for further historical research: to seek out other Capuchin musical scholars and their works. Such a Study would give us added source material upon which to base present day musical compositions; some of the ancient and forgotten compositions, once re-edited and arranged, would make a valuable contribution of music literature for present day use. Such a research would show in clearer detail the part that the apostolate of music has played in the Capuchin and Franciscan life. One final value such a research would have: it would bring to light more and more the Franciscan spirit of song, the Franciscan interpretation of music. (Is not the Franciscan interpretation of, say Gregorian Chant, a bit different than that of the Benedictine?) Further research would eventually result in the establishment of a Franciscan school of music and musical thought.

Now, what of present-day Capuchin views and contributions? As a whole, both in America and in Europe, the enthusiasm is in keeping with the desire of the 20th century Pontiffs. True to Franciscan tradition, the Capuchins are following their ancient maxim: *sentire cum Ecclesia.* This is not to say that there could not be improvement; the Holy Fathers themselves point out the need for improvement. Of course, as in any field of endeavor, so in liturgy and sacred music, improvements will follow in the footsteps of adequate education.

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[33] *Op. cit.*, *Lexicon Cappucinum*, column 1192. *Op. cit.*, *Historia Generalis*, Pars Tertia, p. 408.

[34] *Grove's Dictionary of Music and Musicians*, ed. Eric Bloom, St. Martin Press, N. Y., 1951, Vol. 2, p. 737.

It can be said that the Capuchin view of sacred music is a wholesome one; and that as a result, the Capuchin contributions to this field of apostolic endeavor will continue to flourish, "proving today as in times past that it (this noble art) will be very beneficial in bringing Christian nations to the Lord."[35]

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[35] *Op. cit.*, Benignus of Sant'Illario, *On Fostering Sacred Music*, p. 13.

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THE DOCTRINE OF ALEXANDER OF HALES ON THE NATURE OF SACRAMENTAL GRACE

In the *Glossa in Quattuor Libros Sententiarum*[1] of Alexander of Hales as also throughout some of his *Quaestiones antequam esset frater*[2] we find the lineaments of a theory on the nature of sacramental grace which deserves attention. The purpose of these pages lies in presenting this theory as developed and applied by the author. To do this adequately we must first investigate its application to the sacraments of baptism and penance, since it is here that the author reveals his mind more openly, and then discuss its generalized principles as they pervade both the *Glossa* and the *Quaestiones*.

I. THE SACRAMENTAL GRACE OF BAPTISM AND PENANCE

a) *The efficacy of baptism*

With Alexander as with the other authors of his milieu the question of the efficacy of baptism as a means of justification involves the efficacy likewise of its counterpart in the Old Covenant, namely circumcision. The latter as a sacrament of the Old Law shared with those of the New in some wise an efficacy *ex opere operato* whereby its signification became effected.[3] This signification extended itself to the removal of guilt, and the removal of the punishment of original sin, the loss of the vision of God, carentia visionis Dei, as also to the removal of all corruption in the glorified state.[4] The removal, however, of the loss of the vision of God, or the exclusion of human kind from the possibility of attaining to the beatific vision due to original sin, constituted its principal signification.[5] In accomplishing this signification, however, according to the teaching of the author, the grace of circumcision betrayed a twofold imperfection. In the first place through its proper causality it conferred habitual grace only with respect to the removal of evil, the remission of guilt, and in accordance with the theory of the author on the nature of original sin, the sublimation of man from his dedication to evil inherent to his nature from original sin. The effects of habitual grace which constitute spiritual life, with its faculties the virtues, a life which proceeds from love, it being a sacrament of the Law of fear, it did not bestow, though these effects did follow by concomitance.[6] Secondly, with respect to its principal signification, the removal of the punishment of original sin, circumcision attained but an imperfect efficacy; this punishment consisted in exclusion from the vision of God. As we shall see when discussing the connection of sacramental grace with the *imago recreationis*, the direction which the possession of habitual graces conveys rests in the attainment of the beatific vision. The collective guilt of original sin has as its concomitance in the individual a *macula* or staining of the soul from the corruption arising from its connection with the flesh, and a corresponding *reatus* or debt of eternal punishment, the *aeterna carentia visionis Dei*, or eternal exclusion from the vision of God; these two somehow enter into every sin not venial, a *macula* and a *reatus* or obligation to a punishment which is eternal.[7] As a result of this *macula* or guilt, the *imago Dei*, the image of God in man, becomes deprived of its corresponding complement supernaturally, the superimposed *imago recreationis*, the image of re-creation, consisting in grace with the virtues. In the process of justification in circumcision, God then *from mercy*[8] infused grace, removing the *macula* or deformation of the image of God in man, and removing the *reatus* or debt of eternal punishment, which *necessarily* accompanied the *macula*, and the removal of which necessarily accomplishes the other removal, these two from either point of view being inseparable; nevertheless, God in virtue of circumcision removed the eternal punishment only by changing it and commuting it into a temporary punishment, the temporal loss of the vision of God, *temporalis carentia visionis Dei*. While grace and the eternal loss of beatitude are incompatible, grace and its temporal loss are not. A debt of punishment remained to be paid; consequently while it was the prerogative of God only to infuse grace, the necessary duty of mankind remained to defray punishment for the sin originally committed: this the Christ-man only could defray, acting in his ability as man.[9] Thus only could the temporal loss of beatitude, residual from the grace of circumcision, be removed, namely by punishment undergone by Christ as man.

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[1] Cf. *Magistri Alexandri de Hales Glossa in Quattuor Libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi*, Quaracchi, Florentiae, (*Bibliotheca Franciscana Medii Aevi*, Tom. XII—XV), I (1951), II (1952), III (1954), IV (1957). As to the date of the *Glossa*, the editors assign the entire work to the years 1222—1229 (Cf. IV, p. 44*).

[2] With reference to the authenticity and history of these *Quaestiones* cf. V. Doucet, O. F. M., *Alexandri de Hales Summa Theologica*, Tom. IV, *Prolegomena*, Quaracchi, 1948; cf. pp. CLIII—CLXXII and *passim*; cf. p. CLVI with reference to the *Quaestio de paenitentia* later utilized in this article.

[3] Here it suffices to quote the following *quaeritur:* "Potest esse quaestio, si duae sunt res huius sacramenti, scilicet circumcisio, ab originali et circumcisio plena ab omni corruptione, et hoc sacramentum quoad quid convenit cum sacramento Novae Legis in hoc quod efficit quod figurat: propter quid respectu unius rei significatae, scilicet circumcisionis ab originali, est signum et causa; respectu vero sequentis est signum tantum." *Glossa* IV, dist. 1, p. 37—38.

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[4] *Glossa* IV, dist. 3, p. 64: "Circumcisio vero quantum ad rem illam quae est diminutio fomitis, impleta est in baptismo; non autem quantum ad ablationem carentiae visionis Dei. Haec est autem impleta in Passione; et propter hoc circumcisio quoad illam rem totam impleta est in morte Christi. Praeterea, est alia res circumcisionis, scilicet ablatio ab omni corruptione; et haec iterum non est impleta in baptismo, sed in resurrectione Christi."

[5] *Ibid.* p. 65: "Principalis ergo res circumcisionis est illa quae completa fuit in Christo moriente et resurgente . . . Principale autem significatum ejus est circumcisio ab originali poena, cuius veritas patuit in Christo moriente et resurgente. Et propter hoc circumcisio velut signum cessavit."

[6] *Ibid.* dist. 1, p. 24: "Respondemus: gratia duplicem habet effectum. Unus effectus est gratiae quoad remissionem culpae, alius quoad non faciendum malum; uterque est respectu mali. Quoad bonum est unus effectus conferre vitam spiritualem animae; alius et habilitare potentiam ad opus; tertius, bonum opus elicere a potentia. Dicimus ergo quod in circumcisione spirituali quae fuit sacramenti in Veteri Lege, conferebatur gratia quae est in remissione culpae et ad non faciendum malum; sed nullus de aliis tribus sequentibus . . . haec est differentia inter Veterem et Novam Legem, quod in illa fuit timor, in ista vero fuit amor principium. Quia ergo ex amore est conferre vitam et habilitare potentiam et opus meritorium elicere, non facere vero malum provenit ex timore, gratia prima tollit culpam, gratia cum timore facit cessare a malo, ex parte amoris primo confert vitam. Inde gratia, cum timore dat gratiam quoad primos effectus, non quod alios sequentes."

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[7] *Ibid.* p. 337 (dist. 18): "Respondemus ad primum quod macula esse suum trahit ex parte conversionis, sicut polluitur aliquid contingens lutum corporaliter . . . anima maculatur cum infunditur ex corruptione carnis, sicut in vase dignoscitur esse vitium, cum vinum infusum ascescit.

Differentia vero inter maculam et reatum, quod macula est in quantum deformatur imago, ex contagione mutabilis boni per affectum indebitum; reatus vero dicit obligationem ad poenam.

Poena autem maculae attingit ipsam animam secundum quod est imago Dei. De esse autem imaginis est anima in quantum habet potentiam cognoscendi et volendi; quae duo ad liberum arbitrium referuntur in quantum est facultas rationis et voluntatis.

Differentia autem inter maculam et culpam est, quod macula deformat imaginem, culpa vero est in quantum ad notitiam refertur et ei debetur reatus."

[8] *Ibid.* dist. 1, p. 37: "Licet ergo Dominus ex sua misericordia in circumcisione abstulerit originale peccatum quoad culpam et quoad reatum aeternae carentiae visionis Dei, qui necessario consequitur, non tamen ab illo reatu quoad temporalem poenam absolvit."

[9] *Ibid.*, "Necesse est ergo ut sit satisfactor ille principium illorum hominum ut Deus, et quod solvat poenam in quantum homo."

Wherefore, prior to the Passion of Christ, though justification might ensue, since this is the prerogative of God alone to confer, the punishment of the eternal loss of beatitude must remain commuted only into a temporal loss. A somewhat similar instance occurs, as we shall see later, in the working of the sacrament of penance.[10] The principal signification of circumcision awaited then its full realization in the Passion of Christ.

Baptism before the Passion

The sacrament of baptism according to the *Glossa* of Alexander received a varied institution: *officialiter*, he states, when Christ sent his Apostles forth two by two (*Mk.* 6, 7); with respect to its matter *(materialiter)* in the baptism of Christ; with respect to its form *(formaliter)* when He sent the Apostles to preach and baptize, *Mt.* 28, 19; effectively *(effective)*, or with respect to its efficacy, in the opening of the side of Christ, the water and blood coming forth being signs of the eucharist and baptism.[11] Besides these Alexander distinguishes, with respect to the obligation of baptism, the first giving of the sacrament by way of counsel *(primo in concilium)*, to Nicodemus, and the second by way of precept to the Apostles on their mission *(postea in praecepto)*,[12] the reason for the varying obligation resting in the varying efficacy of the sacrament anterior and subsequent to the Passion. Prior to the Passion[13] both circumcision and baptism existed as alternate means of justification. Existing in counsel only before the Passion baptism enjoyed the effect of conferring grace and removing the eternal punishment of original sin;[14] besides these effects which it shared with circumcision, it enjoyed the further effect of an habilitation to good, that lacking, as we have already seen, in circumcision. These several effects proceeding as such from grace it could enjoy without the intervention of the Passion, the efficacy of which looked towards the removal of punishment. Thus existing as a sacrament prior to the Passion it remained deprived of efficacy toward the removal of the carentia temporalis visionis Dei[15] and in this respect it equated its counterpart in the Old Law.

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[10] *Ibid.*, dist. 1, p. 27: "Respondemus: est reatus quoad carentiam aeternam visionis Dei, aut quoad temporalem carentiam visionis Dei. Cum ergo remittitur originale peccatum, dimittitur reatus aeternae carentiae, non temporalis. Et est exemplum in contritione de poena aeterna et temporali."

[11] Cf. *Glossa*, dist. 3, p. 57.

[12] *Ibid.*, dist. 3, p. 65: ". . . dicendum est quod circumcisio non amisit vim suam primo adveniente baptismo. Dabatur enim baptismus primo in consilium, postea in praeceptum. in *Matt.* ultimo, 19: 'Ite, docete omnes gentes' etc. Cucurrit ergo circumcisio existens in praecepto cum baptismo manente in consilio."

[13] Cf. preceding note, and: ". . . circumcisio mansit quoad effectum suum usque ad Passionem Christi" *ibid.* p. 64.

[14] *Ibid.* d. 1, p. 37: "Baptismus . . . confert specialem gratiam 'ad bene operandum' . . . quod etiam habuit ante Passionem Christi . . ."

Baptism subsequent to the Passion

While grace of its nature directed man to the beatific vision, since it opposes the eternal loss of that vision as something incompatible with it, redemption from the punishment of original sin must intervene before this vision could be secured. Two factors enter into this complete justification: the one the bestowal of grace proper to God alone, the other the redemption from punishment belonging to Christ as man. Alexander reiterates this principle repeatedly: to recreate belongs to God alone since re-creation involves the infusion of grace over which man has no power[16] — it involves creation; through this grace of re-creation God remits guilt. Hence, Christ as man cannot remit guilt or sin, since this involves the infusion of grace. But, to redeem looks to punishment, or the remission of punishment, and belongs to Christ as man.[17] Or, to recall the classical distinction, the power of authority over sin belongs to God; the power of excellence to Christ; so that he could remit the punishment of sin without the sacraments, the power of ministry to man, such that he remits punishment utilizing the sacraments as instruments. Again, when Alexander considers the different appellations bestowed upon Christ, that of Redemptor he asserts as belonging to

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[15] Cf. n. 13 and 14, and: ". . . baptismus erat typus mortis Christi; sed causalitatem non suscepit nisi ex passione iam existente. Unde, si aliqui essent baptizati ante passionem, ad limbum descenderunt." Dist. 3, p. 69.

[16] *Ibid.*, dist. 5, p. 101: "Respondemus: recreare proprie est Dei. Recreatio enim proprie pertinet ad remissionem culpae; nam homo nihil est quoad esse gratiae per culpam, sicut nihil est simpliciter ante creationem; et ideo Christi est recreatio in quantum est Deus. Sed redimere respicit poenam vel obligationem ad poenam; unde convenit Christo secundum quod homo potestas redimendi. Dimittere autem peccata solius Dei est . . . 'Et ita homo Christus per divinitatem peccata dimittit, per humanitatem pro peccatoribus potest mori'." And: "Contra: anima creata est immediate a Deo; ergo et suum optimum est immediate a Deo. Hoc autem gratia; ergo gratia immediate a Deo; non ergo potest esse ab homine. Ergo mundatio vel dimissio peccati non potest convenire homini tamquam efficienti. Quod concedimus."

Alexander holds that redemption had to be the work of the God-man, and that man as such could not be the redeemer (cf. n. 9 *supra*, and complete text in the *Glossa*); what he insists on in these passages is that the act of the redemption pertains to the remission of punishment, and not the remission of guilt (culpa).

[17] *Ibid.*, dist. 5, p. 100: "Est enim triplex potestas: auctoritatis, excellentiae, et ministerii. Prima est Dei, scilicet dimittendi culpas. Secunda fuit Christi, ut sine clave media remitteret peccata, scilicet quoad poenam, sicut aliquis qui aperit ostium digito . . . Tertia, vero, quae est ministerii, est puri hominis, cui conferuntur claves et ordo sacerdotalis . . ."

Him because of redemption from the punishment of sin, Redemptor a poena peccati;[18] He solves from punishment as man, solvit poenam in quantum homo.[19] The Redemption then looks to punishment, and the Redeemer to the removal of punishment.

Wherefore, the Redemption being accomplished, in the Passion, and the punishment of original sin, the carentia visionis Dei, being removed through the Passion, baptism after the Passion, unlike the same sacrament anterior to the Passion, and unlike circumcision, bestowed complete removal of all punishment, and immediate access to beatitude. Thus, the sacraments of the Old Law became extinct,[20] and thus likewise baptism instituted and conferred prior to the Passion acceded likewise to its integral efficacy,[21] the removal of the temporalis carentia visionis Dei.[22] In this respect of complete justification from punishment Alexander interprets the text of St. Paul with respect to being buried with Christ in baptism,[23] by which we are conformed to Christ, as referring to being buried to the punishment of sin, so that we may arise with Christ to a newness of life, sepultus per Passionem quoad poenam peccati.[24]

The sacrament of baptism thus existing extended its causality with respect to punishment to whatever punishment debarred from beatitude, hence also to the temporal punishment due to mortal sin, such sin itself being deleted with respect to guilt by contrition accompanying baptism in an adult.[25]

The respective causality of the two influences flowing into the complete efficacy of this sacrament, namely the removal of guilt and the removal of punishment, finds its expression in the following item:

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[18] *Ibid.*, III dist. 19, p. 229 (this is codex E, however, of the *Glossa*): "Quaestio est in quo differunt et quomodo ordinentur haec quae dicuntur secundum humanam naturam sive quod homo, templum, caput, . . . redemptor . . .

redemptor a poena peccati . . ."

The same appears in Codex L, *ibid.* p. 222.

[19] Cf. *supra* n. 9.

[20] Cf. *supra* n. 4, and 5.

[21] Cf. *ibid.*

[22] *Ibid.*: ". . . causalitatem non suscepit nisi ex Passione iam existente . . ." (dist. 3, p. 69).

[23] Cf. *Rom.* 6, 4.

[24] *Glossa*, IV, dist. 8, p. 141: "Sicut enim fuit sepultus per Passionem quoad poenam peccati, ita et nos in baptismo quoad peccatum et poenam peccati originalis et actualis, si fuerit contritus baptizatus."

[25] *Ibid.*, Introitus p. 6: "Delet enim originale et actuale quoad culpam et poenam, si digne suscipiatur." Cf. Codex E (*ibid.* p. 71) "Item, in perfecto baptismate deletur poena actualis culpae." Cf. also the preceding note, as also the following.

> Praeterea, virtus Passionis Christi delevit poenam originalis peccati, et baptismus ex virtute gratiae delet culpam, et ita plena remissio quoad culpam et poenam fit praeter resurrectionem Christi.
>
> IV *Glossa, dist.* 4, p. 86.

Though this text appears only as an objection, nevertheless, it indicates the mind of Alexander with respect to the elements responsible for the complete efficacy of the sacrament. The remission of guilt, culpa, finds its causality in the infusion of grace by God; the remission of punishment, or the removal of the carentia temporalis visionis Dei, finds its causality in the Passion of Christ, virtus Passionis delevit poenam originalis peccati. This interpretation finds corroboration in Codex ε of the *Glossa*[26] which attributes the removal of guilt, culpa, explicitly to the Holy Spirit, and this as distinct from the removal of punishment. Thus with perfect consistency does Alexander state elsewhere that 'in baptism of water the punishment is removed by virtue of the Passion of Christ.'[27]

As we have already seen, to redeem as such has reference to the removal of punishment. The removal of all punishment impeding the attainment of the vision of God constitute then the part which the Passion of Christ or the Redemption contributes to the causality of baptism. Beyond this, with respect to the removal of guilt, and the infusion of grace, responsibility for causality resides with the Trinity.

That this removal of punishment represents the sacramental grace as such of baptism to the mind of Alexander becomes apparent from his *Quaestio de imagine.*

The *Quaestio de imagine*[28]

Here Alexander places the question: Postea quaeritur de gratia sacramentali, utrum scilicet debeat dici imago recreationis, an illa quae est in virtutibus?[29] For Alexander in this question the *imago recreationis*, or the supernatural re-creation of man belongs integrally to the infusion of gratia gratum faciens and the theological virtues, the gratia virtutum.[30] While it belongs to grace as such to remit sin, — remittere peccata est gratiae secundum se,[31] it belongs to the theological virtues to connect the soul with God supernaturally, or to habilitate the powers to act toward the attainment of their proper end supernaturally,[32] the union of the *imago creationis* with the *imago similitudinis*.

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[26] *Glossa*, dist. 3, p. 70: "ad evidentiam autem horum notandum quod in baptismate ex aqua et Spiritu plurima concurrunt. Ibi enim est aqua mundificans; et praeter hoc Spiritus Sanctus, per quem est prima deletio culpae. Est ibi praeter hoc poenae deletio, tam actualis quam originalis."

[27] *Ibid.* dist. 4, p. 83: "Non sic autem est in baptismo aquae. Poena enim aufertur ibi virtute Passionis Christi."

[28] With reference to the *Quaestio de imagine*, cf. *Alexandri de Hales Summa Theologica, Prolegomena*, p. CLXVIII. We have edited the part of this question which deals with sacramental grace in *The Sacrament of Confirmation in the Early-Middle Scholastic Period* (*Franciscan Institute Publications*, Theology Series no. 5, ed. by Eligius M. Buytaert, O. F. M.), *The* Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure, N. Y., 1957; cf. *ibid.* pp. 246—249.

[29] Cf. *ed. cit.* p. 249.

To his question then as to the function of sacramental grace in the recreation of man, Alexander responds that this recreation belongs to the grace of the virtues, est gratia delens culpam quae inducit virtutes, from which grace he distinguishes gratia sacramentalis; to gratia sacramentalis he allots the function of curing the wound of sin through the Passion of Christ — gratia sacramentalis, et haec est sanativa vulnerum per Passionem Christi.[33] This wound in the present case he identifies with the *apertio ianuae*,[34] or the removal of the wound consists in opening the barrier to entrance to heaven. Wherefore, sacramental grace constitutes a *dispositio removens prohibens*,[35] and its function lies in making possible the union of the created image with the uncreated in beatitude.[36]

The present question in its doctrine then falls into complete accord with the author's doctrine in the *Glossa* in his treatment of baptism. In each case there is a special contribution of the Passion of Christ responsible for the causality removing the barrier to beatitude. This is not gratia gratum faciens, nor the grace of the virtues, to which belongs the *imago recreationis*, but that which the *Quaestio* styles a *dispositio removens prohibens*, or which the *Glossa* styles the removal of the carentia visionis Dei. The *Quaestio* furthermore identifies this removal specifically as the gratia sacramentalis of baptism.

b) *The efficacy of penance*[37]

Here we shall investigate how consistently Alexander applies the ideas present to his treatment of baptism to the functioning of the sacrament of penance, where a removal of guilt and punishment likewise intervenes.

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[30] Cf. *ibid.* p. 247, ll. 33 f.

[31] Cf. *ibid.* line 54, and p. 249, lines 110—111.

[32] *Ibid.* p. 247, lines 42 ff., and p. 248, lines 91 ff.

[33] *Ibid.* p. 249, lines 110—111.

[34] *Ibid.* p. 249, line 110 "Et aperit ianuam per se."

[35] *Ibid.* p. 249, line 113.

[36] *Ibid.* line 112.

[37] With reference to the background of the tract of Alexander of Hales on the sacrament of penance cf. P. Anciaux, *La théologie du Sacrement de Pénitence au XIIe siècle*, Louvain-Gembloux, 1949; it is outside our interest to discuss the fonts of Alexander's doctrine.

In accord with the theology of the time our author must be styled a contritionist. For him the removal of the guilt of mortal sin in an adult must find its place in contrition. This becomes apparent when he distinguishes in penance that which belongs to its being or essence *(quod esse)* from that which belongs to its well-being or ideal essence *(quoad bene esse)*.[37a] Its *esse* becomes realized in contrition, since he states, in contrition consists the essence of penance whereby it is the cause of the remission of sin; its well-being becomes realized in confession and satisfaction.

From another point of view of the author the same conclusion becomes apparent: looked upon as a virtue, penance consists in the performance of satisfaction for sin; looked upon as the means of remitting sin, it acquires the title grace, since to grace infused in contrition belongs properly the effect of remitting guilt.[38] Whence Alexander does not hesitate to style contrition itself a sacrament, nam ut sacramentum ita potest compleri in contritione.[39] The sacramental sign then lies in annihilation, for just as man annihilates himself in contrition so does God annihilate guilt in the remission of sin.[40] To the essence of such contrition as its form pertains grace, as its matter voluntary sorrow for sin.[41]

In consonance with what Alexander stated when speaking of baptism, he posits likewise here the removal of eternal punishment with God alone, 'to the guilt of sin corresponds the merit of eternal punishment, and this God alone removes.'[42] Or to use another manner of speaking of the author, the bond of eternal punishment in contrition becomes loosed to be replaced by the bond of expiation, an expiation to be fulfilled either in purgatory or by a relaxation of this received in confession.[43] In the removal of eternal punishment, God then commutes such eternal punishment into purgatorial.[44] Again, this commutation does not take place without the sacrament of penance in so far as this involves confession; in the commutation of eternal punishment in the grace of contrition the subject becomes to the bond of confession, vinculo enim confessionis ligabatur, in contritione.[45] Whence, in this sense the bond of eternal punishment becomes relaxed in confession since its remission binds to confession.[46] Alexander interprets then the opinion of some, *quidam dixerunt,* that eternal punishment becomes remitted in confession in this sense only of its mitigated form being thus remitted: the opinion itself he rejects.[47]

[37a]. Cf. *Glossa*, IV, dist. 16, p. 253: "Si vero quaeratur cuiusmodi partes, dicendum est quod sunt partes quoad esse, et sunt partes quoad bene esse. Quoad esse est pars contritio; quoad bene esse est pars confessio cum satisfactione, prout satisfactio est praeter contritionem. Nec est hoc contrarium, quod paenitentia secundum sui rationem potest praedicari de contritione, quia in ipsa contritione consistit esse paenitentiae secundum quod est causa delectionis peccati."

[38] *Ibid.*, d. 14, p. 210: "Respondemus: poenitentia est virtus vel gratia. Secundum unum esse est virtus, secundum alterum est gratia. Sunt enim duo effectus; unus est remissio culpae, et alter remissio poenae. Nam in contritione remittitur culpa; per confessionem et satisfactionem poena, quae etiam remittitur quandoque per solam contritionem. Quantum ergo ad remissionem culpae est gratia; effectus enim delendi culpam est gratiae proprius. Quantum autem ad remissionem poenae est virtus; tunc enim homo existens in caritate satisfacit, et ita reddit Deo quod ei debetur, quod scilicet est iustitiae. Est ergo opus illud ex caritate et iustitia procedens."

[39] *Ibid.*, dist. 16, p. 253.

[40] *Ibid.*, dist. 22, p. 382: "Propter hoc videtur potius esse dicendum quod in contritione est principaliter esse poenitentiae secundum quod est sacramentum. Et est ibi quiddam quod est sacramentum tantum, scilicet contritio exterior; quiddam sacramentum et res, scilicet interior contritio; res vero tantum, remissio peccati. Et consistit similitudo in annihilatione. In contritione enim annihilat se homo; in remissione peccati Deus annihilat culpam."

[41] *Ibid.*, dist. 17, p. 274: "Ad illud dicendum quod possit quaeri de forma contritionis et materia, dicendum quod gratia est forma contritionis, dolor autem voluntarius tum sensualis tum spiritualis, materia."

This brings us to a consideration of penance in so far as it is a sacrament of the Church. As a sacramentum-Ecclesiae its virtue consists in the power of the keys, not for the remission of guilt but for the removal of punishment.[48] The Church being injured through the deprivation of the spiritual fruit of a member through sin, has a right also to satisfaction.[49] As penance is then satisfactivum Ecclesiae, its virtue consists in that penance received from a priest, and imposed through the power of the keys in confession. Not alone must one be reconciled to the King but also to His Spouse, and to share in the suffrages of the Church, just as reconciliation to the magistrate has to take place as well as to the king, so too through the sacramentum-Ecclesiae is reconciliation made to the Church.[50] That Alexander speaks here of the sacrament of penance as such, that is the sacrament as dispensed by the Church, becomes apparent when he states with references to its institution, "God remits sin wiping away guilt, and changing eternal punishment into temporal. The priest relaxes from the temporal, and thus is *John* 20, 23 'Whose sins you shall forgive' understood."[51] Wherefore, on one of the seldom times he mentions absolution in his *Glossa* he places its effect in the commutation of the purgatorial punishment into temporal.[52] In line with this same concept, he defines confession as "the sacramental accusation of the delinquent, satisfactory from the shame involved, and from the power of the keys, and obliging to the performance of a penance."[53]

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[42] *Ibid.*, dist. 15, p. 228: "Est iterum reatus poenae aeternae, secundum quod definitur peccatum 'meritum poenae aeternae;' et hunc iterum solus Deus excidit."

[43] *Ibid.*, dist. 18, p. 322: "In hoc enim quod Dominus solvit a vinculo aeternae damnationis, obligat eum ad vinculum expiationis per poenam purgatoriam; in hoc autem quod sacerdos solvit, obligat ipsum ad vinculum expiationis per poenam sibi iniunctam . . . Per iam dicta patet quod dimissio reatus poenae aeternae est a Deo; sed propter vinculum expiationis ad quod tenetur, sive confessionis, a quo absolvitur suscepta poenitentia ex vi clavium a sacerdote, dicitur dimitti a Domino per ministrum."

[44] Cf. dist. 16, p. 253, and *ibid*, dist. 17, p. 282: "Per hoc enim quod ligatur poenitens in confessione ad poenam temporalem commutatur poena purgatoria, per quam fit demissio poenae aeternae, et ita per consequens dimissio peccati quoad reatum illius poenae" as also, *ibid.* dist. 17, p. 289: "Respondemus: haec omnia sunt referenda ad hoc, ut homo sit paratus ad iudicium Ecclesiae, ad sustinendam poenam iniunctam, ad hoc ut per iniunctam poenam commutetur aeterna et simpliciter dimittatur per ipsam peractam . . ."

[45] *Ibid.*, dist. 17, p. 297.

[46] *Ibid.*, dist. 18, p. 322: "Cum Dominus dimittit culpam in contritione, solvit a vinculo captivitatis et servitutis absolute; sed a vinculo damnationis aeternae conditionaliter, ut scilicet digne confiteatur si facultatem habet..."

[47] *Ibid.*: "Per iam dicta patet quod remissio reatus poenae aeternae est a Deo; sed propter vinculum expiationis ad quod tenetur, sive confessionis, a quo absolvitur suscepta poenitentia ex vi clavium a sacerdote, dicitur dimitti a Domino per ministrum. Et haec est causa quare quidam dixerunt Dominus per sacerdotes dimittit reatum poenae aeternae, non quin reatus poenae aeternae esset simpliciter a Domino dimissus." Cf. also dist. 17, p. 297.

[48] *Ibid.*, dist. 22, p. 384: "Sed sacramentum illud prout est Ecclesiae, cuius virtus consistit in virtute clavium, necessarium est non ad demissionem culpae, sed ut non imputetur ad poenam."

On two occasions Alexander applies Lombard's definition of a sacrament — 'invisibilis gratiae visibilis forma ut ejus imaginem gerit et causa existit' -- to penance regarded as a sacramentum-Ecclesiae. On the first occasion he enquires with respect to confession, 'Of what does it bear the image, and of what grace is it the cause?'[54] To this he answers that as a sacrament of the New Law confession effects what it signifies[55], by reason of the shame attached, and by reason of the power of the keys, as we have just seen in the preceding paragraph, relaxes something of the punishment due to sin.[56] The *obligation* to the penance enjoined signifies the conversion of the original purgatorial punishment, residual from the remission of the eternal, into something lesser;[56a] this remission of the purgatorial punishment itself signifies the remission of the original guilt, since such a commutation could not take place without the original guilt being remitted.[57] Hence, confession signifies, by this remission, the remission of the guilt itself of sin. And since in the remission of guilt in contrition, the penitent is obliged to confession, the relaxation of punishment from the power of the keys can be said to be the image and cause in a sense, in deference in this instance to the definition of a sacrement given by Lombard, of the original infusion of grace. Thus also does the penitent by acquiescing that the Church has the power of relaxing from punishment[58] become reconciled to the Church with respect to the guilt of sin through the keys of the Church.[59]

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[49] Cf. *Quaestio de confessione, Bibl. Comm. Assisiensis* 138, f. 129a: ". . . poenitentia est sacramentum secundum quod reconciliatur paranympho in sua sponsa; per peccatum ei subtrahitur membrum Ecclesiae, et quoad fructum cum membris suis subtrahitur similiter; unde iniuriatur; et ita peccat contra Corpus Ecclesiae; unde rediens debet confiteri ad poenam dimittendam . . ." Cf. also *Qu. de poenitentia, Bodl.* 859, f. 352 v, and *London, Brit. Roy. Mus.* 9 E 14, f. 99c: "item, aufertur proximo quod sibi debetur, scilicet bonum commembri, quia bonum meum est bonum proximi."

[50] *Ibid.*, dist. 17, p. 299: "Sicut enim contritionem oportet esse de omnibus in facie Dei ut dimittatur culpa, sic oportet confessionem de omnibus, ut simul dimittatur culpa quoad Ecclesiam. Est enim Ecclesia sponsa Christi, cui oportet satisfacere. Sicut enim non placet regi si tribuatur ei aliqua emenda et reginae non tribuatur emenda, sic accidit de rege celesti et sponsa ejus." And *ibid.*, dist. 18, p. 329: "Per huiusmodi autem solutionem generalem recipitur in gremium Ecclesiae, ad participium suffragiorum; et est simile de comprehenso in crimine absoluto a rege, non a praetore."

[51] *Glossa*, dist. 20, p. 359: "Deus enim remittit peccatum delendo culpam, et commutat poenam aeternam in temporalem. Sacerdos vero de temporali relaxat; et sic intelligitur illud *Ioan.* 20, 23, 'Quorum remiseritis peccata'."

[52] *Ibid.*, dist. 18, p. 329: "absolutio generaliter nihil aliud est quam solutio ab obligatione in foro poenitentiae. Effectus tamen quidam spiritualis est absolutionis in eo qui aeger est: commutatio poenae purgatoriae in temporalem." And *ibid.*, dist., 19, p. 339: "Est enim clavis habens potestatem substantialem, quae consistit in commutatione purgatoriae poenae in temporalem et in iniunctione poenitentiae cum quadam relaxatione."

[53] *Ibid.*, dist. 17, p. 308: "Confessio est sacramentalis delinquentis accusatio, ex erubescentia et per claves satisfactoria, obligans ad peragendam poenitentiam."

On the second occasion when Alexander applies the Lombardian definition he enquires into the possibility of its application to the exterior penance alone.[60] In response he states that in perfect penance, the sacramentum-Ecclesiae, which requires contrition antecedently remitting sin, and acquiescence to the obligation of exterior penance, ultimately remitting the temporal punishment, since there is but one causality or thing caused, viz. the total remission of sin both as to guilt and punishment, there is but one sacrament present;[61] contrition, confession and satisfaction, all somehow involved in the sacramentum-Ecclesiae, exist the sacrament of the total remission of sin; they bear the image of this, and exist its cause since the causality of the total remission lies with the three. Contrition, however, the author hastens to assert, principally retains the essence of the sacrament of penance. In the ultimate analysis the sacramentum-Ecclesiae finds its essence in the *obligatio exterior*, which imposition of exterior penance by a minister of the Church has the power of commuting and relaxing from the purgatorial punishment residual from contrition. In other words the sacramentum-Ecclesiae centers around the remission of punishment.

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[54] *Ibid.*, dist. 17, p. 282—283: "Praeterea, cum sit sacramentum Novae Legis, sacramentum autem est 'quod imaginem gerit et causa existit': quaestio est cujus gerit imaginem vel cuius gratiae est causa."

[55] *Ibid.*, dist. 17, p. 284: "in quantum est sacramentum Novae Legis efficit quod figurat."

[56] *Ibid.*, dist. 17, p. 284: "ostensio prima ore, ratione erubescentiae adiunctae, si fuerit cum gratia, delet quamdam partem poenae; poenitentia vero suscepta ex vi clavium, relaxat aliquid iterum de poena.

[56a] *Ibid.:* "Obligatio ad poenitentiam iniunctam peragendam significat remissionem poenae."

[57] *Ibid.:* "Remissio autem poenae significat remissionem culpae prius factam, et sic per illud medium confessio, ratione ultimae suae partis, significat remissionem culpae."

[58] *Ibid.:* "In confessione enim convenit fidem habere quod Ecclesia catholica habeat potestatem solvendi et relaxandi de poena."

[59] *Ibid.:* "Sicut enim contritionem oportet esse de omnibus in facie Dei ut dimittatur culpa, sic oportet esse confessionem de omnibus ut simul dimittatur culpa quoad Ecclesiam."

[60] *Ibid.:* "Praeterea, si exterior poenitentia consequitur interiorem, et in interiori fit remissio peccati, non videtur exterior esse proprium signum quod sit sacramentum, secundum definitionem sacramenti, quae est, 'quod imaginem gerit et causa existit'."

As we have already seen, both the infusion of grace and the remission of the eternal punishment belong from the point of view of causality to God alone. It remains to investigate the source of the causality of the sacramentum-Ecclesiae, the remission of the purgatorial punishment. This source Alexander divulges when he states:

> coniuncta sunt Passioni a qua omnia sacramenta habent virtutem. Quod enim baptismus (a Passione) habet virtutem . . . Similiter ibidem de poenitentia dicitur: 'In poenitentia vero minoratur: non enim sufficeret illa poena quae poenitentes ligat Ecclesia nisi Christi poena cooperaretur . . .[62]

the exact causality he attributes the sacramentum-Ecclesiae, the relaxation of the purgatorial punishment and its commutation, appears in this text as that shared by the same sacrament from the Passion of Christ: the penance enjoined on the penitent would be inefficacious if the Passion of Christ did not cooperate with it. Alexander corroborates this doctrine when writing of penance explicitly he states:

> appropriatum autem (est) (scilicet sacramentum confessionis) ut sit sacramentum Novae Legis prout confessio duo importat, ostensionem peccati et susceptionem poenae, taxatae secundum iudicium sacerdotis, relaxatae ex vi clavium, quae vim habent ex Passione Christi . . .
>
> Dist. 17, p. 284.

Confession becomes a sacrament of the New Law — it existed already in some manner in the Old Law — in so far as it requires a complete narration of guilt, and in so far as the judgement of the minister applying a specific punishment, the *obligatio exterior* spoken of previously, relaxes through the power of the keys, the extent of the punishment originally due: this relaxation has the source of its causality in the Passion of Christ, vim habent (claves) ex Passione Christi. With this doctrine Alexander remains consistent in his *Quaestio de sacramentis* when he states that it is from the virtue of the Passion of Christ that the keys have power or the efficacy toward relaxing and commuting punishment.[62a]

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[61] *Ibid.*, dist. 22, p. 383: "Unum autem est quod causatum est, scilicet remissio peccati quoad culpam et poenam, quam figurat perfecta poenitentia."

[62] *Ibid.*, dist. 8, p. 137.

As we have already seen, the remission of eternal punishment belongs to God alone: in fact Alexander twice rejects the opinion that the power of the keys remits eternal punishment.[63] This supplies us with the interpretation of the following text, a text which might otherwise seem contrary to what has already been said:

> Est iterum (poenitentia) causa et signum cum dolor ille spiritualis in signum corporale prorumpit, et significat gratiam remissionis poenae aeternae virtute Passionis et virtute clavium.
>
> IV *Glossa*, dist. 4, p. 210.

Alexander speaks here by ellipsis. When he attributes the removal of the eternal punishment to 'the Passion and the power of the keys' he means only that contrition manifested in confession and acquiescing to the obligation of exterior penance becomes the means and cause as well as the sign of the total remission of all punishment; the power of the keys in virtue of the Passion commutes in confession the purgatorial punishment into which the eternal had already been commuted. The *virtus Passionis* operating through the *vis clavium* supplies the means and cause towards this commutation, and signifies ulteriorly in this wise the remission of the eternal punishment itself.

Comparing the discussion of baptism with that of penance we find two common principles run through these tracts: the one, that the remission of guilt and the attendant eternal punishment belongs to God alone. But, it is true that the sacrament possesses causality, wherefore the author styles baptism a *dispositio adaptans*,[64] a disposition to the infusion of habitual grace: that which responds to this causality with respect to the infusion of grace and the remission of eternal punishment is the Trinity. As we shall see shortly when discussing the *Quaestio de poenitentia*, Alexander finds a satisfactory — in the light of his theory — application of this same terminology, *dispositio adeptans*, to the sacrament of penance, and here likewise that which responds to the causality of the entire sacrament is Uncreated Grace. The second principle appearing in the consideration of both penance and baptism asserts that with respect to each of these sacraments, or the causality of each of these sacraments, there remains a temporal punishment to be removed, in baptism, the carentis temporalis visionis Dei, in penance the remission of the purgatorial punishment; toward the removal of each of these through the sacrament there corresponds the *virtus Passionis Christi*. In confession as a sacrament of the Church contrition enters as the means of grace; but the specific causality of the sacrament as that of the Church Alexander places in the *vis clavium* extending itself through its virtue from the Passion of Christ to the commutation of the purgatorial punishment into one compatible with the powers of the penitent. This is properly the grace of the sacrament as a sacrament of the Church. In baptism through the virtue of the same Passion all satisfactory punishment, whether it be the temporal loss of entrance to beatitude or the temporal punishment due to actual sin, finds its total remission.

[62a] "Primo autem modo est ordo in remedium, quoniam nullus plene satisfacit nisi ex virtute Passionis Christi, a qua claves habent virtutem, et possibilitatem relaxandi et convertendi poenam." Cf. ed. in *Franciscan Studies*, 11 (1951) p. 89.

[63] Cf. *supra* n. 47, and also dist. 17, p. 297, where he speaks of 'illa opinione quod reatus poenae aeternae solvitur in confessione ex vi clavium,' as also d. 15, p. 228: "Est iterum reatus poenae aeternae, et hunc iterum solus Deus excidit."

[64] *Ibid.*, dist. 3, p. 53: "Abluit cor sicut dispositio adaptans . . ."

The *Quaestio de poenitentia*[65]

The doctrine of the *Quaestio de poenitentia* of Alexander in its mode of expression leans towards entering the efficacy of the sacrament of penance more in absolution than does that of his *Glossa*; this appears from the following quotation:

> I say therefore that the reception of the penance enjoined by the power of the keys, with the commitment of doing penance, and with absolution in one contrite, this in its entirety is the sign and cause of the remission of sin, both as to punishment and guilt. And it is to be noted that the cause in the sacraments is not efficient, but an adapting cause, since the efficient cause is God Himself.[66]

The remission of sin both as to guilt and punishment is the effect spoken of; to the accomplishment of this effect there concur: the acceptance

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[65] With reference to this *Quaestio* cf. *supra* n. 2.

[66] "Dico ergo quod susceptio poenitentiae iniunctae ex virtute clavium cum proposito poenitendi, et cum absolutione in contrito, hoc totum est signum et causa dimissionis peccati quoad culpam et poenam. Et nota quod causa in sacramentis non est efficiens, sed causa adaptens, quia causa efficiens est ipsa Deus."

Oxford Bodleian 859, f. 354a
London British Roy. Museum 9 E 14, f. 100c.



oined with its commitment, absolution, and contri-
oncur as a *causa adaptans* — the term used in the
to baptism — to the complete removal of sin both
ishment by God. Alexander does not, however, wan-
osition he held in the *Glossa;* this becomes apparent
the same *Quaestio* that the reception of the penance
ith the same concomitants exists the sign and cause
sin, but more closely the remission of the punishment
ised, and through this remission the remission of the
on of the punishment or penance in contrition shows
s already contrite, and thus manifests the possibility
quoad culpam et poenam,' The justifying elements
contrition, as the author shows when he compares
approaching penance to one approaching baptism
sed, or fictitiously; in the latter case the character
, but the remission of sin with respect to guilt and
secured.[68] So, too, is the sacrament of penance in-
contrition: in each case contrition becomes requisite
sion. From the point of view of these pages there
fect specifically for the sacrament of the Church to
nission of punishment: this we shall consider shortly.
t of the history of the sacrament, the present question
derable progress in incorporating all the elements
acrament as the *causa adaptans* to the remission of
ishment; the causality of the absolution in this re-
ect prominance than it did in the *Glossa:* this becomes
apparent when the author states: "the aforesaid acceptance (of penance)
is a sign of the remission of guilt and punishment, and the cause of the

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[67] "Dico ergo quod devota susceptio poenitentiae iniunctae in confessione virtute clavium, cum proposito poenitendi, et cum absolutione, cum debita dispositione ex parte susceptibilis, quae est contritio, signum est et causa dimissionis peccati quoad culpam et poenam, sed propinquius significatur et causatur remissio poenae, et per hoc significatur remissio culpae."

Oxford, Bodl. 859, f. 353 v
London Brit. Roy. Museum 9 E 14, f. 100b.

[68] "Quia in hoc quod suscipit poenitens illam poenitentiam praetendit se esse contritum; ad hoc autem quod hoc signum sit causa, coexigitur contritio ex parte poenitentis, quia sicut baptismus non semper efficit quod figurat, scilicet remissionem originalis culpae et poenae, sicut quando baptizandus adultus ficte accedit, scilicet sine contritione, imprimitur character, sed ultimus effectus ejus non sequitur; similiter in poenitentia ex parte poenitentis coexigitur contritio quoad hoc quod praedicta susceptio sit causa dimissionis peccati quoad culpam et poenam."

Ibid.

remission of temporal punishment: the power of the keys something of the punishment,"[68a] as when he states:

> These three are one sacrament in sanctifying both with res punishment and guilt, since one invisible grace is given in these thr

As we shall see presently, Alexander in this question pla sacramental grace of penance in the remission of punishmen necessary here then to distinguish this grace from the 'particula tia' which he likewise speaks of in the present question, when he

> Gratia ergo universalis quae fuit in Christo est ratione cuiu virtutem habet remittendi peccatum quoad culpam; sed licet ista s esset quantum est de se, tamen coexigitur particularis gratia ad d illam, quae infunditur isti, scilicet poenitenti. Eodem modo poenite versalis quae fuit in Christo deletiva fuit omnium poenarum poeni non tamen delet nisi adiuncta poena ex parte poenitentis. Et haec p in contritione, confessione, et satisfactione.
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> *London, British Royal Museum*, 9 E 14, f. 10
> *Oxford, Bodleian*, 859, f. 353v.

The universal grace of Christ is that which working through as a particular grace remits guilt, just as the specific pain of Chr ing through the same keys remits the punishment; the minis on the person of Christ in the dispensation of the sacrament universal grace, at least the Oxford codex entitles the Uncreat residing in Christ.[68d] In the justification of the penitent from versal grace of Christ there results in this penitent a particul race the virtue of penance; this virtue as a disposition takes on th of contrition justifying the penitent. Wherefore, in justificat concurs a particular grace emanating from the universal grace of Christ, taking the form of contrition, removing both guilt and eternal punishment, and thus supplying the necessary proximate dispositions to the ultimate removal of guilt and punishment through the intervention of eys;[68e] the original justification entered in view of subjection to ame keys. This *gratia particularis* to be identified with the contri- present to the virtue of penance cannot be identified with the *sacramentalis* of the sacrament of penance, since it, at least ideally, des the sacrament, to the efficacy of which it serves as a disposition.

[68a] "Susceptio enim praedicta signum est dimissionis culpae et poenae aeternae, et causae dimissionis poenae temporalis. Virtus enim clavium aliquid de poena relaxat."
Oxford Bodl. 859, f. 354a.
London British Museum 9 E 14, f. 100v.

[68b] *Ibid. Oxford*, f. 354a, *London* f. 100v.

[68c] "Respondeo: Claves sunt aliter in dispensatore, et aliter in Christo; in Christo enim ad delendum culpam et poenam, ita quod per gratiam increatam quae fuit in eo deleatur culpa, et per poenam poena. Unde, cum dicitur 'quorum remiseritis' etc., illa remissio non dicit quod remitteretur eis culpa et poena a ministris, immo a Christo."
London British Roy. Museum 9 E 14, f. 100c.

[68d] Cf. preceding note as an example: 'ita quod per gratiam increatam,' 'increatam' *add. Oxford*.

he conclusion with respect to the nature of the sacramental grace nance as a sacrament of the Church arrived at in the *Glossa* finds t corroboration in the present *Quaestio de poenitentia*. Here using term 'gratia sacramentalis,' the author enquires into what precisely grace connotes; we reproduce here the entire text because of its ortance:

> Postea, quaeritur utrum poenitentia quae est virtus sit eadem cum ia sacramentali quae est res hujus sacramenti quod est poenitentia. nitentia enim est unum septem sacramentorum et habet suam, scilicet iam sacramentalem sicut baptismus . . .
>
> Videtur autem quod sit eadem, quia poenitentia virtus sic definitur ab gustino: Poenitentia est qua commissa mala cum emendationis proposito igimus, et plangenda ulterius non committimus; et Beatus Gregorius liffinit: Poenitere est anteacta flere, et flenda non committere; sed gratia amentalis est qua commissa mala cum emendationis proposito plangimus, ; ergo, una et eadem est utriusque definitio. Ergo, videtur quod sint m secundum rem.
>
> Item, in poenitentia quae est virtus fit remissio peccatorum, vel iustifi- io, et per poenitentiam secundum quod est res sacramenti fit etiam tificatio; ergo, idem effectus utriusque; ergo, ut videtur, sunt idem in stantia.
>
> Contra: nihil se ipsum efficit; sed poenitentia quae est virtus efficit tificationem; sed in iustificatione datur gratia sacramentalis; ergo, poenitentia quae est virtus est causa gratiae sacramentalis; ergo, non sunt idem in substantia.
>
> Item, ad idem: gratia sacramentalis datur ministerio Ecclesiae, id est eius qui habet claves scientiae et auctoritatis; sed non oportet quod simul cum hac detur poenitentia quae est virtus, immo potius datur in contritione; alia autem, gratia sacramentalis, in confessione. Relinquitur ergo quod non sunt idem.
>
> Respondeo: Gratia sacramentalis dupliciter accipitur, vel quae significatur in sacramento vel quae datur in sacramento. Dico ergo quod gratia sacramentalis illa quae significatur per sacramentum est eadem in essentia

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[68e] Cf. passage quoted above in the body of the text, as also: "oportet ergo quod cum ipsa Passione Christi et gratia universali Christi habeamus particularem gratiam, quae est poenitentiae virtutis, et particularem poenam quae est in contritione, confessione et satisfactione." *Bodleian* f. 353v, and *British Museum*, f. 100c., and "in poenitentia non totum aliunde dependet, unde coexigitur aliqua dispositio ex parte poenitentis, scilicet contritio" *Bodleian* 859, f. 353v. and *London British Museum* 9 E 14, f. 100v.

cum poenitentia quae est virtus, diversa autem ratione, quia gratia sacramentalis dicitur in quantum significat remissionem peccati quoad culpam et poenam, illa autem eadem dicitur virtus in quantum movet liberum arbitrium ad dolendum de culpa, et ad satisfaciendum de poena, gratia autem in quantum remittit culpam. Sed gratia creata ex vi sacramenti poenitentiae non est necessario cum poenitentia virtute, quia haec gratia est remissio peccati quoad aliquotam partem de virtute clavium. Virtus enim clavium habet ex Passione Christi virtutem qua dimittitur aliquota pars poenae; unde virtus clavium habet potentiam ad deletionem totius poenae ex passione Christi, qui pro omnibus satisfecit. Relinquitur tamen aliquid ex parte poenitentis, sicut postea dicetur. Haec autem gratia datur in susceptione poenitentiae iniunctae a discreto sacerdote; poenitentia autem virtus datur in contritione, sicut dictum est. Patet ergo quod non est eadem poenitentia virtus cum gratia sacramentali quae causatur ex hoc sacramento quod est poenitentia.

Oxford Bodleian 859, f. 353r
London, British Royal Museum 9 E 14, f. 100a

Penance as one of the seven sacraments must have its specific res or sacramental grace. Against the arguments that that grace consists solely in the virtue of penance, the combined arguments appear that sacramental grace being given in justification, and justification itself flowing from the virtue of penance, the virtue and the sacramental grace cannot be identical, any more than a cause and its effect can be identical. Furthermore, the virtue of penance exists outside the ministry of the Church, or the sacrament of the Church, being acquired in contrition; but sacramental grace comes only through the ministry of the Church; hence, the virtue and sacramental grace again are not identical.

In his personal response Alexander distinguishes a twofold sense of sacramental grace. The one denotes sacramental grace in so far as it signifies the complete removal of guilt and punishment; from this point of view it constitutes, first, the virtue of penance in so far as that virtue embraces contrition for guilt and satisfaction for punishment, and secondly, grace, in so far as grace present to the virtue of contrition exists the cause of the removal of guilt.

That sacramental grace, however, proper to the sacrament as residing in the power of the keys, consists in the removal of a proportionate part of the punishment residual from original justification. In distinction to the virtue of penance given in contrition, this is the grace given in the reception of penance from a minister of the Church. The source of the causality of this grace resides in the Passion of Christ: virtus enim clavium habet ex passione Christi virtutem qua dimittitur aliquota pars poenae. The sacramental grace caused by the sacrament of penance, the remission of punishment, differs then from the removal of guilt and the will to penance given in contrition.

The present question has its salient importance in disintegrating the essential element of sacramental grace from the heterogenous elements present to the complete concept of penance at the time. It has its salient importance likewise in the application of the nomenclature 'gratia sacramentalis' to designate this essential element. From a comparative point of view with the *Glossa*, we see that the *Glossa* and the present *Question* agree exactly in their conclusion; for each the efficacy of the sacrament as a sacrament of the Church consists in the remission or commutation of punishment through the power of the keys having virtue from the Passion of Christ. In distinction to the *Glossa*, this remission the *Quaestio* explicitly styles the *gratia sacramentalis* of penance.

We may add here that the text of the *Quaestio de poenitentia* reappears in the anonymous commentary of *Vat. lat.* 782, f. 162r:[69]

> Contra: nihil se ipsum efficit; sed virtus efficit iustificationem, et sacramentalis gratia est ipsa iustificatio. Ergo, gratia sacramentalis non est eadem cum virtute.
>
> Praetereae, gratia sacramentalis datur ministerio Ecclesiae, sed virtus non . . .
>
> Respondeo: Gratia sacramentalis dupliciter potest intelligi, scilicet una quam significat poenitentia, et hoc est eadem in substantia cum virtute poenitentiae; tamen differt ratione, quia illa est deletiva culpae, unde respicit proprie essentiam animae; sed ista est motiva ad bonum, unde respicit potentiam animae. Item, est alia gratia sacramentalis quam efficit sacramentum poenitentiae, scilicet demissio alicujus poenae, et ista non est eadem cum virtute, scilicet qua peccata demittantur, quomodo infra habebitur cum tractabitur de clavibus.

As becomes apparent the present text constitutes merely an abbreviation of the *Quaestio* of Alexander of Hales. The doctrine however remains the same: the sacramental grace which the sacrament of penance effects lies in the demission of some punishment, and differs both from the virtue of penance looking toward the remission of punishment through the exercise of the virtue, and the grace of penance looking toward the remission of guilt. The item of *Vat. lat.* 782 has its value in corroborating the doctrine of both the *Glossa* and the *Question* on penance of Alexander.

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[69] With reference to *Vat. lat. 782 cf. Alexandri de Hales Summa Theologica, Prolegomena*, p. CXXXVI; with reference to the present commentary cited cf. p. CXXXVII, 'Ignotorum ex comm. in IV, II et I Sent. excerpta, f. 148d—179d;' here we find the reference to the study of A. Landgraf, in *Zk. Theol.* 52 (1928) 55sq. pertaining to the present unknown commentary.

To adequately study the nature of sacramental grace according to Alexander of Hales it had become necessary to analyse the causality of both baptism and penance. Here the principles controlling his concept of that grace appear more lucidly applied. We shall now consider these principles in themselves as they reveal themselves in texts throughout the *Glossa*, and with the aid more particularly of the *Quaestio de sacramentis in genere.*

II. PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE NATURE OF SACRAMENTAL GRACE

Here we shall study sacramental grace from the point of view of the specific effects of the sacraments: what are the principles running through these different effects considered as effects. Later, by way of conclusion, we shall have the opportunity to consider these effects from the point of view of the ultimate cause of their realization, according to the mind of Alexander, namely, in their relation to gratia gratum faciens.

1. *First Principle: The sacramental grace as such of each sacrament has as the font of its efficacy a particular virtue of the Passion of Christ.*

As we have seen already when discussing baptism, the essence of the Redemption consisted for the author in liberation from punishment. Consistent with this outlook Alexander places the graces of the virtues considered in the third book of Lombard as more remotely associated with beatitude than sacramental grace considered in the fourth book, and specifically because the grace of the virtues could not remove the sword barring man from Paradise as does sacramental grace.[70] In the same connection in the Prologue to his fourth book of the *Glossa* Alexander places an insufficiency for salvation in the precepts and the grace of the virtues, an insufficiency which posits the requirement of the grace of the sacraments, a grace which has respect not to that which flows from God alone to that which comes to us through the instrumentality of the Mediator.[71] Even though, for example, the graces of the virtues come to us through baptism as a medium of its infusion, nevertheless the author distinguishes this grace as such from sacramental grace, since this latter entails a special influence or intervention from the Redemptor and Mediator Christ, the removal namely of punishment. The same association of sacramental grace with something emanating specifically from the Passion of Christ as distinct from the grace of the virtues finds repetition, as we have seen, in the *Quaestio de imagine:* gratia sacramentalis est sanativa vulnerum per Passionem Christi.[72] This concept of a sharing of the Passion through sacramental grace dominated likewise the treatment of the tract on baptism: its principle effect, the removal of the loss of entrance to Paradise, followed from that sacrament as instituted specifically only after the Passion of Christ. As instituted prior to the Passion the sacrament could bestow the grace of the virtues, something obtainable likewise from the efficacy of circumcision, but not its own peculiar effect, the removal of the barrier to beatitude. Likewise with respect to the sacrament of penance, as a sacrament properly speaking of the Church, its efficacy, the removal of purgatorial punishment, arises from the virtue of the Passion working through the power of the keys. Toward this efficacy coming from the Passion the sacrament was precisely instituted, and through it becomes disintegrated from penance as a virtue involving contrition, which latter of itself confers the grace of the virtues. This special efficacy of the keys coming from the Passion, the *Quaestio de poenitentia* segregates and styles properly sacramental grace.

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[70] *Glossa*, Lib. I, dist. 1, p. 7: "Gratia enim praeceptorum et virtutum de quibus agitur in tertio libro remotius se habet ad beatitudinem quam gratia sacramentalis; illa enim in Lege rumphaeum non amovit, haec autem reseravit ianuam paradisi."

[71] *Glossa*, lib. IV, Introitus, p. 2: "In quarto libro, quia nondum est in iis sufficientia ad salutem, agit de sacramentis et de gratiis sacramentorum, quae gratiae sacramentorum non respiciunt solum quod immediate influit a Deo, sed quod per Mediatorem; et de beatitudine et poena opposita."

Such specific attribution of the Passion as responsible for the efficacy of these particular sacramental graces finds generalization toward the specific efficacy of all sacramental grace from the same cause oftentimes in the *Glossa* of Alexander. Discussing the definition of a sacrament, Alexander states that the death and Resurrection of Christ may be entitled sacraments in a sense, because they constitute the efficient cause of the virtue of all the sacraments — *ex virtute mortis et resurrectione habent sacramenta virtutem.*[73] Again, both the Eucharist and baptism signify Redemption through the Passion of Christ; it was befitting then that they enjoyed in the Old Dispensation a multiplicity of prefigurement, since that prefigurement, through the signification itself by these sacraments of the Passion, and through the fact that the prefigurement became succeedingly more manifest in the Old Dispensation, showed the Passion or Redemption itself as more closely approaching. With its actual advent, baptism and the Eucharist signifying the Passion as already come, emptied entirely circumcision and the paschal lamb. The Redemption emptied the ceremonial of the Old Dispensation of any significance, and the sacraments which succeeded found in the Passion the efficacy of their virtue — redemptionem per passionem Christi, in qua est virtus omnis sacramenti.[74]

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[72] Cf. n. 33.

[73] *Glossa,* dist. 1, p. 9: "vel effective dicuntur sacramenta, quia ex virtute mortis et resurrectionis habent sacramenta virtutem."

Elsewhere, discussing the Eucharist, the author speaks of the reason for the real presence of Christ in this sacrament. In response he answers that the Eucharist is the sacrament of charity, its grace being toward greater union with Christ; but this is the end ultimately of all the sacraments, although the means they use may not be the grace of charity as in the Eucharist. The medium in all the sacraments is the suffered-Christ, Christus-passus, since in virtue of His Passion all the sacraments obtain their efficacy — medium in sacramentis est Christus passus, sive Mediator, quia per virtutem Passionis ejus omnia sacramenta virtutem habent. In the virtue of charity the means contains the end, the possession of the highest good through the love of the highest good. Hence, it is appropriate that in this the sacrament of charity, where the means of the efficacy of all appears signified, that the end of the efficacy of all should corresponding to this signification remain likewise contained.[75] Thus as charity is the complement of the virtues, so is the Eucharist the complement of the sacraments. What interest us here is that the sacrament of the Eucharist signifies the means of the efficacy of all the others. Christ-Suffered, or the Passion of Christ.

In the same tenor, he states, the sacraments of the Eucharist and baptism, befigured in the blood and water flowing from the Side of Christ, represent Redemption through the Passion of Christ, from which Passion the virtue of all the sacraments flows.[76] Elsewhere, he states, the forms of the Eucharist and baptism were instituted proximately to the Passion because these sacraments represent the principal virtues, charity and faith; hence, because of their singular virtue and dignity they are more closely joined to the Passion, from which the virtue of all the sacraments takes its efficacy — a qua omnia sacramenta habent virtutem.[77]

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[74] Cf. *ibid.*, dist. 26, p. 450.

[75] *Ibid.* dist. 8, p. 140: "Medium in sacramentis est Christus passus, sive Mediator, quia per virtutem Passionis ejus omnia sacramenta habent virtutem . . . fit autem extremum cum se ipsum confert in sacramento."

[76] Cf. *Glossa*, dist. 3, p. 57, and succeeding note.

[77] *Ibid.*, dist. 8, p. 137: "Respondemus: haec duo sacramenta sunt principalium virtutum significativa: fidei quae est ianua salutis, et caritatis quae est complementum virtutum. Ut ergo notaretur principalis virtus aut dignitas eorum, coniuncta sunt Passioni, a qua omnia sacramenta habent virtutem."

In his question on the sacraments in general Alexander reverts to the same doctrine. Here the author distinguishes various graces:[78] gratia gratum faciens or that of the virtues and the gifts; the gratia gratis data, or the nine charismata mentioned by St. Paul in I *Cor.* 12; besides these, there exists the universal grace of the Suffered-Christ, *universalis autem est Christi passi*, from which grace the sacraments take their specific virtue as particular graces descending from the act of Redemption. These specific graces of the several sacraments he thus distinguishes from gratia gratum faciens in so far as they represent particular sharings of the Passion, or the universal grace of the Passion.

Speaking in this same question of the Eucharist, the author alluding to the sacramental function of blood in the Old Testament, asserts that in the New blood also retains a sacramental function since the blood of Christ here exists as the reason for the virtue of all the sacraments, the virtue of all being in the blood of Christ, a virtue shared singly in each as a particular grace.[79]

These passing references the author *in globo* recapitulates and elucidates in a passage of the *Glossa* where he identifies the particular efficacy shared by each of the sacraments from the Passion. Since this passage has dominant importance toward the elucidation of his entire theory on sacramental grace, we shall consider it *in extenso*.

As we have seen when discussing baptism the specific efficacy of that sacrament resides in removing the barrier to beatitude such that no temporal punishment whatever remains; this complete removal of punishment the author identifies in the present passage as the effect attributable in baptism to the Passion of Christ:[80]

> Respondemus: Haec duo sacramenta sunt principalium virtutum significativa: fidei quae est ianua salutis, et caritatis quae est complementum virtutum. Ut ergo notaretur principalis virtus aut dignitas eorum coniuncta sunt passioni, a qua omnia sacramenta habent virtutem. Quod autem baptismus (a passione) habeat virtutem habetur in tertio libro, dist. XIX, cap. *Peccata quoque*, etc., ubi dicitur de baptismo, 'quod per ipsius poenam quam sustinuit in cruce omnis poena temporalis pro peccato debita in baptismo relaxatur ut nulla exigatur.'
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> IV *Glossa*, dist. 8, p. 137.

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[78] Cf. our edition of this question in *Franciscan Studies*, vol. 11 (March, 1951) p. 74 ff.

[79] Cf. *ibid.* p. 91: "sanguis in Novo Testamento non tantum est sacramentum, sed virtus omnium sacramentorum, scilicet sanguis, quia in singulis sacramentis est particularis gratia, sed in sanguine Christi est tota virtus, et ad hoc significandum fuit ille sanguis *Lev.* 24."

[80] *Glossa*, dist. 8, p. 137—138.

The efficacy shared from the Passion by baptism resides with the complete remission of all punishment.

The efficacy of the sacrament of penance for both the *Commentary* and the *Quaestio de poenitentia* resides in the amelioration of the purgatorial punishment into an obligation to a temporal penance applied by the use of the power of the keys. This the author identifies in the present passage we are considering as the influence of the Passion in the sacrament of penance: the mitigation of the punishment due through the application of the pain of Christ to the penitent . . .

> Similiter ibidem de poenitentia dicitur: 'In poenitentia vero minoratur; non enim sufficeret illa qua poenitentes ligat Ecclesia, nisi Christi poena cooperaretur.
> *Ibid.*

With reference to the contribution of the Passion of Christ conveyed by the Eucharist the author states:

> In eucharistia similiter datur virtus, quia quantum est de caritate passionis, maior fit unio per caritatem membrorum corporis mystici ad Caput.
> *Ibid.*

Through the grace of the Eucharist shared from the Passion the union of the members of the Mystical Body to the Head by charity becomes increased. Repeatedly in his *Glossa* Alexander identifies the proper effect to the Eucharist as *uniri* or *magis uniri*.[81] From the text of the *Glossa* it appears that this greater unifying of the members to the Head must be understood in the sense of the removal of the impediments to this union and its growth accruing from the daily obstacles to the fervor of charity. Through original sin man suffered a wound in his rational, concupiscible, and irascible nature,[82] which presents a deterrant to remaining or standing in charity,[83] and in this wise imperils the union itself with the Head, and impedes its progress. As an antidote against this diurnal infirmity the Eucharist supplies a daily bread for the sustentation and conservation of grace;[84] thus the wound prevalent to the three powers does not impede or imperil the union of charity.[85] The sacrament itself for Alexander represented also the Mystical Body; though its proper representation is the real body of Christ. In so far as it embodies the elements of sacrifice in the separated species it designates the motive of the charity uniting the members of the Mystical Body to the Head,[86] the act of Redemption, and at the same time by signifying the Mystical Body it represents the origin of the form of that Body in the New Dispensation, the Church coming from the death of Christ. Thus does the Eucharist achieve through quelling the wounds of sin a greater union of charity between the Head and the members, and at the same time does it exist as a sacrament in the New Dispensation of the greater union of the Head to the members proper to the Mystical Body in that Dispensation from the charity of the Passion giving rise to the Church: quantum est de caritate Passionis maior fit unio per caritatem membrorum corporis mystici ad caput.

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[81] *Ibid.*, dist. 8, p. 132: "Tertia (utilitas) est ut uniat membra corporis (mystici) Christo Capiti per caritatem." and *ibid.* dist. 3, p. 48: "habilitat nos eucharistia ad unionem Ecclesiae, vel corpori Christi mystico, vel ut iam uniti magis uniamur."

[82] Cf. *Glossa*, Introitus, pp. 6—7.

[83] Cf. *Glossa, Introitus* p. 7: "Ratione difficultatis standi contra tentationes datur sacramentum eucharistiae."

[84] *Ibid.*, d. 23, p. 389: "est cibus cotidianus ad sustentationem et conservationem gratiae." Cf. also dist. 13, p. 199: "Contra: Contrarium videtur . . . ergo non est peccatum, sed bonum, videre corpus Christi, quod est medicina quotidianae infirmitatis."

The contribution of the Passion to confirmation the author presents as a more ample confirmation in the Church with the brethren for suffering for them:

> Passio enim sua pro fratibus dat nobis confirmationem ampliorem in Ecclesia cum fratribus ad patiendum pro eis.
>
> *Ibid.*

In noting the different wounds inflicted by original sin Alexander ascribes a special wound to the irascible power which impedes its ability toward progress in good.[87] Against this wound he assigns the sacrament of confirmation that the recipient may become a firm combatant in the combat of the Lord.[88] In this same sense he styles the recipient of confirmation a soldier of Christ,[89] armed for struggle for the faith by a corroboration or strengthening of sanctifying or habitual grace such that he may suffer persecution without defection.[90] Combat for the faith of the Church and not so much combat for the personal preservation of faith or personal virtue is that which Alexander identifies as the efficacy due to confirmation. In line with the passage quoted above, confirmation gives us this deepening, or confirming, or strengthening within the Church to combat for the members of the Mystical Body or to become the soldiers of that Body. The removing of the wound of original sin existing an impediment to such an office derives from the Passion, and represents the extension of redemption from original punishment from this aspect.

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[85] The *Quaestio de sacramentis* identifies the wound to be removed by the Eucharist as a perennial weakness, *debilitas*, to which the special diet of the Eucharist serves as a daily antidote. Cf. *ed. cit.* p. 88.

[86] *Glossa*, d. 26, p. 462: ". . . In quantum ergo amatur Christus caput ratione redemptionis per Passionem a membris, designatur caritas in sacramento altaris; nec est ibi caritas in quantum huiusmodi signifcata, sed corpus mysticum, cuius vinculum est per hanc caritatem."

[87] *Ibid.* p. 6: ". . . in irascibili difficultas proficiendi in bono."

[88] *Ibid.* p. 7: "ratione difficultatis proficiendi in bono datur confirmatio in adiutorium ut sit signatus firmus athleta in certamine Domini."

[89] *Ibid.*, dist. 7, p. 131: "quod miles sit in certamine Domini."

[90] *Ibid.*, dist. 3, p. 389: "Confirmatio vero quia est sicut characteris baptismalis corroboratio, confertur in ea gratia gratum faciens, vel gratia baptismalis augetur sive corroboratur. Non enim sufficit certanti in agone gratia gratis data." Cf. also, d. 7, p. 129: "duplex est robur gratiae: unum ad tolerantiam mali . . . datur in confirmatione."

In the Old Dispensation both the unity and the indissolubility of matrimony had been lost through the extension of liceity at one time to a plurality of wives and the permission of a bill of divorce. In *Matt.* 19, 6 Our Divine Lord reconstitutes matrimony as to its indissolubility including unity,[91] and thus that which the Scholastics styled a *bonum sacramenti* became restored to marriage; the *bonum sacramenti* consists in the inseparability[92] of the marriage bond with its essential unity.[93] By its property[94] of inseparability in the New Law the contract of marriage takes on the nature of a sacrament becoming a sign of the inseparable unity or union of the one Christ with the one Church. Since it exists a sacrament Alexander against the current of his time extended it some efficacy with respect to gratia gratum faciens, a grace namely consisting in a spiritual union of charity.[95] The hypostatic union of itself, however, represented the union of the Head with the members inseparably, a union which currently among the authors in the milieu of Alexander found replication in the inseparability present to marriage from the pages of *Genesis*. When we compare then the grace of charity as expressed in both the Eucharist and marriage this grace as signified by these two becomes distinguished according as they bear reference either to the charity manifested in the hypostatic union or the charity manifested in the Passion. The Eucharist in its signification bears reference to the charity uniting the Head to the members in the Passion; marriage to the charity uniting the Head to the members in the hypostatic union — significatur hic gratia caritatis, . . . secundum quod uniuntur membra capiti secundum quod caput est Deus et homo (Dist. 26, p. 462). Although marriage signifies the union of Christ to the Church through inseparability, it does not express the motive in the charity of that union, Redemption through the Passion, as does the sacrament of the Eucharist. But, the consent of Christ uniting Himself to the Church by the Passion, a consent in inseparability, solidifies the perpetual inseparability present to the signification of marriage. Hence, Alexander states:

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[91] *Ibid.*, dist. 26, p. 457: "In *Matthaei* vero 19, 6; institutum fuit quoad bonum sacramenti, cum dictum est: 'Quod Deus coniunxit' etc. Cum enim aliquando licitum esset in Vetri populo plures habere ad prolis multiplicationem in populo Dei, dum parvus erat numero; ex tunc factum est illicitum omnino."

[92] "Inseparabilitas quae est bonum sacramenti" dist. 28, p. 480, "inseparabilitas dicitur bonum sacramenti" dist. 31, p. 489.

[93] "Contra sacramentum est contrahere cum pluribus" dist. 34, p. 543.

[94] *Ibid.*, dist. 31, p. 489: "Dicitur ergo bonum matrimonii 'sacramentum,' quod est ipsa proprietas secundum quod matrimonium dicitur sacramentum. Haec autem est inseparabilitas coniugalis, et est signum coniunctionis Christi et Ecclesiae. In matrimonio est vinculum ad huiusmodi inseparabilitatem, et ideo inseparabilitas dicitur bonum matrimonii."

[95] *Ibid.*, dist. 26, p. 460: ". . . potest in digne consentientibus et existentibus in caritate conferri augmentum gratiae . . ." With reference to the efficacy of marriage with respect to grace, cf. D. Van den Eynde, O. F. M., *Les Définitions des Sacrements pendant la première période de la théologie scholastique* (1050—1240), Rome-Louvain, 1950, pp. 109—110, and our article "The Theory of Alexander of Hales on the Efficacy of the Sacrament of Matrimony," in *Franciscan Studies*, 11 (Sept.-Dez. 1951: *St. Bonaventure University Commemorative Volume*) 69—139; in this latter study special attention is paid to the *Quaestiones* of Alexander on this topic, which show these *Quaestiones* of the author as fully corroborative of the opinion stated in the *Glossa*, which opinion indeed the *Quaestiones* develop far more explicitly.

> Similiter eius unio per caritatem ad Ecclesiam dat in matrimonio effectum unionis ampliorem sponsi ad sponsam per consensum in iis qui digne sunt iuncti matrimonio. *Ibid.* (Dist. 8, p. 137)

In this manner also redemption from the effect of original sin becomes acquired by the recipients of the sacrament.[96] The wound of concupiscence in the Old Law militated against and broke the original inseparability of marriage; in the New Law marriage both its restored significance and accompanying spiritual efficacy counteracts this wound of sin.

As we have seen when discussing the sacrament of penance, Alexander places the dispensing of the sacramental grace of that sacrament, which consists in the discrete commutation of the purgatorial punishment into one compatible with the ability of the penitent here below, with the administration of penance as a sacrament of the Church by its ministers.[97] This for Alexander essentially constituted the power of the keys, and in its exercise it rests on authority deriving from Christ through the Church. The obedience of Christ to the command of His Father in undergoing the passion obtained for Him this authority and power to alleviate punishment, which He in turn confers upon the ministers of the Church. These latter authoritatively and discreetly discern guilt in their subjects, and exercise the power of binding and loosing. The possession of such power represents for Alexander in the passage under discussion the contribution of the Passion of Christ to the sacrament of orders:

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[96] Cf. *Glossa*, Introitus p. 6, "in concupiscibili difficultas resistendi, nam illa potentia corrupta est et infecta . . .," and "ratione difficultatis resistendi concupiscentiis carnis datur matrimonium. Matrimonium enim datur 'in remedium contra carnalis concupiscentiae corruptelam'." — *ibid.* p. 7.

[97] *Glossa*, dist. 17, p. 284: "appropriatum autem est ut sit sacramentum Novae Legis prout confessio duo importat: ostensionem peccati et susceptionem poenae, taxatae secundum iudicium sacerdotis, relaxatae ex vi clavium, quae vim habent ex passione Christi." Cf. also: ". . . Ecclesia catholica

> Quia vero perfecta obedientia et discreta fuit in eo respectu Patris in passione, collata est ei auctoritas et potestas, quam contulit praelatis ratione discretae obedientiae quoad auctoritatem discernendi *inter lepram et lepram* respectu subditorum et potestatem ligandi et solvendi.
>
> *Ibid. loc. cit.*

For the exercise of this power, as likewise for the exercise of the power of consecrating, as we shall have occasion to see, Alexander concedes to Orders a spiritual augment of sanctifying grace.

Viewed in the *raison d'être* of its existence, the sacramental grace conceeded in Orders from the Passion, finds its motive in the wound of the rational power by original sin. The authority and power, specifically connected with the discernment of the punishment of guilt in the use of the power of the keys, counteracts, or supplies for, the injury in the wounding of the rational power to discern, and toward the regulment of that which pertains to penance in the Church constitutes a sharing of the Redemption through the Passion from this point of view.[98]

Extreme unction essentially consists in an anointing; this anointing unlike that of confirmation bears significance toward a assuaging or mitigating of spiritual infirmity:[99] it is this which as the essential effect of the sacrament it both signifies and causes[100] — a removal namely of spiritual infirmity or infirmity of the mind,[101] as the author likewise

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habeat potestatem solvendi et relaxandi de poena. Hanc autem potestatem habet ratione capitis sui, quod influit principalioribus membris Ecclesiae hanc potestatem." *Ibid.* d. 17, p. 285—286.

[98] "In rationali est difficultas discernendi . . ." Introitus, p. 6, and "ratione difficultatis discernendi datur ordo" *ibid.* p. 7.

[99] *Glossa,* dist. 23, p. 387: ". . . sed proprie esse sacramenti tenet unctio in debita materia. Habet autem similitudinem cum unctione spirituali quae fit per gratiam. Est autem in oleo non tantum proprietas ungendi, sed etiam leniendi; secundum quam similitudinem signat et disponendo causat mitigationem infirmitatis spiritualis, quae fit per gratiam, et procedit infirmitas illa a peccato; et per posterius, mitigationem infirmitatis corporalis."

[100] Cf. preceding note, "signat et disponendo causat mitigationem infirmitatis spiritualis."

[101] *Glossa,* dist. 26, p. 454: ". . . unus est essentialis effectus quem designat oleum, ratione qua lenit, mitigando infirmitatem mentis, aut etiam corporis aliquando si expedit."

entitles it. When he then likewise indicates the principal effect of the sacrament as the removal of venial sins,[102] this must be understood in the light of the preceding as a removal not merely, or not so much, of venial sins, but of the infirmity or weakness which the diverse habits of venial sin visited upon the soul.[103] In its cause this entire infirmity may again be considered as the surging of the infirmity itself of the pain of concupiscence resulting from original sin, and burdening the soul *in extremis*. Wherefore, the sacrament exists more fully for the sustaining and conservation of grace *in extremis* by the removal of that which remains after the manner of a contrary even after the removal itself of mortal sin, should this have been present.[104]

Besides this effect which the sacrament signifies *leniendo*, there is the other which it ulteriorly signifies *ungendo*, and this with reference to the body. For just as leniendo it can signify the assuaging of bodily infirmity with the possible recovery of bodily health, so *ungendo* it signifies complete redemption from bodily infirmity, the sublimation of the body toward entrance to beatitude, or in a terminology popular with the author, the acquirement of full grace, or full redemption.[105]

These effects of extreme unction indicated in the scattered texts of the *Glossa* Alexander succinctly recovers and attributes to the effect of the Passion present to this sacrament when in the original passage under discussion he writes:

> Contulit etiam unctioni virtutem, nam passio fuit contra poenam concupiscentiae, ex qua accidunt venialia, et ut tolleretur infirmitas corporis; est etiam effectiva incorruptionis ex parte corporis.
>
> *Loc. cit.* (Dist. 8, p. 138)

The Passion of Christ opposed the pain of concupiscence, the font of venial sin, and bestowed a source of escape from the infirmity of the flesh, as well as the ultimate incorruption of immortality. Alexander in this as in so many other instance due to the elliptical style of his writing weaves many meanings into his texts, as for instance here when he remarks 'ut tolleretur infirmitas corporis;' the text presently cited, however, represents as coming from the Passion those effects which he intermittently associates with the efficacy of extreme unction.

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[102] IV *Glossa*, Introitus, p. 7, "ratione vero venialis peccati datur extrema unctio," and "unus est principalis (effectus), scilicet, dimissio peccati, principaliter venialis." *Glossa*, dist. 18, p. 387.

[103] "Per poenam peccati contrahitur infirmitas spiritualis" dist. 18, p. 387, and "procedit infirmitas illa a peccato" dist. 23, p. 387, as also, "fit in partibus diversis, . . . hoc est quia diversa infirmitas contrahitur per diversa peccata." Cf. d. 23, p. 387.

[104] *Glossa*, dist. 23, p. 389: "Sicut enim Eucharistia est cibus quotidianus ad sustentationem et conservationem gratiae, et est efficax ad venialium dimissionem, ita et hoc sacramentum in extremis, vel cum homo gravi infirmitate tenetur."

[105] Cf. *Glossa*, dist. 26, p. 448: "Unctio vero extrema significat plenam gratiam quae habetur in receptione utriusque stolae . . . Per redemptionem facta est apertio ianuae, in qua habebatur visio Dei, et plena gloria in corporis resumptione."

The preceding careful association of the specific contribution of the Passion to the constitution of the essential sacramental grace of each of the sacraments, remains outstanding in the theology of that grace. The Redemption for Alexander was not something once accomplished, but something which through the sacramental system remains perpetuated such as to continue to flow in a very precise way into the spiritual life of each recipient of a sacrament. Though the author developed this doctrine more elaborately in dealing with the sacraments of baptism and penance, he makes sufficiently precise application of it in considering the efficacy of each of the other sacraments, such that by its means his entire theology of the sacramental system finds cohesion and unity.

2. *Second Principle: By sacramental grace we become conformed to the Suffered-Christ*

In both his *Glossa* and his *Quaestio de sacramentis in genere* Alexander develops the concept of the sacraments conforming us, or effecting in us a conformation, to the Suffered-Christ, *Christus-passus*. Since the treatment of the *Glossa* and that of the *Quaestio* show an affinity which becomes verbal at times we shall combine the consideration of their doctrine.

In man elevated to the supernatural order considered in the fullness of his career, from creation through to glory, a threefold assimilation or similarity intervenes. The first similarity man receives from nature in his creation: 'Let us make man to our image'[106] *(ad imaginem)*; the soul then, one being in three powers, the memory, the intellect, and the will, has as its exemplar the divine being one in essence and triune in persons.[107] The second similitude becomes that of grace, and this in turn becomes twofold according to the twofold grace, the *gratia virtutum*, and the grace of the sacraments, by which a similitude to God in the supernatural order and a similitude to the God-man, Christ the Mediator, become in the present order necessary to man for the accomplishment of the supernatural end with which he is endowed.[108] The similitude to God becomes attainable through habitual grace, and the accompanying theological virtues: faith, hope and charity, joining man to God one in essence and triune in persons as an end to be possessed.[109] This similitude of recreation by grace, the *imago recreationis*, becomes attributable to the operation of Uncreated Grace, the Holy Spirit.[110] The similitude to Christ wrought in us by the reception of the various sacramental graces[111] differs from the former, the *imago recreationis*, in this, that whereas the similitude to God proceeds from gratia gratum faciens with the informed virtues, and directs here below to the working of virtue, *ad opera bona*,[112] the similitude of sacramental grace proceeds from the suffered Christ and looks to the putting on of Christ through the reparation of man from the wounds of sin by sacramental redemption, or redemption proceeding from the suffered Christ through the graces of the sacraments.[113] While the grace of the virtues has its relation to merit, the grace of the sacraments has its relation to the implanting of a specific fruit of the Redemption,[114] and a specific similitude to the Redeemer.

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[106] *Gen.* 1, 26.

[107] With reference to the assimilation of the *imago naturae*, cf. *Glossa*, lib. I, dist. 2, pp. 34—35, dist. 31, p. 316, dist. 16, p. 149, and lib. III, dist. 35, p. 438.

Christ having undergone the Passion became anointed with the oil of complete grace; this oil of complete grace the author identifies as that which we might almost entitle by way of comparison with the rest of mankind — although in a univocal sense completely impossible to Christ — subjective redemption, namely the glorification of the body as well as the soul — quia stolam corporis et animae habuit (*Qu.* p. 83).[115]

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[108] *Glossa* libr. IV, dist. 6, p. 107: "Illa vero quae est gratiae, plena est in gratia sacramentali, secundum quam est assimilatio ad Verbum incarnatum, pro nobis passum. Cum enim homo habet sacramenta, tunc reformatur ad similitudinem Christi, qui venit ad redimendum hominem a iugo peccati."

[109] *Ibid.*, lib. III, dist. 35, p. 438: "Est autem tertius modus prout cognoscitur (Deus) per gratiam creatam, quae reformat imaginem in hac trinitate, fides, spes, caritas, vel quae succedit eis, et ab ista cognitione habet sapientia initium."

[110] *Glossa*, lib. IV, dist. 6, p. 108: "quoad vim operativam imprimitur gratia, quae informat potestatem ad merendum . . . operatur Pater per Spiritum Sanctum."

[111] *Quaestio de sacramentis, ed. cit.* p. 83: "homo per sacramenta reformatur ad similitudinem Christi qui venit ad redimendum hominem." Cf. *Glossa*, dist. 6, p. 107: "Cum enim homo habet sacramenta, tunc reformatur ad similitudinem Christi . . ."

[112] *Quaestio, ed. cit.* p. 82: "quaedam gratia est ad opera bona, et haec multiplicatur per virtutes, dona, et beatitudines . . . Una similitudo est ad Deum, scilicet illa similitudo quae est in virtutibus, donis et beatitudinis."

[113] *Qu., ed. cit.* p. 82, "secundum quod reparativa est laesionis factae per peccatum . . . illa, scilicet, quae est in sacramentis respicit Mediatorem."

[114] *Quaestio, ed. cit.* p. 82, "secundum quod est ad opera, vel secundum quod reparativa est laesionis perfectae per peccatum."

[115] *Glossa, loc. cit.* p. 107, "sponsus Ecclesiae resurrexit, oleo plenae gratiae delibutus . . ." and *Qu. ed. cit.* p. 83, "sponsus Ecclesiae resurrexit oleo gratiae plene delibutus."

To this exemplar of the glorified Christ it becomes the function of the variety of sacramental graces to work a conformation in us by redeeming us from the wounds of sin, such that our original destiny endowed us by the *imago recreationis* may persevere toward its accomplishment and avoid frustration. Besides the similitude then to God performed in us by habitual grace through the causality of uncreated Grace there remains to man needing a redemption now accomplished a similitude likewise to the Redeemer, *Christus-passus*, a redemption to be performed in us through the causality of that Redemption itself operating through the sacraments.[116]

In his *Quaestio de sacramentis* Alexander proceeds to determine cursorily for each sacrament that in which the similitude it works to Christ consists; here we find but a very cursory treatment somewhat repetitious of the doctrine we have already seen in the consideration of the preceding principle. In baptism not alone the guilt but all the punishment to sin becomes removed so that entrance to glory becomes uninhibited; thus by baptism we become conformed to the Suffered-Christ, *Christus-passus*, who by His Passion redeemed mankind from punishment, and acquired thereby a Resurrection to a glorified state: 'For we were buried with Him by means of baptism unto death in order, that just as Christ has arisen from the dead, through the glory of the Father, so we also may walk in the newness of life' (R*om.* 6, 4).[117] By confirmation we become armed with a *robur gratiae* to become an undeflecting soldier or combatant for the Christian faith *(certans in agone)*; the similitude is to Christ in His Passion undergoing agony at the hands of His enemies: per confirmationem ad similitudinem Christi pugnantis contra inimicos.[118] Through the grace of the Eucharist we offer ourselves to God the Father to become more deeply submerged in the Mystical Body (the res of the Eucharist for Alexander was the Mystical Body and its grace *uniri* or *magis uniri*); the conformation of the Eucharist is then to Christ in sacrifice — per eucharistiam vero ad similitudinem Christi qui est ad sacrificium.[119] The sacrament of orders empowers us to offer sacrifice, consequently it conforms us to Christ the Priest: per ordinem sacerdotii.[120] Penance in its completeness as a virtue, which involves also the reception of the sacrament obliging to temporal punishment, works toward the satisfaction of all punishment for sin; we are then conformed by penance to Christ likewise satisfying for sin, the sins of mankind: per paenitentiam conformamur Christo secundum quod est satisfaciens.[121] Matrimony in its inseparability exists a sacrament of the union of Christ and His Church; in His Passion the Church came forth from the side of Christ as His inseparable spouse; by matrimony we are then conformed to Christ in so far as He is the spouse of the Church: per matrimonium in similitudinem Christi secundum quod est sponsus Ecclesiae.[122] Extreme unction as a sacrament of the Church effects the removal of spiritual debility or infirmity, as possibility also corporeal illness, and in its full significance befigures the anointing of the body from all infirmity by the endowment of immortality; in this wise it conforms us to Christ rising gloriously in body and soul from the infirmity of the Passion: per extremam unctionem conformamur ei secundum quod resurrexit oleo plenae gratiae delibutus, quia stolam corporis et animae habuit.[123] "This similitude therefore which is through sacramental grace bears respect to Christ the Mediator" in the act of Redemption.[124]

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[116] *Qu.* p. 83, Haec ergo similitudo quae est per gratiam sacramentorum respicit Mediatorem." Cf. also p. 84, "Est ergo similitudo gratiae sacramentalis quae ad reparationem est," and *Glossa loc. cit.* p. 107, "Similitudo autem ista consistit in gratiis quae insunt virtute sacramentorum."

[117] *Qu. ed. cit.* p. 82: "In quantum homo suscipit baptismum conformatur ad similitudinem Christi passi, quia ex virtute Passionis Christi deletur originale quoad culpam suam et poenam, *Ad Rom.* 6, 4, 'Consepulti sumus' etc. . . ."

[118] Cf. *ibid.* p. 83.

[119] Cf. *ibid.*

The foregoing presentation of the conformity wrought by the single sacraments to the Redeemer must be understood with cognisance of the complete theology of the sacraments and the doctrine on redemption present to Alexander of Hales. Here he points out the merely ideal elements of the conformity. His presentation must not by any means be understood as a purely figurative-devotional consideration not solidly founded in doctrinal bases. To the contrary it presents the complete theory of subjective redemption bearing on man as a member of the Mystical Body. The endowment of the *imago recreationis* conforms to God because created grace is a similitude of the uncreated, and empowers us to merit reward through the works of the virtues; the endowment of sacramental grace proceeds from the Passion of Christ, and conforms us to the act of Redemption. Through it we become ordered toward our subjective redemption, through a healing from the wound of sin, in the status in which the salvation of man must take in the present ordering of things. Through it we become ultimately endowed for entrance to beatitude glorified in body and soul. Christ in the act of Redemption represents the exemplar of this grace in its working, just as God one in essence and triune in Persons represents the exemplar of the gratia recreationis.

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[120] *Ibid.*

[121] *Ibid.*

[122] *Ibid.*

[123] *Ibid.*

[124] "Haec ergo similitudo quae est per gratiam sacramentalem respicit Mediatorem." Cf. *Qu., ed. cit.* p. 83.

3. *Third Principle: Every sacramental grace constitutes but a partial grace in its causality*

In his *Glossa* Alexander inquires whether an adult requires the integrity of the sacraments just as he requires the integrity of the virtues. In his response he differentiates between the ultimate purpose of the sacraments in contradistinction to the ultimate purpose of the virtues. To each adult the integrity of the virtues becomes requisite in view of the *raison d'être* of the virtues themselves, the perfect meriting of eternal life; eternal life constitutes a perfection or wholeness, the perfect possession of God, and requires a corresponding wholeness in the life of virtue which serves as a means to its attainment. An incongruity would be present to a life of partial virtue acceeding to a perfection in reward, God. The sacraments, however, as such do not exist for meriting or the attainment of reward, but rather constitute an aid against the difference of sin or the defects arising from sin.[125] Their particular necessity rests then on the presence of sin or the several defects emanating from sin, *sunt ex parte*.[126] While the life of sanctifying grace shall then pass into the life of glory, or to use the terminology of the *Quaestio de imagine*, the *imago recreationis* shall become united to the *imago similitudinis*, the sacraments on the contrary shall have no reason for permanence, since being *ex parte* and directed only to the removal of sin and its defects, their complete motive of existence, they shall have no reason for permanence in a glorified state. While Alexander in the present text manifestly utilizes the background of I *Cor*. 13, 10, "For we know in part, and prophecy in part, but when that which is perfect has come, that which is imperfect will be done away with," nonetheless, it becomes apparent that he wishes to differentiate between the *gratia virtutum* and sacramental grace in so far as the former necessarily represents a perfect or integral endowment, all the virtues and gifts being concomitant with gratia gratum faciens, while the latter, sacramental graces, represent but partial graces shared from the Redemption in accordance with the special needs of subjective redemption requiring them. They are *ex parte* not only in the sense of being proper to this life only, but also in the sense that they do not involve each other, but constitute merely partial graces.

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[125] *Glossa*, dist. 23, p. 384: "Sacramenta enim data sunt in adiutorium contra differentiam peccati vel defectuum ex peccato provenientium; virtutum vero integritas ad perfectum meritum vitae aeternae, quae post meritum transeunt in praemium."

[126] *Ibid*. "nec sunt necessaria nisi ubi fuerit differentia peccati correspondens vel defectus ex peccato procedentis."

In describing the efficacy of circumcision, the sacrament of the Old Law, we have seen that it had as its effect the mutation of the eternal loss of God from original sin into a temporal loss. Alexander then enquires, why, since circumcision as a sacrament of the Old Law shared the nature of the efficacy of those of the New in this that it effected what it signified, did it not effect its complete signification, the removal of original sin in its entirety both with respect to guilt and punishment. In response Alexander affirms that the complete removal of original sin belongs only to universal grace, est effectus universalis gratiae proprie; universal grace is the grace of the Suffered-Christ, complete incorruption in the glorified state of both body and soul. This can be given through Christ alone through complete redemption. Every sacramental grace however, is given partially only with respect to causality in sharing that Redemption, omnis gratia sacramentalis est data secundum partem quoad causandum.[127] Hence, both the commutation of eternal punishment into temporal in circumcision, and the complete relaxation of all temporal punishment due to sin in baptism, the fulfillment of circumcision, each represents only partial graces, or partial sharings in the complete plenitude of the grace of Redemption, such partial sharings as sacramental graces belonging as such to the efficacy of the sacraments.

That Alexander speaking in these texts of sacramental grace as partial, *ex parte*, has in mind, or utilizes, a terminology, specifically distinguishing sacramental grace as such from gratia gratum faciens, becomes apparent from the re-appearance of this same terminology in his *ex professo* discussion of gratia gratum faciens in Book III of the *Glossa*. Here we find the following texts:

> Utrum habens unum, habeat omnia dona. Dona enim sunt ex gratia gratum faciente, *quae non est secundum partem.* Sed quoniam ex illa gratia

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[127] *Glossa*, dist. 1, p. 38: "Respondemus: circumcisio secunda, ab omni corruptione, est effectus universalis gratiae proprie. Universalis enim circumcisio universali gratiae competit. Sed omnis gratia sacramentalis est data secundum partem quoad causandum; unde, re adveniente, omne sacramentum evacuabitur in circumcisione ultima. Et propter hoc neque ex virtute circumcisionis neque ex virtute baptismi convenit universalem incorruptionem dari. Sed circumcisio ab originali peccato est quidem effectus gratiae particularis, quem ex virtute sacramenti convenit effici. Soli autem Christo convenit qui habet plenitudinem gratiarum, universalem incorruptionem dare."

sunt virtutes, ideo habita una virtute, habentur omnes; ergo, habito uno dono, habentur omnia . . .

Dicendum quod qui habet unum habitu, habet omnes (omnia?); sed non necesse est quod qui habet unum secundum actum, quod habeat omnes secundum actum.[128] III *Glossa,* d. 35, p. 438—39.

Cum autem virtutis intensio sit ex intensione gratiae, et illa intensa, facit omnes intendi virtutes, quoniam *ipsa non secundum partem est* . . .
Ibid. d. 36, p. 450—1.

Thus gratia gratum faciens constitutes an integral endowment associating with it all the virtues and all the gifts;[129] it cannot be a partial grace, *non est secundum partem.* Or, according to Codex L, the connection of the virtues resides in grace, such that they are all endowed in the giving of gratia gratum faciens; so too are the gifts connected in their complete endowment in gratia gratum faciens, and this since gratia gratum faciens cannot be infused partially. A concomitant intensification of the virtues likewise flows from gratia gratum faciens for the same reason that an intensification of grace cannot be without its concomitant intensification of the virtues; it cannot be divided or partial, *ipsa non secundum partem est.* In the Fourth Book of the *Glossa,* where Alexander explicitly deals with sacramental grace, he identifies this grace as being *ex parte,* or particular, omnis gratia sacramentalis est data secundum partem quoad causandum; he wishes therefore by this terminology to indicate a characteristic of sacramental grace by which it differs from gratia gratum faciens.

The doctrine of Alexander's *Quaestio de sacramentis* re-affirms and agrees with that of the *Glossa.* The Eucharist contains the plenitude of grace, Christ-suffered; this does not however obviate the necessity of the other sacraments, since the effect of the Eucharist is not toward the bestowal of this plenitude of grace, resident in the Redeemer, toward the distribution of which as special effects other sacraments exist.[130]

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[128] Cf. Codex L, *Glossa* lib. III, dist. 35, p. 441 ed. cit.: "Item, quaeritur utrum unum donum possit haberi sine altero. Et videtur quod non: dona sunt a gratia gratum faciente; ergo, sicut virtutes connexae sunt propter gratiam, quae non infundit se secundum partem, sed secundum se totam, ita et dona . . ."

[129] Cf. *Glossa,* lib. III, dist. 39, p. 516, "Dicendum quod licet virtutes sese concomitentur . . ." and *ibid.* dist. 36, p. 451, "adveniente una gratia in anima, advenient virtutes in omnibus potentiis animae." Cf. also dist. 36, p. 445.

[130] *Quaestio de sacramentis, ed. cit.* p. 76: "In sacramento altaris est totus Christus, in quo est plenitudo gratiae, sed vero quoad effectum plenitudinis gratiae non est ibi, quia effectus plenitudinis gratiae non sequitur ad hoc unum; unde alia sacramenta sunt necessaria ad efficiendum effectus speciales gratiae . . ."

In another text we have already seen Alexander distinguishes three types of grace, universal and particular, gratia gratis data, and gratia gratum faciens. Universal grace flows from the Suffered-Christ[131] and constitutes the virtue of all the sacraments — this is the *plenitudo gratiae* spoken of in the preceding paragraph. From this universal grace flows the grace of the sacraments as particular graces directed against one or the other wound of sin.[132] The same terminology appears in another text we have likewise seen, where the author speaks of the blood of Christ as the total virtue behind all the sacraments, a virtue shared in each as a particular grace.[133]

In a final text, the author distinguishes two types of grace, present to the ordinary accomplishment of our complete justification, grace namely either according as it works toward reparation, or grace according as it works toward the acquirement of merit.[134] That grace which exists for the acquirement of merit has its infusion *tota simul*. If the working of any one virtue, the author states, merits the attainment of total beatitude, this has as its reason the total presence or perfection of gratia gratum faciens with all the virtues joined in that virtue, otherwise the perfection of glory would not be due the work as a reward.[135] The sacraments, on the other hand, because their grace is not directed to meriting, but toward the repairment of man, confer singly or severally their respective graces. Wherefore the grace of the sacraments may not be aligned to the variety of the virtues according to a division popular with some authors of the time, since this would posit the connection of the several sacramental graces by concomitance.[136]

When Alexander therefore both in his *Glossa* and in this *Quaestio* repeatedly asserts the particularity of sacramental grace in contrast to the *gratia virtutum*, it becomes evident that this contrast represents a distinction for him between these graces as such: the one is particular, the other integral. The consistency again with which Alexander applies the terminology '*ex parte*' to sacramental grace, and '*secundum totam*' or '*non secundum partem*' to gratia gratum faciens gives the strong impression that this represents a terminology for the distinction of these graces present to his milieu. In making it his own, or in utilizing it, Alexander manifests the distinction of function inherent to these two graces: gratia gratum faciens with all the virtues at least *in habitu* represents the perfection of means requisite to the attainment of the perfection of reward; sacramental grace determined in its effect by the specific wound of sin to be healed becomes in each case only a particular grace terminated in its effect in the state of a voyager.

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[131] *Ibid.*, p. 94, "Universalis autem est Christi passi a qua virtutem sumunt sacramenta, et particularis descendit ab hac . . ."

[132] *Ibid.* "et haec particularis est vel contra hanc laesionem vel contra illam."

[133] *Ibid.* "in singulis sacramentis est particularis gratia, sed in sanguine Christi est tota virtus . . ."

[134] *Ibid.* "gratia dupliciter dicitur: vel secundum quod est ad reparandum, vel secundum quod est ad merendum . . ." p. 93.

[135] *Ibid.* "gratia quae est ad merendum datur tota simul, . . . non datur gratia nisi secundum totam in qualibet virtute, quia opus cuiuslibet virtutis meritorium est vitae aeternae secundum totum."

[136] *Ibid.* p. 94: "Unde non secundum hoc (videlicet numerum septiformis gratiae Spiritus Sancti, vel septem virtutum vel beatitudinum) sunt septem sacramenta, nec etiam aptantur virtutes sacramentis."

4. *Fourth Principle: Sacramental grace as such is not toward merit*

In the preceding principle we have already seen the utilization of the present one. We may state before considering it, that our interest here consists only in identifying a principle of sacramental grace in the author specifically in so far as this grace is sacramental; it is not asserted that the sacraments for the author do not confer habitual grace or its augment[137] — this he himself asserts as we shall see later. Nonetheless, although the different sacraments do confer habitual grace, in the theology of the author sacramental grace as such, or the grace of the sacraments as specifically sacramental, exists not as a means toward the accomplishment of merit, but toward the extension of the Redemption to the removal of the wounds or impediments of sin. The acquirement of merit remains the function of the *gratia virtutum*. Though this principle presumes what has been said in Books II and III of the *Glossa*, it obtains adequate expression throughout the IV Book.

If it be asserted, for example, in line with the customary repertory of objections present to the literature of the time, that since a good life exists the sign and cause of salvation, it may therefore by styled a sacrament,[138] Alexander answers by distinguishing between a meritorious cause and a material cause. While a good life exists the meritorious cause of salvation, and eternal life its reward, a sacrament exists only after the manner of a material cause, a medicinal vessel, containing grace as a medicine. Although the sacrament exists as the means of grace, and gratia gratum faciens, grace as acquired through the sacrament has as its end a medicinal or healing purpose, and not as such an end toward merit. Likewise, in a text we have considered just previously when discussing the former principle,[139] Alexander discusses the necessity of the integrity of the sacraments to the Christian life. This necessity he rejects, since the sacraments exist only for the removal of the difference of sin or its defects, which constitutes their necessity, while the grace of the virtues on the contrary because it exists the means to meriting becomes requisite in its integrity. The sacraments remove the impediments to good, or the impediments to merit itself.[140]

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[137] Cf. *infra*.

[138] *Glossa*, dist. 1, p. 13: "Bona enim vita est causa meritoria salutis, sive causa in subiecto disponens, secundum aliam Facultatem, et est salus praemium. Sacramenta autem non sunt causa meritoria, sed tantum est per gratiam meritum; sed sunt causa materialis in qua, ut vasa medicinalia, gratia ut medicina."

This same concept dividing the notion of merit from sacramental grace appears in the *Glossa* when the author discusses the cases of those having baptism or penance *in voto* but deprived *in extremis* of their actual reception.[141] Of two equal in charity having the *votum* baptismi, one receives the sacrament, and obtains from its actual reception the complete remission of all temporal punishment, while the other deprived of it obtains from the *votum* the removal of the carentia temporalis visionis Dei, he must undergo satisfaction in purgatory for the temporal punishment of actual sin. Comparing these two from the point of view of merit Alexander asserts their identical equality: Concedendum est autem quod tantum meretur unus quantum alius;[142] the removal of the temporary punishment due to actual sin has its causality not in the act of receiving the sacrament but in the sacrament itself, or the sacrament received, and this as proceeding from the virtue of the Passion as deleting all punishment in this sacrament. The sacrament received does not bear causality toward merit, but toward sharing the merit of Christ. Alexander here divorces himself from the question of the augment of gratia gratum faciens to be derived from the sacrament, and the corresponding augment of reward.

A similar case presents itself from the point of view of the actual reception of the sacrament of penance.[143] Of two equally justified in contrition, one *in extremis* becomes deprived of the actual reception of the sacrament. As in the preceding instance, here likewise the author asserts the equality of these two from the point of view of merit, irrespective of the reception of the sacrament. But, since the sacrament of the Church has as its sacramental grace the alleviation of the purgatorial punishment, from this point of view of the duration of punishment they differ. As very apparent in this instance, the sacramental grace of penance bears no relation as such to merit.

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[139] Cf. *Glossa*, dist. 22, p. 384; cf. *supra* n. 125 and 126.

[140] *Glossa*, dist. 1, p. 10, "Sunt enim contra peccata et contra impedimenta peccati."

[141] Cf. *Glossa*, dist. 4, p. 84—85.

[142] Cf. *ibid.*

[143] *Glossa* IV, dist. 17, pp. 299—300.

The *Quaestio de sacramentis* throughout several texts we have previously discussed corroborates and elucidates the preceding conclusions. Here the author distinguishes between grace in so far as it finds treatment in the II or III Book of Lombard or the IVth. In Books II and III of the *Sentences* grace as the *gratia virtutum* finds its treatment, a grace which exists for the performance of good works and becomes multiplied in the virtues, the gifts, and the beatitudes.[144] This grace would have existed and attained its function outside the event of the Fall of man.[145] Such grace requisite to man's elevation to the supernatural order in any dispensation as the means of merit and reward, the author entitles *gratia ad opera.* In contradistinction to this *gratia ad opera* there exists in virtue of the Fall of man and the accomplished Redemption another series of graces, those of the sacraments; the function of these does not consist with the performance of works of merit, this function appertaining and continuing to reside with the *gratia ad opera,* but in the removal of sin and its *impedimenta.* The *gratia ad opera,* gratia gratum faciens, exists the means of merit, *gratia sacramentalis* the means of healing.[146]

Alexander finds another opportunity to distinguish these graces from the same point of view when in response to an objection he rejects unguents, incense and thyme — used in the ceremonial of the Old Law — as ingredients competent to the constitution of the matter of the sacraments of the New Law, since these three elements, he states, represent not those things pertaining to healing or repairing, but rather that which pertains to the working of virtue.[147] The matter of the sacraments must bear relation, not to the *gratia virtutum,* the grace for meriting, but to a *gratia ad reparandum,* a grace of healing: the accomplishment of merit pertains to the virtues, the reparation of man to the grace of the sacraments.

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[144] *Quaestio de sacramentis in genere, ed. cit.* p. 82: "Secundum unum respectum agitur de gratia in II Sent. et III, secundum alium respectum in IV, scilicet in quantum est reparativa laesionis factae per peccatum."

[145] *Ibid.* ". . . si homo non esset lapsus per peccatum adhuc esset gratia in virtutibus, et donis, sed gratia in sacramentis non."

[146] *Ibid.* p. 82: "Similitudo ergo potest esse per gratiam vel secundum quod est ad opera, vel secundum quod reparativa est laesionis perfectae per peccatum."

[147] *Quaestio, ed. cit.* p. 91: "Ad hoc quod obicitur de unguento, thure et thymiamate, respondeo, quod sacramenta sunt ad reparandum laesionem; praedicta vero tria significant quae necessaria sunt non ad reparandum, sed ad operandum. Significant enim ea quae pertinent ad actus virtutum."

Finally, in a text we have likewise already discussed, the author outrightly distinguishes grace *vel secundum quod est ad reparandum, vel secundum quod est ad merendum,* grace toward repairing and grace toward meriting.[148] The grace for meriting finds its possession in its entirely simultaneously, such that its endowment confers likewise all the virtues for the perfect meriting of eternal life;[149] the *gratia ad reparandum,* sacramental grace, on the contrary, finds its communication separately from the separate sacraments, or part by part, according as it finds its necessity toward the conferral of one or the other particular effect.[150]

In both his *Glossa* and his *Quaestio* Alexander therefore manifests himself as very conscious of the distinction of grace as a means toward merit from grace as sacramental. It may be said that this concept dominates his entire sacramental literature. He develops his tract on baptism very consciously in the light of the effect of that sacrament toward the removal of the barrier to beatitude; the tract on penance reserved for the sacrament of penance as a sacrament of the Church, the amelioration of the purgatorial punishment due to sin; the effects of the other sacraments reveal themselves as the removal of one or the other consequent of sin, original or actual, inhibitive of the ideal ordering of man to glory. These effects represent the sharing of the merit of Christ's Passion; the work of personal merit, on our part, on the other hand, belongs to the exercise of the *gratia virtutum,* endowing man with the simultaneous concatenation of all the virtues and gifts.

5. *Fifth Principle: The special effect of sacramental grace ensues only from the actual reception of the sacrament*

The present principle appears from the consideration of the different cases which arise with reference to the reception of the sacraments *in voto,* instances we have already considered from another point of view.

The effect of the baptism of desire present to contrition restricts itself to the removal of actual sin, and concomitantly that of original sin, since these remissions are inseparable. Because, however, the pain or punishment present merely to contrition cannot be accounted adequate to defray the temporal punishment due to actual sin, a purgatorial punishment remains to be defrayed.[151] Different, however, from the baptism of desire through penance, the baptism of blood, or martyrdom, deletes not only actual and original sin, but also the entire debt of punishment due to actual sin, or all purgatorial punishment. From the point of view of effect, then, the baptism of water possesses the same efficacy as the baptism of blood: all temporary and satisfactory punishment becomes deleted. But, unlike the case of baptism of water, where the Passion of Christ operating through the sacrament remits *ex opere operato* all punishment,[152] the baptism of martyrdom remits this only in virtue of the personal punishment of the recipient. Thus does it belong to the sacrament actually received to confer a grace of remission of punishment not possible to its mere *votum* as in the baptism of penance or contrition, or possible only to personal punishment as in the baptism of blood.

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[148] Cf. *ed.* p. 93.

[149] *Ibid.* p. 93: ". . . gratia quae est ad merendum datur tota simul . . . Ex parte meriti non est sic, quia non datur gratia nisi secundum totam in qualibet virtute, quia opus cuiuslibet virtutis meritorium est vitae aeternae secundum totam . . . Cum ergo beatitudo remuneretur omnes virtutes, et digne datur parvulo, non possit hoc esse nisi in eo esset virtutes connexae per caritatem."

[150] "Si tota gratia reparandi daretur in baptismo, tunc non ostenderetur quod alia sacramenta essent ad alios spirituales effectus." *Loc. cit.* p. 93.

A similar conclusion appears with reference to the sacrament of penance. Here the justifying element resides in contrition, which removes the actual guilt of sin. But, one not deprived of the actual reception of penance as a sacramentum-Ecclesiae through the power of the keys, having virtue from the Passion of Christ, acquires a proportionate remission of the purgatorial punishment due to actual sin already remitted; one contrite with the *voluntas confitendi* but deprived of the sacramentum-Ecclesiae, must defray the purgatorial punishment personally. The special effect which the sacrament produces, or of which its non-reception deprives one, remains something not due to any personal dispositions, — though these be necessary — on the part of the recipient, or would-be recipient, but flows only and precisely from the Passion of Christ through the sacrament actually received.[153] In this connection the objection found in the *Quaestio de poenitentia* of the author, and repeated in *Vat. lat.* 782, finds its import, viz, *gratia sacramentalis datur ministerio Ecclesiae*, sacramental grace comes through the ministry of the Church.[154] Also in penance, where the removal of guilt derives from contrition, and not from the sacrament of the Church as such, there remains a special effect of that sacrament from the Passion of Christ not as such otherwise obtainable except through the reception of the actual sacrament. The case of marriage in the present connection presents no difficulty since the recipients in this sacrament act as the ministers of the Church.

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[151] Cf. *Glossa*, dist. 4, p. 83.

[152] *Ibid.* d. 4, p. 85: "Deletio autem poenae satisfactoriae debetur sacramento suscepto . . . quod sacramentum ex virtute Passionis Christi delet omnem poenam satisfactoriam."

[153] Cf. *Glossa*, dist. 17, pp. 299—300.

[154] Cf. *supra.*

The theology of the same sacrament of matrimony offers an illustration likewise of this principle. Here the sacrament resides in inseparability, a property present to the contract, as the author states from the Passion of Christ in the founding of the Church: dat (Passio) in matrimonio effectum unionis ampliorem sponsi ad sponsam in iis qui digne sunt iuncti matrimonio.[155] The marriage of infidels does not enjoy this property of inseparability present only to the sacrament itself received; such infidel marriage, contracted outside the Mystical Body, remains deprived of a relation of signification to the inseparable union of the Head to that body, a relation found only in the sacramentum-Ecclesiae. Hence, one party being converted such a marriage becomes dissoluble.[156] The special grace of inseparability proceeds from the sacrament actually received, the lack of baptism preventing the contract in infidels from attaining unto the *bonum sacramenti.*

Here we need not pursue further the application of this principle. As we have seen according to the mind of Alexander, it does not involve the impossibility of obtaining the equivalent of sacramental grace by means other than the reception of the sacrament, as for example through martyrdom with respect to the grace of baptism. It does, however, posit in the economy of the Mystical Body the distribution of special graces, sacramental graces, with the actual reception of the sacraments and the non-obtention of these graces as such by the *votum sacramenti*, or ordinarily by means which are not sacramental.

Ultimate resolution of the nature of sacramental grace

In treating the principles governing sacramental grace in our author we have concentrated on the nature of that grace as such, namely as viewed in its effect in the recipient of a sacrament. The source of this effect we have seen to reside in the Passion of Christ deriving to us through the instrumentality of the sacraments. It now remains for us to present by way of conclusion a consideration of the proximate efficacious cause of sacramental grace, the aspect of sacramental grace more discussed in presentday literature. Does the effect which the author recognises as sacramental grace flow in some collateral manner with gratia gratum faciens from the sacrament, or in virtue of the merits of the Passion of Christ does gratia gratum faciens itself received by redeemed man through the instrumentality of the sacraments achieve this effect.

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[155] IV *Glossa,* dist. 8, p. 137.

[156] IV *Glossa,* dist. 26, p. 460: "Coniugium autem infidelium non est perfectum coniugium. Quod patet: si enim unus convertatur ad fidem, reliquo manente in infidelitate, separabile est coniugium, propter fornicationem spiritualem; et ita non omnia bona matrimonii concurrunt."

Quite apparently one cannot expect from Alexander of Hales any theory of sacramental grace involving any intrinsic connection of the sacrament or the habitual grace it confers with transitory actual graces subsequently to be given as the need for attaining the end of the sacrament arises. For him all such transitory aids in the realm of grace subsequent to justification must proceed the grace of the virtues and the gifts; actual grace in its present connotation did not find place in his theology. The connection then of sacramental grace for the accomplishment of its effects — if such a connection exist in our author — must exist with gratia gratum faciens.[156a]

In the discussion of the concept of sacramental grace in Alexander, we have seen him assign characteristics to it which do not belong to gratia gratum faciens as such, as for example, all sacramental grace is a partial grace, through sacramental grace we are conformed to the Suffered-Christ, through sacramental grace we do not merit, etc. Throughout the discussions of his *Glossa*, however, we find him attribute these same effects in the proximate causality which accounts for their existence to the operation of gratia gratum faciens. A clear assertion of this kind appears in his *Glossa* when he ascribes to habitual grace the commutation of the purgatorial punishment affected in virtue of the power of the keys:

> Si vero quaeratur adhuc utrum immediate fit ex vi clavium commutatio purgatoriae, aut per gratiam mediante vi, dicendum quod secundum ultimum modum. Non est enim ibi opus tantum in potestate hominis, sed etiam Dei.
> IV *Glossa*, d. 18, p. 325.

The specific *gratia sacramentalis* of penance as a sacrament of the Church owes its existence from the point of view of causality, the author points out, to gratia gratum faciens working through the sacrament of the Church, *per gratiam mediante vi*. The same doctrine appears in his *Quaestio de confessione:*

> Confessio . . . ex virtute clavium per gratiam mutat poenam aeternam in temporalem. *Assisi Bibl. Com.* 138, f. 129d.

[156a] With reference to the current theories on sacramental grace cf. C. B. Crowley, O. P.., *A Defense of the Common Teaching on Sacramental Grace*, Pontifical Institute Angelicum, (Rome, 1947), and the work the author undertakes to refute, viz., B. Brazzarola, *La natura della grazia sacramentale nella dottrina di S. Tommaso*, (Grottaferrata, 1941), as also A. Michel, art. Sacrements, in the *Dict. de Théol. Cath.* vol. 14 (1939), 627 ff.

To reconcile this seeming antinomy we must first consider the efficacy of the sacraments with respect to gratia gratum faciens. Such an efficacy Alexander outrightly posits for the first six sacraments:

> . . . alia sacramenta *(other than matrimony)* quantum est de se conferunt gratiam spiritualem, vel augmentum gratiae, dico autem gratiae gratum facientis, si digne suscipiantur.
>
> IV *Glossa*, d. 26, p. 445.

Each of the first six sacraments confer gratia gratum faciens or its augment; matrimony, however, likewise as we have seen, exists, the author ultimately concedes, also as a means of the augment of habitual grace. When the author discusses the individual sacraments the same efficacy becomes asserted, and here specifically toward the accomplishment of the end of the sacramental grace of the particular sacrament. In baptism, for example, the anointing of the breast and between the shoulders with holy oil, prior to the actual conferring of the sacrament, itself constitutes an habilitation to the subsequent infusion of gratia gratum faciens remitting, he states, both punishment and guilt;[157] again, he states, the *significatum et non manens necessario* of the sacrament, by which both punishment anf guilt becomes deleted, consists in gratia gratum faciens.[158] This grace of baptism Alexander styles *gratia prima*, that of confirmation *gratia secunda*;[159] this latter consists in an augment of baptismal grace, since the mere impression of a character, which he styles here a *gratia gratis data*, would not suffice for attaining the end of the sacrament, victory in severe conflict for the faith.[160] The sacrament of the Eucharist likewise confers an augment of grace toward greater union in the Mystical Body.[161]

The recipient of the sacrament of orders requires the grace of spiritual power with respect to others, and 'sanctifying grace' — *gratia sanctifi-*

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[157] Dist. 6, p. 122: "Post habilitationem gratiae gratis datae ad effectum, sequitur infusio gratiae gratum facientis, remittendis culpam et poenam, quod significatur in baptismo."

[158] Dist. 3, p. 51: ". . . tertium significatum et non manens necessario, scilicet gratia per quam deletur culpa et poena."

[159] Dist. 23, p. 395: "Si ergo primae gratiae et secundae respondet character, multo fortius gratiae consummatae. Sed prima in baptismo, roborata in confirmatione, consummata in eucharistia; sed character concomitatur gratiam in baptismo et confirmatione; ergo in eucharistia fortius."

[160] *Ibid.*, dist. 23, p. 389: "Confirmatio vero, quia est sicut characteris baptismalis corroboratio, confertur in ea gratia gratum faciens, vel gratia baptismalis augetur sive corroboratur. Non enim sufficit certanti in agone gratia gratis data."

[161] *Ibid.*, dist. 2, p. 41, "augetur gratia."

cans — with respect to himself for the proper utilization of this power;[162] furthermore, since those in orders touch the Body and Blood of Christ and exist the mediators of grace in others, they require the possession, not merely of some grace inferior to gratia gratum faciens such as the character and spiritual power, but gratia gratum faciens in its augment.[163] Likewise, as we have seen from the general principle already posited with respect to the first six sacraments, extreme unction must confer some use of gratia gratum faciens. Marriage, finally, in the New Law disposes to a spiritual union of charity corresponding to the inseparability of the sacrament. We have already seen that the removal of punishment, *poena*, in penance constituting the sacramental grace as such specifically in this instance, becomes here likewise as in baptism attributable to gratia gratum faciens.

The specific effect, then, which derives to each sacrament from the Passion of Christ, and which in the theology of the author constitutes its gratia sacramentalis, Alexander throughout the preceding instances places, from the point of view of the causality immediately response for its existence, with gratia gratum faciens. How these two graces are linked the author reveals more lucidly when he speaks of baptism and penance.

In the discussion of both these sacraments throughout this article it became repeatedly apparent that the remission of guilt, since this involves the infusion of gratia gratum faciens, belongs only to God, whether this removal be considered as wrought through the instrumentality of a sacrament as in the case of baptism, or attained without a sacrament as in the case of penance. Consequently, that the sacrament may remove guilt by the infusion of gratia gratum faciens posits its institution as an instrument with God alone; the same divine institution becomes implied in the instrumentality of a sacrament as the means of the augment of grace. Hence Alexander posits the institution of all the sacraments with Christ as God, a Domino: *omnia enim sacramenta ab eo sunt.*[164] This is so since the elevation of man to the supernatural order, with the consequent remission of guilt in fallen man, involves creation, the creation of gratia gratum faciens, with the infusion of the concomitant theological virtues, a creation which Alexander styles the *imago recreationis*. The *imago recreationis* in its identity whether considered antecedently or subsequently to the Fall remains the same. In the New Dispensation, however, gratia gratum faciens as the *gratia prima*, as also in its augment, by divine institution proceeds from God through the sacraments acting as a *causa adaptans* and *ex opere operato*.[165] It may of course also be received through contrition and augmented otherwise than sacramentally.

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[163] *Ibid.*, dist. 24, p. 424: "Oportet enim hos abundantiorem gratiam habere, ut non tantum sit in eis gratia gratis data, vel gratis superaddita, sed gratum faciens, eo quod ipsi immediate tractant dominicum sacramentum et quia debent esse mediatores gratiae in alios transfundendae."

[162] *Ibid.*, dist. 26, p. 453: "Similiter in sacramento ordinis exigitur gratia potestatis spiritualis, et hoc respectu alterius; et gratia sanctificans ut digne exsequatur opus illius potestatis spiritualis."

[164] *Ibid.*, dist. 1, p. 12.

In virtue of the accomplished Redemption, and in virtue of the signification of the sacraments divinely instituted, which belong to this Dispensation, gratia gratum faciens linked to its conferral sacramentally, because the sacraments effect what they signify, operates the specific sacramental effects which constitute the several sacramental graces. That this constitutes the theory of Alexander to account for the immediate causality behind sacramental grace, we have already seen previously in the texts pertaining to baptism. Gratia gratum faciens does not of itself delete punishment residual from the deletion of guilt; this became apparent in circumcision where the temporalis carentia visionis Dei remained together with the possession of the *imago recreationis* secured through the efficacy of this rite. It belonged only to grace in baptism instituted subsequent to the Passion to delete all temporal punishment due either to original or actual sin. Wherefore, although the remission of guilt and temporal punishment have no intimate connection, Alexander oftentimes speaks of habitual grace in baptism removing both the guilt itself and the punishment, and carefully attributes such complete remission to a special efficacy of gratia gratum faciens in this sacrament: sequitur infusio gratiae gratum facientis remittentis culpam et poenam.[166]

This theory placing the appearance of the effect which is sacramental grace with gratia gratum faciens as an immediate cause becomes again apparent when the author, as we have seen, attributes the commutation of the purgatorial punishment residual from actual sin to grace as effecting this through the power of the keys. In the text already quoted he enquires explicitly whether this commutation belongs to the keys, or to the working of grace through the keys, and responds that this belongs to grace operating through the keys, *per gratiam mediante vi (clavium)*.[167]

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[165] *Ibid.*, dist. 3, p. 53: "Eo enim quod fit baptismus in fide Ecclesiae, eo abluit cor, sicut dispositio adaptans, non sicut efficiens; solus enim Deus per gratiam hoc efficit."

[166] Cf. *supra* n. 157.

[167] *Glossa*, dist. 18, p. 325; cf. *supra*.

The same outlook becomes further apparent when he, in his treatment of penance in the *Glossa*, discusses the effect of grace in itself, and its effect as united to the completeness of penance:

> Habet enim gratia per se quemdam effectum; alium secundum quod coniungitur cum dolore spirituali sive voluntate detestandi peccatum; tertium secundum quod coniungitur cum dolore sensibili; quartum secundum quod coniungitur cum opere compassionis sive misericordiae quod dicitur eleemosyna, adiuncto ieiunio et oratione.
>
> IV *Glossa*, d. 18, p. 310.

Grace essentially remits guilt or restores the *imago recreationis* to the soul; in virtue of the detestation of sin present to contrition in which grace is infused, the same grace deletes eternal punishment; in virtue of the sensible sorrow present to confession in the sacramentum-Ecclesiae the purgatorial punishment residual after the removal of guilt becomes deleted in the sense of being commuted; finally the works of mercy and satisfaction through the presence of grace delete all temporal punishment:

> Effectus autem gratiae secundum se est delere culpam. Secundum quod adiungitur (ei voluntas) habitualis vel actualis detestandi peccatum, delet reatum poenae aeterna. Secundum quod adiungitur ei dolor sensibilis delet poenam purgatoriam sub conditione. Secundum quod coniungitur operibus misericordiae et satisfactionis, quae in tribus praedictis consistit, delet poenam temporalem. *Ibid.*

To gratia gratum faciens, then, linked to sensible sorrow in confession, through the power of the keys, belongs the effect proper to this sacrament, its sacramental grace.

From the preceding discussion, there remains no doubt but that gratia gratum faciens receives from its connection with the several sacraments an efficacy to produce the sacramental grace itself of the sacrament indicated in its signification. As to how gratia gratum faciens may have these different causalities by which it extends itself to the accomplishment of effects other than those proper to it, or essentially belonging to it, Alexander does not anywhere state. In some instances these effects represent entities more pertaining to the intentional order, as for example the commutation of the purgatorial punishment, or the demission of the temporary loss of the vision of God accomplished through baptism. In other instances they represent entities more belonging to the physical order, as the removal of the weakness of the irascible power with respect to confirmation, or the removal of the spiritual torpor or infirmity with reference to extreme unction. It is true that discussing the grace of marriage, he speaks of grace being determined to something specific by the different sacraments, 'secundum quod gratia ad aliquid determinatur' — 'secundum quod contrahitur.'[168] However, this does not answer the question at hand since the effects in question in no wise belong to the ordinary use of habitual grace, such as the removal of purgatorial punishment. Alexander does not offer any solution from this aspect of things.

Whatever be the case with reference to this latter item, it remains that Alexander presents an integrated and adequate explanation, from the point of view of history, of the entire question of the causality responsible for sacramental grace. The proximate cause of this grace as an effect is gratia gratum faciens; its source as the several effects which constitute the several sacramental graces, the Passion of Christ. This same theory, enucleated from the writings of Alexander, was later to find the patronage of St. Bonaventure in his *Commentary on the Sentences*, where it finds concise expression, if not also the patronage of St. Thomas Aquinas likewise in his *Scriptum*. Alexander, who in scattered texts dwells more on the nature of sacramental grace from the point of view of effect, as we have seen when discussing the principles governing that grace, gives the present aspect from the point of view of immediate efficient cause but incidental mention.

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[168] *Ibid.*, dist. 26, p. 462: "Praeterea, cum matrimonium sit signum gratiae, aut communiter aut secundum quod gratia ad aliquid determinatur. Sed non communiter tantum, quia in hoc non distingueretur ab alio sacramento. Si vero secundum quod contrahitur, non videtur nisi ad usum caritatis . . ."

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